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Abstract 
In November 2012, voters across England and Wales went to the polls for the first time to 
elect Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs), individual political office holders 
responsible for the governance of policing in local police forces. The PCCs replaced 
seventeen member Police Authorities that had been in place since 1964. The 
Conservative party had made the concept a key policy in its manifesto for the 2010 
general election and the ensuing coalition government rapidly implemented it.  The 
governance problem to which PCCs were seen as the answer was a perceived lack of 
police accountability and a democratic deficit in public participation in police governance. 
This thesis undertakes a review of organisational governance literature, particularly with 
regards to the public sector and the police service, before moving on to discussing the 
political journey to the PCC model of policing governance. The literature and a pilot study 
indicated that the interpersonal relationship between the Chief Constable and the PCC 
was crucial in terms of understanding the governance dynamic. The research therefore 
focussed upon qualitative accounts of sixteen serving Chief Constables and fifteen Police 
and Crime Commissioners, semi-structured interviews were undertaken and subjected to 
content analysis. The findings indicated that there have been benefits as a result of the 
introduction of PCCs, in terms of a greater speed and efficiency in decision making, 
reduced bureaucracy, more effective partnership working and a more focussed approach 
that comes with a full time role. There were, however significant issues disclosed 
regarding the PCC governance model; a lack of accountability, issues of personal 
resilience and the risks of the interpersonal relationship between PCCs and the Chief 
Constable and its impact upon operational delivery. These issues need to be addressed 
if the project driven by the Conservative Party of the early 2000’s is to become an 
effective governance structure that both enables the police to serve and protect 
communities, while also being effectively held to account. 
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Chapter One 
Background and Purpose 
Introduction 
The 1950s saw a number of scandals involving English police forces.  At that time local 
‘watch committees’ responsible for police governance had been set up in municipal areas 
by the Municipal Corporations Act 1835 (Home Office, 1835) and in rural areas by the 
County and Rural Constabulary Act 1839 (Home Office, 1839). The committees were 
ostensibly responsible for holding local police forces to account.  Some committees were 
alleged to be failing to control deviant police behaviour and to be exerting an 
inappropriate and corrupt influence on local policing, (Marshall, 1965 p.12). These cases 
prompted in 1962, the formation of a Royal Commission with a remit to review the 
constitutional position of the police (Home Office, 1962). The findings led to the Police 
Act 1964 that introduced ‘police authorities’, governance bodies comprising local 
councillors, magistrates and later in 1994 independent members (Police and Magistrates 
Courts Act, 1994). The police authority was responsible for scrutinising and holding 
police forces to account (Home Office, 1964). Police authorities formed part of a ‘tripartite 
system’ of police governance (Lustgarten, 1986 p.113, Mawby & Wright, 2003, pp.169-
195) in which responsibility was shared between police authorities, the Home Secretary, 
and chief police officers.  
 
This system of police governance remained in place for the next 48 years until the arrival 
of the Police and Social Responsibility Act 2011 (Home Office 2011). This established in 
November 2012 Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs). Who were to be directly 
elected individuals responsible for police governance. PCCs, as will be discussed in 
detail later in this thesis were given significantly wider powers and responsibilities 
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including the setting of the policing strategy for their area (Home Office 2011, Home 
Office 2011a).   
 
The journey that led to the change in police governance was driven by increasing 
concerns regarding the accountability of chief constables and a perceived democratic 
deficit in the way that policing was governed (Reiner 1991, Reiner 2013, Lister and Rowe 
2015, Millen and Stephens 2011, Loveday and Reid 2003 and Muir and Lodge 2008). 
The Conservative party in opposition identified the issue of police governance, which was 
fuelled by the notion of a democratic deficit in the early 2000s (Caless and Owens 2016).  
 
In its manifesto for the 2010 UK elections, the Conservative Party made a commitment to 
introduce across England and Wales; 
  ‘...a directly elected individual who will set policing priorities for local 
 communities’ (Conservative Party, 2010 p.57). 
This model of police accountability appears to have had its origin in the experience of 
Prime Minister Cameron’s exposure to policing models in the United States of America 
(Cameron, 2005).   Cameron was further influenced by the recommendations of the 
Policy Exchange report; ‘Going Local: Who should run Britain’s Police?’  (Loveday and 
Reid, 2003), it reported that there was a growing perception that police forces were 
withdrawing from communities as part of a growing centralist governance agenda. The 
report recommended that police forces should be more accountable to directly elected 
local council leaders or mayors.  The subsequent coalition government consultation 
document (Home Office, 2010) asserted that local people had become disempowered 
regarding policing with increased influence from central government and largely 
ineffective and invisible police authorities.   
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Despite Cameron’s positive view of the US policing governance landscape, Mawby & 
Smith (2013), were to find no evidence of a consistent US policing governance model, or 
that those governance structures in place across the USA were particularly effective in 
delivering local police accountability. They noted that some commentators suggested that 
the structure of police authorities in England & Wales would be a more appropriate model 
for US policing governance (ibid p.148). 
 
Police authorities were dissolved, in their place locally elected PCCs were established by 
the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 (Home Office 2011) across 41 
Police Forces in England and Wales.   Secondary legislation, the Policing Protocol Order 
2011 (Home Office 2011a), set out the way that PCCs and chief officers of police should 
exercise their functions in relation to one another.   Particular reference was made to 
police operational independence (s22, Policing Protocol Order, 2011), which was well 
established within the ‘tripartite’ structure (Jones et al, 2012).  The principle established 
in the cases of Fisher –V- Oldham Corporation (1930) and R v Commissioner of Police of 
the Metropolis ex parte Blackburn (1968) was overturned in a judicial review of the 
Policing Protocol Order, (2011) in so far that it related to the responsibility of the PCC to 
intervene in operational policing matters (R (Crompton) -v- PCC South Yorkshire & 
others [QBD Para 78:2017]) emphasised that the Policing Protocol provided a more 
‘nuanced approach’ to police operational independence: 
 ‘It is in our judgement impossible to see operational independence as being 
 beyond the supervision of the PCC’  
 (R (Crompton) –v- PCC South Yorkshire [QBD Para 79:2017]).    
The potential impact of this judgement will be the subject of more detailed discussion in 
this thesis. 
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The Policing Protocol 2011 (Home Office 2011a) also established Police and Crime 
Panels (PCPs), charged with supporting, scrutinising and holding to account the PCC, 
(s28 (2), Home Office 2011).   
 
These reforms were presented by the government as bringing greater public influence 
upon policing priorities by way of a democratic mandate (Green, 2012).  There was, 
however the potential to further fundamentally alter the balance of the tripartite 
arrangement (Sampson, 2012, Jones et al, 2012). This was more likely, given the 
additional dimension of a gradual withdrawal of central government from police 
governance exemplified by Home Secretary Theresa May’s speech to the Conservative 
party conference in October 2011 in which she highlighted the removal of central 
performance targets for the police, replaced by one measure, that to ‘cut crime’ and 
emphasised the role of PCCs in directing police strategy (May, 2011). 
 
In the advent of the changes, there was great debate regarding the potential impact upon 
policing delivery.  Sir Hugh Orde, President of the Association of Chief Police Officers, 
drew attention to the significance of the changes: 
 ‘... I remain concerned with the general lack of appreciation of just how 
 significant the introduction of PCCs is likely to be.’ (Orde 2012 p.1) 
Sir Hugh remained of the same view at the time of the submission of this thesis: 
‘…I still view the Police and Crime Commissioner Governance structure to be 
fatally flawed.  Any structure that relies on just two individuals getting on, when 
one holds the power to dismiss the other is doomed to fail.  Failure in policing is 
too important to risk’ (Orde 2018). 
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Chair of the civil rights organisation Liberty also raised concerns regarding perceived 
changes in the constitutional position of the police; 
 ‘Today in the 21st Century, policing should continue to serve the rule of law 
 rather than the interests of the executive.’                                                                           
 (Chakrabarti  2011 p.26) 
 
Police authorities were understandably concerned (Sampson 2012).  Academics saw the 
direct election model of governance as questionable: 
 ‘...PCCs are a new and entirely untested venture into popular election and 
 represent a significant shift in the form of governance that has traditionally 
 characterised public administration’ (Loveday, 2013 p.22).2 
 ‘To be truly effective PCCs will need to resist the temptation to play to the  gallery, 
and will need to defend those aspects of policing which are least easy  to measure, or 
may be relatively invisible to the voting public.’                                                                                                    
 (Newburn, 2012 p.2). 
 
Confidence in the new governance structure was not improved by a problematic election 
process as a result of the government failing to communicate to the public the 
significance of the role of the PCC role, and to stand-alone elections held in November.  
The low elector turnout was described by Loveday as an ‘Election Omnishambles’ 
(Loveday, 2012, p. 183, Loveday, 2017 p. 29). 
 
 
 
  
 
 16 
Aim of this Thesis 
This thesis will explore the history of policing governance in England and Wales, placing 
it in the context of established models of governance, before considering the 
development of the new governance paradigm. A detailed analysis of the legislative and 
policy distinctions between the legislation which established police authorities and later 
PCCs, respectively the Police Act 1964 (Home Office, 1964) and the Police Reform and 
Social Responsibility Act 2011 (Home Office 2011) will be undertaken to identify 
differences in functions, responsibilities and accountabilities across the two structures.    
 
There is a growing literature that considers the way in which the introduction of PCCs has 
impacted on both governance and on the delivery of policing since their implementation.  
The reviews conducted immediately following the introduction of PCCs focussed upon 
public awareness of the role (Gilmore, 2013) or took the form of governmental reviews of 
effectiveness in setting budgets or holding chief police officers to account (Home Office, 
2014). There is some insight into the views of Commissioners in a collection of essays 
drawn together by Policy Exchange (Chambers, 2013). The relationship between PCCs 
and PCPs, the body established to support the commissioners and to scrutinise their 
activities were examined in a report by the Centre for Public Scrutiny (Centre for Public 
Scrutiny, 2014). There is later academic work that examines the way in which the new 
governance structure has been working in practice and how police professionals 
perceived the way in which the new paradigm has affected the delivery of policing and 
community safety in a professional context. Wells (2015) interviewed matched pairs of 11 
Chief Constables and PCCs, and Caless and Owen (2016) interviewed 20 Chief Police 
Officers and 23 PCCs. The research in this thesis was to some extent contemporaneous 
to those studies, it seeks to build upon that body of work and in doing so provide new 
insights.  
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The thesis makes use of a qualitative methodology to access the views and perceptions 
of key actors in the new policing governance structure. The overarching objective of the 
research has been to gain an understanding of the way in which the new governance 
structure in policing across England and Wales has altered, and what that means for 
service delivery in policing. It considers key issues that have arisen since the introduction 
of the role of PCC from the perspective of significant actors  consisting of chief 
constables and PCCs in police forces across England and Wales. In particular it 
considers how governance and operational delivery are affected by the interpersonal 
dynamic between the Chief Constable and the PCC.    
 
Informal Impressions and a Pilot Study 
The author is a former chief police officer in one of the larger police forces in England 
and Wales. Conversations with members of his network including both serving police 
staff, academics in the criminal justice field and contacts within his social network that 
took place prior to the commencement of this research acted as a catalyst for his thinking 
in this area.  As the author began to refine his decision to conduct his doctoral research 
upon the changed paradigm in policing governance, such interactions became more 
salient to him and he paid close attention to the views that his contacts articulated.  
During these interactions with ex colleagues and others he developed a sense of the 
emerging themes that might prove to be salient in research in this area.  Although 
unrecorded and informal, these contributed to his growing conceptualisation of the 
research domain alongside more formal models that are discussed later in this thesis. 
 
In preparation for this research project, a pilot study was conducted with the intention of 
exploring emerging issues following the change in the policing governance paradigm. 
This took the form of a small scale, qualitative study (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003) conducted 
in April 2013, a relatively short time after the PCCs had taken up their posts in November 
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2012.  The research focussed upon five Chief Constables, the most senior operational 
police officers, responsible for the professional leadership of the police (Home Office 
1964). The cohort had been directly affected by the change in as much that they were 
working with a PCC, an office holder who has a democratic mandate to deliver policing 
and crime reduction (Home Office 2011a), which was not the case with police authorities, 
whose remit was confined to scrutiny of the chief officer in respect of his/ her delivery of 
efficient and effective policing (Home Office, 1994).  
 
The Research Questions 
Building upon a review of the available literature, the learning provided by the pilot study 
and his informal interactions, the following research questions for this study were 
identified: 
What has been the effect of the new governance paradigm in Policing across 
England and Wales upon the way that Policing is governed and delivered at a 
strategic and operational level? 
What aspects of the new governance paradigm in policing may be positive in 
terms of improving the effective delivery of policing and community safety? 
What aspects of the new governance paradigm in policing may inhibit the delivery 
of effective policing and community safety? 
What changes or adaptations to the governance paradigm are apparent that may 
have the potential to improve effectiveness in delivering policing and community 
safety? 
These research questions guided the development of the research methodology, the 
research approach itself and the later data analysis phase. 
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Reflection and Reflexivity 
The author was, for over 30 years a serving police officer.  An important aspect his 
preparation for this research was his exposure to the theory of reflective practice and 
learning.  From Marcus Aurelius who in 167 ACE produced his reflective account of life 
and meta physical questions in which he demonstrated the importance of individuals 
developing and improving by reflecting carefully upon one's environment (Long, 2010), 
through to Schon (1983), who, building upon the work of others is generally credited as 
having introduced the concept of reflective practice,  
 
An important aspect of the author’s reflection was his identification of himself as a 
researcher within the research paradigm itself.  A practitioner researcher (Scott et al 
2004) must position his/ herself within the research construct, and adopt a reflexive 
stance, as described by Woolgar (1988) and Etherington (2004).   This is particularly 
important in interview-based research (Atkinson and Coffey, 2003, p.119), the basis of 
the research methodology described here. 
 
As a serving chief police officer in England and Wales, the author had been closely 
engaged in the tripartite structure that was in place prior to the introduction of PCCs.  The 
pre-existing structure underpinned policing governance for all of his 32 years of service, 
and was strongly embedded in his cognitive schema in terms of his perception of 
appropriate policing governance models. 
 
During the conduct of this research project, he had to take care to ensure that his earlier 
perceptions did not influence either the construction of the project itself or the analysis 
and interpretation of the data.  He asked the question: 
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 ‘Am I writing about me, or reflecting a truly independent reality?’ (Dunne et al, 
 2005, p. 130). 
 
The author had to take care that his previous position and his frames of reference did not 
impact upon the research or the participants in terms of affecting the ‘internal validity’ of 
any data and findings (Campbell and Stanley, 1963, pp. 2-5).  He did this by constructing 
research conditions that reduced as much as possible the influence of his embedded 
experiences. An important step in reducing the potential inappropriate impact of personal 
experiences was the recognition that they were a factor and to be as disciplined as 
possible in keeping the issues to the fore, whilst also recognising that complete 
independence was not possible: 
 ‘... even the best laid plans and designs have to be actualized in social, 
 institutional and political context which can have a profound effect on the 
 outcome of research.’  (Jupp et al, 2000, p. 169). 
 
The author chose this research subject because it was an area of great interest to him. 
His challenge was to maintain objectivity in progressing the project to meaningful and 
valid conclusions, (Robson, 2003, p. 21).   His initial view was that the implementation of 
PCCs was ill thought out on the part of government and had the potential to drive policing 
delivery away from the needs of the community to those of the individual PCC or more 
reflective of their political affiliation. Which in effect would constitute the politicisation of 
policing. The author sought to adopt a reflective and reflexive approach throughout the 
formulation of the research questions and the methodological approach adopted. This 
included the development of a philosophical stance, through the execution and analysis 
phases of this research along with the final completion of the thesis. 
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A Significant Study? 
There is now an elected individual office holder with the responsibility for delivering 
policing and crime reduction across 41 police force areas. However, just what the 
implications were for the delivery of policing and the integrity of the governance 
framework were not at all clear prior to this research.   The pilot study and the review of 
the current literature identified that a critical area in the governance dynamic could prove 
to be the relationship between the chief constable and the PCC. This research therefore 
focused upon that dynamic.  The research considered the way in which changes in the 
governance structure has impacted upon strategic leadership, and the direction and 
delivery of policing to communities. The knowledge obtained provided an assessment of 
the level of success of the change in governance in terms of providing effective policing 
and identified potential areas for improvement. This study has, therefore potentially 
considerable professional significance across the domain of policing governance. 
 
Sign Posts- The Structure of this Thesis 
In Chapter one, the author has sought to summarise the rationale for conducting 
research in this area and its potential significance as well as beginning to lay out the key 
issues and debates.   
A comprehensive literature review will be provided within Chapter two. This explores the 
history of governance models, particularly within public sector bodies by reference to 
accountability and effectiveness of the organisation. Chapter three provides a 
comparative analysis of governance models within policing organisations up to the point 
of the earlier ‘Tripartite model’ (Lustgarten, 1986 p.113, Mawby & Wright, 2003, pp.169-
195). It then examines the academic and political thinking around policing governance in 
the advent of the introduction of PCCs in November 2012.  In addition it identifies the 
legislative and policy evidence that clearly contrasts the different roles, powers and 
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expectations placed on PCCs when compared with police authorities.  This extends to a 
discussion of the role of the PCP and its ability to support and bring the PCC to account.   
 
Chapter four considers research methodology and provides a critical review of a range of 
methodologies and their applicability to this research.  It highlights the adopted research 
strategy, sampling issues and ethical considerations. Chapter five outlines the conduct of 
the research and also explores the analytical approach adopted by the researcher.  
  
Chapter six provides the findings arising from the research phase. It highlights links to the 
current literature concerned with both general governance and policing governance 
paradigms.  Chapter seven draws together the key findings and how they might inform a 
judgement as to the way in which the new governance paradigm has impacted police 
effectiveness.  In concluding, further research and improvements are suggested based 
upon the research for the development of policing governance.  
   
Chapter Two 
Policing Governance and Accountability; A Critical 
History and a Review of the Literature 
 
The Rationale and Structure of the Literature Review. 
It is essential to frame any research study within the context of the body of research 
literature and knowledge on the areas relevant to the enquiry; 
 ‘…a review of the literature is important because without it you will not acquire 
 an understanding of your topic, of what has already been done on it, how it has 
 been researched, and what the key issues are.’ (Hart,1998, p.1). 
Hart’s argument is reinforced by that of Creswell who also emphasised the importance 
of the literature review in;  
 ‘…determining whether the topic is worth studying and it provides insights into 
 ways in which the researcher can limit the scope to a needed area of inquiry’ 
 (Cresswell, 2014 p. 25).  
 
Easterby-Smith et al, (2002) see the literature review as integral to any research 
exercise they build upon McCutcheon and Meredith (1993) who emphasise the 
importance of a literature review in identifying the conceptual content of the area under 
research and in supporting the development of theories in the field. Dellinger and 
Leech (2007, p.319) point to the importance of the literature review in determining 
validity in qualitative studies Fink (2014, p.3-5) draws attention to the importance of the 
literature review being systematic, explicit and reproducible she describes a 
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systematic process for the literature review, which the author found helpful in 
structuring his review of the literature in this study. 
 
The literature review was undertaken in order to enable the author to fully appreciate 
and understand the domain of governance from an academic perspective and how it 
has been applied in both the public sector generally and to police organisations in 
particular. This would put the research into the context of our current knowledge base 
and also help to identify key issues that would drive the development of the research 
question while providing a clear focus for the research project. 
 
The chapter considers therefore organisational governance theory, governance in 
public sector bodies and governance in police organisations. It examines and how this 
has developed in England and Wales and it concludes with a review of police 
accountability frameworks. 
 
Organisational Governance Theory 
In etymological terms, ‘governance’ arises from the Greek verb kubernan meaning to 
pilot or steer a vessel. Plato used the term to describe the design of a system of rules 
in society (Kjaer, 2004). The Oxford English Dictionary defines ‘governance’ rather 
unhelpfully as; ‘the action or manner of governing’ (1971, p.319). However, in the 
same volume ‘to govern’ is defined as ‘…to direct and control the actions and affairs 
(of a people, a state or its members) whether despotically or constitutionally; to rule or 
regulate (a body of men, corporation)…’ (1971, p317).   Rhodes (1997) sums up the 
development of the concept of governance in stating that: 
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‘Governance refers to self-organising, interorganisational networks 
charachterised by interdependence, resource exchange, rules of the game, 
and significant autonomy from the state’. (Ibid p.15) 
 
There is a significant ambiguity in the way that governance typologies are 
conceptualised (Rotberg, 2014, p.511). There is considerable diversity in the way that 
the terms are used to describe political and organisational networks and activities. 
(Kjaer, 2004, p.4).  Governance has a wide range of definitions and these are 
dependent on the organisational context that is being examined.  At its core, however 
is the concept that governance is more than ‘government’ (Kjaer, 2004 p189). 
 
The most extensive research in the field of governance have been in the domain of 
management and corporate governance. This has typically focused upon the dyad of 
the board of directors and the executive in the context of the generation of revenue by 
the effective and efficient allocation of resources,  (Tihanyi et al. 2015, p.2). There 
appear to be synergies with the PCC police governance model to the extent that the 
PCC directors set or approve strategy, which chief constables as executives deliver 
against a performance framework (Home Office 2011a). 
 
Given the apparent difficulty in defining governance, it is perhaps helpful to identify 
what constitutes good governance. The United Nations brought together five principles 
of good governance, which generally arise within the literature. These are ‘Legitimacy 
and Voice’, ‘Direction’,  ‘Performance’, ‘Accountability’ and ‘Fairness’ (Graham et.al, 
2003 p.3); 
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Governance of organisations therefore is concerned providing leadership and direction 
to people within organisations, and the control of systems and processes within a 
clearly defined framework (Audit Commission, 2003).  This conceptualisation was 
reinforced by Foss and Klein (2008) who discussed organisational governance with 
reference to the ‘instruments of governance’ that organisations use to influence 
members of that organisation and stakeholders to contribute to the organisation’s 
goals.   
 
This research is focused on examining relationships and delivery within the 
governance of policing in England and Wales. However, this narrative will begin with 
an exploration of public sector governance.  
 
Governance in Public Sector Bodies 
The literature on corporate governance in organisations is divided into that which 
considers corporate governance in the private sector and that which deals with the 
public sector. The later are defined simply as; organisations that deliver services on 
behalf of the public (Australian National Audit Office, 2014).  
 
Public sector governance theory has centered in England and Wales upon the 
emergence of a decentralised model of governmental control over public sector 
organisations since the 1980’s. This phenomenon was described as ‘agentfication’ by 
Kjaer, (2004, p27). He pointed to the establishment of semi-autonomous public 
agencies that are distanced from central government in order to allow them to manage 
in the absence of political pressure.  The formation of PCC structure can be seen as 
part of this continuum of devolvement.  The ‘hollowing-out’ of the governmental 
executive has been driven by a number of factors.  External factors include the growth 
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of European structures, while internal factors can be characterised as the growth in the 
complexity of devolved governmental functionality (Bevir and Rhodes, 2003, p.58).  
The transition from central to devolved governance was potentially significant in terms 
of the perceived changes in the pre existing ‘tripartite’ governance arrangement in 
policing (Lustgarten, 1986, p133, Mawby and Wright, 2003, pp169-195), and formed a 
key area for examination in this research. 
 
The PCC structure is distinguished from other public agencies by being the only 
governance structure with a single politically elected official having sole responsibility 
and accountability for the delivery of the service that the agency provides (Longstaff, 
2013). Indeed, the closest public governance role in England and Wales appears to be 
the directly elected city mayors responsible for setting policy across several agencies 
including policing.  In the case of London, the mayor takes the role of PCC for the 
Metropolitan Police, Home Office (2011) and iteratively other city mayors are taking 
that dual role as they are appointed (Home Office 2016 s107F (1)).  In practice the 
day-to-day responsibility for crime and policing is devolved to their deputies. 
 
Ferlie, Ashburner and Fitzgerald, (1995) in their study of governance within the 
National Health Service (NHS) saw, the demise of a public sector tripartite governance 
structure similar to that in policing post 1964 in the 1990’s. This framework comprised 
professionals, generalists and local authority nominees on NHS boards.  Criticisms of 
the NHS tripartite framework have some resonance with the issues raised during the 
debates that led to the introduction of the PCC model.  The perceptions of a 
‘democratic deficit’, for example and issues of apparent loss of probity in public 
services were to the fore (ibid, p389).  One of the disadvantages of the reformed NHS 
structure identified at an early stage was the dominance of the chair/CEO duopoly, 
again potentially resonating with this research. (ibid p389).  
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Accompanying the decentralisation of agencies delivering public services across 
western societies was the ‘New Public Management’ (NPM) movement.  Hood (1995) 
reminds us that NPM was neither new nor a coherent concept (ibid, p94), but was a 
repackaging of disparate ideas in management over the preceding decades.  He 
identified a range of NPM characteristics, these included the disaggregation of public 
organisations into ‘corporate’ units bringing with it devolved budgets and managerial 
autonomy. Together with a shift, even within ‘captive markets’ towards competition 
between public sector and public-private sector organisations. A move to the use in 
the public sector of private sector managerial practices along with greater discipline 
and ‘parsimony’ in the use of resources. There was a focus on finding less costly ways 
of delivering public services and increasing measurement of performance by 
developing performance cultures within public sector organisations. (Hood, 1995, 
pp.96-97). 
 
These developments were driven across all public sector organisations including the 
police service, Gilling (2014) identified the impact of managerialism on policing driven 
by both Conservative and New Labour governments over two decades from the 
1980s. The author whose police service was contemporary with the development of 
NPM recognises the above dimensions of management within the policing paradigm 
throughout the 1980’s, 90’s and into the first few years of the 21st century.   
 
Governance in Police Organisations 
Loader (2000), drawing together the work of Webber (1972), Walker (1999) and Berki 
(1986) provides a useful summary of the way in which western liberal societies have 
over the past two centuries been part of a construct of state-centred government with 
particular reference to policing. As he argues: 
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 “…the defining feature of the modern sovereign state is its monopoly of 
 legitimate force within given spatial boundaries, a monopoly that is principally 
 vested, with regard to internal security at least, in the dedicated uniformed 
 body we have come to know as the police…This institution has, moreover, 
 come to be closely if paradoxically  tied to the production of security within 
 liberal democratic societies, the police representing both a guarantor of the 
 security upon which the exercise of liberty depends, and a potent ever-present 
 threat to those same liberties.’ (Ibid; p325). 
 
Given the double-edged sword of policing’s effect on society identified by Loader, 
there is a clear need in liberal democracies for effective governance frameworks that 
ensure, by way of oversight and accountability that the security of communities is 
maximised at the same time that any threat of unaccountable policing is minimised. 
This concept is fundamental to any policing governance arrangement and underpins 
the importance of research that examines the efficacy of policing governance 
arrangements.   Out side the scope of this research is the challenge of plural policing 
where non-government organisations perform quasi-policing roles, the dangers of 
which have been identified by a number of commentators (Hirst (1997), Button, (1999), 
Rhodes, (1997)).  
 
Jones (2008) in his review of a range of publications on the subject of policing 
governance draws attention to the need for policing governance to go beyond 
accountability to latent threats to liberty posed by police and the need to address 
societal issues. He states that there is a need to: 
 ‘…bring into focus the importance and continued need for scholarship 
 dedicated to the development of democratic police forces, both domestically 
 and abroad. Rather than focusing on narrowly constrained issues of law 
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 enforcement, the trend appears to be an investigation of the strategy needed to 
 transform police forces around the world into successful institutions for social 
 problem solving’.  (Ibid; 584) 
Aguja and Born (2017, p.6) provide a comparison of the governance in Asian and 
European policing organisations. They see three distinct functions of oversight, in the 
context of parliamentary responsibility and these are; ‘Legislative, ‘Oversight’ and 
‘Budgetary control’. 
 
There are a range of solutions to the challenges to provide an effective and meaningful 
governance model for policing. They present different constructs, from militaristic 
policing organisations with direct national government control to more civil centric 
policing models. This dilemma has been described by Bayley and Stenning (2017), as 
one facing all democracies.  In effect, the challenge is, how to manage the police so 
that they act in the public interest whilst avoiding the temptation to use them for 
partisan interests.  In their review of six jurisdictions Bayley and Stenning provide an 
insight into the diversity of policing constructs across the world. They identify a number 
of separate policing organisations in various countries which does not seem 
necessarily to correlate with population or geography.  
 
These are listed below: 
New Zealand  – 1 Police organisation 
Australia  - 8 Police organisations 
India   - 36 Police organisations 
Britain  - 43 Police organisations 
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Canada -340 Police organisations 
USA  - 17,000 Police organisations (estimated)   
        (Ibid) 
 
Table 1, below provides examples of global policing governance models drawn from 
data available through police web sites, and other sources.  Within the United 
Kingdom, only England and Wales have introduced the PCC model and there does not 
seem to be any homogeneity between countries in the same region. The closest 
model to that of the PCC globally appears to be the US County/ Sherriff construct; 
 Table 1.  Police and Policing Governance Structures  
Jurisdiction Police Structure Governance Structure 
England & Wales 1. 43 Local forces 
Civilian, Community 
policing focus. 
 
2. Centrally controlled 
forces (BTP, MoD) 
1. Directly Elected Police & 
Crime Commissioner (or 
City Mayor fulfilling the 
PCC role) 
 
2. Centrally Controlled – 
Departmental panels 
Scotland 1. One national force 
Civilian, Community 
policing focus.  
 
2. Centrally controlled 
1. Police Authority 
comprising 10-14 
centrally appointed 
members as public 
officials. 
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forces (BTP, MoD) 2. Centrally Controlled 
– Departmental 
panels 
 
Northern Ireland Province wide Police 
Service (PSNI) 
 
Policing Board political 
members and independent 
members. 
Canada 1. National (RCMP) 
2. Provincial Police 
Forces 
3. Urban Police 
Forces 
1. National 
Government, 
overseen by 
Central Association 
of Police 
Governance 
2. Provincial 
government 
overseen as above. 
3. Municipal councils, 
overseen as above. 
Australia 1. National – AFP 
2. State 
1. National 
Government 
2. Minister of Police 
with State Policing 
boards. 
India 1. Federal Police 
(IPS) 
1. Ministry of Internal 
Affairs 
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2. State Police 2. State Government 
(all chief police 
officers are 
appointments of the 
IPS) 
USA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Multi Level; 
1. Federal – National 
responsibility 
2. State – State wide 
responsibilities   
3. County Police 
4. Sheriffs Depts. 
5. Municipal/ 
Metropolitan 
6. Specialist (i.e. Port 
Authority, University 
Campus etc.) 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Direct central 
government control 
through relevant 
department (Dept. of 
Justice, Dept. of 
Homeland Security, US 
Secret Service etc.) 
2. State Government 
offices. 
3. County Government/ 
directly elected County 
Sherriff 
4. Directly Elected local 
Sheriffs. 
5. Local Mayor/ City 
Manager 
6. CEO/ Manager of 
relevant organisation. 
United Arab Emirates 1. Abu Dhabi Police 
2. Northern Emirates 
Police 
1. Minister of the 
Interior for Abu 
Dhabi 
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3. Dubai Police 2. As above 
3. Minister of the 
Interior of Dubai 
Serbia Single national policing 
body  
Central government – 
Interior Ministry. 
Thailand Central only Royal Thai 
Police  
National Government 
France 1. Two national forces 
a) Police Nationale, 
b) Gendarmerie 
Nationale 
2. Municipal Police  
1.a) Ministry of the Interior 
b) Ministry of Defence 
2. Local Mayor 
Germany 1. Federal – 
Bundespoleizei 
2. State - 
Landespoleizei 
1. Federal 
Government 
2. State Government 
 
The findings as to the diversity of police governance constructs are echoed by Aguja 
and Born (2017); 
 ‘…the governance and structure of the police is a complex matter, with a great 
 variety of governance models between states…’  (ibid; p. 231).  
 
The explanation for the variety of governance models reflects differing political and 
constitutional frameworks and culture (Aguja and Born, 2017). An additional driver in 
the development of policing governance may have been negative perceptions of police 
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behaviour such as those in Northern Ireland; (Wilks-Heeg, Blick and Crone (2012)), 
Australia; (Dupont 2003) and Ireland; (Conway and Walsh (2011)). 
 
Against the background of a diverse global patchwork of policing governance 
frameworks, the Cameron led Conservative party began a search for a new 
governance paradigm for policing across England and wales, in which they would: 
  ‘…swap the bureaucratic control of the police for democratic accountability’. 
          (Herbert 2011). 
 
The Development of Police Governance Frameworks in England & Wales. 
This section will provide a chronology the development of policing structures and 
governance across England and Wales and a backdrop to the implementation of the 
PCC construct. 
 
In etymological terms Emsley (2016) identifies the word police as having origins in 
ancient Greek Poletia, which referred matters relating to the security and welfare of the 
state (Polis). Over millennia, the meaning developed such that it referred to individuals 
and public bodies that enforced state and local regulation, and latterly community 
safety and security (ibid p.3) 
 
Policing in England and Wales has its origins in the Anglo Saxon period (400-1066) in 
which the responsibility for preventing wrongdoing and taking action against offenders 
was vested in local communities.  Following the Norman conquest of 1066, a system 
of ‘Frankpledge’ was introduced that required all adult males within a community to 
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swear a pledge to conduct themselves in a lawful manner and to work together to 
prevent wrongdoing and detect wrongdoers in the community.  Offenders were tried by 
their peers in ‘Frankpledge’ hearings (Joyce and Wain, 2011).  The first recorded 
formal policing structure can be traced back to the Statute of Winchester, enacted in 
1285, in which the court of King Edward I attempted to address what was seen as 
unacceptable lawlessness in England. It put in place the statute that required each 
local area (hundred) take responsibility for controlling crime and raising ‘hue and cry’ 
(pursuit of criminals) when necessary. The local landowner was charged with making 
the arrangements to ensure the statute was complied with (Cannon 2015). Effectively, 
this was the first recognisable policing structure with an identifiable ‘police chief’ at its 
head. 
 
Over the next five and a half centuries, local policing arrangements remained 
disparate with the ad hoc development of watch committees and the establishment of 
the office of ‘constable’. This was a term brought to England at the time of the Norman 
conquest, originally a military officer with responsibility for the security of garrison 
stables ‘comesstabuli’, it came to refer to people appointed to serve local parishes, 
providing security and bringing offenders before local courts, (Cannon 2015). 
 
The first organised police force in England and Wales was the Metropolitan Police, 
serving London and other places (such as the Portsmouth Dockyard) established by 
the then Home Secretary Robert Peel in 1829, (Home Office, 1829). However, 
Scotland can (and does) lay claim to having the first police force in Great Britain. 
Glasgow police was formed in 1800 and Edinburgh police followed in 1805 (Cannon 
2015).  Given that it is the only jurisdiction to have introduced PCCs. This research 
has restricted its focus to policing across England and Wales. Scotland, following the 
   
  
 37 
setting up of a national police force retains an un elected wholly appointed policing 
board structure (Malik, 2017).  
 
Outside London, the Municipal Corporations Act 1835 (Home Office, 1835) required 
local authorities to establish police forces in 178 towns and cities. Following a royal 
commission in 1836, the County and Rural Constabularies Act, 1839 (Home Office, 
1839) enabled justices of the peace to establish police forces within their jurisdictions 
in rural areas.  By 1851, approximately 13,000 police forces had been established 
across England and Wales, (Taylor, 1997, UK Parliament (2017)).  This number was 
reduced by the County and Borough Police Act (1856), which required every town and 
county to have a police force in place. It also required amalgamations forming fewer, 
larger forces (Hart, 1956). 
 
By the late nineteenth century the model and structure of policing recognisable today 
had been set. Governance fell to either the Home secretary in the case of the 
Metropolitan Police, or outside London to watch committees in municipal areas or in 
rural areas standing joint committees both made up of Justices of the Peace and local 
councillors, (Taylor 1997). 
 
The next significant development did not arrive until the first (and only) police strikes in 
1918 and 1919, linked to officers’ poor pay and conditions. This led to the Police Act 
(1919) that prohibited the police taking strike action. The Police Union was outlawed 
and the Police Federation, a staff association without the power to organise industrial 
action was established (Reiner, 2011).  
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Perhaps the most significant legislation in policing governance in the 20th century was 
the Police Act 1964 (Home Office 1964). The act followed a number of scandals during 
the 1950s involving English police forces governed then by local ‘Watch Committees’ 
who were alleged to be exerting undue and corrupt influence on local policing, 
(Marshall, 1965 p.12). This prompted a Royal Commission into policing with a remit to 
review the constitutional position of the police (Home Office, 1962). The findings of the 
Royal Commission led to the Police Act 1964 (Home office, 1964). The Act introduced 
police authorities that were mandated to comprise local councillors and magistrates. 
They were to be governance bodies whose responsibility was: 
 ‘…to secure the maintenance of an adequate and efficient police force for the 
 area.’  (Home Office, 1964 S4 (1)). 
 
For the next 48 years, the police authority model of governance remained in place, 
subject to adaptations required by statute in the Local Government Act (1985), the 
Police and Magistrates Courts Act, 1994 and the Police Act,1996 (Home Office (1994), 
Home Office (1996)). 
 
The Development of Police Accountability  
A crucial element in the story of policing governance across England and Wales has 
been that of accountability.  The concept of accountability was described by Jones 
(1992) as being associated with a ‘higher authority’ calling an individual or organisation 
‘to account’ for their actions and that higher authority having the power to levy 
sanctions for misdemeanours or malpractice (Murphy, Eckersley and Ferry, 2016 p.2).  
In the context of the criminal justice domain Joyce and Wain (2011) define 
accountability as being: 
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 ‘…a political concept whereby individuals or agencies to whom responsibilities 
 have been delegated are required to submit to the scrutiny of another body (or 
 bodies) and justify their actions’.  (ibid p.4). 
 
Accountability in policing has focussed upon two key areas. The first is a monitoring 
function, which provides a level of democratic supervision of performance against 
expectations of policing delivery (Talbot, 2004). The second is around the prevention 
and detection of wrongdoing (Jones, 1992, Brain, 2010).  Alongside these supervisory 
imperatives sits the additional convention of the ‘operational independence’ of the 
police (Wood and MacAlister, (2005 p.198)).  From the beginnings of policing in 
England and Wales, issues of accountability and operational independence have been 
the imperatives at the core of the development of governance models. They have 
been driven by attempts to achieve a degree of balance between these elements (ibid, 
p. 197, Caless and Owen, 2016 p.13). 
 
Stenning (1999) saw accountability and operational independence as a dichotomy with 
separate, mutually exclusive aims. Wood and McAlister (2005) however took a more 
nuanced view that; 
 ‘They should be seen instead as competitive, but integral, dimensions of 
 practical police governance endeavours.’ (ibid p.202). 
 
It is important therefore, when examining the development of policing governance to 
see that evolution in the context of the competing imperatives of accountability and 
independence.   
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Lustgarten (1986) in his description of the development of policing governance, looked 
back to the 1926 case of the chief constable and watch committee of St Helens which 
turned upon allegations excessive force used by the police in respect of the policing of 
a miners ‘lock out’ industrial dispute as the beginning of the debate around the need 
for effective police accountability.  The debate paused during the 1939-1945 war but 
was taken up in the public and political response to three incidents where public 
attention was focussed upon the inadequacy of the law surrounding the accountability 
relationship between authorities responsible for the oversight of police forces and the 
police.  
 
In 1956, the chief constable of Cardiganshire was subjected to disciplinary 
proceedings for inefficiency while the chief constable of Brighton was dismissed for 
corruption.  In 1957, a young man was assaulted by police officers in Thurso.  These 
incidents led to two parliamentary debates and a public enquiry (Oliver, 1987). The 
final catalyst for change occured when in 1959, the public debate became more 
heated following a dispute between the chief constable of Nottingham Captain 
Athelstan Popkess and his watch committee. The watch committee following to his 
refusal to disclose to them a report on alleged financial irregularities by members of 
the committee suspended Captain Popkess.  He later was reinstated by the then 
Home Secretary (Brain 2010).   
 
These cases led to the Conservative government of the time establishing the 1960-
1962 Royal Commission on Policing (Marshall, 1965, Oliver, 1987, Brain, 2010).  The 
commission examined the constitutional position of the police (UK National Archives 
1962). 
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Two reports delivered by the commission were used to formulate the Police Act 1964 
(Home Office 1964). The Act established for the first time the lines of accountability 
between the Home Secretary, police authorities created by the Act and chief 
constables. These formed the ‘tripartite arrangement’ (Newburn and Reiner 2014).  
That structure remained in place until the introduction of PCCs in 2012. The 1964 Act 
and its later iterations; the Police and Magistrates Courts Act, 1994, and the Police Act 
1996 provided the basis of police accountability in terms of the efficient and effective 
delivery of policing services as well as establishing a complaints and disciplinary 
framework.  Although these measures followed the ‘noisy politics’ of the 1980s with 
calls for greater police accountability in the wake of urban riots and industrial disputes 
(Gilling, 2014), they did little to improve police accountability. 
 
As regards police complaints and discipline, increasingly empowered independent 
bodies were put in place to manage complaints against the police to improve public 
confidence in the complaints process. These were; the Police Complaints Board 
between 1977and 1985, then the Police Complaints Authority from 1985 (Waters and 
Brown, 2000). In 2004 the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) was 
established. It was replaced in January 2018 by the current Independent Office for 
Police Conduct (Home Office, 2018). 
 
The legislation that mandated the accountability framework was silent upon the 
second issue that caused tension in police governance, which was police operational 
independence (Wood and MacAlister 2005).  The issue of operational independence 
had been considered in the debates around the causes celebres during the 1950s 
discussed above. The principle had been established in the case of Fisher –V- 
Oldham Corporation, ([1930] 2 KBD 364). The claimant, Fisher sued the Oldham 
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Corporation and its watch committee for wrongful imprisonment by the police. The 
judgement, inter alia, held that there could be no master/ servant relationship between 
the corporation and the police albeit they employed them.  In addition, the judges 
found that constables had authority conferred upon them by the state, not the local 
authority that paid them, and were therefore not in the control of those that paid their 
salary. The Fisher judgement built on an earlier case Stanbury v Exeter Corporation 
([1905] 2 KBD 838).  In this case, the judges made a comparison with the police in the 
case before them that concerned the actions of a ‘sheep disease inspector’. The 
argument was that if an official was mandated to perform public and national functions, 
then local government could not be made liable for their actions. The principle of police 
independence was further reinforced in the judgement of R. v. Metropolitan Police 
Commissioner, ex p. Blackburn ([1968] 2 Q.B. 118). This case related to an action 
brought by an individual who complained that the police had adopted a policy of not 
prosecuting London gaming clubs for illegal gambling. The court held that the police 
decision as to what or how to investigate was not open to question.  In summing up 
Judge Denning stated; 
	 ‘No minister of the crown can tell [the Commissioner] that he must, or must not, 
 keep observation on this place or that; or that me must or must not, prosecute 
 this man or that one. Nor can any police authority tell him so. The responsibility 
 for law  enforcement lies on him. He is answerable to the law and the law alone. 
  ([1968] 2 Q.B. 118). 
 
The police officer’s status was identified by Alder, 2011 p.94 as an official locally 
appointed but deriving an original authority from the Crown, supporting an earlier 
description of the origin of that status and its implication: 
‘…law and order was the responsibility of borough watchmen and parish 
constables. The latter is an ancient common law office. Policemen today are 
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also constables and thus inherit the status of that office. This means that a 
policeman’s responsibilities to enforce the law and maintain the peace are 
original, not delegated. Consequently he cannot be subjected to the orders of 
and political superior in the exercise of these duties. Decisions about 
operational policing can only be taken by policemen.’ 
      (Regan 1983 p.4 (in Hampton, 1987 p.70)) 
 
Chief constables over the ensuing years used the doctrine of police independence as 
both a sword and a shield in their interactions with police authorities and central 
government (Brogden, 1982, Loveday, 1983, Loveday, 1984, Loveday, 2017). There 
was disagreement between academics as to the implications for the lack of police 
authority influence on operational policing, exemplified by the debate between 
Loveday (1984) and Waddington (1984) in which the former saw dangers inherent in 
the lack of influence, whilst the latter was more comfortable with the extant 
relationship.  Often the line between operational independence and policy issues was 
blurred, to the extent that over time police accountability arrangements became 
increasingly opaque (Murphy, Eckersley and Ferry, 2016 p. 2).  
 
Hampton (1987) in his examination of local government and politics identified the 
problem that the convention of police operational independence gave police authorities 
in holding chief constables to account: 
‘Police committees, therefore are precluded from either directing or even 
questioning the chief constable on operational matters (Loveday 1983). They 
are confined to discussions of a very general nature and to the providing of 
resources necessary for an efficient service.’ (ibid p. 70). 
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He went on to identify that there were suggestions that police authorities were so 
ineffective that police forces should be directly accountable to the Home Secretary 
(ibid p.70). 
 
In respect of the PCC experience, in her interviews of chief constables and PCCs, 
Wells (2015) found that there was some evidence to support the assertion that PCCs 
were beginning to test the boundary of operational and strategic independence of chief 
constables. 
 
In the context of policing in Northern Ireland, the issue of police operational 
independence was addressed by the recommendations of the Patten Report that 
sought to replace the concept of ‘operational independence’ with that of ‘operational 
responsibility’  (Independent Commission on Policing in Northern Ireland, 1999, para 
6.20).  Lister (2013) reports that a similar recommendation was made in respect of 
PCCs by the Home Affairs Select Committee (House of Commons, 2010). This was 
rejected by the legislators on the basis that the roles and responsibilities of chief 
constables and PCCs were already defined by existing and draft legislation (Lister, 
2013, p. 240). 
	
This research project was, therefore set against the background of a rather confused 
accountability framework that the Conservative government of 2010 sought to reform 
by the introduction of PCCs.  Chapter three discusses the political drive towards a new 
governance structure.   
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Chapter Three 
 
A New Policing Governance Paradigm;  
The Advent of Police and Crime Commissioners  
In England & Wales. 
 
The Wind of Change – Political and Academic Thought leading to the Police & 
Crime Commissioner Model. 
The effectiveness of Police Authorities as a governance framework for policing was 
being questioned in the early 1980’s (Hampton, 1987, pp. 68-71, Regan, 1983 p.13). 
Loveday (1983, p.39) commented that despite financing police forces, the authority 
had little influence on how those funds were spent. Elcock, (1982 p.170) suggested 
that police forces should be directly accountable to the Home Secretary and through 
that office to parliament.   There was growing dissatisfaction with the police 
governance model across several domains. 
 
Commentators identified a widening schism in the tripartite governance arrangement, 
with increasing central government control (Loveday (2006), Murphy, Eckersley and 
Ferry (2016)).  This was in part exemplified in the effect of legislation such as The 
Police and Magistrates Courts Act, 1994 that changed the composition of police 
authorities, by introducing independent members appointed by the Home Secretary 
(Home Office 1994). Summing up the issue, Loveday and Reid  (2003) argued that: 
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 ‘ The recent history of policing in Britain has been one of increasing central 
 control and weakening links between police and local communities…’(Ibid p.7). 
Loveday (2006) also identified as part of a growing centralist agenda the increasing 
influence of Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) working closely with 
the Home Office to drive compliance by police forces and police authorities.  This trend 
continued, even with the Conservative government’s avowed commitment localism in 
policing.  Murphy, Eckersley and Ferry (2016) supported this view when they reported 
that between 1998 and 2010 every Public Service Agreement linked central 
government funding to the delivery of ministerial priorities included targets relating to 
police performance. 
 
A further significant development in the move to centralism, contemporaneous with the 
implementation of PCCs was the appointment of Tom Winsor as Chief Inspector of 
Constabulary. Winsor, who had no police background, was appointed to a role 
traditionally seen as the remit of senior police officers.  His appointment created 
widespread concern across the police service (BBC 2012).  This may have been 
intentional, given that Winsor had, shortly before his appointment to HMIC conducted 
a review of police pay, conditions and structures which had been critical of existing 
police structures and practices and recommended significant changes (Winsor 2012). 
Whilst some, particularly the Police Federation argued that the role could not be 
effectively discharged by someone with a non-police background who was unlikely to 
understand policing, the government policing minister Nick Herbert argued that 
Winsor’s appointment was not as a senior police officer, but that the role was one of 
inspection and that he would provide ‘fearless independence’ (BBC 2012b). 
 
At the same time, chief police officers through the Association of Chief Police Officers 
(ACPO) were perceived as having a growing in influence over both national and local 
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policing, and becoming to some extent an open rival to the Home Office. (Loveday, 
2000, Savage, Charman and Cope, 2000).  This was particularly noticeable in the run 
up to the introduction of PCCs in an open antipathy between the Chair of ACPO, Sir 
Hugh Orde and the Home Secretary Theresa May (Blackburn, 2011). 
In addition, the tripartite structure had grown into a complex construct. The diagram 
below, taken from Murphy, Eckersley and Ferry (2016) demonstrates the tripartite 
model prior to the implementation of PCCs.  The reality was far more complex and top 
down than the tripartite shorthand suggested. 
 
 
  
 
The tripartite arrangement that had been at the core of policing governance across 
England and Wales since 1964 was seen by both the academic community and some 
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political commentators as broken and impotent as a means of governance (Reiner, 
1991, Reiner 2013, Loveday and Reid, 2003 Lister and Rowe, 2015).  
 
Crucially there was evidence that police authorities failed to properly engage with the 
public and represent their needs and expectations in terms of policing, MIllen and 
Stephens, (2011).  
 
The challenge lay in identifying what model should replace the police authority, given 
that it was widely seen to be unable to fulfil its statutory remit.   
 
The first proposal for a police governance framework with directly elected PCCs was 
provided in a 2002 pamphlet by Douglas Carswell, founder of the radical ‘Direct 
Democracy’ group within the Conservative party. He proposed directly elected police 
commissioners based upon the US Sherriff model, a proposal described in more detail 
in a follow up paper entitled ‘Send for the Sherriff’ (Carswell, 2010).  
 
November 2003 saw the New Labour Home Secretary David Blunkett adopt a similar 
approach in a speech to police authority chairs. He raised the prospect of directly 
elected police authorities or panels (Blunkett, 2003). He cited the need for 
communities to feel more connected with policing and for clearer accountability. The 
chair of the Association of Police Authorities (the APA) Ruth Henig and on behalf of 
chief constables, ACPO chair Chris Fox were quick to oppose the plan. They did so on 
the basis of a risk to diversity of membership on police authorities and of increased 
parochialism (Johnson, 2004).  Influenced by these objections, in December 2008 the 
proposal was dropped by the New Labour government. Ironically the Home Secretary 
Jacqui Smith expressed concern that such a development would politicise policing. At 
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the same time she took the opportunity to criticise the opposition Conservative party’s 
proposals for directly elected commissioners, seeing it wrongly as an attempt to 
maintain centralised control of policing (BBC, 2008). 
The Cameron led Conservative party used for evidence of the need for directly elected 
police governance the work of both Loveday and Reid (2003) and of  Muir and Lodge 
(2008) who built a similar thesis for change. However, neither Loveday and Reid 
(2003), nor Muir and Lodge (2008) recommended the introduction of a directly elected 
PCC. The former recommended that local police should be accountable to Mayors or 
Council Leaders, and the latter identified a range of options, only one of which was the 
directly elected PCC.  The political catalyst for the drive to introduce a directly elected 
police commissioner may have had its foundation in a visit by David Cameron when 
leader of the government opposition to the USA in 2005 (Davies, 2014). This 
experience built upon the earlier ideas of Carswell (Carswell, 2010) and contributed to 
Cameron’s comments on police governance in his wide-ranging speech on public 
sector reform made in Portsmouth in September 2005 (Cameron 2005). 
 
The author was at that time a chief police officer and had an opportunity prior to 
Cameron’s 2005 speech to meet and discuss with David Cameron his positive 
impressions of the US elected sheriff model.  Cameron was convinced of the 
effectiveness of the US system and its ability to connect local communities with 
policing. In his conversation with the author, Cameron was not prepared to brook any 
discussion of the disadvantages, which the author articulated and were identified by 
Loveday and Reid (2003) in their report relied upon by the Conservative party as 
evidence for police governance change and which noted of the US sheriff system that; 
 ‘Where they are weak, corruption and incompetence can flourish’. (ibid, p.47). 
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Some commentators suggested (in the context of city mayors), that directly elected 
officials ‘’at the apex of a public body’ can increase the ability of the organisation to 
achieve its objectives (Eckersley and Timm-Arnold (2014).  During this research, the 
author searched for other public bodies across the UK where the strategic head of a 
public body had been directly elected. With the exception of city mayors and PCCs, he 
was unable to find any examples of this. Cousins (2012, p 16) drew attention to the 
fact that in the UK, politicians have hitherto been elected to generalist roles. This 
includes city mayors who have a local generalist responsibility.  ‘Specialisms’ such as 
policing were, prior to the introduction of PCCs governed by appointed individuals or 
bodies.  Longstaff (2013, p. 8) of the Police Foundation confirmed that there were no 
equivalent posts to that of PCCs in public service in the UK.   
An additional assertion made by the Conservative party was that part of the rationale 
for the creation of PCCs was the need to reduce central control of policing and 
improve accountability (Conservative Party 2010).  This appears to be at odds with the 
drive by the same coalition government to abolish the large number of quasi-
autonomous national government organisations (QUANGOs), which had been 
established by both Labour and Conservative governments since the 1980s (O’Leary, 
2015).  O’Leary identifies inconsistency in the express rationales for the abolition of 
QUANGOs as between Prime Minister Cameron, the Cabinet Secretary and the 
House of Commons Public Administration Committee, as between accountability and 
cost savings. Questions therefore arise as to the validity of the government argument 
at a strategic policy level. 
 
There therefore appears little evidence to support the hypothesis that the PCC 
structure was the right answer to the question  ‘what is the best governance structure 
for policing in England and Wales?’  In particular, there appears to have been no 
consideration of formal theories of governance in organisations underpinning the 
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decision to move to the new structure, and the devolved structure was at odds with the 
policy of QUANGO reform by the same government.   
 
In opposition, a decision was made by the Cameron government in waiting that a 
directly elected individual responsible for policing would be created to replace the 
existing 17 member police authorities. Also that they would be provided with wider 
powers to set policing policy than the police authority whose remit extended only to a 
scrutiny role (s28 (2) Home Office 2011).  The scene was set for one of the first acts of 
the 2010 Coalition government to move forward legislation to deliver directly elected 
PCCs who took office across 41 Police Forces in England and Wales in November 
2012. 
 
This key priority had been described in the manifesto in the lead up to the 2010 
elections (Conservative Party, 2010 p 57). The document cited the review conducted 
by Muir and Lodge (2008) which argued that there was an ‘accountability deficit’ in 
British policing, Policing Minister Nick Herbert MP converted this into the term 
‘democratic deficit’ for the purposes of his speech.  In describing the ‘problem’ in 
policing accountability at that time, Muir and Lodge were clear that; 
 ‘The police service in England and Wales suffers from an accountability deficit. 
 At the national level fragmented governance means that no actor in the system 
 has the power to effectively incentivise performance improvement or drive 
 through change and reform. Recent attempts by the Government to increase 
 control from the centre through target setting and top-down initiatives have had 
 limited success and have made policing even less responsive to local needs 
 and circumstances. At the local level there is no real democratic accountability: 
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 police authorities are weak, unaccountable and remote, while elected local 
 government has no effective say over local policing priorities.’ (ibid; p. 8). 
This position was supported by the HMIC thematic review of police authorities in 2010 
(HMIC, 2010). 
 
The Conservative led coalition government made it a priority to address these 
‘problems’ in policing governance immediately they came to office, articulated within 
their coalition programme (Cabinet Office 2010 p.13). A consultation paper was 
published just two years prior to the abolition of the police authorities which put PCCs 
in place;  ‘Policing in the 21st Century: Reconnecting police and the people (Home 
Office 2010), made it clear that: 
 ‘We will abolish Police Authorities and put power directly in the hands of the 
 public. For the first time ever the public will be able to directly vote for an 
 individual to represent their community’s policing needs…These reforms are 
 too pressing for a lengthy Royal Commission on increasing policing 
 accountability. The coalition agreement set out our intention to introduce Police 
 and Crime Commissioners. We are keen to hear your views about how we can 
 make this work most effectively. We will introduce legislation in the autumn and 
 the public will be able to vote for their Commissioners for the first time in May 
 2012’. (ibid paras. 2.4/ 2.7) 
 
The paper outlined how the government saw the role of PCC as an agent to reconnect 
the public with policing and reducing top down influence. It stated that; 
 ‘Police and Crime Commissioners will be powerful representatives of the public 
 leading the fight against crime and ASB. They will ensure that: 
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 • The public can better hold police forces and senior officers to account; 
 • There is greater public engagement in policing both in terms of priority setting 
 and active citizenship; 
 • There is greater public – rather than Whitehall – ownership of force 
 performance; and, 
 • The public have someone ‘on their side’ in the fight against crime and ASB.  
  Police and Crime Commissioners will ensure that the police are held to account 
 democratically, not bureaucratically by Whitehall. This is part of the deal for the 
 police: removing micro-management by central government in local policing, in 
 return for much greater responsiveness to and engagement with the public.’ 
 (ibid paras. 2.5-2.6). 
 
The coalition government clearly placed great store in direct elections providing the 
solution to the problem of a ‘democratic deficit’ in policing governance. Reiner (2013) 
however cautioned that this was but one element, and that the assumption that the 
problem was solved was dangerous. He noted	that	the	introduction	of	PCCs:	
		 ‘identifies	democracy	solely	and	wholly	with	voting;	a	contemporary	trope	that	
	 is	(mis)used	much	more	widely...	Free	and	fair	elections	are	a	necessary	but	not	
	 a	sufficient	condition	of	democracy’	(ibid	p.	173).	
 
The apparent haste on the part of the Conservative party to introduce this key policy 
was, perhaps demonstrated by the ‘…late and unwelcome’ introduction of Police and 
Crime Panels (PCPs), a body whose purpose was to hold to account and to support 
the PCC. The PCP construct was only included in the legislation following pressure 
  
 
 54 
from the Liberal Democrat element of the coalition government (Caless and Owen, 
2016, Bailey, 2017). 
 
On 28 March, 2011, a speech by Nick Herbert MP, (Herbert, 2011), became a 
statement of intent by the Cameron led coalition to introduce PCCs. The policing 
governance ‘problem’ that Nick Herbert described: 
 ‘…is that police authorities are not strong enough to exercise this alternative 
 governance, and they are not sufficiently connected to the public’  
 (Herbert, 2011). 
 
Clearly the consultation was not about whether or when, but how PCCs would be 
introduced.  This provided the background for the most significant change to policing 
governance in nearly 50 years. 
 
Police Authorities-v-Police & Crime Commissioners comparative Models, Roles, 
Responsibilities and Powers. 
Having dealt with the drivers for change, this chapter will now analyse the legislation 
that defines the roles, relationships and responsibilities of PCCs in comparison to that 
which applied to police authorities from 1964. In order to understand the scale of the 
paradigm shift in policing governance across England and Wales that occurred 
following the elections for PCCs, it might be helpful to compare and contrast the two 
models of governance. 
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An express objective of the coalition government in driving the implementation of 
PCCs was to ‘reconnect the police and the people’ (Home Office 2010).  This would 
suggest a simplified construct, which facilitated accessibility by the community to the 
governance framework enabling the community to both express its needs, 
expectations and complaints whilst at the same time understanding with more clarity 
the rationales for strategic and tactical policing activity.  A comparison of the reality of 
the two governance frameworks suggests that the new model is more, not less 
complex and for the layperson potentially even more opaque.  It is helpful to compare 
Figure 1 (ante) that describes the pre 2012 model (Murphy, Eckersley and Ferry 
(2016)), with that post the implementation of PCCs, (Figure 2) which the authors use 
to demonstrate that in spite of government rhetoric, the new model is considerably 
more complicated (ibid): 
  
 
NB. The Association of Chief Police Officers included above is now no longer in existence, its role in this context is 
taken by the National Police Chief’s Council. 
  
 
 56 
The new governance model was described by Lister (2013, p. 241) as a ‘quadripartite’ 
governance framework, with the added Police and Crime Panel component. 
 
Policing Governance in England and Wales 1964-2012 
The Police Act 1964 (Home Office 1964), a significant piece of legislation in police 
governance established not only police authorities, but also put in place the tripartite 
arrangement of governance.  In addition it delineated police areas and dealt with many 
day-to-day organisational issues such as pensions, codes of police conduct.  
 
Within this legislation, the ‘Police Authority’ . Two thirds of the authority were required 
to be councillors appointed by the relevant council and one-third local magistrates 
(S2.1 (Home Office 1964)). 
 
In the case of metropolitan police areas (i.e. Manchester, Liverpool, West Midlands 
etc.) and combined areas (i.e. Thames Valley Police with policing responsibility for 
more than one county), similar arrangements were prescribed, except for the case of 
The (London) Metropolitan Police on which the Act was silent and for whom the police 
authority remained the Home Secretary until the enactment of The Police and 
Magistrates Courts Act, 1994 (Home Office (1994)), when, inter alia, the (London) 
Metropolitan Police Authority was established with similar responsibilities to the then 
reformed county Police Authorities. Other ‘non Home Office’ Police forces (i.e. City of 
London, British Transport Police & Ministry of Defence Police) had separate 
governance arrangements outside the Police Act 1964, though they generally mirrored 
those prescribed by the Act. 
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Having established police authorities, the 1964 Act identified their responsibilities. It 
stated that the police authority should secure an ‘adequate’ and ‘efficient’ police force 
for their area. In doing so they were required to appoint the chief constable and 
determine the number of police officers of each rank in the force. More prosaically they 
were also charged with maintaining adequate police buildings, vehicles and equipment 
(ibid S4, (1)-(4)). 
 
It is interesting to note that significantly more attention within the 1964 Act is devoted 
to the procurement responsibilities of the police authority than to any discussion of 
how it might go about securing the ‘ maintenance of an adequate and efficient police 
force’. Still less space is given to what an adequate or efficient police force might look 
like or how it might be judged, except that annually the chief constable was required to 
produce a report to the police authority ‘…on the policing for that year..’.,(ibid S12 (1)) 
or when required by the police authority (ibid S12 (2)). This being the extent to which 
the chief constable and the force were to be held to account. 
 
The seeds of the later demise of police authorities may, in fact lie in the complete lack 
of reference in the Police Act 1964 to any form of public or community engagement, 
representation or communication. This was the core of later of complaints that the 
police authority governance construct created an accountability and democratic deficit. 
Reiner, (1991), Reiner (2013), Loveday and Reid (2003) Lister and Rowe (2015), 
MIllen and Stephens, (2011) and Muir and Lodge (2008).  It appears that the original 
model, like the policing culture of its time did not see community understanding or 
engagement as being relevant.  
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Successive governments moved towards more centralised control and managerialism 
in policing (Drake and Simper, 2004), and this led to the Police and Magistrates Courts 
Act, 1994 (Home Office (1994)). Amending the 1964 significantly, it stated that; the 
size of a Police Authority would be 17 members (ibid S3A(1). Its purpose was to 
‘secure the maintenance of an efficient and effective police force for its area’. (A 
semantic change in the purpose from ‘appropriate’ to ‘effective’). (ibid S4(1)). It was 
made clear that ‘In discharging its functions, every police authority established under 
section 3 of this Act shall have regard to—(a) any objectives determined by the 
Secretary of State under section 28A of this Act, (ibid S4(2)(a)). Establishing more 
direct downwards influence from central government. 
 
For the first time the Act required police authorities to develop a policing plan ‘Every 
police authority established under section 3 of this Act shall, before the beginning of 
each financial year, determine objectives for the policing of the authority’s area during 
that year’.(ibid S4A (1))	
In the 1994 Act, there was, however still no requirement, or recommendation to 
consult communities when assessing policing needs or the allocation of policing 
resources.  
 
There was some movement in the direction of public engagement with the 
implementation of the Police Act 1996, (Home Office 1996). This consolidated much of 
the 1994 Act, and placed a responsibility on the authority to produce a three year 
strategic plan, (ibid S 6A(1)). This however, had to be compliant with directions of the 
Home Office and in consultation with the chief constable. The Act for the first time 
instructed the police authority to obtain the views of local people about matters 
concerning the policing of the area, and their co-operation with the police in preventing 
crime in that area’(ibid S96 (1)). 
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Attempts made by the police authority to engage with communities in accordance with 
S 96 of The Police Act 1996 were often lacklustre, (Author’s personal observation). In 
the early 2000’s however, it became increasingly apparent from government that the 
importance of community engagement in policing was growing, and becoming an 
existential threat to the police authorities. This was particularly the case when reports 
began to use phrases such as ‘democratic deficit’. These attempts at public 
engagement by the authorities were, however ineffective. It appeared that the police, 
as they became more sophisticated in their public engagement strategies, rapidly left 
police authorities behind in this regard.  The police authority relied increasingly upon 
the police to carry out the engagement required to comply with S96, Police Act 1996 
on their behalf (Author’s personal observation).   
 
Loveday (2018 p.3) noted that the Police Acts 1994 and 1996 (Home Office 1994, 
Home Office, 1996) significantly reduced the power and influence of police authorities 
within the tripartite arrangement. Chief constables and ACPO were more directly 
linked to the Home Office through national priority setting, the number of members on 
the authority was significantly reduced, chief constables had more budgetary control 
and the HMIC were given wider responsibilities.  Legislation that tended to further 
marginalise police authorities proved to be the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (Home 
Office, 1998a). Gilling (2008) congratulated the New Labour government for bringing in 
the act as a radical reform in crime control, but at the same time he criticised its 
effective government control of the Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships 
(CDRP) set up by the Act.  
 
Police authorities had, therefore a relatively narrow and declining remit that amounted 
to scrutinising and holding the chief constable and the police force to account for the 
efficient and effective delivery of policing across their area of responsibility, producing 
a strategic plan and appointing or dismissing the chief constable and other chief 
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officers (Loveday, 2018).  Until 1996, there was no requirement to engage with the 
communities who were subject to the service being delivered.  When that became a 
requirement the authorities were ineffective in doing so Loveday and Reid (2003), Muir 
and Lodge (2008), Herbert (2011). The end of the era of police authorities was 
drawing inexorably to its close. 
 
The Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 (Home Office 2011).   
The 2011 Act abolished police authorities (ibid S1(9)) and established PCCs across 41 
police forces in England and Wales outside of London (ibid S1 (1)). It also established 
the analogous ‘Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime’  (ibid S3 (1)) that empowered 
the Mayor of London to perform a similar governance role for policing across the 
metropolis. The Act included descriptions of the responsibilities of the PCC and of the 
Mayor for London, their relationships with police forces, government and Her Majesty’s 
Inspectorate of Constabulary. It also included the arrangements for the election of 
PCCs.  The Act also dealt with a number of loosely connected issues, including ‘selling 
of alcohol to children’ (ibid S118), ‘demonstrations in the vicinity of parliament’  (ibid 
S141 (1)) and ‘restrictions on arrest warrants in private prosecutions’ (ibid S153 (1)). 
This made the Act a historical piece of legislation that revolutionised police 
governance.  
 
Responsibilities of The Police and Crime Commissioner 
The 2011 Act, at the outset established the PCC as a ‘corporation sole’ (ibid S1 (2), 
the office to perpetuating while individual post holders may change. This is a status 
that has its roots in ecclesiastical law and includes the monarchy and other high 
offices of state McLean (2012). 
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The functions of the PCC set by the Act were very broad, and certainly wider than the 
narrow scrutiny remit of the police authorities. Section 1 of the Act dealt with the 
‘Police’ dimension of the role, in terms of maintaining an ‘efficient and effective’ police 
service and to holding the chief constable to account for the delivery of his/ her 
statutory functions (ibid S1 ss. 6-8)). 
 
The thrust of Chapter 3 of the Act is the requirement of the production by the PCC of a 
Police and Crime Plan, immediately within the financial year that he/ she takes up 
office and to review and re-issue on a regular basis (ibid S5 (1-13)).  In this section, 
the only reference to the PCC having regard to external considerations is one that ties 
the PCC back to central government by the need to maintain certain strategic policing 
resources for national deployment in times of crisis. This had regard to the ‘strategic 
policing requirement’ issued by the Secretary of State under section 37A of the Police 
Act 1996’. (ibid S 5. (5)) 
 
In addition to responsibilities within policing, S 9(1) of the Act empowers the PCC to 
make ‘Crime and Disorder Reduction Grants’ to individuals or bodies whose activities 
may tend to reduce crime and disorder in the relevant area, extending similar powers 
and practices exercised by the police authorities. 
 
Public and community consultation requirements were, as one would expect from the 
above drivers for change, significantly increased for PCCs beyond those placed upon 
the police authorities by The Police Act 1996 (Home Office, 1996).  In particular, S 14 
(1-6) of the 2011 Act extends the provisions of S.96 of the 1996 act to include the 
views of victims of crime as to policing issues in addition to communities more 
generally. Given the concerns regarding the ‘democratic deficit’, and the inability of 
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police authorities to engage with the public (MIllen and Stephens, 2011), it might have 
provided more detail in the legislation as to how a single individual could be expected 
achieve this more effectively than an authority of 17 members. 
 
S 21 of the 2011 Act, et. seq provides the PCC with financial powers to receive the 
various policing grants and to allocate them according to policing needs.  In addition, 
S26 enables the Commissioner to set a precept on local rates to contribute to the 
policing fund.  
 
Accountability of the Police and Crime Commissioner  
The creation of a body to hold the PCC to account became something of an after 
thought brought about at the insistence of the Liberal party element of the coalition 
government, (Caless and Owen, 2016, Bailey, 2017)).  As argued by Policing Minister 
Nick Herbert MP seeking to justify the inclusion of this body; 
 ‘To prevent too much power from being invested in a single individual, we are 
 putting in place strict checks and balances.  These will include local Police and 
 Crime Panels, with representatives from each local authority and independent 
 members, with the power to scrutinise the commissioner’s actions’.  
 (Herbert 2011). 
 
Section 28 of the 2011 Act established the Police and Crime Panel (PCP); 
 ‘The functions of the police and crime panel for a police area must be 
 exercised with a view to supporting the effective exercise of the functions of the 
 police and crime commissioner for that police area’. (ibid S 28 (2)). 
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At the same time the PCP is required to review and scrutinise the activities of the 
PCC. This includes decisions made, or other action taken, by the PCC in connection 
with the discharge of the commissioner’s functions; and to make reports or 
recommendations to the relevant police and crime commissioner with respect to the 
discharge of the commissioner’s functions’. (ibid S. 28 (6)). 
 
This late addition of PCPs to the governance structure has changed the tripartite 
arrangement into a ‘quadripartite’ arrangement (Lister, 2013, Murphy, Eckersley and 
Ferry, 2016).  The findings of Bailey (2017) in his more focused work on this aspect of 
the governance framework raised significant questions as to the efficacy and impact of 
PCPs and questioned Herbert’s reassurance about this model.  Lister and Rowe 
(2013) questioned whether it was realistic to expect PCPs to be able to fulfill their 
disparate roles of both scrutinising and supporting the PCC. Lister (2014) later 
concluded that the PCP’s performance so far as scrutiny of the PCC was concerned 
was Ineffective and unchallenging. Loveday (2013) drew attention to the fact that there 
was no requirement for the PCC to act upon any recommendation or requirement of 
the PCP. Indeed, in the view of Loveday (2018) the issue of the accountability of PCCs 
appeared to have replaced the earlier concerns expressed regarding the accountability 
of chief constables (Loveday 2018 p.5) 
 
Appointment and Dismissal of Chief Constables 
A section of the 2011 Act that was to generate much debate and which forms a key 
part of the findings of this thesis (Chapter six), this concerns the ability of the PCC to 
‘hire and fire’ chief constables’ (Orde, 2011).   
  
 
 64 
The chief constable is the most senior operational police officer within a police force. 
The 2011 Act sets out their responsibilities; 
 ‘A police force, and the civilian staff of a police force, are under the direction 
 and control of the chief constable of the force’. (ibid S 2 (3)).   
It had previously been the role of the police authority to appoint and potentially dismiss 
the whole of the chief officer team (including Deputy Chief Constable and Assistant 
Chief Constables) Police Act 1964  (S6 (4)). The candidates for chief officer posts 
needed the approval of the Secretary of State (ibid S 6 (4)). This was in practice based 
on the advice of HMIC. Under the 2011 Act, there is no requirement for candidates to 
be so approved. However, the PCC must, according Schedule 8 of the Act seek the 
approval of the relevant PCP for the appointment of the chief constable. The PCP 
must in turn hold a public ‘confirmation hearing’ at which the preferred candidate for 
the post will be questioned (ibid Sched. 8 (6; 1-4)).  The PCP has the power to veto 
the appointment of the candidate (ibid Sched 8, (8: (1-3)). If they do so, the provisions 
are somewhat vague as to what the further steps are, other than stating that the 
Secretary of State may make regulations to deal with such circumstances (ibid Sched. 
8 (9,10)).   
 
There was also increasing controversy surrounding the powers of PCCs to dismiss 
chief constables. Schedule 8 of the 2011 Act sets out the procedure for the PCC to 
remove a chief constable. This is achieved by requiring the chief constable to resign or 
retire and where the chief constable has no alternative but to do so (S 38 ibid).  The 
only procedural requirements placed upon the PCC in this regard are for him/ her to 
provide the chief constable with a written explanation of the decision, and then to 
consider any written response from the chief constable. At the same time the PCC 
should seek advice from HMIC and inform the PCP who will consider the proposal and 
may hold a scrutiny hearing.  The PCP is required to inform the PCC of their views 
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within six weeks of the initiation of this process.  Following that process it is then solely 
the decision of the PCC whether or not to dismiss the chief constable; 
 ‘…the role of the panel is purely advisory. The final decision to dismiss a Chief 
 Constable rests with the commissioner alone.’ (House of Commons, 2013 p.3). 
 
There is no role in this process for the Home Secretary, and the view of the Home 
Affairs Committee on the matter was somewhat equivocal; 
 ‘Some will argue that it represents an undermining of the independence of the 
 office of chief constable if it becomes too easy for their political masters to 
 dismiss them over any minor disagreement or personality clash. On the other 
 hand, it is essential to commissioners’ role as directly elected office-holders 
 that they have the power to dismiss chief constables, and commissioners can 
 and should provide robust, critical challenge to chief constables. It is right that 
 commissioners should have the initiative in removing a chief constable…’   
 (ibid p.5). 
 
The response from government to the report by the Home Affairs Committee was to 
state that they felt that there were sufficient safeguards in place within the process to 
remove chief constable and that they would remind PCPs that they should fully 
exercise their powers of scrutiny in this regard (Home Office, 2013). Tom Winsor the 
Chief HMIC attempted to reinforce this when he cautioned PCCs to exercise care 
when using their powers to dismiss chief constables ‘without reason (or at will)’, and 
reminded them that they should do so in the context of the 2011 Act as a whole and 
only in respect of matters where the performance of the chief constable affected the 
delivery of policing objectives  (Winsor, 2013 p. 9). Despite in his speech Winsor’s 
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attempts to clarify this issue, by the end of it the situation remained as opaque as at 
the start.  
 
In the case of R v PCC South Yorkshire (2017) the PCC for South Yorkshire, required 
his chief constable to resign following a public comment by the chief constable in 
respect of the findings of the independent panel examining the ‘Hillsborough’ tragedy 
in which 96 people lost their lives at a soccer match in 1989. The comments of the 
chief constable were subject to public criticism and to censure in parliament.  The chief 
constable applied for judicial review of the decision of the PCC. The court found that 
the decision of the PCC in this case was irrational in view of the representations made 
by the chief constable and HMIC to him regarding his decision, and that he should 
have taken due regard of them.  Yet, still the process remains unchanged, and in the 
event the chief constable did not return to office.  Another example which raised 
questions as to the competence of PCCs to manage disciplinary issues in respect of 
chief constables alone proved to be that of the chief constable of Cheshire police. He 
was charged with allegations of gross misconduct by his PCC in spite of never having 
been informed of the allegations or interviewed about them. The disciplinary panel 
chair held that the actions of the PCC were ‘…an affront to natural justice’ and that it 
had ‘the potential to discredit public confidence in the police misconduct regulations’ 
(BBC, 2018).  
 
Police Operational Independence 
A key issue within the policing governance model in England and Wales is that of the 
operational independence of the chief constable and thereby the police force (Orde, 
2011, Caless, 2011, Wells, 2015, Winsor, 2013).  This debate has continued into the 
   
  
 67 
current PCC construct. It was also addressed by Herbert (2011) in a speech to the 
Institute for Public Policy Research: 
 ‘It’s fundamental to the British system that the police remain operationally 
 independent.  No politician can tell a constable – a sworn officer of the crown – 
 who to arrest.  Forces will continue to be under the legal ‘direction and control’ 
 of their chief constable.’ (Ibid 2011). 
  
The government consultation paper Policing the 21st Century  (Home office 2010) 
identified this concern and was explicit in addressing it: 
 ‘Giving chief constables a clear line of accountability to directly elected Police 
 and Crime commissioners will not cut across their operational independence 
 and duty to act without fear or favour.’ (ibid, para. 2.13). 
 
HMIC, in its thematic review of police governance attempted to define police operation 
al independence as; 
 ‘The principal consideration of whether a matter falls within the chief constables 
 operational remit is, accordingly, whether it is, or significantly impacts on, an 
 issue in relation to which he or she has specific expertise (i.e. how to uphold 
 the law in their force area)’. (HMIC, 2010 p.18) 
 
The independence of chief constables in terms of the new governance model was 
meant to be clarified by Nick Herbert MP, when he described the proposed legislative 
arrangements for doing so: 
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 ‘The government has therefore committed to developing a new protocol – 
 which has also been described as a Memorandum of Understanding – to 
 delineate the key responsibilities of Chief Constables, Police and Crime 
 Commissioners, the new local Police and Crime Panels’ (Herbert 2011). 
 
The Policing Protocol Order 2011, Home Office (2011a) is a statutory instrument 
issued under S. 79 of the 2011 Act. It sets out the powers and duties of the PCC 
insofar as the relationship between the chief constable and the PCC is concerned.  In 
terms of the operational independence of the chief constable it states that; 
 ‘…the PCC must not fetter the operational independence of the police force 
 and the Chief Constable who leads it... The Chief Constable is accountable to 
 the law for the exercise of police powers, and to the PCC for the delivery of 
 efficient and effective policing, management of resources and expenditure by 
 the police force. At all times the Chief Constable, their constables and staff, 
 remain operationally independent…’  (Ibid paras. 18 & 22). 
 
The protocol, having made it clear that the PCC should not impinge upon the 
operational independence of the chief constable, goes on to recognise that there is 
some room for debate as to what operational independence means in practice. It 
exhorts the chief constable and PCC to work it out between themselves; 
 ‘The PCC and Chief Constable must work together to safeguard the principle of 
 operational independence, while ensuring that the PCC is not fettered in 
 fulfilling their statutory role. The concept of operational independence is not 
 defined in statute, and as HMIC has stated, by its nature, is fluid and context-
 driven’. (ibid para. 35). 
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The concept of operational independence by chief officers, was, therefore in the view 
of the government enshrined in the Policing Protocol Order 2011, which purportedly 
reinforced the principles established by the stated cases of Fisher –V- Oldham 
Corporation, (1930) and the Blackburn dicta (R v Commissioner of Police of the 
Metropolis ex parte Blackburn1968 [2QB 118]). The assumption that strong police 
operational independence was universally beneficial was not unchallenged. Loveday 
(2017, p. 29) argued that the drive by successive governments to preserve this model 
actually mitigated against democratic accountability, and cited the fact that this gave 
chief constables the ability to rebuff challenges without proper scrutiny (Brogden, 
1982, Reiner, 2000).   
 
Winsor (2013) in his John Harris Memorial Lecture, in a response to concerns around 
police operational independence that had arisen since the implementation of PCCs 
provided a comprehensive review of the development and importance of the 
operational independence of chief constables, concluding that; 
 ‘In making the chief constable accountable to a directly elected police and 
 crime commissioner, Parliament did not intend to affect or diminish the 
 operational independence of the police, which remains a fundamental principle 
 of British policing. The concept of a chief constable being accountable to the 
 police and crime commissioner does not mean that he or she is not 
 independent of the police and crime commissioner’. (ibid, p. 12). 
 
Lister (2013) examined the way in which the Policing Protocol Order  (Home Office 
2011a) affected operational police independence. He found that although the protocol 
spoke of the importance of such independence, it goes on to undermine that ambition; 
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  ‘…by the nature, scope and reach of the powers that it confers on PCCs’  
 (ibid,  p. 10). 
 
Supporting Lister, Loveday (2014) identified that the ‘unfettered powers’ of the PCC 
were significantly more wide-ranging than those of the police authority.   Lister (2013) 
drew attention to the potential impact of strategic, policy decisions upon chief 
constable’s ability to deliver operational outcomes. He correctly predicted that the 
matter would be subject to clarification by the courts (ibid, p.13). 
 
The 2017 case of R-v- PCC South Yorkshire ([2017] EWHC 1349) examined the 
decision of the PCC for South Yorkshire to suspend and then require the resignation of 
the Chief Constable in respect of matters relating to the inquest of those that died in 
the Hillsborough tragedy (BBC, 2016a BBC 2017).  The judgement found that the PCC 
was; 
 ‘…obliged to hold the relevant chief constable to account  in respect of all the 
 functions  of the chief constable and for all the functions of those acting under 
 his direction and control... In our judgement matters relevant to operational 
 independence are not excluded from the scope of the PCCs power of scrutiny. 
 The operational independence at common law [See notably Commissioner of 
 the Metropolis ex parte Blackburn [1968 2QB 118 at 135] must give way if so 
 required by the terms of the 2011 Act and in our judgement the Act qualifies 
 that common law rule’   
 (R-v- PCC South Yorkshire ([2017]	EWHC 1349 paras 76-78) 
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The implications of this judgement are considerable and have yet to be fully realised 
by both PCCs and Chief Constables. At the 2018 CoPaCC policing governance 
conference during the debates, it was clear that very few participants were aware of 
the significance of the case in terms of identifying the responsibility of PCCs for all 
operational policing delivery (CoPaCC, 2018). 
 
The very live issues of police accountability and operational independence have 
become key issues within the research.  The research questions identified in Chapter 
four were framed in order to capture not only the clear areas of operational police 
activity such as policing operations in terms of arrests etc., but also grey areas such as 
those where the decisions of the PCC may affect the ability of the chief constable to 
deliver an effective operational response. This might include the closure (or otherwise) 
of police stations, or the categories of police staff taken under direct control of the 
Commissioner under the so-called ‘Stage 2’ arrangements (Home Office, (2011) 
Sched. 15 Para 23).  
 
The Role of The Chief Constable 
The Policing Protocol Order 2011 (Home Office 2011a) states that: 
 ‘The Chief Constable is responsible for maintaining the Queen’s Peace, and 
 has direction and control over the force’s officers and staff. The Chief 
 Constable holds office under the Crown, but is appointed by the PCC…The 
 Chief Constable is accountable to the law for the exercise of police powers, 
 and to the PCC for the delivery of efficient and effective policing, management 
 of resources and expenditure by the police force. At all times the Chief 
 Constable, their constables and staff, remain operationally independent in the 
 service of the communities that they serve.' (ibid) 
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In particular, the legislation specifically requires the chief constable to; lead the force, 
ensuring that it acts with impartiality and to appoint the force’s officers and staff (in 
consultation with the PCC, in the case of officers above the rank of Chief 
Superintendent and police staff equivalents).  They should manage all complaints 
against the force, its officers and staff, except in relation to the Chief Constable, and 
ensure that the PCC is kept informed in such a way as to enable the PCC to discharge 
their statutory obligations.  
 
The chief constable is also required to support the PCC in the delivery of the strategy 
and objectives set out in his/ her plan, to assist the PCC in planning the force’s budget. 
Provide the PCC with access to information, officers and staff.  In particular exercising 
the power of direction and control in such a way as is reasonable to enable their PCC 
to have access to all necessary information and staff within the force.  
 
In doing so they must have regard to the national Strategic Policing Requirement when 
exercising and planning their policing functions in respect of their force’s national and 
international policing responsibilities. They have day-to-day responsibility for financial 
management of the force within the framework of the agreed budget allocation and 
levels of authorisation issued by the PCC. 
 
They must notify and brief the PCC of any matter or investigation on which the PCC 
may need to provide public assurance either alone or in company with the Chief 
Constable (the Act also states that all PCCs will be designated as Crown Servants 
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under the Official Secrets Act 1989(a), making them subject to the same duties in 
relation to sensitive material as Government Ministers). 
 
The chief constable is the operational voice of policing in the force area regularly 
explaining to the public the operational activity. Where appropriate they enter into 
collaboration agreements with other Chief Constables, other policing bodies and 
partners that improve the efficiency or effectiveness of policing.  
The chief constable must at all times remain politically independent of their PCC.  
Home Office 2011a (paras. 21-23). 
 
The government’s desired relationship between the chief constable and the PCC, was 
summarised within the protocol as being: 
 ‘The relationship between the PCC and Chief Constable is defined by the 
 PCC’s democratic mandate to hold the Chief Constable to account, and by the 
 law itself: primary legislation and common law already provide clarity on the 
 legal principles that underpin operational independence and the Office of 
 Constable.’ (ibid, para. 36). 
   
This assertion as to clarity around police operational independence has, as discussed 
been apparently overturned by judgement of the court in the case of R-v- PCC South 
Yorkshire QBD (2017). 
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Brain, a former Chief Constable of Gloucestershire raised a worrying spectre within the 
new governance paradigm with particular reference to the relationship between the 
PCC and the Chief Constable: 
 ‘Chief constables have always faced political pressure from politicians, but the 
 ultimate power in policing authorities was dispersed. Now, there will be a risk of 
 more subtle influence: behind closed doors, a PCC may ask a chief constable 
 to focus on a particular local area where the commissioner has a lot of support. 
 And the new PCCs have sole authority to appoint or remove the chief 
 constable. Removing a chief constable is messy, but they will also be on fixed-
 term contracts, so if you were a young, ambitious chief constable, not quite 
 ready for your pension and your contract was near renewal, what would you 
 do?’ (Brain, 2012). 
 
Lister (2013) also saw potential problems in the interpersonal relationship between 
PCCs and chief constables and it’s potential detrimental impact upon policing services 
(ibid p.245). Davies and Johnson (2016) pointed to examples of such relationships 
ranging from ‘strong partnerships to total breakdown’, the latter being a reference to 
the dismissal of chief constables by PCCs in Avon and Somerset Police, Lincolnshire 
Police and Gwent Police (ibid p.285).  
 
The findings in later chapters will consider whether this critical interpersonal 
relationship allows for the delivery of effective policing and community safety. 
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The Role of Central Government 
The historical ‘tripartite arrangement’ was described above as a balanced construct in 
which chief police officers, the Home Office and police authorities each contributed to 
the governance of policing across England and Wales. The Home Office provided 
central funding and national policy, the authorities, local funding and accountability and 
Chief Officers, operational delivery professional management of policing Lustgarten, 
(1986), Mawby & Wright, (2003).  The 2011 Act (Home Office,(2011) and the Policing 
Protocol (2011) (Home Office (2011a) demonstrated the intention of the Home Office 
to end the hitherto growing centralist approach: 
 ‘The establishment of PCCs has allowed for the Home Office to withdraw from 
 day-to-day policing matters, giving the police greater freedom to fight crime as 
 they see fit, and allowing local communities to hold the police to account’. 
 (Home Office 2011a para. 27.). 
 
The Home Office, however retained within the Policing Protocol significant influence. 
Thus the Home Secretary has reserve powers and legislative tools that enable 
intervention and direction to all parties, in order to prevent or mitigate risk to the public 
or national security.  These, as emphasised in the protocol will be used only as a last 
resort, and will not be used to interfere with the ‘democratic will of the electorate’.  In 
addition, the Home Secretary has retained accountability for national security and the 
role that the police service plays within the delivery of any national response. The 
Home Secretary is required to issue a ‘Strategic Policing Requirement’ that sets out 
what are the national threats at the time and the national policing capabilities that are 
required to counter them. (Ibid paras. 28 & 29). The express intent of the Home Office 
to move away from immediate engagement in police governance and its impact would 
be tested during this research. 
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As the government policy of decentralisation of local government to metropolitan 
mayors, (Casebourne, 2017) has moved forward, the new city mayors are, like the 
Mayor of London to be given the responsibility for policing governance and have been 
empowered to act as PCCs by the Cities and Local Government Devolution Act 2016 
(S107F (1)). 
 
Summary 
The legislation that created and guided the police authorities within the ‘tripartite 
arrangement’, the Police Act 1964, the Police and Magistrates Court Act, 1994 and the 
Police Act 1996 required that the authorities hold the police to account and provide 
scrutiny as to efficiency and effectiveness, the later two Acts required that the 
authorities do this in the context of the views of communities.  
 
The potential impact of a single elected individual, the PCC with ‘unfettered powers’ 
(Loveday 2014) who has responsibility for setting policing strategy and relying upon 
the Chief Constable, (whom they have ‘hired’ and may ‘fire’) to deliver that strategy 
while at the same time delivering day to day policing is at the core of this research. 
 
The relationship between the PCC and the chief constable, is therefore crucial in 
delivering effective policing.  Gilling, 2014 identified that prior to the introduction of 
PCCs, within the manageralist governance construct that chief constables and the 
Home Office were in a principal/ agent relationship statutorily imposed by the Police 
Reform Act 2002 (Home Office, 2002) that gave the Home Office powers to monitor 
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performance in police forces and to intervene in failing forces. Loveday (2017), Raine 
(2016), Davies and Johnson (2016), pointed to an analogous ‘principal/ agent’ 
relationship between the PCC and the chief constable. Davies and Johnson (2016), 
examined the principal/ agent relationship relying on the definition by Pratt and 
Zeckerhauser (1985): 
 ‘Whenever one individual depends on the action of another, an agency 
 relationship arises. The individual taking the action is called the agent. The 
 affected party is the principal’ (ibid, p.2) 
 
 Davies and Johnson (2016), drew upon the analysis of research based on interviews 
of PCCs and chief constables. Davies and Johnson’s findings suggested that the 
formation of a principal/ agent relationship may, in the context of policing governance 
be positive so long as ‘goal divergence’ is avoided. Their paper goes on to recommend 
tactics for maintaining an effective relationship between the PCC and chief constable. 
The extent of the principal/ agent relationship and its importance would be explored 
within this research. 
 
Early Days – An Analysis of the Implementation of Police & Crime 
Commissioners. Public, Media, Academic and Political perceptions  
The election process for PCCs across England and Wales, held on 15th November 
2012 was badly organised. There was little public information as to what the PCC was, 
or how voters would have a voice in policing their communities.  The chair of the 
Electoral Commission Jenny Watson stated that the government had not delivered an 
effective process, and that this had caused a record low turnout of voters. The 
elections she argued had taken place: 
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‘…at an unfamiliar time of year, which is why we have made clear at every 
stage that it would be important to engage effectively with voters…The 
government took a number of decisions about how to run these elections that 
we did not agree with…’  (BBC 2012 (a)). 
 
The average voter turnout across the country was 15.1%, the lowest being 
Staffordshire at 12 % and West Midlands at 12.3 %. The highest turnout was in 
Northamptonshire at 19.8%, (Electoral Commission 2013). The highest figure was still 
well short of the average of turnouts for local elections, which vary, but as a 
reasonable comparator the turnout for the most recent local elections held in 5 May 
2011 across England was 42% (Rallings and Thrasher, 2011). The new PCC elections 
were the lowest ever turnout for a national election, the previous low being the 1999 
elections to the European elections which stood at 23.1%, Berman, Coleman and 
Taylor (2012). 
 
The Electoral Commission review of the 2012 PCC elections, Electoral Commission 
(2013) identified the factors that accounted for the very poor turnout; 
 ‘There were a number of factors at play here: the arguments about these being 
 new elections taking place at an unfamiliar time of year are well rehearsed. But 
 the decision to limit public support to candidates in getting information about 
 themselves to voters, so that candidate information was provided primarily via 
 a website, was a mistake…the Home Office does not have the necessary 
 expertise to set the detailed legal framework for holding elections. As a result 
 some of the rules were confirmed too late, which caused confusion or a lack of 
 certainty for candidates and electoral administrators. This is unacceptable. This 
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 expertise resides with the Cabinet Office, and they should have played a 
 greater role’ (ibid p.7) 
 
This review provides support for Loveday’s description of the process as an ‘Election 
Omnishambles’ (Loveday, 2012, p. 183). The process did little to add to the credibility 
of the role of PCC, or indeed the democratic mandate of the post holders as they 
assumed their new roles.  The claim in Loveday (2012) and the Electoral Commission 
(2013) that one of the most significant factors in the lack of public engagement in the 
election process was the lack of information was supported by a poll reported in 
Berman, Coleman and Taylor (2012). This also identified a significant level of 
antipathy and disinterest: 
I didn't have enough information about the candidates to make a decision  45%  
I don't agree with electing police officials in this way     19% 
I wasn't interested         18%  
I didn't think that my vote would make difference     5%  
I wasn't aware of the election        3%  
I didn't know where to go to cast my vote      2%  
Other           9% 
        (ibid p.10)  
 
The majority of those elected to positions of PCCs in 2012 were former elected 
politicians (52%) Berman, Coleman and Taylor (2012). Interestingly a significant 
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number of independent candidates were successful (29%) (ibid). The division of the 
political representation was, 16 Conservative, 13 Labour and 12 Independents. 
In part, the concept of PCCs was based upon the US Sherriff model (Cameron 2005), 
it is therefore interesting to compare the voter turnout at elections for Sherriffs in the 
USA.  Tomberlin (2018) questions how meaningful accountability through election is, 
given the low awareness of voters coupled with a low and reducing turnout (ibid. p 
143). In doing so he cited Macaig (2014) who researched voter turnout in local 
elections (which included sheriffs) across 144 large US cities, and found an average of 
26.6% in 2001 and 21% in 2011.   Both Tomberlin and Macaig raised concerns of 
legitimacy with those turnout figures although they were clearly much higher than in 
the PCC elections of 2012 and 2016. 
 
Given the high level of politically motivated successful candidates in the PCC 
elections, Newburn (2012) in one of the first articles following the election of PCCs in 
November 2012, exhorted them to act in an apolitical manner; 
 ‘To be truly effective PCCs will need to resist the temptation to play to the 
 gallery, and will need to defend those aspects of policing which are least easy 
 to measure, or may be relatively invisible to the voting public.’                                                                                                    
 (ibid p.2)  
 
Perhaps due to the questionable democratic mandate of PCCs, or the antipathy to the 
new governance framework Orde (2012), Chakrabarti  (2011), Sampson (2012), Jones 
et al, (2012), Loveday (2013 a) and Newburn (2012), there was considerable scrutiny 
of the new policing governance model and how it operated.  
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A relatively positive tone was set by the Home Affairs Committee (HAC) that reviewed 
the development of the governance construct (House of Commons, 2014). The HAC 
found that even at an early stage, PCCs were demonstrating greater clarity of 
leadership and were becoming more recognisable by the public as having 
responsibility for the strategic direction of policing. There were also positive comments 
in respect of the way in which PCCs had addressed collaborative working and support 
for victims. However there were concerns around the transparency of some 
commissioners and the way in which deputies and assistants had been appointed, 
echoing the claims of cronyism made to the committee (ibid pp.46-47). 
 
Concerns were raised around a number of examples where PCCs had within a 
relatively short time following election, sought to dismiss their chief constables (Brain 
2012).   Examples that interested the HAC (House of Commons 2013 & 2014) were, 
the chief constable of Avon and Somerset Police being required to re-apply for his job 
by the incoming PCC, ostensibly in order that the tenure of the chief constable would 
become coterminous with the PCC’s period of office. The chief constable of Gwent 
police, who was invited to retire by the PCC as an alternative to dismissal, and the 
chief constable of Lincolnshire who was suspended by the PCC, only to be reinstated 
by order of the High Court.  Carmel Napier, the chief constable of Gwent police 
summed up the issue for the committee: 
 ‘...the Government had drafted the legislation, the Police Reform and Social 
 Responsibility Act, which apparently gave the PCCs unfettered powers to 
 appoint, suspend, and remove Chief Constables. Therefore no matter what 
 process I went through with the Police and Crime Panel, the outcome could be 
 the same because the PCC is the ultimate decision-maker about what has 
 happened.’ (ibid p.4) 
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The government rejected these concerns (BBC 2013). However, in 2014, the 
Committee on Standards in Public Life (2015) revisited the same issues in its review of 
accountability and ethics in police leadership. Evidence was provided to the committee 
by a range of individuals and organisations including the author, his first supervisor 
and colleagues (Loveday et al 2014). Their paper identified that there were potential 
risks around the relationships between individual PCCs and chief constables, which 
were opaque to the scrutiny of the PCP (ibid p.15).  In addition, their evidence 
highlighted the risks associated with the potential for PCCs to behave unethically in 
the absence of an effective accountability framework (ibid p.16). The Committee on 
Standards in Public Life subsequently found that there was insufficient challenge and 
scrutiny of the PCC in addition to insufficient redress where a PCC’s behaviour fell 
below that expected in public office (Committee on Standards in Public Life, 2015 p.5). 
To date, no changes have been made to the legislation regarding the accountability of 
PCCs.  
 
Further questions have arisen regarding the decisions of PCCs concerning the 
behaviour of PCCs towards chief constables. An example being the suspension of the 
chief constable of South Yorkshire Police and the call for him to resign by the PCC. 
This was later described as unlawful by the High Court (BBC 2017).  In another 
example : 
 ‘…Surrey PC Kevin Hurley’s former chief constable, Lynne Owens showed 
 how ugly things could get when politics, policing and personalities collided’. 
 (BBC 2016). 
 
At the same time, pressure bore upon the new governance construct from the 
‘Independent Police Commission’ set up by the Labour Party which saw the PCC 
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governance construct as ‘riddled with failings’ and ‘systematically flawed’. The report 
called for it to be abandoned Stevens (2013 p.13). The report suggested that it be 
replaced by a system where local authorities appointed police commanders and set 
local policing priorities in a construct similar to that recommended by Loveday and 
Reid (2003). However, the report was silent upon the issue of police accountability. 
The report was not taken forward, particularly given that many Labour party PCCs 
once in the role saw it as effective and had put in place many beneficial initiatives 
(Gaskarth, 2014). 
 
The conduct of a number of PCCs raised further questions regarding the 
appropriateness of one individual having the responsibility for police governance. This 
included the PCC for Kent who appeared in a television documentary where her 
behaviour was criticised, and other concerns were raised regarding her appointment of 
an assistant commissioner (Guardian, 2014).  Shaun Wright PCC for South Yorkshire 
was found to be culpable as head of children’s services in the response to widespread 
child sexual abuse allegations. In spite of pressure from the media and government to 
do so, he did not stand down for a significant period of time. This raised further 
questions as to the accountability of commissioners (BBC 2014).  These concerns 
were recognised by the Committee on Standards in Public Life (2015) that considered 
inter alia evidence submitted by the author and his academic supervisor.  The Lord 
Bew identified the risks resulting from a significant shift in the power balance within the 
police governance structure such that the PCC holds a ‘monocratic’ position that could 
lead to too much power in the hands of the PCC without sufficient public accountability 
(ibid pp. 36-37).  The report also highlighted concerns regarding the relationship 
between the PCC and the chief constable, in particular the potential for the ability of 
PCCs alone to dismiss chief constables or to decline to renew their contracts to impact 
upon the confidence of chief constables to exercise independent professional 
judgement for fear of upsetting the PCC (ibid. p.100). 
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Anecdotal evidence within political parties suggests that some regret the selection of 
their candidate to a PCC post.  The author was informed by a senior party-political 
member that the incumbent PCC affiliated with their party was so incompetent that 
central office was attempting to induce the PCC to step down, but were worried about 
forcing the issue in case the PCC dropped his party allegiance and remained in office 
as a potentially hostile independent (Personal Conversation 2018). 
 
Against this background, four years later the second round of PCC elections were held 
on 5 May 2016. Significantly, these elections were held at the same time as local 
council elections in most areas across England and Wales. This may explain the 
significantly increased voter turnout that was up by 11.5% to a national average of 
26.6%. The voter turnout was significantly higher in areas where local council elections 
were being held in addition to the PCC elections (Electoral Commission, 2016).  This 
may have contributed to the fact that in the 2016 elections, the number of 
Independents fell from 12 to 3, as the political parties increased their share, with 20 
Conservative commissioners, 15 Labour and 3 Plaid Cymru in Wales.  (Dempsey 
(2016 p.16)).   
 
Whilst welcoming the increased voter turnout, the Electoral Commission was still 
critical of the government for failing to improve voter awareness of PCCs in the lead up 
to the elections: 
‘We were disappointed when the Government did not follow this 
recommendation and candidate information was not delivered directly to voters 
ahead of the elections in May 2016. The findings of this report support the 
Commission’s previous concerns about the lack of candidate information 
available to voters to enable them to make an informed decision of how to vote 
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in the PCC elections. They also highlight that this had a significant impact on 
voter understanding of what are still relatively new elections’. (Electoral 
Commission (2016 p.1)). 
 
It is appropriate at this juncture to state that the author was, himself a candidate in the 
2016 PCC elections.  He stood as independent of the main political parties and in the 
event he was not successful. However, the experience gave him a very significant 
insight into the process of the election. It appeared to him that the process militated 
against individuals with no support infrastructure. This was highlighted by Gilmore 
(2013) in her review of the first year of PCCs and Joyce (2016) who found that, public 
apathy to the role meant that the main route for successful PCCs was through party 
political affiliation (ibid. p.50).  This was a view supported by Mawby and Smith (2016) 
who saw the increase in successful party-political candidates as undermining the 
express desire on the part of government to insulate the police from the influence of 
party politics (ibid, p. 29). 
 
In a recent development in terms of PCCs span of responsibility, the Policing and 
Crime Act 2017, which came into force in April 2017, inter alia empowers PCCs to take 
responsibility for fire and rescue services should there be a case to do so (Home 
Office 2017).  Time will tell whether this amendment along with the potential for 
convergence of policing, fire and rescue services will improve community safety, or 
merely support the continuing drive for economies in public services. The 2017 Act 
does not, however change the policing governance construct put in place in 2012. 
Interestingly, and perhaps signalling a direction of travel, at the same time the police 
inspectorate HMIC in July 2017 had its remit extended to fire and rescue services and 
was re named Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services 
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(HMICFRS) (Home Office 2017a), and the government Police Minister is now termed 
the Minister of State for Fire and Policing (Home Office, 2018a). 
 
Summary 
This chapter has catalogued the drivers for change in police governance across 
England and Wales, since the Conservative 2010 manifesto (Conservative Party 2010) 
which was implemented immediately on their election in the Police Reform and Social 
Responsibility Act 2011 (Home Office 2011). This replaced police authorities and put 
in their place PCCs. The chapter has also compared the roles and responsibilities of 
PCCs against the police authorities they replaced, with particular reference to police 
accountability and operational independence. It has also reviewed academic and 
media perceptions of the way that the new governance construct has operated to date. 
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Chapter Four. 
Methodological Choices 
 
Philosophical Positioning and Methodology 
Approaches to social research carry with them important epistemological and 
ontological considerations. (Bryman and Bell, 2003, p.29). The philosophical position 
of the researcher must be made explicit in order that readers of the account of the 
research can understand the paradigm within which the research was conducted 
(Scotland, 2012). If researchers do not understand the principles and assumptions that 
underpin their research then this may limit or distort the integrity and validity of the 
research design and the research findings (Crotty, (1998) Robson, (2003)).   
 
The philosophical concepts of ontology and epistemology have a long history within 
philosophy dating back to pre-Socratic traditions (McCabe,1995).  Ontology is the 
philosophical domain that considers the nature of, and how individuals understand 
reality (Hudson and Ozanne 1988, Jupp, 2006) and how judgments are made about 
the world (Corbin and Strauss, 2008).  Epistemology, deals with the way in which 
individuals come to have legitimate knowledge (Bunge, 1983), what it means to have 
knowledge (Cohen et al, 2007) and the relationship between the researcher and reality 
(Carson et al., 2001). 
 
Positivist ontology, ‘realism’ views the world as external and having a reality 
independent of the observer (Carson et al, 2001, Cohen et al, 2007). Positivists see a 
clear distinction between science and individual personal experience.  The positivist 
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researcher seeks objectivity using rational and logical, structured approaches reliant 
upon statistical and mathematical methods (Carson et al, 2001). The positivist 
epistemological standpoint has been described as ‘objectivism’, in which knowledge is 
an independent reality that can be discovered by the research including the 
identification of causes that influence outcomes (Cresswell, 2009). The research 
methods favored by proponents of this approach are quantitative in nature, involving 
measurement and experiment. 
 
Interpretivist ontology, ‘relativism’ takes the view that all reality is subjective and differs 
from individual to individual within a population (Guba and Lincoln, 1994). In relativist 
terms reality is constructed in the interaction between individuals and the real world 
mediated through social contexts (Berger and Luckman, 1967: Crotty, 1998).  
Epistemologically, interpretivism is characterized as ‘subjectivism’ which recognizes 
that the world does not exist independently of the individual’s knowledge of it and that 
knowledge is influenced by interactions between the individual and his/ her world 
(Heron and Reason, 1997: Grix, 2004). The principal methods used as part of an 
interpretivist approach to research are those referred to as ‘qualitative’, describing 
research that is naturalistic, concerned with understanding the meanings that 
individuals place on actions, decisions and beliefs within a social context (Ritchie and 
Lewis, 2003).  
 
Hagan (2010) described quantitative and qualitative research as evolving from 
separate philosophical traditions.  The former being associated with the positivist 
natural science position, emphasising empirical measurement and data analysis, 
whilst the latter seeks to understand the issue or reality under examination in a 
manner that sociologist Weber described as ‘Verstehen’, meaning ‘understanding or 
empathy’ (Weber, 1949).   
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Significant cohorts of methodological commentators see interpretivist/ qualitative 
approaches as being incompatible with positivist/ quantitative methodologies (Sale, 
Lohfeld, and Brazil, 2002). Dichter (1955, p.27) described quantitative methods as 
being limiting in that they only contribute a component of the information required to 
‘make an intelligent and scientifically based decision’. Denzin & Lincoln, (2005 p.12) 
report that quantitative researchers see qualitative, interpretivist research as 
‘unreliable, impressionistic and not objective’.  Others see these philosophical 
standpoints as being on a continuum between an extreme pole of the qualitative 
‘historicism’ which rejects positivism completely (Fullerton, 1987) where all events are 
a chronicle of unique happenings with no potential to draw generalisable scientific 
data, to the quantitative extreme of ‘scientism’, where the view taken is that if a 
phenomenon cannot be measured, then it is not worthy of study (Anastas, 2012).   
Weber (2004) suggests that the positivist versus interpretivist rhetoric has reduced 
over recent years and that all methodologies can contribute to an understanding of 
reality.  O’Leary (2007, pp.206-207) points out, the dichotomous distinctions drawn by 
some commentators in terms ontological and epistemological philosophical stances 
are both unrealistic and unhelpful.  
 
‘Pragmatism’ is seen as an alternative to the quantitative, qualitative ‘dogma’ (Howe, 
(1988), James, (2010)) whereby the researcher chooses from the array of tools 
available, those that address the research question most effectively, using a diversity 
of methods to address a given research question. In doing so the researcher 
recognises that no one method or combination of methods is perfect (Creswell, 2009, 
Denscombe, 2010, Fielzer, 2010 Muijs, 2011).  This position is supported by Mhlanga 
(2000) in his discussion of a research model constructed to examine ethnicity issues in 
criminal justice; 
 ‘While quantitative data are thought of as ‘hard’ and qualitative data as ‘soft’, it 
 is also now widely accepted in criminological research that quantitative and 
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 qualitative data can complement one another, each shedding light on the 
 other.’ (Mhlanga, 2000, p.415). 
 
The author of this thesis was attracted to an interpretivist rather than a positivist 
approach. He was therefore philosophically inclined towards using qualitative 
methods. This study was not to be about testing out the validity of a hypothesis within 
a positivist approach, but was focussed upon developing an understanding of what the 
issues were within a governance construct. Much of the data required was likely to 
involve individual perceptions and interpersonal interactions between chief officers and 
the PCCs.  In this regard, the author was particularly attracted to the adapted 
‘Grounded Theory’ (Glaser and Straus 1967, Corbin and Straus 2008) where research 
is structured in such a way that the researcher gathers data without pre-conceptions or 
hypothetical constraints, allowing understanding to arise from the data itself. This 
methodology is particularly appropriate in areas where there is little extant literature 
upon which theories can be based (Creswell, 2005, p. 30) which at the time of the 
research phase was arguably true in this area.   
 
In addition, in the context of the research questions in this study, which were focused 
upon understanding the way in which a changed governance paradigm in policing 
affected the delivery of policing within a local area.  Such data were, is seemed to the 
author more susceptible to a methodology that accessed subjective perceptions of 
reality by key actors than a more positivist approach that would look at statistical data.  
This position was supported by Bevir and Rhodes (2003 p 17) who advocate an 
interpretivist approach to the study of governance. 
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The author was at the same time mindful of the importance of selecting the right 
methods rather than one that he was most comfortable with, heeding the warning from 
Silverman, (2005); 
 ‘...qualitative research is not always appropriate to every research problem. 
 You need to think through exactly what you are trying to achieve rather than be 
 guided by some fashion or trivial preference- perhaps you are not comfortable 
 doing statistical calculations.’ (Silverman, 2005, p. 7). 
 
A positivist approach, focusing on statistical data could, in the author’s view only give a 
report of response, demand or public satisfaction indicators that would not enable an 
understanding the interpersonal dynamic between the police and the PCCs in a 
manner that could provide an insight into the impact and efficacy of the governance 
arrangement at a human participant level.  Indeed there is an argument that traditional 
performance data used in policing is not necessarily a measure of impact or effect in 
policing delivery (Eterno and Silverman, 2012), and that the determination of any 
statistical correlation between police performance and the introduction of PCCs would 
be questionable (Ludwig, Norton & McLean 2017).  The author was not looking for 
statistical evidence of changes in policing outputs such as crime rates, or public fear of 
crime following the election of PCCs.  Hinton (2014) identifies that statistical analyses 
are more appropriate in quantitative research rather than qualitative data such as 
those arising from research that involves interviews as in this study. He goes on to 
point out however, that a combination of the analytical approaches may provide a 
more comprehensive answer to the research question.  In this research, the search 
was for a subjective account of perceived changes within the police governance 
dynamic, which suggested a qualitative strategy. Although the author accepts that it 
would be possible to reduce interview data into numerical categories such as the 
frequency of participant comments within a categorical theme from which meaningful 
interpretations may be made that could contribute to answering the research 
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questions. However, since this was a new area of research in an area about which 
little was known, it was, therefore in the view of the author necessary to apply a 
grounded approach (Corbyn and Strauss, 2008).  He therefore took a decision to 
choose an interpretivist approach for the study, employing a qualitative methodology in 
which concepts and ideas enhance the understanding and explanation of reality 
(Weber, 1949, Vlidich & Lyman, 1994). 
 
The author recognised the potential disadvantages in taking an interpretivist approach 
in this study, particularly in terms of the perception of potential readers who may be 
looking for definitive, measurable evidence of the impact of the governance change. 
He took the view however that his approach had the potential to access the developing 
interpersonal relationships and how they affect the governance process, rather than 
reporting descriptive statistics from which it may prove impossible to draw causal 
relationships thereby being unlikely to take forward the body of knowledge in this area. 
Future research may use the data produced within this study to add to an 
understanding of the domain. 
 
Critical Review of Available Methods and Selection of the Appropriate Method 
Having determined his philosophical stance, the author looked towards the appropriate 
methodology to address the research questions. Crotty describes research 
methodology as the strategy or plan that guides the choice and use of particular 
research methods that are the specific techniques and procedures to collect and 
analyse data (Crotty 1998, p3).  It is crucial that the chosen research methodology is 
constructed in a rigorous manner using appropriate methods. King and Wincup identify 
the strategic imperative: 
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 ‘Problems of law and order, crime, and the criminal justice process ...must be 
 effectively researched in ways that are theoretically grounded, 
 methodologically secure and practically based’.  (King and Wincup, 2000, p.1) 
 
Mays and Pope (1995, p.109) added that it is crucial, in order to avoid assertions that 
the research is unscientific, that the qualitative researcher ensures that the design 
provides for replicability and generalsability. These were key aims for the author in his 
review of the available techniques and the construction of his research plan. 
 
The principal qualitative methods are summarised by Noakes and Wincup (2004). The 
author felt that all of the methods would, potentially have applicability in studying the 
impact of the changes in policing governance, each with advantages and potential 
disadvantages. 
 
Ethnographic techniques are defined as, including participant observation originating 
in the work of the so called ‘Chicago School’ studies of ‘deviant groups in their natural 
setting’ Noakes and Wincup (2004, p.94). An ethnographic approach may allow the 
observation of the developing relationship between chief constables and the PCCs. 
However, it was anticipated that such access would be very difficult to achieve, given 
the potential sensitivities around the developing relationships. In addition the crucial 
nature of the business interaction may give rise to skewed behaviour due to observer 
effect (Jones and Nisbett, 1972). This method was rejected at an early stage. 
 
Documentary Evidence, in this context documents are not used to extract statistical 
data as a quantitative researcher might, but are used as a means of; ‘exploring those 
who produce such materials ‘ (Brookman ,1999, p.52). The processes of policing and 
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its governance, particularly at a strategic level, generates of a plethora of documentary 
material.  These documents in a hermeneutic sense (Patterson and Williams, 2002) 
are potentially a rich source of data. However, it was felt that given the change in 
governance structure had occurred recently that relatively little material would have 
been produced. Therefore it would not be possible at that stage to discern changes 
that could be reliably represented as correlating to systematic effects. In addition, it 
was questionable whether access would be forthcoming in respect of the material from 
both PCCs and the chief constables. 
 
Interviews, research interviews of individuals or groups, using structured, semi-
structured or unstructured techniques are described by Robson (2003, p228) as 
‘conversations with a purpose’. They provide the researcher with the ability to gain an 
understanding of the participant’s real world experience (Kvale, 1996, p.2, 
Hammersley 1992, p. 165).  Interviews were, therefore seen by the author as 
potentially the most productive   method in terms of identifying the perceptions of 
actors (Rubin and Rubin, 2005, p. 2). Thereby enabling an understanding of the critical 
governance relationship and its effect, if any upon policing delivery.  Noakes and 
Wincup (2004, pp. 77-78) highlight that the term ‘interview’ is generic, ranging from 
delivery of a quantitative research questionnaire to the semi structured interview or in-
depth study.  The decision as to the model employed depended upon many factors, 
including the characteristics of the research population, the sensitivity of the topic, the 
location of the interview and the timescales. Three types of interview are identified 
(Noakes and Wincup 2004, pp. 79-80); 
Firstly the ‘structured interview’ which is common in large scale projects where 
consistency is required due to the large number of subjects and potentially large 
numbers of researchers. It does not allow for prompting or probing by the interviewer 
to obtain a deeper understanding. In the view of Robson (2003, p. 229) this method 
offers nothing above the administration of a questionnaire, and according to Bryman 
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(2012, p. 193) is more applicable to areas that have already been extensively 
researched.  Secondly, ‘semi- structured interviews’ are used where there is a need for 
the researcher to understand the topic, they allow for appropriate probing within an 
interview schedule. The semi-structured interview offers more opportunity to probe 
with follow up questions.  The interviewer has a choice of the order in which to ask 
questions from the schedule. The semi structured interview relies on a schedule of 
prompts and sub questions to keep the interview on track, and the interviewee led 
nature of the process may mean that the participant is more relaxed and therefore 
more likely to provide in depth responses (DiCiccio-Bloom and Crabtree 2006, p. 315). 
Finally, the ‘unstructured interview’ which are often used in life history, biographical 
studies, the interviewer has a broad aim, but allows the interviewee the freedom to talk 
and ascribe meaning.  This method can elicit very in-depth data (Patton 2002), 
however due to the lack of standardisation of the research instrument; there can be a 
lack of focus and the potential for interviewer bias (Robson 2003, Bryman 2012).  
Cockcroft (1999) in his study of Police culture using unstructured interviews of retired 
Police Officers found that issues associated with unreliable memories and the 
influence of hindsight could intervene.  In order to focus down on issues, Cockcroft 
went on to use semi-structured interviews on later subjects. 
 
The author, having considered the available models, chose the semi-structured model 
as the most appropriate, given that he alone would be interviewing in this case a small 
population about a subject in respect of which he had a good understanding (Bryman 
and Bell, 2003), in an area of research that had little precedence (Bryman 2012, p. 
193).   He took the view, therefore that semi-structured interviews would be most 
effective in answering the research questions in this study. 
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Selection of Participants 
In terms of social science participant sampling strategies, four broad typographies are 
generally accepted (Teddlie and Yeu, 2007); 
 
Probability – Participants are selected from the population under examination 
in relatively large numbers in a random manner. Probability sampling attempts 
to achieve representativeness of the entire population. This method is often 
used for quantitative studies within a positivist research paradigm.  
Purposive – Participants are selected for the purpose of answering the 
research question.  In the words of Maxwell, ‘…particular settings, persons or 
events are deliberately selected for the important information that they can 
provide that cannot be gotten as well from other choices’ (Maxwell 1997, p.87). 
Convenience – participants who are easily accessible and willing to participate 
in the study. 
Mixed Method – Techniques used to combine probability and purposive 
sampling strategies.  
 
The literature had indicated that the relationship between the chief constables and 
PCCs was likely to be crucial in terms of the governance structure of policing (Jones et 
al, 2012, Loveday 2013, Loveday 2017, Davis & Johnson, 2016).   It seemed that 
those best able to provide ‘…important information… that cannot be gotten from other 
choices’ (Maxwell, 1997, p. 87) were individual chief constables and PCCs.  The 
author therefore decided upon a purposive sampling strategy focussing upon chief 
constables and PCCs as interview participants. This decision was to some extent 
validated by the later similar research carried out by Wells (2015) and by Caless and 
Owen (2016) who also conducted interviews of chief constables and PCCs and whose 
findings echoed some of those within this thesis. 
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Ethical Considerations 
In its guidelines, the British Sociological Association state clearly that researchers 
have; 
 “...a responsibility both to safeguard the proper interests of those involved in, or 
 affected by their work, and to report their findings accurately and truthfully. 
 They need to consider the effects of their involvement and the consequences 
 of their work or its misuse for those they study and other interested parties...” 
 (ibid 2002 p.2). 
This requirement, along with a large body of literature on the subject of ethics in 
research places a responsibility upon the researcher to consider at all stages of the 
research journey issues that may affect the subjects of that research, stakeholders 
and the wider community, as well as ensuring the integrity of the methodology and any 
results reported. (Kimmel,1988). 
There are also, within the jurisdiction of England and Wales, legal considerations 
including the Human Rights Act 1998 (Home Office 1998) and the Data Protection Act 
2004 (Home Office, 2004) which must be taken into account when obtaining and 
handling personal data obtained from individuals. 
 
Ethical issues must be resolved prior to the commencement of the research study 
(Silverman, 2005, pp. 257-258).  In this study, the author complied with the University 
of Portsmouth ethical guidelines by formally seeking a positive ethical view from the 
Institute of Criminal Justice Studies, Faculty Research Ethics Committee prior to 
embarking upon the data collection phase.  An ‘ethics self-assessment form’, together 
with a research protocol describing the methodology to be undertaken and an ethical 
narrative describing in detail the ethical issues and mitigation measures in place was 
submitted for ethical review (Appendix A). 
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The thinking required in order to address the ethical issues in this study and the 
process of completing the required research ethics assessment and protocol was, for 
the author an important experience in that it focused his thinking not only on the 
research but also upon the wider implications for the potential participants and his 
responsibility towards them.   
 
At first glance, the chief constable cohort of potential interview participants in this 
study, represented a relatively small and resilient group (Reiner, 1991), the same 
might, prima facie, be reasonably inferred of those who had gained the office of PCC. 
However, the author was aware that there were significant ethical considerations in 
this research project potentially centred upon the dynamic between the chief constable 
and the PCC.  In particular, the need to consider sensitivities in a research project is 
relative to the potential impact upon the potential participants. This will always be a 
subjective judgement; 
 ‘...a sensitive topic is one that potentially poses for those involved a substantial 
 threat, the emergence of which renders problematic for the researcher and/ or 
 the researched the collection, holding and/ or dissemination of research data.’ 
 (Renzetti and Lee, 1993, p.5). 
 
The author took the view that the context and circumstances of this study did present 
issues of sensitivity within the above definition for both the chief constable cohort and 
the PCC participants. 
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Considerations Regarding Chief Constables  
The Policing Protocol Order (Home Office 2011a) imposes a requirement for a close 
working relationship between the PCC charged with driving a policing strategy that 
meets the needs of local communities, and the chief constable.  In pragmatic terms, in 
order for the chief constable to deliver, he/ she needs a positive working relationship 
with the PCC, particularly given the assertion in Loveday (2017) that the PCC can ‘do 
anything that is lawful’.   
 
In addition, at an individual level, chief constables are subject to time-limited contracts 
of employment (Home Office, 2003) and rely in employment terms upon the PCC who 
has the sole power to decide whether or not to renew the chief constable’s contract, or 
to dismiss him/ her (Home Office 2011).  It is reasonable, therefore to anticipate that 
chief constables who participated this research may be concerned as to the potential 
impact upon their relationship with their PCC if their participation and their views found 
their way into the public domain.  This potential also gave rise a concern as to the 
validity of the research itself in terms of the potential for chief constable participants to 
be reluctant or inhibited in their responses if they feared that the PCC could become 
aware of their participation and/ or comments. These considerations provided an 
imperative to minimise the potential for the subject’s participation to impact upon the 
crucial professional relationship at the heart of the governance paradigm. 
 
It was decided therefore not to approach the PCCs in order to seek permission to 
interview chief constable participants. Indeed, the legal relationship is such that 
although the PCC appoints the chief constable, he/ she is not in a legal sense the 
employer of the chief constable who is an independent officer of the crown (Home 
Office 2011). The author therefore felt no requirement to approach PCCs to seek such 
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permission.   Further, to inform the PCC would in the view of the author have 
compromised the strategy to ensure the anonymity of the chief constable participants.   
 
Considerations Regarding Police and Crime Commissioners 
PCCs are statutorily separated from the police hierarchy, (Home Office 2011). They 
appoint chief constables as well as renewing their contracts. It was considered, 
therefore that they would not feel themselves to be vulnerable in the same way that 
chief constables might when participating in the study. However the literature indicated 
that the interpersonal relationship between the chief constable and the PCC was 
critical. This was reinforced by the author’s pilot study to this research project, which is 
described below. 
 
It was therefore important to maintain the confidentiality of the PCC participants so as 
not to compromise that working relationship. In addition, PCCs are subject to public 
election to their positions and the author recognised the importance that their 
comments were not inappropriately put into the public domain without their informed 
consent, given the potential impact upon public perception upon the individual or the 
office of PCC. Maintenance of confidentiality was, in the view of the author, as critical 
for the PCC participants as for the chief constables. 
 
Participant Confidentiality Arrangements 
The author addressed the issue of confidentiality in some detail in the letter of 
invitation to potential participants (Appendices B & C) and the accompanying 
Participant Information Sheet (Appendix D) which detailed the measures that would be 
taken to ensure individual anonymity.  
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The research project and the proposed methodology received a favorable ethical 
opinion in January 2015 (Appendix E). It was then appropriate to move forward with 
the research project as described within the ethical review documents, being careful at 
all times to adhere to the research protocol and ethical narrative that had been 
reviewed. Any deviation from those parameters would require the author to seek a 
further review of the changed circumstances or proposal. 
 
A Pilot Study 
This research study was advised by an earlier pilot study involving semi-structured 
interviews of five Chief Constables carried out by the author in April 2013.  
The author decided that in the pilot study, only serving chief constables would be 
approached as research participants in this study, and not at that time Police and 
Crime Commissioners, since chief constables alone would be able to answer the 
research question as to whether there had been discernible change in policing delivery 
since the introduction of Police and Crime Commissioners. They had been a constant 
across the changed governance paradigm.   
Seven chief constables were approached, five indicated that they were prepared to 
assist in the research and two declined.  One of those declining gave no reason for 
doing so, but the other indicated that they felt that there was too great a risk that the 
Police and Crime Commissioner would learn of the encounter and that may 
detrimentally affect their relationship which was of crucial importance in the delivery of 
policing across the Force area.  This rationale for declining to participate is potentially 
significant in that it immediately disclosed a concern on the part of a Chief Constable 
of the potential impact on their ability to deliver policing dependent upon their personal 
relationship with the PCC.  
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Semi-structured interviews were conducted with the chief constable participants. 
Participants were confident in their responses and the interviews were free flowing.  
The pilot study enabled the author to test whether the area was likely to be fruitful in 
terms of adding to the body of knowledge in the domain of policing governance, as 
well as testing the methodological approach.  
Pilot Study Findings; 
The product of the interviews were analysed using a thematic content analysis of 
responses (Newell and Burnard, 2011, pp. 118-129) based upon themed question 
domains.  The findings were grouped within thematic areas as follows; 
1. The expectations of the Chief Constables prior to the implementation of 
Police and Crime Commissioners. 
Four chief constables indicated skepticism, uncertainty, trepidation and opposition on 
their part in the advent of Police and Crime Commissioners. The remaining participant 
welcomed the prospect on the basis that it may remove a large degree of bureaucracy 
that was a feature of the Police Authority framework.  
The group felt that there might be too much power vested in one individual, one 
commenting that there was no other public or private model of governance provided by 
one person.  
Three respondents questioned what, in fact was the problem that needed to be solved. 
They felt that The Police Authority governance model of 17 members including elected 
representatives had effectively held them to account.  
One respondent was concerned about the introduction of national and local politics 
into policing, which was seen as a deliberate intent of the government. However, they 
were not about confusion over operational independence because they were ‘up for 
the fight’ with the Commissioner if necessary.  
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2. What change has occurred since the implementation of Police and Crime 
Commissioners and what has been the impact on Policing delivery and on Chief 
Constables? 
Three of the respondents confirmed that there had, as expected been a significant 
reduction in bureaucracy since the implementation of Police and Crime 
Commissioners, they also said that the Police and Crime Commissioner who had been 
elected in their Force area were ‘good’, ‘sensible’ and ‘a breath of fresh air’. The 
participant who had earlier expressed concern regarding the perception of a political 
agenda, and was ready for confrontation over the issue of operational independence, 
in the event found that the elected Police and Crime Commissioner was ‘a good 
person’ whose vision of policing to a great extent accorded with theirs. The remaining 
respondent was less positive, reporting that the Police and Crime Commissioner for 
that area was beginning to declare themselves on single issues, apparently seeking to 
turn them into causes célèbre.  This respondent was beginning to sense that the 
motivation of the Police and Crime Commissioner was more about seeking publicity 
with a view to politics and re-election than public service. 
In terms of the individual impact upon the chief constables, three of the respondents 
had positive experiences in that they did not perceive any change as far as their 
personal position was concerned. References were made to the importance of a good 
interpersonal relationship with the Police and Crime Commissioner.  A respondent 
commented that the Police and Crime Commissioners making new chief officer 
appointments were probably appointing candidates who would deliver their vision.  
There were significant concerns about the power of the Police and Crime 
Commissioner to ‘hire & fire’ chief constables with concerns that this would put 
pressure upon chief officers to comply with the agenda of the Police and Crime 
Commissioner even if that was at odds with their professional judgment. A respondent 
developed a further thread expressing concerns that the checks and balances present 
in the 17 member Police Authority had been removed. There was the potential for a 
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clash of personalities to detrimentally affect delivery.  This was made worse by a lack 
of clarity as to what the checks and balances are around appointments, or disputes. 
Another participant echoed this theme, concluding that there was no accountability 
framework for the PCC and that a chief constable has no ability to challenge the PCC. 
The PCP were seen as having no power and the role of the Inspectorate (HMIC) was 
unclear. 
Two participants saw the changes to the previous ‘tripartite structure’ as having 
reduced the influence of the chief constable, one commenting that the position of chief 
constable had moved from that of Chief Executive Officer of the Force to that of Chief 
Operating Officer. 
A positive effect that one chief constable saw was that the PCC, due to their 
constitutional position could say things in the public domain that the Chief Constable 
may feel constrained in saying.  The Chief may use this as a way of getting ‘greater 
traction’ on some issues. 
3. The effect of the implementation of Police and Crime Commissioners 
upon the key relationships between the Chief Constable, partners, the 
public and the government. 
In terms of partner organisations, none of the respondents saw any change, although 
two respondents reported some confusion on the part of partners as to what the role of 
the PCC was in this context. This appeared to be in spite of the fact that as two 
respondents highlighted, the PCC now holds very significant budgets for crime and 
anti social behaviour reduction activity. 
In terms of the relationship with Government, four interviewees saw a retreat by 
central government from the new tripartite arrangement, as a deliberate intent of the 
Home Office, which is to be expected given the intention of the legislation (Home 
Office 2011).  Only one saw a danger in this around chief constables being ‘out of the 
loop’ in terms of national developments and debate. In this regard, one participant 
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interestingly saw the retreat of the Home Office as part of an agenda to distance 
themselves from risk.  In a time of austerity, they saw the Home Office pushing risk 
and responsibility down to the local level onto PCCs and chief constables.  This 
respondent saw this as paradoxical in the light of government apparently taking a 
more centralist approach in respect of counter terrorism and serious and organised 
crime. 
4. The importance of the relationship between the Chief Constable and the 
Police and Crime Commissioner in delivering policing. 
It was the unanimous view of all participants that the interpersonal relationship 
between the chief constable and the Police and Crime Commissioner was extremely 
important and critical in allowing effective policing delivery.  Phrases such as 
‘massively important’, ‘critical’ and ‘vital’ were used. One chief constable said that the 
relationship with their Police and Crime Commissioner was ‘good’, but that they 
recognised how difficult it would be if the relationship were not good. 
5. The positive and negative effects of the implementation of Police and 
Crime Commissioners. 
The overwhelmingly positive aspect of the introduction of PCCs was seen by chief 
constables in this cohort as a reduction in personal and organisational bureaucracy, 
previously a great deal of time and resources were expended responding to the 
demands of the Police Authority structure. They are now working to a single individual 
providing a more direct and rapid conduit for reporting and decision-making.  
PCCs being able to address issues publicly and with government that the Chief could 
not, was also seen as a positive by one. 
One participant saw the ability to develop a close relationship with the Police and 
Crime Commissioner as potentially an opportunity to offset risk.  The participant 
indicated that they would seek to develop a close relationship with the Police and 
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Crime Commissioner putting them ‘right in alongside me to understand every risk and 
threat… I want [the Police and Crime Commissioner] to understand the difficulties we 
face then [the Police and Crime Commissioner] will understand the difficulties we face 
because then [the Police and Crime Commissioner] understands tough professional 
decisions’. 
Three participants did not see any negative aspects at the time of the interview, but 
the negatives raised by two interviewees were, the influence of politics, potential 
blurring of lines around operational independence and one had concerns about the 
extent to which the Police and Crime Commissioner held the Force to account. 
6. The future of policing delivery and key issues going forward. 
One chief constable made reference to the significance of the relationship between the 
Chief Constable and Police and Crime Commissioner, and how that might play out 
when there was a significant divergence of view.  This theme was also raised by 
another who said that the first ‘critical incident’ (a significant operational policing 
incident with the ability to affect confidence in the policing response) would be likely to 
test that relationship. 
The perception of the key issues for chief constables into the future of the governance 
arrangements centered around structural issues such as staffing models and budgets, 
and again interpersonal relationships between Police and Crime Commissioners and 
chief constables, in this context at times of conflict or crisis. 
 
The Methodological Choice 
The reviews of the literature in Chapters three and four, together with the personal 
interactions of the author articulated in Chapter one, and the findings of the pilot study 
described above enabled the construction of the research questions in this study that 
are; 
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Research Questions 
What has been the effect of the new governance paradigm in Policing across 
England and Wales upon the way that Policing is governed and delivered at a 
strategic and operational level? 
What aspects of the new governance paradigm in policing may be positive in 
terms of improving the effective delivery of policing and community safety? 
What aspects of the new governance paradigm in policing may inhibit the 
delivery of effective policing and community safety? 
What changes or adaptations to the governance paradigm are apparent that 
may have the potential to improve effectiveness in delivering policing and 
community safety? 
 
The review of the available research paradigms, methodology and research methods 
in the context of the philosophical stance of the author, described in this chapter 
enabled the author to identify the methodology appropriate to answering the research 
questions.   This was to conduct semi-structured interviews with police chief 
constables and PCCs in a manner that maintained confidentiality of the individual 
participants so that they would be more likely to speak openly and any potential 
detrimental impact upon the individuals was eliminated. 
 
The following chapters describe the conduct of the research, analysis of the data and 
the findings that arose. 
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Chapter Five. 
Research Conduct, Analysis and Findings 
 
How it Went - The conduct of the Research 
The Arrangements 
The author was a former chief police officer in England and Wales which meant that 
he personally knew a large proportion of chief constables, and a smaller number of the 
PCCs, particularly those who were former police officers.  He was mindful of the 
possibility that a different approach to those participants that he knew as against those 
that he did not could introduce a skewed effect in terms of those who chose to take 
part in the study.  The author had to accept, however that those who knew him (and 
were well disposed towards him) might be more likely to agree to participate than 
those who did not. In any event, he was keen to minimize that potential danger.  In 
communications with potential participants, therefore no indication was given as to any 
familiarity with the prospective participant.  Where the author was known to the chief 
constable, or to the PCC the letter and other communications remained in the formal 
format agreed within the ethical review. This maintained consistency, and so far as 
was possible avoided potentially skewed responses that a more informal approach 
could have produced, i.e. a cohort of the author’s ‘old chums’.  
 
In addition, prior to making an approach to participants the author considered it 
important to inform the national bodies representing the two cohorts of the research. 
This was in order to make them aware of his intention to approach chief constables 
and PCCs as potential participants. The researcher made it clear that he was not 
seeking any permission, approval or validation by those organisations, but that it was 
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likely that some of the individuals who had been approached by him would contact 
their respective professional body querying the bona fide of the research.  He 
therefore contacted by telephone and by email both the Association of Chief Police 
Officers for England and Wales (ACPO) (now defunct and succeeded in April 2015 by 
the National Police Chiefs Council (NPCC)) and the Association of PCCs (APCC).  
The former organisation responded positively, and without being asked the CEO of 
ACPO sent an email to all Chief Constables explaining the research project to them 
and indicating that as a body they supported the project.   Indeed, as a result of that 
communication by ACPO, the author was encouraged by the fact that five chief 
constables contacted him offering to take part in the study.  Unfortunately, in spite of 
follows up messages, the APCC did not respond to his message, which had been 
directed to a named individual within the APCC. 
 
Personal contact was, made with the personal assistants, or equivalent of the potential 
participants.  Given the author’s understanding of police and organisational culture, 
this was seen as a strategy that would maximise the potential for the letters to be put 
before the chief constable or PCC rather than being filtered out at an early stage by 
junior staff members. Second, in order to maintain confidentiality, given that personal 
assistants are familiar with managing confidential matters on behalf of their principals, 
they would be unlikely to disclose to others participation in this project by their 
principals.  In this way, each of the 41 Chief Constables and the 41 PCCs across the 
Police Forces of England and Wales were sent by email copies of the Letter of 
Introduction, the Information Sheet and the Participant Consent Form (Appendix D & 
F) in the formats approved by the university research ethics committee. 
 
As part of the arrangements to maintain the anonymity of the potential participants that 
were approached, and those who agreed to participate, their identities are not included 
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within this research.  A schedule was prepared within an MS Excel format to manage 
the contact and arrangements with potential participants. That schedule is not 
reproduced here, but is available for review by academic supervisors and examiners 
as are copies of the correspondence sent and received. Within the schedule, in order 
to provide ease of reference within a confidential framework, individual participants 
were ascribed a random number, i.e. CC 5 (Chief Constable 5) or PCC 23 (Police and 
Crime Commissioner 23). It was important to ensure that the numbering was not 
sequential such that the knowledge of the number of one police force would not give 
an inference as to those before or after in the sequence. In addition the author had to 
ensure that the random number ascribed to a particular police force did not match their 
national police identifier number, (for the purposes of certain documents and computer 
input, Forces are assigned a numerical code number, for example the Hampshire 
Constabulary numerical identifier is ‘44’). It was important, therefore that the 
numbering could not be related to the force identifier.  No force represented on the 
schedule and thereby no participant has their respective force identifier as their 
reference number for the purposes of this study. 
 
Over time, responses were received to the direct requests sent via personal assistants 
or equivalents to all 82 potential participants.  By June 2015, 27 chief constables had 
replied (66%) and 20 (48%) of PCCs had replied.  Of those who responded, 17 chief 
constables (41% of the total available population) indicated that they were content to 
take part in the study.  One chief constable later withdrew however, having decided to 
retire, and this reduced the research cohort of chief constables to 16 (39% of the total 
available population). 15 PCCs (36% of the total available population) indicated that 
they would be content to participate in the research. 
 
   
  
 111 
Some of those that replied to the approach indicated that they did not wish to take part 
in the research, five PCCs (12% of the total available population) and 9 chief 
constables (21% of the total available population) declined to participate. The reasons 
given for not wishing to take part by PCCs were ‘too busy/ too many commitments’ in 
the case of four, whilst one provided no explanation at all.   
 
In the case of the chief constables who declined to participate, three claimed that they 
were ‘too busy’. Four chief constables gave no reason at all.  Of the remaining two, 
one indicated that they were not content to participate ‘for the reasons stated in your 
letter’. The author took this as a reference to the clauses in the letter of invitation to 
participate that referred to the rationale for confidentiality being the potential impact 
upon chief constables;  
 ‘I recognise that some Chief Constables may be concerned about being 
 involved in such a project, given the importance of the Chief Constable 
 maintaining a positive working relationship with their PCC. There may be 
 understandable concerns that comments made by them as part of the research 
 may potentially impact upon that relationship.’ (Appendix B) 
  
The PCC in the same Force as the above chief constable was one of those that did 
not respond to the request to participate. 
 
The remaining chief constable, who declined to participate, was known personally to 
the author. That officer took the time to telephone the author to explain their rationale 
for declining to take part. The chief constable concerned, who consented to reporting 
their comments in this research, said that they were; 
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  ‘...just too worried about the consequences of (the PCC) finding out that I have 
 spoken to you…I feel too vulnerable…’  
 (Personal conversation with the author.  March 2015). 
Significantly perhaps, the PCC for this Force did take part in the research. 
 
The total number of police forces represented by either a chief constable or PCC 
participant was 25 (60% of the total number of Forces). In only four cases did both the 
chief constable and the PCC from the same police force participate in this study. 
 
The researcher was satisfied with the response levels to his first contact.  He began to 
set about making arrangements to conduct semi-structured interviews with the 
participants.  Those interviews were completed by the end of July 2015.  The 
researcher decided that following the end of the tranche of interviews he would contact 
again those chief constables and PCCs who had either not responded or who had 
declined the first invitations to participate. The reason for this was that given the 
passage of time and the fact that 31 interviews had been conducted and confidentiality 
had been maintained, those who had initially declined to participate might have taken 
a different view.  Also, given the career churn of chief constables newly appointed 
chief constables might have felt able to participate in circumstances where their 
predecessors refused to do so.  A second tranche of requests was therefore sent to 
potential participants, in the manner described above including 13 Chief Constables 
and 19 PCCs who had either failed to respond or declined to be interviewed in the first 
tranche.  Unfortunately, none of those approached for a second time agreed to join the 
participant cohort. 
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Arrangements for the semi-structured interviews were made with the participants or 
their representatives to meet at locations of their choice. The author, based upon his 
experience of interviewing individuals acquired during his police investigative career 
had decided that it was important to ensure that the interviews were face to face. This 
decision was supported in the literature on research interviewing, in particular by 
Szolnoki and Hoffmann (2013). In their review of survey methodologies, they found 
that face to face surveys delivered the most representative results when compared 
with telephone, paper or online surveys.   
 
In each case a private room was secured for the interview so as to maintain 
confidentiality, and, the author hoped give the participant confidence to speak openly.  
In the majority of cases the location of the interview was in the offices of the 
participant.  The author took care not to disclose the purpose of his visit to anyone 
apart from the personal assistant or equivalent with whom he had made the 
arrangements to meet the participant. 
 
The location of the interviews were, given the geographical range of the force locations 
of the participants spread across England and Wales, it was often necessary for the 
author to travel very significant distances over several days, involving considerable 
financial cost in terms of travelling and accommodation expenses.  In addition, the 
exercise was physically demanding, with often very early starting times in order to 
meet a participant at the time of his/ her choosing.   
 
The author after some time was tempted to revert to conducting the remaining 
interviews by telephone or Skype/ Facetime.  He was, however reinforced in his 
commitment to face-to-face interviews by the experience of interviews with two 
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participants, one chief constable and one PCC who had both indicated that they would 
only consent to a telephone interview.  These interviews were far less flowing or rich in 
detail.  In face-to face interviews, it was possible for the author to use pauses to allow 
participants to expand on comments and concepts and explore a more conversational 
approach. This was not the case in the telephone interviews that were more stilted, 
requiring more reference to the semi-structured interview schedule.  Rubin and Rubin 
(2005 p.2) speak of the interviewer talking and listening intently to the participant thus 
obtaining rich information. The telephone interview did not allow the author to have a 
conversation with the participant in the same way that he could in a face-to-face 
situation.    
 
The telephone interviews were also significantly shorter (an average of 40 minutes 
compared to an average of 65 minutes in face-to-face interviews), which might 
suggest that less information was forthcoming.   In spite, of the logistical issues 
connected with face-to-face interviews, the author determined to continue to pursue 
that strategy wherever possible in order to maximize the richness of the resultant data 
in accordance with the advice of Szolnoki and Hoffmann (2103).  
 
A semi-structured interview schedule was developed by the author a process requiring 
a number of iterations. The questions were based upon the issues that arose from the 
literature, the pilot study and informal conversations that the author had engaged in 
with chief police officers, PCCs and academic contacts prior to embarking on this 
study. In this way initial themes were identified which required further probing in a 
more controlled environment.  Importantly the schedule needed to focus the interview 
upon the research questions, while allowing the participant to answer freely within the 
topic being covered. In particular, the author was careful to avoid closed questions, 
which invite binary yes/no response. An example of potential bias in such 
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circumstances is described by Noakes and Wincup (2004). They found that where 
they asked open questions of residents in an area what crime categories were a 
problem in their area, the responses differed when asked if a particular crime was a 
problem or not. (ibid, p.77).  Care was, therefore necessary in the construction the 
question schedule, in doing so the author referred to a number of texts on the subject. 
(Kvale,1998, Briggs, 1995, Silverman, 1995, Robson, 2003, Noakes and Wincup 
2004).  The semi-structured interview schedules used in this study are attached at 
(Appendix G). The interview schedules differ slightly between chief constable and PCC 
participants, given their differing roles and responsibilities.  
 
The Interviews 
In total 31 semi-structured interviews were carried out, 29 face-to-face and 2 by 
telephone. Suchman and Jordan, (1992) in a study of semi-structured interviews, saw 
the interview as an interactive event between the researcher and participant, the 
difference between a conversation and an interview being the interpersonal dynamic in 
terms of who decides the topics discussed. This built upon the work of Cohen and 
Manion (1989) who defined the interview as an event; 
 ‘…initiated by the interviewer for the specific purpose of obtaining research 
 relevant information and focused by him on content specified by research 
 objectives of systematic description, prediction or explanation…’(ibid p.307) 
and upon that of Robson (2003) who saw the interview as; 
 ‘…a conversation with a purpose.’ (ibid p.228) 
In particular, Fielding and Thomas (2008) highlight that crucially, the semi-structured 
interview in particular involves having clear questions, asked within construct that 
allows the researcher to probe and adapt to the dynamic of the interview. 
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In terms of approaching the interviews as an event, the author primarily considered the 
generic issues associated with effective interviewing within the literature as well as the 
author’s reflection on his position as a researcher who had a strong connection to the 
subject under review and in some cases an association and acquaintance with the 
subjects.  The author felt relatively confident in the techniques of conducting a semi-
structured interview. Having spent a career in investigation and the leadership of 
investigations, and having had a lead role in ethical investigative interviewing 
development for the police service nationally, he felt comfortable in structuring the 
interview event and the phased approach to developing the interview conversation 
within the model adopted by the police in England and Wales (College of Policing, 
2015).   
 
It was important, however for him to review the requirements and guidance that was 
available for interviews within a research context.  He therefore examined the literature 
in respect of the use of semi structured interviewing in a social research context 
(Hagan, 2010, Robson, 2003, Miller and Crabtree, 1999, DiCicco-Bloom and Crabtree, 
2006, Ruben and Ruben, 2005, Melia, 2000 Atkinson and Coffey, 2003). The advice 
given in those publications was strikingly similar to that adopted in the established 
police investigative interviewing process, including the establishment of rapport, 
putting the participant at ease, use of open questions, probing areas of interest and 
considerations as to closing the interview. 
 
In terms of the potential impact of the author as the interviewer upon the participant 
and the interview process itself, Holstein and Gubrium (2003) highlighted the dangers 
of the ‘active interviewer’ failing to be aware of his/ her contribution to the data 
produced by the interview. Kvale, (1996), emphasized the importance for the 
researcher to approach the interview as a professional conversation that needed to be 
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managed effectively so as to elicit the maximum data recognising the context and the 
potential influences of the researcher, whether inadvertent or not. In addition, the 
author considered the impact of his own experiences and views having been a police 
officer for almost 32 years and latterly a chief officer, he realized the potential impact 
of his approach, if unconsidered to detrimentally affect the interview and thereby the 
quality of the data.   
 
In Chapter one of this study, issues of reflection and reflexivity were discussed, in the 
context of the overall research study, in particular the importance for the author to 
recognise the potential for his pre-formed schema and biases to impact upon the 
construction of the research project, its conduct and the analysis of the data.  It was 
particularly important for the author to carefully reflect on his position within the 
interactive arena of the interview, and to ensure that so far as was possible he did not 
knowingly, or inadvertently influence the interview with his own views.  In this regard, 
the author, given his psychological training (a Masters degree in psychology) was 
mindful of the potential impact of heuristics and cognitive biases in the conduct of the 
interviews and the later analysis summarised in the work of Gilovich et al. (2003). The 
interview schedule was, therefore critical in ensuring that the author focused upon 
questioning that linked directly with the research questions and was not skewed by 
pre-formed cognitive schema. 
 
The author took care to use the interview schedule as a guide to enable him to ensure 
that, so far as was possible all the areas relevant to the research questions were 
covered during the interview conversation rather than as a restrictive template.  In this 
way, he was able to probe and pursue issues raised by the participants in their 
answers to the open-ended questions whilst remaining aware of the potential impact of 
his presence and style of questioning.  
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In addition, prior to the interviews taking place, the author researched the background 
and views of the participant using open sources.  This he anticipated would facilitate 
the interviews, ensuring that he was able to understand the local or individual context 
of the responses given. 
 
The Interview Events 
Prior to commencing each interview, the author carefully went through the information 
sheet and the consent form with the participant.  The documents had already been 
provided with the initial request to the participant by email as part of the initial request 
for participation. (Appendices B, C & D). The majority of the consent forms were 
signed in the presence of the author at the commencement of the interview; the 
remainder had been pre-signed by the participant (this was particularly the case for 
those who had elected to conduct a telephone interview).  In the latter cases, the 
author ensured that he discussed the content of the consent form with the participant 
who had pre-signed the consent form.  His objective was to ensure that informed 
consent was obtained for the interview to take place in the circumstances described 
within the form. Emphasis was placed upon consent to digitally record the interview, 
and that verbatim quotes would not be used in any report without the consent of the 
participant. In all cases full consent was forthcoming.  The signed consent forms are 
available for inspection by academic supervisors and examiners. 
 
All participants were content to be recorded using an application to the author’s iPad 
tablet computer.  This method of recording allowed the author to secure the responses 
in a reliable, secure format within a password-protected device.  Upon return to base, 
the author made backup copies of the recordings on a password protected desktop 
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computer. It is possible to identify the participant by reference to his/ her reference 
number assigned in this project which can be compared with the securely stored 
participant schedule. The audio files are available for review by academic supervisors 
and examiners.  
 
The participants were confident in their responses and the interviews were free 
flowing. The interviews were scheduled for one hour, in the event they lasted between 
38 and 97 minutes, with an average for face-to-face interviews of 65 minutes. The 
duration of the shorter interviews seemed more a function of the character and brevity 
of expression of the participant generally rather than any reluctance or hesitation on 
the parts of those providing the shorter interviews.   
 
The author tried hard to make the interview with participants a conversational event, 
mindful that this was most likely to produce the desired rich data (Hagan, 2010, 
Robson, 2003, Miller and Crabtree, 1999, DiCicco-Bloom and Crabtree, 2006, Ruben 
and Ruben, 2005, Melia, 2000, Atkinson and Coffey, 2003).   
 
In the case of the chief constables, all the discussions were conversational in tone with 
the participant often speaking widely on the subject, questions from the author acting 
as prompts.  Many of the PCCs also took this approach, however some took a more 
didactic stance, requiring the author to use more questioning than with the more 
expressive participants. On reflection, it may be that the chief constable participants 
felt more comfortable having a conversation with the author who was known 
personally to them, or was known to be a former chief officer. 
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In the early interviews, the author noticed that on the occasions that he began to make 
a note during the interview, the participant often slowed down or stopped speaking, 
and looked at the note pad, presumably to see what was being noted and/or to give 
him time to finish the note.  This broke the flow of the conversation. In the remainder of 
interviews the author elected not to make notes during the interview, but to make 
notes from memory immediately following the interview.  Similarly, in the early 
interviews, the author needed to refer to the question schedule to remain on track, 
however after a few occasions he was able to remember the areas to be covered, and 
this enabled the interview to be more conversational, thereby more comfortable for the 
participant which it was hoped would elicit richer data. 
 
A key issue that arose during the series of interviews was an order effect, in that there 
were issues raised by the first participants that had not been included specifically in 
the interview schedule, following each interview, the author reflected upon the 
experience and how the conversation had developed as well as the data elicited. 
Utilising the principles of the ‘responsive interviewing model’ (Rubin and Rubin, 2005, 
p.36) and with reference to the Grounded Theory model (Glaser and Strauss, 1967, 
Bryman and Bell, 2003, Corbin and Straus, 2008), the author adapted the later 
interviews to include the additional issues, pursuing their significance with subsequent 
participants. 
 
In summary, the participant cohort represented a significant proportion of the chief 
constables (39%) and PCCs (36%) across England and Wales.  All participants were 
supportive and gave full responses to the questions asked, with many discussing 
further issues that contributed to a greater understanding of the issues related to the 
research questions.   
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Analysis Commentary 
Miles (1979) argued that the analysis of qualitative data was the most demanding 
aspect of the research process within that methodological paradigm, and for the 
author, Basit (2003) effectively sums up the challenges and opportunities in the 
analysis phase of qualitative research, such as that conducted in this study; 
 ‘Data analysis is the most difficult and crucial aspect of qualitative research. 
 Coding is one of the significant steps taken during analysis to organise and 
 make sense of the contextual data. This is usually seen as arduous.  It is not 
 fundamentally a mechanical or technical exercise. It is a dynamic, intuitive and 
 creative process of inductive reasoning, thinking and theorising’ (ibid p.143). 
 
This approach is at the core of the interpretive approach taken by the author in this 
study where the object of analysing qualitative data is to determine the categories, 
relationships and assumptions that inform the interviewee’s view of the subject of the 
research. McCracken (1988).  Significantly, Basit (2003) identifies that; 
 ‘Qualitative data analysis is not a discrete procedure carried out at the final 
 stages of research. It is, indeed, an all-encompassing activity that continues 
 throughout the life of the project’. (ibid p.145). 
 
This phenomenon described by Basit describes exactly how the findings evolved for 
the author, after each interview during his reflection upon the conversation, themes 
began to arise based upon the frequency of the apparent saliency of the comments 
made by the subject in the context of both the literature he had reviewed and other 
interviews carried out previously.  He recognised that these early impressions may be 
  
 
 122 
the subject of bias due to pre existing cognitive schema discussed previously in this 
thesis.  However, this informal categorisation was the beginning of the analytical 
process that was to follow within more formal parameters.  
 
The material was subjected to content analysis, which is a structured analytical 
method used to interpret meaning from the content of textual data (Hsieh and 
Shannon, 2005).  A phrase widely used in the field of qualitative content analysis is 
that of ‘coding’. Saldana (2016) in his coding manual he describes a ‘code’ as a 
researcher generated construct that symbolises or describes the data (Ibid p.4).  In 
order to draw out the themes within the interview data that may serve to address the 
research questions, it was necessary for the author to apply a structured 
categorisation of the material, coding provided an effective means of doing so in a 
manner that attributed meaning to the data (ibid p.292).   
 
A great deal of consideration was given to the mechanics of the process by which the 
coding was carried out, and the author in particular looked closely at the NViVO 
computer aided content analysis and coding system (Robson, 2003). This automated 
solution seemed at the outset to offer a more effective and potentially more time 
efficient process.  In order to assess the efficacy of NViVO, the author engaged in two 
University of Portsmouth graduate development courses, examining in detail the 
applicability of the technology to his research analysis requirements.  In the event, the 
technology did not appear to the author to offer any significant advantages, and 
indeed, in his view it threatened to potentially become a distraction in terms of the 
author working for the technology rather than it enabling him to draw greater 
understanding from it.  Therefore, following discussions with his first supervisor, the 
author decided to conduct the content analysis and coding manually. In the event, the 
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author found that this approach kept him more connected to the data and in retrospect, 
he is of the view that it was the right decision. 
 
The author therefore began the laborious, but rewarding task of immersing himself in 
the interview recordings, systematically identifying the material that appeared to 
answer the research questions, or indeed given that this was a relatively new area of 
research, and the strategy was to some extent a ‘grounded approach’ (Glaser and 
Strauss 1967) in that there was the potential for the identification of new issues within 
the policing governance construct.  
 
The author was mindful during the coding process of the risks to critical thinking in 
drawing out themes from the data that may emanate from cognitive biases and 
heuristics described by Gilovich et al. (2003). He worked hard to ensure that the 
coding judgement were based upon the interview product, linked to the extant 
literature.  
 
The author reviewed the material in detail over several iterations, coding the data, as 
either single category descriptors or as longer explanatory passages.  Given that the 
author had, for the reasons described in the ethical review process assured the 
participants of complete confidentiality, it was not appropriate to reproduce in this 
thesis verbatim quotes from participants and therefore the coding narratives in the 
resultant spread sheet are paraphrased records as close to a quote as possible rather 
than verbatim references. 
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Summary 
In this chapter, the author has described the approach to the research and how the 
planned method operated in practice.  The process was extremely challenging in 
terms of logistics and the sheer geography involved, requiring considerable journeys 
across England and Wales in order to meet and interview the participants, this was 
necessary, given that their status and position meant that there was no chance of 
them travelling to meet the researcher.  Some thought was given to meeting a number 
of chief constables at ACPO/ NPCC gatherings or APCC meetings when a large 
number of potential participants would be together in one place.  The author 
discounted this since it had the potential to compromise the confidentiality of the 
research that had been assured.  In the event, the approach appeared to be correct, 
given the difference found by the researcher when he was required to conduct 
telephone interviews that yielded significantly less data. 
 
Chapter six will discuss the findings of this research. 
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Chapter Six. 
Findings 
Pilot Study Findings 
A pilot study was conducted to explore early emerging issues as a result of the change 
in policing governance, and to test the methodological approach. The pilot study was 
conducted in April 2013, a relatively short time after the PCCs had taken up their posts 
in November 2012.  The study took a qualitative approach and consisted of semi-
structured interviews (Noakes and Wincup 2004, Pogrebin, 2003) with chief 
constables. It sought to answer the relatively simple research question posed at that 
time; 
 ‘Has there been any effect on policing delivery since the introduction of Police 
 and Crime Commissioners on 22 November 2012?’   
The product of the interviews was analysed using a thematic content analysis of 
responses (Newell and Burnard, 2011, pp. 118-129).  The findings were identified 
within the thematic areas and were explored within those contexts, and are discussed 
in Chapter 4 ante. In summary, they were, the expectations of the chief constables 
prior to the implementation of PCCs, changes that have occurred since the 
implementation of PCCs, the impact on Policing delivery and on chief constables. In 
addition to the effect of the implementation of PCCs upon the key relationships 
between the chief constable, partners, the public and the government together with the 
importance of the relationship between the chief constable and the PCC in delivering 
policing and the positive or negative effects of the implementation of PCCs. Finally, the 
future of policing delivery and key issues going forward. 
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Main Research Findings 
The Research Questions 
Building upon a review of the available literature, and the learning provided by the pilot 
study, the following research questions for this study were developed; 
What has been the effect of the new governance paradigm in Policing across 
England and Wales upon the way that Policing is governed and delivered at a 
strategic and operational level? 
What aspects of the new governance paradigm in policing may be positive in 
terms of improving the effective delivery of policing and community safety? 
What aspects of the new governance paradigm in policing may inhibit the 
delivery of effective policing and community safety? 
What changes or adaptations to the governance paradigm are apparent that 
may have the potential to improve effectiveness in delivering policing and 
community safety? 
 
The research questions guided the analysis of the data. The findings are reported 
below. 
 
The Findings – Commentary 
Thirteen key governance themes were evident in the interviews of both chief 
constables and PCCs. This section will explore those key governance themes in a 
manner that examines in detail the issues that individuals and cohorts found were 
salient and made comment upon during the interviews. Within each theme there is a 
discussion of the issues with examples of responses by participants that support the 
finding. The full collection of participants responses under each theme is attached in 
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Appendices J & K.  The key findings are drawn together at the conclusion of the 
narrative in respect of each theme. 
 
Positive Views of Police & Crime Commissioner Governance Structure 
Chief constables and PCCs saw positive aspects in the new governance paradigm. 
The principal positive impact seen by chief constables was the improved speed of 
decision-making facilitated by the fact that they now only had to interact with a single, 
full time office holder rather than a part time 17-member committee. This reflected 
similar findings reported by Caless and Owens (2016), and the predictions of HMIC as 
to an expected improved speed of strategic decision-making  (HMIC 2010 p. 13); 
 CC	
‘Flash	to	bang	time	is	quicker…	There’s	definitely	innovation	around	the	country...	that	
probably	wouldn’t	be	set	up	under	a	Police	Authority’.	
CC	
‘With	a	Police	Authority	with	17	people	you	were	constantly	being	lobbied,	engaged	in	
conversation,	about	local	issues...I	would	go	to	(PA)	meetings	trying	to	focus	on	the	
corporate	...	Inevitably	there	were	conversations	raised	around	local	issues.	The	things	
that	local	people	are	speaking	to	the	PCC	about	are	the	same	that	they	were	at	the	
Police	Authority.	In	some	ways	that’s	a	good	thing	because	you	only	have	to	have	that	
conversation	once.	The	plethora	of	meetings	and	committees	we	had	under	the	Police	
Authority	have	been	swept	away’.		
CC	
Bureaucracy	has	been	massively	reduced,	typically	with	the	Police	Authority	we	would	
complete	over	200	reports	a	year	on	anything	they	took	a	fancy	to	or	were	enquiring	
about.	If	we	wanted	to	bring	about	change	in	the	force	particularly	if	it	cost	money,	
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and	it	was	something	we	felt	needed	Police	Authority	approval,	then	typically	we	
would	submit	a	report,	it	would	get	in	front	of	a	committee	within	3	months	we'd	be	
asked	for	another	one	and	another	one,	and	it	would	go	on	until	eventually	the	answer	
would	be	no.	With	the	PCC	all	of	that	bureaucracy	has	been	removed	I	can	either	
address	issues	in	my	one	to	one	with	[the	PCC],	in	informal	meetings	in	special	
meetings	or	have	a	conversation	and	[the	PCC]	will	make	a	decision	quickly.’		
One chief constable saw consistency as a significant improvement; 
CC	
‘I’ve	got	one	person	to	deal	with,	I	get	consistency	of	view	from	that	person.’	
Another chief constable saw improved community representation as an important 
positive aspect of the new structure. 
CC.	
‘I	felt	that	the	link	between	police	and	the	community	was	essential.	Separate	to	the	
police	a	route	that	communities	and	partners	can	engage	with	policing.	I’m	not	sure	
there’s	an	ideal	way	of	that	being	delivered.	I	think	the	system	was	appropriate	for	
change.’	
However, amongst the positive views, chief constables expressed concerns that along 
with more rapid decision-making, there may have been brought with it a reduction in 
the moderation effect of the police authority committee structure;  
 CC	
	‘There	is	a	challenge	because	with	one	person	you	have	one	view,	but	it	is	better	than	
the	Police	Authority’.	
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CC	
‘The	Police	Authority	was	very	formulaic,	very	committee	focused	...it	was	slow	and	
laborious	lots	of	scrutiny	but	it	was	a	kind	of	chess	match.	This	can	be	far	more	
dynamic	because	there	are	two	individuals,	if	those	individuals	agree	it	tends	to	
happen.	But	then	there’s	the	question	who	is	constraining	those	individuals	to	make	
sure	they	make	the	right	decision?’	
Among PCCs, surprisingly perhaps there were some who questioned the perceived 
defects in the police authority structure that in part led to the introduction of the 
changed governance framework, though now that they were PCCs they saw benefits; 
 PCC	
‘I	did	not	see	the	Police	Authority	system	needed	fixing	saw	it	as	a	move	by	
government	to	blame	PCCs	for	the	failures	that	were	inevitably	going	to	result	from	
cutbacks.	Although	I	was	an	opponent,	it	is	a	better	system’.		
Other PCCs echoed the assertions made by the 2010 coalition government in the lead 
up to the changes in governance and the findings of Loveday & Reid (2003) in respect 
of the failings of police authorities; 
PCC	
‘They	[Police	Authorities]	did	a	competent	job	but	I	saw	nothing	at	all	that	convinced	
me	that	they	were	properly	holding	the	chief	constables	to	account	on	behalf	of	the	
public.	Police	Authorities	were	cowed	by	the	sight	of	someone	in	braid.	However	on	
the	technical	side	they	were	quite	effective	I	don’t	think	they	were	a	waste	of	time	but	
they	were	invisible.’		
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PCC	
‘Police	Authorities	did	not	do	the	job	they	were	paid	to	do.	The	relationship	between	
Police	Authority	and	Chief	Constables	was	one	with	too	much	familiarity.	Police	forces	
had	more	money	than	they	needed	and	were	not	used	to	being	held	to	account’.		
In terms of the positive aspects of the introduction of PCCs, again the PCC 
participants echoed the views of chief constables in terms of the reduction of 
bureaucracy and improvements in decision-making; 
	 PCC	
‘If	we	decide	to	move	in	a	certain	direction	we	can	do	it	much	quicker	than	the	old	
system’.		
PCC	
‘On	the	whole	its	fairly	satisfactory,	a	huge	improvement	on	Police	Authorities,	for	
example	in	speed	of	decision	making.	We	get	things	done	its	a	proactive	system	rather	
than	a	reactive	system	as	Police	Authorities’.		
PCC	
‘…decisions	can	be	made	very	quickly,	not	hastily,	but	the	decision	making	process	
which	helps	the	force,	helps	the	Chief	Constable	they	need	to	know	where	they	stand	
on	funding	and	a	million	and	one	other	things.	I	can	say	yes	to	the	Chief	Constable,	
and	nobody	can	gain	say	me,	I	can	say	you	will	have	this,	this	is	the	amount	of	money	
you	will	have...its	not	just	a	steer,	making	a	decision	is	another,	I	can	give	the	Chief	
Constable	certainty	I	don’t	have	to	ask	anybody	else’.	
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PCCs mentioned the positive aspects of improved accountability more than was the 
case with chief constables; 
PCC	
‘...they	[the	public]	get	a	direct	line	of	accountability	that	they’ve	never	had	before.	
With	Police	Authorities	they	were	never	elected	to	represent	the	authority’.		
PCC	
‘The	core	principle	of	democratically	accountable	policing	I	supported.	Having	taken	it	
on	I	really	think	it’s	a	good	idea.	The	public	identify	Chief	Constables	who	have	failed	
but	for	each	of	those	there	was	a	Police	Authority	that	allowed	them	to	fail.	There	has	
been	inadequate	policing	governance	in	the	past	and	the	principle	of	making	that	
governance	sharper,	open,	transparent,	locally	democratically	accountable	is	a	really	
good	principle’.		
One PCC also saw some improvement in accountability more widely across the 
governance framework; 
 PCC	
‘It	would	be	very	hard	for	me	in	this	role	to	operate	in	a	secret	perverted	way	or	be	
corrupt,	I	think	there’s	more	likelihood	of	that	in	a	Police	Authority	type	setting	where	
you’ve	got	part	time	members	who	are	occasional	visitors	...I	think	when	you’ve	got	a	
full	time	person	in	that	role	they	[others]	are	far	better	informed	far	more	aware	of	
what’s	going	on’.	
Both chief constables and PCCs in this sample saw the principal positive aspects of 
the introduction of the new governance structure to be a reduction in bureaucracy 
leading to improved, quicker decision making at the strategic governance level. In 
addition to improved police accountability and enhanced community representation. 
  
 
 132 
These findings confirm those identified in the pilot study. They provide an overall 
positive backdrop to the new governance framework, apparently achieving, in the view 
of these participants the express aims of the coalition government of 2010 (Cameron, 
2009). 
 
It is, however important to note that, in particular the chief constable participant cohort 
did not include participants who had not responded to a request to participate or who 
had declined to take part.  Given the tone of the responses from chief constables who 
declined to participate, strong negative feelings existed that may not be represented in 
this sample. This was exemplified in the chief constables who in Chapter five reported 
feeling too vulnerable in terms of their relationship with their PCC to participate. 
 
Negative Views of Police & Crime Commissioner Governance Structure 
Given that PCCs had put themselves forward to be elected to the new governance 
role, it is perhaps not surprising that as a cohort they had fewer negative views of the 
governance structure. The concerns were around the accountability framework for 
PCCs themselves and suggest a lack of confidence in the efficacy of PCPs to perform 
that moderation role; 
PCC	
‘…not	strong	enough	checks	and	balances	on	the	PCC	not	to	do	things	that	are	disruptive.’	
 
 
Chief constables saw more potential dangers, notably in respect of the same 
accountability of a single elected individual issue that was identified by PCCs; 
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CC	
‘Too	much	power	vested	in	one	person	I’ve	seen	the	good	and	bad	of	that.	The	trouble	
is	you	are	just	too	dependent	upon	the	intellect,	the	politics	the	personal	
characteristics	of	the	individual	that	gets	the	job.’	
CC	
‘Fundamentally	I	disagreed	with	it.	On	the	basis	that	it	all	becomes	an	individual	...	It’s	
a	big	role	in	the	hands	of	one	person.	The	bits	that	are	positive;	it	gives	a	human	face	
where	people	know	they	can	contact	somebody	where	Police	Authorities	were	
anonymous...I	don’t	think	its	right	for	one	to	have	such	an	influence	over	something	as	
important	as	policing.’	
	 	
A number of chief constables saw potential danger in what they saw as too much 
power vested in one person in the new structure. In the event, however they found that 
this did not manifest in their experience with their PCC, again perhaps an indicator that 
this cohort had a degree of self selection based upon chief constables who had a 
relatively benign relationship with their PCC.  
CC	
‘I	don’t	agree	with	it,	its	too	much	power	in	one	person	and	its	too	personality	driven	
[however]	My	own	PCC	has	been	breath	of	fresh	air...Its	too	much	power	in	one	pair	of	
hands	if	they	choose	not	to	use	it	properly	or	proportionately	or	fairly	or	listen...	The	
power	in	the	hands	of	one	person	if	they	use	it	appropriately	can	be	enormously	
helpful,	as	it	is	here	but	it	is	too	dependent	on	one	personality…[The	Police	Authority	
was]	Bureaucratic,	self	serving,	corrupt	and	ineffective’. 
Others expressed concerns about the level of political influence inherent in the 
structure both party political and as an element of the structure itself; 
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CC	
‘I	think	the	model	of	governance	is	fundamentally	flawed	on	a	whole	series	of	levels.	
One	thing	that	was	talked	about	was	the	introduction	of	politics	into	policing	and	I	
think	that	has	manifested	itself,	not	so	much	as	party	politics,	but	the	mechanics	and	
the	day	to	day	focus	of	somebody	who	is	elected	and	therefore	is	a	politician,	in	an	
organisation	to	influence	views	and	deliverables	which	I	as	a	police	professional	don’t	
always	agree	with	Whilst	there	is	a	Policing	Protocol	that	talks	about	43	Chief	
Constables	independent	operational	Chief	Constables	and	the	PCC	not	fettering	the	
ability	of	the	Chief	Constable	to	deliver	their	business.	The	reality	is	that	it’s	not	
anything	like	as	black	and	white	as	that	gets	presented.	Because	at	the	end	of	
anything	you	might	want	to	do	there	is	money	and/	or	reputation.’		
One chief constable saw potential dangers in the new governance structure allowing a 
return to the issues that had led to the formation of the 1962 Royal Commission and 
the enactment of the Police Act 1964 (Home office 1964) that set up police authorities 
as an improved governance system; 
CC		
‘...	so	my	sense	is	that	we	should	have	strong	democratic	governance.	albeit,	I	thought	
	 the	Police	Authorities	were	entirely	serviceable	certainly	better	than	the	watch	
	 committees		which	thru	various	iterations	they	replaced.	When	you	look	back	at	what	
	 was	happening	in	Notts.	&	South	Wales	in	the	50's	and	early	60's	...	I	wouldn’t	want	to	
	 go	back	to	those	bad	old	days.	There	is	a	sense	in	some	of	my	colleagues	that	that	is	
	 what	is	the	case.’	
It appears therefore, that the concerns raised in the advent of the legislation to 
introduce PCCs as regards the potential for erratic behaviour and for political bias 
(Orde, 2012, Chakrabarti, 2011) and more recently (Davies 2014, Joyce, 2016), is 
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supported by chief constables in this cohort, in both respects and by PCCs to some 
extent in the case of erratic behaviour. 
 
The key findings in terms of the negative views of the PCC governance structure were, 
therefore according to this cohort are; a lack of accountability of individual PCCs and 
the potential for inappropriate political and party political influence upon policing. 
 
Perceived Dangers of Police & Crime Commissioner Governance Structure. 
Chief constables and PCCs expressed significantly more positive views of the new 
governance structure than they did negative views. When the interview turned to 
issues that they saw as potential dangers in the structure, chief constables focussed 
upon personal and interpersonal issues; 
CC	
‘Delivering	policing	services	and	delivering	a	business	based	upon	the	relationship	
between	two	people	which	is	absolutely	critical	is	flawed.	It	doesn’t	work	to	the	
benefit	of	the	public,	and	as	we	go	into	austerity,	having	to	think	about	what	do	the	
public	really	need	from	a	professional	police	service	as	opposed	to	what	does	the	PCC	
want	to	do	because	its	popular	with	the	public	then	we	are	likely	to	get	into	some	
difficult	territory.’	
CC	
‘The	trouble	with	the	system	is	that	it	is	a	very	personal	system	its	designed	to	be	very	
personal...so	you	make	an	assumption	that	you	set	up	arrangements	for	how	the	
working	relationship	should	work....	there’s	a	great	deal	of	instability	in	it	all...its	
possible	you	may	have	to	undo	all	the	arrangements	{when	a	new	PCC	arrives}....the	
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arrangements	between	the	two	corporations	sole	are	only	as	good	as	the	agreement	
of	the	current	PCC....it	seems	to	me	that	because	its	based	upon	the	individual	its	
inherently	unstable.’		
CC	
‘...what	you’ve	got	with	a	PCC	is	a	personality	who	has	been	put	into	a	role	with	no	
prior	qualifications	no	prior	experience...and	then	in	effect	(though	CHMI)	would	
disagree	with	this,	but	has	in	effect	unfettered	power	within	an	organisation.	It	really	
is	dependent	upon	the	Chief	Constable	setting	the	ground	rules,	developing	the	
relationship,	working	out	where	the	line	is.’		
Some chief constables also raised issues of competence in PCCs; 
CC	
‘I	think	the	PCC	finds	policing	quite	complex,	the	reality	is	that	if	you	applied	a	pure	
resources	to	risk	basis,	I’d	be	pulling	a	lot	of	resources	out	of	the	rural	areas	and	
putting	them	into	XX	&	XX	(urban	areas)	but	that	is	politically	difficult,	not	only	from	
the	PCCs	perspective	but	also	from	the	community	engagement	aspect	for	me.		
CC	
‘[PCC]	misses	the	point	its	more	powerful	for	me	to	have	someone	to	say	I’ve	
challenged	the	CC	and	I’m	satisfied	rather	than	were	doing	this	and	that.	The	public	do	
not	get	the	scrutiny	they	deserve.’		
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A further danger was seen in the behaviour of some PCCs that alluded to the potential 
danger for PCCs to behave in an extreme manner in a way that may give the chief 
constable cause for concern regarding their personal professional position; 
CC	
‘If	you	are	one	of	those	CCs	with	a	PCC	at	either	end	of	that	curve	of	normality,	
particularly	if	you’ve	got	the	more	aggressive	bombastic,	throwing	their	weight	
around	type	of	PCC,	its	incredibly	stressful	because	its	a	one	on	one	relationship...it	
does	make	a	difference	as	to	how	stressful	your	life	is	massively	....	You’ve	got	***	
(referring	to	a	Chief	Constable	who	went	sick	allegedly	due	to	stress)	who’s	gone	off	
how	open	people	will	be	I	don’t	know	but	that’s	all	PCC	driven.	I	never	got	there	
because	I	got	my	head	around	it...	But	that’s	ok	for	me	to	say	who's	kids	have	left	
school	...	But	if	you’re	(referred	to	another	Chief	Constable	with	younger	family	who	
had	gone	sick	allegedly	due	to	stress)	...	In	a	more	vulnerable	position	with	younger	
kids	and	you	saw	what	happened	to	**	(referring	to	the	CC	in	question).	Its	all	very	
easy	for	me	to	say	get	your	head	around	it,	perhaps	my	particular	situation	meant	it	
was	easier	for	me	to	get	my	head	round	it,	if	Id	been	just	over	25yrs,	kids	10	&	11	
...different	ball	game.’		
CC	
‘I	feel	sometimes	they	have	recreated	the	silverbacks	of	policing	but	called	them	
something	different.	So	some	of	the	worst	excesses	of	some	of	the	CCs	who	thought	
they	were	running	their	own	fiefdoms	it	does	create	the	environment	for	that	to	
happen	because	who’s	going	to	stop	them’.	
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There was some evidence that the personal interests of PCCs affected their span of 
interest either personally or politically; 
CC	
		 ‘PCC	must	be	briefed	re	things	happening	in	the	area	he	lives’.	
CC	
‘…in	practice	as	its	worked	out	for	me	its	been	a	pretty	positive	experience.	But	I	think	
that’s	a	bit	of	a	lottery.	I’m	not	sure	there’s	enough	regulation	around	a	PCC	who	
might	want	to	be	making	operational	decisions,	when	they	are	paying	my	salary	and	
responsible	for	sacking	me	or	not...I’ve	seen	it	with	neighboring	forces	where	their	
relationship	is	just	not	the	same	as	ours.	But	I	really	think	if	you’ve	got	those	three	
criteria	right	(boundaries,	equity	&	trust)	it	works...clearly,	there	are	some	[PCCs]	that	
are	politically	motivated	-	party	political.	...There	are	Chief	Constables	around	the	
country	who	have	no	relationship	with	their	PCCs	...you	have	also	got	some	PCCs	
around	the	country	who	have	come	into	office	and	think	they	have	to	have	all	the	
ideas	about	changing	the	service	and	forget	we’ve	done	this	for	150	yrs.,	and	are	not	
dull	people.	
 
Another issue for chief constables was a perceived lack of resilience in the 
governance structure due to authority being vested in one individual, echoing similar 
concerns raised by participants in the Caless and Owen (2016) study which identified 
PCCs working under significant workload pressure; 
CC	
[Re	PCC	being	unavailable]	‘It	showed	the	fragility	of	the	system,	the	resilience	was	
non	existent	there	is	no	statutory	position	for	the	deputy,	so	that	at	the	point	[PCC	
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became	unavailable]	we	had	no	governance	for	a	period.	The	panel,	which	is	one	of	
the	elements	in	the	new	governance	arrangements	that	has	just	not	functioned.	The	
panel	had	responsibilities	but	didn’t	appreciate	their	significance,	couldn’t	act	quickly.	
We	had	all	sorts	of	fun	and	games	with	the	Home	Office,	trying	to	work	out	what	the	
rules	were.’	
CC	
[Chief	Constable	described	the	situation	when	PCC	was	unavailable	long	term].	‘…This	
meant	that	policing	would	be	affected	-	the	CFO	was	identified	as	the	person	who	
would	sign	matters	off	in	the	absence	of	any	guidance.	He	avoided	taking	decisions	
that	an	elected	PCC	would,	so	was	seen	as	there	to	only	enable	the	police	to	conduct	
business,	and	not	to	determine	long	term	strategy.’	
Some PCCs agreed with chief constables regarding the dangers presented by the 
personal and interpersonal skills and traits of some PCCs and the need for 
moderation; 
PCC	
‘There	must	be	a	system	that	prevents	mad	people	being	PCCs.’	
PCC	
‘If	you	have	a	maverick	what	do	you	do?	PCCs	should	have	same	power	of	recall	as	
MPs.’		
Other PCCs however recognised the danger but felt that it was mitigated; 
PCC	
‘The	PCC	has	a	lot	of	responsibility	but	not	much	exercisable	power	There	is	a	risk	from	
maverick	PCCs,	but	they	would	be	recognised	and	weeded	out	the	big	risk	is	from	
mediocre	PCCs	who	might	coast	along	not	take	decisions	etc’.	
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PCC	
‘Its	a	hugely	powerful	role	(PCC)...I	don’t	think	it	places	too	much	power	in	the	hands	
of	one	person	I’m	an	Individual,	I’m	a	PCC,	I’m	a	Corporation	Sole,	and	I’m	a	Local	
Authority	all	rolled	into	one	nobody	has	ever	had	that	before	-	never.	I	don’t	think	its	
too	much	power	and	the	government	are	going	to	give	us	even	more	power.’	
PCCs also saw the personal resilience of PCCs as a potential risk in the governance 
structure; 
PCC	
‘Its	unproven	whether	the	model	is	sustainable	by	investing	it	in	one	person	
particularly	when	we	are	doing	it	with	meager	resources	Its	about	resourcing	and	
personal	resilience.’		
PCC	
‘[Personal	resilience	is	an	issue]	The	age	profile	of	PCCs	is	quite	high.	The	statistical	
chance	of	someone	dropping	dead	in	the	next	4	years	is	very	high.	At	the	moment	two	
are	seriously	ill	and	one	has	died.’	
The key findings in terms of the perceived dangers presented by the governance 
structure are therefore; the potential for the PCC to have too much power vested in an 
individual. There was a risk of inappropriate behaviour by PCCs. In addition there was 
a perceived lack of scrutiny and/or moderation of PCCs, both of which echoed the 
earlier findings of the Committee for Standards in Public Life (2015). A lack of personal 
resilience in PCCs was seen as potentially leading to strategic vulnerability. 
Inappropriate political influence in policing as a consequence of the structure was also 
seen as a risk. Finally, there were concerns regarding the operational independence of 
Chief Constables. 
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The preceding thematic categories described above are somewhat general in terms of 
perceptions of chief constables in respect of positive and negative impressions of the 
impact of the implementation of the new governance structure.  The thematic 
categories that follow are more focussed upon particular aspects of governance and 
its impact upon the police and the delivery of policing. 
 
Police & Crime Commissioner Election/ Legitimacy Issues 
Immediately following the elections of the first PCCs in November 2012 there was 
significant public and academic debate regarding the level of voter turnout and the 
consequent issues for the democratic legitimacy of PCCs (Electoral Commission, 
2013). These issues were discussed in Chapter three of this thesis. Much of the 
argument against the police authority model was predicated upon the perceived 
democratic deficit in the governance structure put in place by the Police Act 1964 
(Home Office 1964) (Herbert, 2011). This theme reports upon the views of the 
participant cohorts in this regard. 
 
PCCs recognised the issue of poor voter turnout as a fact, but did not see it as 
affecting their democratic mandate; 
PCC	
‘There	is	a	single	elected	person	and	it	doesn’t	matter	if	it	was	16.38%	or	60%.’	
PCC	
‘...they	[the	public]	get	a	direct	line	of	accountability	that	they’ve	never	had	before.	
With	Police	Authorities	they	were	never	elected	to	represent	the	authority’.		
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Chief constables did question the process in terms of legitimacy, one commenting that; 
CC	
‘You’ve	really	got	to	question	the	democratic	process	where	a	person	has	been	elected	
by	14%	of	the	electorate	is	now	responsible	for	such	a	big	budget	with	big	
responsibilities...’		
It was apparent that in spite of the media and academics seeing the poor electoral 
turnout as significant, for chief constables and PCCs in these cohorts it was not an 
issue of concern. Their view seemed to be that the democratic process had been 
followed and those that had been elected represented the whole community within the 
relevant policing area. Both cohorts did, however feel that improved electoral turnouts 
would improve the perception of the legitimacy of PCCs. The issue of political 
legitimacy feeds directly into that of public engagement that is discussed below.  
 
Public Engagement 
Public engagement is fundamental to delivering effective policing to communities 
(Millen and Stephens, 2011) and was a key thrust of the 2010 Coalition government in 
driving the PCC agenda (Home Office, 2010) that led to the Policing, Crime and Social 
Responsibility Act 2011 (Home Office, 2011). 
 
The responses from both cohorts in this research indicated that overall the 
implementation of PCCs has been seen as positive in terms of engagement with 
communities; 
PCC	
‘94%	didn’t	know	a	Police	Authority	existed...	at	least	70-%	of	people	know	they	have	a	
PCC.’	
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PCC	
‘...the	frustration	from	the	public	early	on	was	a)	there	was	no	point	complaining	
because	nobody	listened	and	b)	if	you	did	complain	it	put	you	at	a	disadvantage	...	A	
sense	of	there’s	no	way	into	this	organisation,	no	way	to	challenge	it.	The	very	fact	of	
there	being	someone	who	is	not	the	police	but	has	some	authority	over	them,	that	in	
itself	is	a	reassurance’.		
 
Some PCCs mentioned the importance of the media in terms of positive and negative 
community perceptions of their role; 
PCC	
‘It	is	difficult	to	engage	with	the	public	across	a	large	force.	The	size	of	my	area	is	such	
that	I	needed	a	part	time	one	driver/	staff	officer.	I	was	accused	of	having	a	chauffer,	I	
was	hammered	by	the	BBC.	MPs	and	Local	Councilors	can	claim	expenses	to	go	to	their	
place	of	work	PCCs	cant.	It	could	put	people	off	doing	the	job,	particularly	rural	ones’.	
PCC	
‘Various	editorials	were	very	aggressive,	for	example	the	Times	reported	that	24	PCCs	
were	under	investigation,	when	many	of	those	matters	related	to	things	years	before	
PCCs	were	created.	I	think	the	press	have	now	woken	up	to	PCCs	being	quite	a	good	
thing’.		
Chief constables supported the PCC cohort in this regard; 
CC	
‘I	am	a	fan	of	his	Police	&	Crime	Plan...he	crafted	a	plan	that	was	framed	around	some	
priorities	that	would	be	meaningful	to	the	public.	The	public	are	better	engaged	into	
policing	due	to	[the	PCC].’	
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CC	
‘They	[PCCs]	are	more	out	there	in	the	media	and	sometimes	they	can	add	to	the	
public	debate	in	a	way	that	it	would	be	inappropriate	for	me	to	do...He	will	get	
engaged	in	political	conversations	and	can	say	what	he	wants’.		
CC	
‘They	are	incredibly	hard	working	they	try	to	meet	as	many	people	as	they	can	my	only	
criticism	is	that	sometimes	its	not	coordinated.	...	I	cannot	fault	their	commitment	and	
public	spiritedness.’		
	
The chief constable cohort did, however point to persistent public confusion and to an 
extent disinterest in the new policing governance structure; 
CC	
‘...the	public	still	recognise	the	head	of	the	police	service	as	being	the	Chief	Constable	
rather	than	the	PCC.	There	are	some	PCCs	who	would	say	they	are	the	boss.	and	that	
has	undoubtedly	caused	some	real	problems’.		
CC	
‘The	public	are	confused,	they	don’t	understand	that	the	PCC	is	separate	to	the	police	
and	the	PCC	is	there	to	hold	me	to	account	The	public	and	the	media	sometimes	
believe	that	the	PCC	runs	the	operational	side	of	the	organisation,	and	it	is	not	
uncommon	to	see	headlines	where	they	talk	about	the	police	chief	when	they	talk	
about	the	PCC.	So	I	do	think	there	is	utter	confusion.	There	is	a	need	for	marketing	to	
explain	the	role	of	PCC’.		
In this sample, both chief constables and PCCs held views that were consistent with 
Loveday (2017) in that they both saw the potential for and the practical positive impact 
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of the introduction of PCCs on public engagement and public understanding of 
policing. There is, however much more work to be done, in particular a need for the 
role of the PCC in representing the public to be more widely understood across 
communities.  This view is supported by the work of Wells (2015) who expressed 
concern regarding the ineffective ways in which PCCs accessed public views (ibid, 
p.96).  The key finding arising from this theme was, therefore; that the introduction of 
PCCs has improved public engagement in policing, however there is a lack of 
understanding across communities of the policing governance structure. 
 
Partnerships 
In order to deliver effective policing, strong partnership working by the police and other 
local authorities and organisations is essential (Sampson et al (1988), McCarthy and 
O’Neil, (2014)), There was criticism of police authorities in terms of their involvement in 
local partnerships and much of the development and management of partnerships was 
left to the police (McCarthy and O’Neil, 2014). The Policing Protocol 2011 (Home 
Office, 2011a) requires that the PCC drive effective local partnerships to facilitate 
effective policing. 
 
The chief constable participants had mixed views regarding how PCCs had impacted 
upon effective partnership working, from a negative perspective; 
CC	
‘We	are	one	of	the	places	where	it	[partnerships]	has	been	disastrous....	the	PCC	is	
perceived	in	a	very	hostile	way	by	local	leaders,	seen	as	mayoral	rival	and	a	point	of	
influence	that	they	don’t	control.	Its	made	it	harder	for	us	to	get	engaged	in	
partnerships.	..It	shows	how	if	you	drop	a	political	figure	into	the	pool	of	local	
government	and	local	control	and	you	cant	judge	where	the	ripples	will	go	to.	In	our	
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case	its	created	more	tension.	We,	me	and	the	Chief	Exec	get	on	well	...but	as	soon	as	
the	PCC	is	introduced	into	that	mix	its	difficult	so	we	try	not	to	do	it.	The	PCC	is	not	at	
the	partnership	meetings.	PCC	has	high	media	profile	and	often	says	the	wrong	things	
because	he	is	not	part	of	the	debate.’		
CC	
‘Lack	of	structure	and	planning	means	that	partnerships	have	been	a	bit	of	a	dogs	
breakfast.	[commissioning]	they	cant	work	out	how	to	effectively	fund	and	measure	so	
what	happens	is	....	Somebody	will	come	and	see	him	with	a	project	and	wow	him	then	
they'll	fund	him.	..	But	they	never	ask	the	so	what	factor’.	
		 		
Other chief constables, however see the involvement of PCCs as being more positive; 
CC	
‘The	PCC	is	very	engaged	in	partnerships	some	times	I	have	to	pick	up	the	pieces.	But	
he	can	say	things	I	can’t	that	is	a	really	blunt	instrument.	So	on	the	one	hand	I	think	oh	
goodness	I	have	to	pick	up	the	pieces	but	on	the	other	hand	he	really	does	say	the	
things	you	want	to	say	yourself…He	[the	PCC]	is	good	enough	to	ask	me	before	he	says	
it.’		
	 CC	
		 ‘PCC	is	able	to	get	traction	where	we	struggled.’	
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PCCs saw their partnership role as important and adding significant value; 
PCC	
‘A	big	part	of	my	job	is	to	bring	organisations	together...to	have	sensible	
conversations,	often	quite	difficult	ones.	E.g.	Community	safety	partnerships	I	aligned	
all	their	priorities	to	the	police	&	crime	plan	priorities’.		
PCC	
‘I’ve	been	able	to	make	alliances	that	perhaps	the	authority	because	of	the	way	they	
work	and	they	were	very	geographically	confined.	I	can	move	out	nationally	as	well	for	
example	a	CSE	project	with	the	Children’s	Commissioner.’		
 
At the same time, PCCs recognised the effectiveness of the police in this area; 
PCC	
‘The	Chief	Constable	and	staff	are	good	at	building	partnerships.’	
PCC	
‘The	Chief	Constable	has	very	good	relations	with	partners’.		
Partnership working for the benefit of effective policing is therefore according to these 
participants a positive aspect of the introduction of the new governance structure. The 
introduction of PCCs has improved partnership working in some areas, but in others 
more improvement is needed. 
 
Politics (HMG, HMIC, ACPO) 
The tripartite structure of policing governance (Lusgarten, 1986, Mawby and Wright, 
2003) was fundamental to the post Police Act 1964 (Home Office, 1964) structure. 
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This positioned chief constables including both individual chief cfficers and the 
combined Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), the Government (Home Office) 
and the police authorities (including the Association of Police Authorities (APA)) in 
terms of their relative influence.  This structure for 48 years underpinned the way in 
which policing was governed including the setting of policy, practice and 
accountability.  The introduction of PCCs and the subsequent collapse of the 
Association of Chief Police Officers, it is argued by Murphy, Eckersley and Ferry 
(2016) and Lister, (2013) has fundamentally altered the distribution of influence within 
the governance framework. 
 
Caless and Owens, (2016) in their interviews of chief constables and PCCs found that 
there was little overt party political influence on policing governance, this research 
found a more mixed picture; 
PCC	
‘The	relationship	has	become	more	political	since	Police	Authorities	.	As	an	example,	
last	year	when	the	announcement	was	made	about	further	cuts,	the	APCC	said	this	
cannot	continue.	...we	decided	to	write	to	the	Home	Secretary	saying	we	are	happy	to	
take	our	share,	but	this	is	now	getting	dangerous...	the	conservative	PCCs	to	a	man	
and	woman	refused	to	sign	it.	On	a	more	local	level,	an	MP	summoned	me	to	a	
meeting,	I	declined	the	PCC	from	**	went	they	are	from	the	same	political	party.	You	
get	it	from	both	Tory	and	Labour	saying	they	cant	go	or	express	a	view	because	their	
party	allegiance	is	stronger.’	
PCC	
‘Its	the	opposite	of	being	politicised...most	of	the	PCCs	don’t	have	political	differences	
about	policing	in	the	APCC	unless	you	looked	them	up	you’d	be	hard	pressed	to	tell	if	
   
  
 149 
they	were	representing	Conservatives	Independents	or	Labour	Its	a	red	herring	The	
government	has	less	direction	[of	policing]	at	a	local	level	it	has	been	devolved.’	
PCC	
‘Policing	damn	well	ought	to	be	under	political	control!	In	any	democracy	the	police	
answer	to	the	civilian	authority	that	is	a	fairly	fundamental	principle.	All	civilian	
authorities	in	a	democracy	are	political	because	they	are	elected	The	police	answer	to	
someone	not	run	around	doing	what	the	hell	they	think	they	should	be	doing.’	
	 PCC	
	 ‘Even	with	the	ones	who	belong	to	political	parties	-...I	have	never	ever	seen	or		 heard	
	 of	a	decision	that	is	politically	motivated...’	
Unsurprisingly within the PCC cohort, there were dissenting views as to the positive 
views regarding the political dimension expressed above; 
PCC	
‘The	Home	Office	in	some	ways	wish	they	had	not	let	the	Genie	out	of	the	bottle,	I	
think	they	would	like	to	have	a	bit	more	control	than	they	do.	Look	at	the	Rotherham	
case	where	they	realised	they	couldn’t	sack	a	PCC	that	was	a	wake	up	call	to	them’.		
PCC	
‘I	Feel	abandoned	by	central	government.’	
 
 
Some chief constables expressed negative views regarding the political dimension 
centered on increased politicisation of policing and a somewhat cynical perception of 
the motives of government in driving the governance change; 
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CC	
‘Although	our	relationship	is	good	I	didn’t	like	operating	in	it.	I	never	felt	relaxed	I	
always	had	to	watch	every	decision	and	every	policy	and	everything	had	to	be	
carefully	managed.	It	puts	political	control	into	CCs	too	directly	I	agree	CCs	needed	
more	accountability...they	had	a	degree	of	autonomy	unlike	other	public	services	I	
accept	those	days	are	gone,	but	the	way	in	which	this	operates	its	too	much	on	the	
other	side	of	the	pendulum.	There	is	too	much	political	control’.		
CC	
‘...central	govt	have	become	less	likely	to	do	anything,	bluntly.	I	don’t	know	if	in	some	
respects	they	created	the	PCC	system	because	that’s	what	they	wanted,	or	whether	
the	PCC	system	made	that	happen’.		
CC	
‘The	relationship	with	government	has	never	been	much	poorer	to	be	honest.	The	
whole	movement	to	PCCs	was	to	push	power	down	and	for	the	Home	Office	not	to	be	
responsible	for	the	things	they	were	responsible	for	in	the	past.	Very	little	point	in	
talking	to	the	home	office	because	they	don’t	hold	the	power	anymore,	its	a	waste	of	
time	to	be	quite	honest.	I	think	this	govt	went	too	far	in	pushing	power	down	and	not	
taking	responsibility	for	anything	or	providing	any	national	leadership....	There’s	a	
whole	host	of	reasons	why	with	this	government	relationship	with	the	Home	Office	
has	not	been	good,	but	that’s	not	to	say	because	we’ve	got	PCCs	its	a	wider	
movement’.		
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There were, however some positive views, albeit these were generally seen as 
unintended consequences by government; 
CC	
‘I	would	argue	yes	[it	is]	its	been	extremely	helpful	with	austerity	I	don’t	think	you	can	
put	aside	the	austerity,	what	the	Police	is	calling	austerity	I	don’t	think	is	austerity	I	
think	it	is	some	kind	of	fundamental	challenge	to	the	way	that	we’ve	delivered	policing	
and	the	police’s	ability	to	deal	with	some	of	the	really	wicked	problems	in	society.	The	
relationship	with	government	has	never	been	much	poorer	to	be	honest.	The	whole	
movement	to	PCCs	was	to	push	power	down	and	for	the	Home	Office	not	to	be	
responsible	for	the	things	they	were	responsible	for	in	the	past.	Very	little	point	in	
talking	to	the	home	office	because	they	don’t	hold	the	power	anymore,	its	a	waste	of	
time	to	be	quite	honest.	I	think	this	govt	went	too	far	in	pushing	power	down	and	not	
taking	responsibility	for	anything	or	providing	any	national	leadership’.		
CC	
‘When	you’ve	got	one	local	figure	who’s	been	elected	very	clearly...	They	are	actually	
in	a	far	stronger	position	(than	Police	Authority),	to	say	no	government,	I’m	not	going	
to	because	I’ve	got	a	lot	more	political	legitimacy	because	I’m	the	only	person	elected	
by	all	the	people	of	**	(force	area)’.	
Both chief constables and PCCs saw political issues becoming more significant in the 
run up to elections; 
CC	
‘He	{PCC}	has	courted	controversy	on	occasions	I	have	not	welcomed	that	but	I	
recognise	that	he	has	a	public	profile	that	he	works	to	maintain,	and	candidly	that’s	
going	to	get	worse	before	May	next	year	(elections)	because	he	will	want	to	get	re	
elected.’	
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PCC	
‘I’m	already	seeing	evidence	of	PCC	colleagues	acting	in	a	way	that	they	have	one	eye	
on	May	2016.	It’s	already	started.	That	is	counter	productive.	Its	a	demanding	job,	
they	should	be	concentrating	on	the	job	and	delivering	for	the	public.	There	is	one	PCC	
who	has	said	to	me	that	they	are	taking	3	months	off	from	February	to	May	to	
prepare.’		
Chief constables, as a cohort were ambivalent regarding the demise of the Association 
of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and its replacement by the National Police Chief’s 
Council (NPCC); 
CC	
‘Has	it	changed?	I’m	still	the	national	lead	for	X	&	Y,	my	meetings	haven’t	changed.	I	
think	this	is	Sir	Hugh’s	(sir	Hugh	Orde,	President	of	ACPO)	relationship	with	the	Home	
Secretary	etc	that	caused	a	lot	of	the	issues,	its	between	the	two	and	the	change	in	
name,	I	don’t	think	will	alter	one	jot	the	work	that’s	been	undertaken.	Different	re	the	
things	that	should	never	have	been	part	of	ACPO	the	Limited	company	status	that	will	
go	but	I	don’t	think	it	will	change’.	
Some chief constables, however saw the demise of ACPO as more sinister and part of 
a move by government and to some extent PCCs to reduce the influence of chief 
constables within the tripartite arrangement; 
CC	
‘This	administration	wanted	to	remove	the	perceived	power,	some	PCCs	felt	
threatened.	The	incentive	for	chief	officers	to	take	national	role	has	reduced	given	that	
PCCs	are	locally	focused	etc.	The	relationship	with	government	was	damaged	during	
the	time	with	Hugh	(Orde),	it	is	better	with	Sara,	she	spends	more	time	in	the	Home	
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Office.	We	have	to	change,	you	can	no	longer	operate	the	way	some	Chief	Constables	
did	(big	Silver	back	Gorillas)	those	days	are	gone’.	
CC	
‘It	has	been	decapitated	by	the	Home	Office	when	you	put	that	all	together;	the	Chief	
Constable	role	has	been	downgraded.	I’m	not	sure	that	the	NPCC	as	a	coordinating	
body	can	maintain	the	independence	of	policing’.		
Some PCCs agreed with the chief constables as far as ACPO was concerned; 
PCC	
‘It	[ACPO]	was	not	too	strong,	it	was	a	way	of	organising	themselves	Some	of	the	
political	PCCs	see	it	as	a	challenge,	the	Chief	Constables	conspiring.	I	see	it	as	them	
talking	about	the	challenges	and	what	they	can	do	together	to	address	them’.		
PCC	
‘The	way	the	Home	Secretary	dealt	with	ACPO	was	quite	damaging.	It	didn’t	do	the	
PCC/	Chief	Constable	relationship	much	good.	Some	PCCs	who	like	to	flex	their	muscles	
used	that	time	to	reinforce	the	fact	that	they	are	in	charge.	The	loss	of	ACPO	itself	is	
not	that	important	NPCC	will	take	it	forward’.		
	
However,	unsurprisingly perhaps the majority of PCCs in this cohort saw ACPO, as an 
obstacle to change and to some extent anti-democratic; 
PCC	
‘I	saw	the	silver	backs	in	action,	they	had	to	go	[ACPO].'		
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PCC	
‘There	were	significant	problems	with	ACPO	making	up	the	rules	as	they	went	along.	A	
lot	of	their	guidelines	became	almost	law	without	outside	scrutiny	or	thought.	The	
companies	they	set	up	were	wrong’.		
Within this theme there was also some discussion of the role of HMIC whose position 
within the governance framework was discussed earlier in this thesis at Chapter three. 
Those PCCs who referred to the HMIC were relatively negative in their views; 
PCC	
‘The	Police	have	been	thoroughly	reformed,	HMIC	still	reflects	policing	of	yester	year’.	
Chief constables however, expressed concerns regarding HMIC only in the context of 
the removal of the Inspectorate from involvement in the selection process for chief 
officers; 
CC	
‘...we	have	lost	a	lot,	an	awful	lot	with	the	HMI	and	their	role	and	the	fact	that	the	
HMI	now	has	zero	impact	on	the	appointment	of	Chief	Constables	is	a	huge	loss’.		
CC	
‘That	selection	process	[of	Chief	Constables]	just	seems	whimsical	you’ve	got	someone	
as	important	as	the	Chief	Constable	in	the	constitution	of	the	fabric	of	society,	I	don’t	
think	you	should	be	whimsical.	Its	not	really	a	PCC	issue,	its	because	they	got	rid	of	SAP	
[the	Senior	Appointments	Panel,	administered	by	HMIC]	so	all	those	checks	and	
balances	that	would	have	supported	the	PCC	e.g.	HMIC	are	no	longer	allowed	to	be	
part	of	the	selection	process.	I	rang	the	HMIC	when	I	was	looking	to	appoint	a	Deputy	
and	he	said	I	can’t	get	involved,	I	would	have	loved	him	to	get	involved’.	
   
  
 155 
 It may be the case that, given that all chief constables in the cohort will have operated 
with HMIC throughout their policing career that they did not have concerns regarding 
their role more generally as did the PCCs. 
 
The two cohorts then saw political issues in the introduction of PCCs as; introducing a 
political dimension to policing governance in the current model. The majority saw this 
as appropriate.  It was not seen as a problem in terms of policing delivery. However, 
some saw the potential for inappropriate party political influence, particularly in the run 
up to elections. 
 
There has been a significant change in the tripartite structure of policing governance 
with chief constables having less influence and a retreat of central government, the 
latter seen by some as an attempt by government to distance itself from responsibility 
in a time of austerity. 
 
The attitude of chief constables to the demise of ACPO was somewhat sanguine and 
seen almost as an inevitability, whist PCCs saw the removal of ACPO as a more 
significant event in reforming the governance structure and the reduction of the 
traditional power of chief constables. There were differing views of HMIC, seen by 
PCCs as a reactionary influence, whilst chief constables merely lamented their role in 
the selection of chief officers. 
 
Police & Crime Commissioner Scrutiny & Accountability role in Policing 
A significant driver for the change in policing governance that gave rise to PCCs was 
the issue of police accountability that is discussed at length in Chapter two of this 
thesis. There was a clear perception that police authorities were not effectively holding 
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chief constables to account for the delivery of policing to communities (Loveday and 
Reid, 2003). A key element of the role of PCCs was that of holding the police to 
account (S1. Police Crime and Social Responsibility Act, 2011 (Home Office, 2011)). 
Many chief constables reported that they felt they were more effectively held to 
account by the PCC than they had been by the police authority;	 
CC	
‘He	holds	me	to	account	more	effectively	than	the	Police	Authority	did.	Its	not	a	
theatre	where	you	could	walk	into	a	Police	Authority	and	perform	in	uniform	and	that	
was	the	end	of	it,	this	is	much	more	intimate,	more	regular	and	it	reacts	more	quickly	
to	local	concerns’.		
CC	
‘The	principle	of	the	PCCs	making	policing	more	accountable...I	think	its	definitely	done	
that.	...	A	significant	change	in	policing	on	a	daily	basis.	...	the	PCC	is	in	the	next	
building,	full	time	staff	who	are	here	permanently	to	support	the	PCC	an	individual	
who	is	not	only	passionate	about	[Force	area],	but	is	absolutely	clear	on	benefits	to	
communities	that	he	can	bring	without	interfering	with	operational	policing,	and	can	
hold	us	to	account	on	behalf	of	communities,	and	is	absolutely	striving	for	a	more	
transparent	service.	There’s	things	he’s	challenged	policing	in	[Force	area]	on	that	we	
would	previously	have	said	either	we	cant	be	open	about	that,	transparent	no	we	
wouldn’t	release	that	report	to	the	public,	to	be	honest	wouldn’t	even	have	thought	to	
release	it	to	the	public	{e.g.	Significant	football	disorder	-	debrief	&	learning	PCC	
suggested	publishing	redacted	version	–	Chief	Constable	thought	this	a	good	idea}.’	
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Some chief constables were less convinced; 
CC	
‘...its	not	the	most	robust	accountability	framework	that	I	have	ever	worked	within	or	
had	to	report	to.	I’d	say	it	was	the	same	(as	the	Police	Authority).	Across	the	country	
you	may	see	PCCs	saying	next	week	I’m	holding	the	Chief	Constable	to	account	
because,	but	that’s	only	showboating.	...There’s	no	huge	interest	in	these	public	
meetings...	They’re	held	in	the	middle	of	the	morning	on	a	working	day	-	who’s	going	
to	want	to	come	and	listen	to	that?’	
CC	
‘Its	all	informal,	he	doesn’t	like	formal	governance	which	I	find	at	times	makes	me	feel	
a	bit	vulnerable	having	been	brought	up	through	Police	Authorities	where	you	would	
have	a	very	formalised	process	...	PCC	doesn’t	particularly	like	papers	doesn’t	
particularly	like	structure.’.		
 
PCCs tasked with delivering a robust accountability regime and, generally (with the 
exception of former members of police authorities and former police officers) had no 
previous experience of policing accountability regimes, generally thought that their 
accountability processes were an improvement and did effectively hold the police to 
account on behalf of communities; 
PCC	
‘I	see	the	role	as	making	sure	that	the	public	know	what	the	Police	are	doing.	Police	
had	lost	sight	of	the	fact	that	they	were	to	serve	the	public,	the	fixation	was	on	
recorded	crime’.		
	
  
 
 158 
PCC	
‘The	role	of	the	PCC	[is	to	hold	the	police	to	account]	from	my	point	of	view,	I	would	
say	there	are	several	aspects	to	that,	there	is	the	traditional	role	of	holding	the	Force	
to	account	holding	the	Chief	Constable	to	account	and	introduce	an	accountability	
structure	that	works.’	
A principal aim of the government’s drive for policing governance reform was focused 
upon policing accountability. The interviews with these cohorts suggest that whilst 
policing accountability frameworks put in place by PCCs differ across the country, in 
general there has been an improvement; Police accountability frameworks are 
improving in terms of effectiveness and openness. 
 
Police & Crime Commissioner Relationship with Police Officers & Staff 
In addition to their relationships with communities, partners and chief officers, the 
relationship with police officers and staff across forces was discussed. Again there 
was significant variety;	 
CC	
‘The	cops	just	get	on	with	it.	we	are	looking	at	our	estate	like	everyone	else,	we	may	
end	up	reducing	opening	hours	or	the	number	of	stations.	The	staff	are	saying	this	is	
the	PCC	getting	rid	of	staff	they	are	not	saying	its	the	Chief	Constable,	its	the	PCC.	
...the	PCC	said	people	will	always	remain	loyal	to	the	Chief	Constable	because	you	are	
seen	as	the	institution	of	policing	and	I’m	a	politician.	And	you	cant	get	away	from	the	
fact	that	the	public	have	a	particular	view	of	politics	and	politicians	in	particular	so	
they	will	always	query	the	motivations	for	any	particular	decision	and	in	reality	the	
review	was	instigated	through	the	operational	policing	review’.		
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CC	
‘At	a	senior	level	[they	understand	the	role	of	the	PCC],	less	so	lower	down.	At	a	
strategic	level,	they	are	really	comfortable	around	him.	At	a	lower	level,	there	is	a	bit	
of	deference,	they	see	him	as	the	boss,	there	is	a	little	bit	of	that’.		
PCCs held similar views; 
PCC	
‘At	commander	level,	they	[the	police]	definitely	understand,		below	that	I	think	no’.	
PCC	
‘There	is	no	misunderstanding	in	force	as	to	what	PCC	can	&	cannot	do	PCC	must	
stand	up	and	say	I	am	not	the	Chief	Constable,	the	PCC	job	is	to	be	the	bridge	with	the	
public.’		
The research participants were relatively ambivalent regarding this issue. There is, 
however some evidence that more recently that rank and file police officers are 
expressing significant concerns regarding the performance of their PCC, including in 
Hampshire Constabulary, the Police Federation held a vote of no confidence in their 
PCC (Police Oracle, 2018). Whilst having no constitutional standing the result of that 
poll which demonstrated a significant lack of confidence in the PCC by the rank and 
file which did potentially impact upon the credibility of the office of PCC (BBC, 2018a).   
 
The key finding from this cohort within this theme therefore was that whilst there is 
variability across the country in the manner and extent to which PCCs interact with 
police officers and staff, this does not yet appear to be a significant issue. 
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Police & Crime Commissioner/ Chief Constable Relationship  
The pilot study in this research project and the later work of Wells, (2015),  Caless and 
Owens, (2016) and the findings of the Committee on Standards in Public Life (2015) 
pointed to the potential critical importance of the interpersonal relationship between 
chief constables and PCCs in maximising the effective delivery of policing to 
communities.  In the view of Reiss (2018), having observed the relationships between 
PCCs and chief constables in his role as chief executive for the Durham PCC there 
was; 
‘…a spectrum of PCC, chief constable relationships, from cosy to adversarial. 
At every stage there is an effect on policing delivery’ (ibid). 
 
 It was not surprising therefore that both chief constables and PCCs saw this theme as 
very significant. PCCs generally recognised that a good interpersonal relationship was 
important, but saw themselves as the senior partner in that relationship; 
PCC	
‘You	can	make	any	governance	system	work	provided	you’ve	got	the	right	individuals	
involved.	If	you	have	got	people	who	are	reasonably	mature,	proportionate	balanced	
then	you	would	have	a	reasonably	constructive	working	relationship.	If	you’ve	got	
individuals	who	are	flawed	in	whatever,	there	have	been	one	or	two	examples...I	think	
there	should	probably	be	some	reforms	to	the	role’.			
PCC	
‘I	want	him	to	be	the	best	Chief	Constable	in	the	country	because	that	delivers	better	
policing...its	not	about	publically	humiliating	him	because	the	only	person	that	shows	
up	is	you.	I	have	seen	that	done	unfortunately	and	its	been	quite	unedifying’.	
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PCC	
‘We	are	not	best	mates,	that’s	not	how	it	works,	we	have	a	mutual	respect...he’s	got	a	
job	I’ve	got	a	mandate.	In	the	balance	a	mandate	is	far	more	powerful	than	a	job...we	
get	on	very	well’.		
PCC	
‘We	don’t	live	a	life	of	compromise	I	produce	a	police	and	crime	plan	that	plan	is	
followed	by	the	Chief	Constable...on	behalf	of	the	people	of***	whose	views	I	have	
sought	before	drawing	up	the	plan,	I	make	sure	they	get	the	sort	of	policing	they	tell	
me	they	want’.		
Chief constables appeared to place even more importance on positive interpersonal 
relationships. Many found it to be potentially a significant risk to the delivery of 
effective policing;  
CC	
‘Its	far	too	important,	what	I	mean	by	that	is	that	I’m	incredibly	lucky	here	I	will	finish	
my	time	and	feel	-	not	a	friendship	[with	PCC]	we	deliberately	don’t	even	have	a	drink	
together,	we	don’t	have	meals	together.	We’ve	kept	it	very	professional...However,	it	
could	be	the	other	way,	and	because	there’s	no	checks	and	balances...	It	could	be	if	we	
didn’t	get	on	there’s	very	little	to	make	it	work,	the	PCP	certainly	couldn’t,	it	doesn’t	
have	the	time	influence,	power	to	bash	heads	together,	and	our	relationship	could	be	
very	fractured	and	fraught	and	counter	productive...that	does	worry	me	that	too	much	
is	predicated	on	that	one	to	one	marking...	I	sense	most	Chief	Constables	are	saying	its	
working	ok	but	its	a	risky	model.	The	one	thing	a	Police	Authority	had,	it	did	have	
moderating	impacts...	I	don’t	think	there	are	any	ways	that	it	can	be	mitigated	now	
[conflict	between	PCC	&	CC]	I	think	its	a	really	tricky	scenario’.		
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CC	
‘Delivering	policing	services	and	delivering	a	business	based	upon	the	relationship	
between	two	people	which	is	absolutely	critical	is	flawed.	It	doesn’t	work	to	the	
benefit	of	the	public,	and	as	we	go	into	austerity,	having	to	think	about	what	do	the	
public	really	need	from	a	professional	police	service	as	opposed	to	what	does	the	PCC	
want	to	do	because	its	popular	with	the	public	then	we	are	likely	to	get	into	some	
difficult	territory’.		
CC	
‘I’ve	known	[PCC]	for	many	years,	there	are	three	criteria	that	have	to	exist	or	else	our	
relationship	is	built	on	sand.	First	a	shared	vision.	...second,	there’s	equity	in	the	
relationship	...that	equity	works	well	so	we	don’t	fall	out	we	have	difference	of	opinion	
but	we	don’t	fall	out	...the	third	one	is	that	we	trust	each	other’.		
CC	
‘The	trouble	with	the	system	is	that	it	is	a	very	personal	system	its	designed	to	be	very	
personal...so	you	make	an	assumption	that	you	set	up	arrangements	for	how	the	
working	relationship	should	work....	there’s	a	great	deal	of	instability	in	it	all...its	
possible	you	may	have	to	undo	all	the	arrangements	[when	a	new	PCC	arrives]....the	
arrangements	between	the	two	corporations	sole	are	only	as	good	as	the	agreement	
of	the	current	PCC....it	seems	to	me	that	because	its	based	upon	the	individual	its	
inherently	unstable’.		
CC	
‘Its	too	much	personality	based.	I	think	that’s	a	risk	I	think	if	people	aren’t	able	to	
maintain	effective	professional	relationships	then	it	is	easy	for	it	to	be	undermined.	
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We’ve	had	some	examples,	Lincolnshire	was	the	classic.	There	need	to	be	a	few	more	
safety	nets.	..and	the	PCP,	doesn’t	really	have	much	teeth’.	
	
Sub Theme – Contractual Relationships 
The legislation establishing PCCs, the Police, Crime and Social Responsibility Act 
2011 (Home Office 2011) and the Policing Protocol 2011 (Home office 2011a) make it 
clear that the PCC is responsible for appointing and for dismissing the chief constable 
(Home Office, 2011 S38 (1-4)). In addition, chief constables are subject to time-limited 
contracts of employment defined by Regulation 11 of the Police Regulations 2003 
(Home Office 2003).  This fact coupled with the importance of the interpersonal 
professional relationship exercised many of the chief constables in terms of the 
potential for the possibility of dismissal to affect the ability of a chief constable who 
feared for their position to exercise proper professional judgement a risk also identified 
by Brain (2012); 
CC	
‘I	absolutely	believe	that	it	[PCC	ability	to	‘hire	&	fire	Chief	Constables]	affects	the	
nature	of	the	relationships	with	CCs	and	PCCs.	Its	got	to	hasn’t	it?	In	Chiefs	council,	
people	have	said	to	what	sounds	like	a	really	good	professional	idea,	I	won’t	be	able	to	
do	because	I’ve	got	a	PDR	[Personal	Development	Review]	priority,	I’ve	got	to	work	
very	closely	with	the	PCC!		The	example	is	the	Police	Innovation	fund	we	said,	why	not	
pick	three	things	from	policing	that	will	help	advance	professional	policing.	Rather	
than	competing	with	each	other...	I	was	a	big	supporter	of	it,	but	there	were	people	
saying	that	'I’ve	got	that	as	a	PDR	priority,	and	I	wont	be	able	to	go	back	to	the	PCC	
other	than,	I	will	be	pursuing	money	on	behalf	of	the	organisation.	People	wont	
necessarily	say	I’m	concerned	about	my	position	but	we’ve	got	people	(Chief	
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Constables)	in	the	country	that	are	in	quite	a	difficult	position	because	of	their	
relationship	with	the	PCC’.		
CC	
‘A	lot	of	Chief	Constables	depend	on	their	contracts	with	PCCs	and	that	means	that	
they	don’t	have	the	strength	to	stand	their	ground.	To	stand	up	and	resist	it	as	they	
did	before.	Saying	[PCC]	I’m	not	worried	about	my	pension.	Or	getting	my	contract	
extended,	a	lot	of	people	are	not	in	that	position.	The	Chief	Constables	wanted	to	
write	a	collective	letter,	to	the	Home	Secretary	from	all	43	Chief	Constables	saying	that	
we	believed	that	the	cuts	could	no	longer	be	maintained	without	a	serious	impact	on	
public	safety.	..at	the	last	minute	in	Chiefs	council,	7	or	8	Chief	Constables	said	our	
PCCs	have	told	us	that	if	we	sign	that	letter	it	will	have	consequences	for	us.	(they	
were	all	CCs	with	less	than	30	yrs	service).	That	demonstrated	to	me...they	are	
beholden	to	PCCs’.	
CC	
‘It	helps	that	I’ve	got	over	30	years	in	-	that	was	a	very	liberating	milestone.	Because	
I’ve	got	that	in	my	back	pocket	he	can	make	me	a	retired	person	I’d	be	disappointed	
because	I’ve	still	a	lot	to	do....	I’m	not	going	to	deny	my	selflessness	is	influenced	by	
that	30	years’.		
CC	
‘I	look	round	the	room	at	Chief	Constables	council	and	there	are	too	many	people	in	
that	room	who	are	not	capable	I	don’t	believe	of	standing	up	to	their	PCCs	and	saying	
this	is	operational	policing	this	is	none	of	your	business	and	being	prepared	to	fight	
their	corner.	Easy	for	me	to	say	that	from	my	position	of	strength,	they	are	vulnerable	
nothing	to	loose	I	just	want	to	come	into	work	and	do	a	good	job	in	an	in	terms	of	their	
appointment	and	their	longevity	as	Chief	Constables	It	doesn’t	seem	to	me	terribly	
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healthy	that	you’ve	got	that	situation	and	something	needs	to	be	done	about	it.	One	
thing	you	could	do	is	change	the	selection	process	for	Chief	Constables	take	it	out	of	
the	hands	of	the	PCC	and	say	that’s	a	decision	for	the	panel	or	for	whoever	takes	the	
place	of	the	panel’.		
Some PCCs recognised the problem articulated by chief constables; 
PCC	
‘I	can	see	that	the	fear	that	PCCs	may	use	the	power	[to	decline	to	renew	a	CC	
contract]	arbitrarily	is	true’.		
PCC	
‘I	come	across	Chiefs	who	appear	to	be	a	bit	frightened	of	the	PCC.	There	was	an	
occasion	when	a	group	of	Chiefs	wanted	to	write	a	letter	to	the	Home	
Secretary…’[repeated	story	of	some	Chief	Constables	declining	to	sign	fearing	
repercussions	from	their	PCC].	
 
Further issues of concern regarding the potential impact on professional judgement 
and independence for chief constables who were appointed by their PCC, and the 
effect upon the available pool of candidates for Chief Constable posts was expressed 
by both chief constables and PCCs; 
CC	
‘Another	effect	was	the	loss	of	something	like	SAP	[Senior	Appointments	Panel]	there	
is	nothing	there	the	college	has	done	some	good	work	to	put	some	best	practice,	some	
guidelines	around	it	[selection	of	Chief	Constables],	but	not	to	put	too	finer	point	on	it,	
it	really	is	down	to	PCCs	to	pick	their	person.	There	is	no	coordination	of	Chief	Officer	
careers	the	quantitative	stats	would	suggest	they	are	safer	than	ever,	there’s	less	
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movement	of	Chief	officers,	more	Deps	get	put	in	Chief	Constable	slots	than	ever	
before....	So,	any	sense	that	bringing	PCCs	in	would	create	a	healthier	refreshing,	
that’s	not	happening’.		
CC	
A	weakness	of	the	system	is	that	there	is	no	proper	national	oversight	over	[Chief	
Constable]	appointments	I	think	that	is	the	area	of	weakness,	things	like	decisions	to	
extend	contracts	appointment	processes	I	think	that	is	the	bit	where	there	is	too	much	
power	in	one	hand.	Where	there	is	potential	for	soft	corruption	on	both	sides	so	I’ve	
been	arguing	that	there	should	be	a	national	system	because	there	are	too	many	
internal	appointments	too	many	DCCs	almost	automatically	getting	the	job.	And	what	
that	is,	is	a	sign	that	government	in	its	wish	to	push	more	and	more	stuff	down	has	
gone	too	far.	And	there	needs	to	be	a	bit	of	adjustment	back	up	to	say	that	within	this	
process	there	are	some	really	crucial	decisions	like	the	appointment	of	the	Chief	
Constable...	Going	to	some	form	of	SAP	process	some	form	of	external	accreditation,	
some	form	of	national	talent	management’.		
CC	
‘I	think	that	one	of	the	truly	constitutionally	worrying	issues	is	the	number	of	Chief	
Constables	now	being	appointed	from	deputies	in	their	existing	force	...there’s	a	
number	who	have	never	served	in	forces	other	than	the	one	they	are	about	to	be	Chief	
Constable	of.		I	don’t	think	its	good.	Also	I	think	it	creates	a	sort	of	mutual	dependence	
that’s	not	great.	Almost	it	could	take	us	back	into	the	Cleveland	scenario	of	mutual	
support.	....	there	is	something	not	very	healthy	where	two	people	work	together	and	
one	gets	picked	as	the	next	Chief	Constable.	It’s	very	hard	then	to	get	clarity,	
separation	and	to	dig	in	on	the	points	that	perhaps	you	would	want	to	dig	in	
professionally	around’.		
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PCC	
	‘[DCCs	being	appointed	to	CC	posts	in	the	same	force]	Huge	danger,	just	not	healthy.	
One	PCC	got	on	with	his	DCC	and	could	not	be	bothered	with	a	wider	process.	This	
happened	with	Police	Authorities,		DCCs	groomed	Police	Authority	reps.’	
PCC	
‘Big	danger	[single	CC	candidates	for	vacancies].	I	increased	the	pay	rate	for	my	Chief	
Constable	to	get	more	applicants.	I’m	considering	international	applicants’.		
PCC	
‘I’ve	been	surprised	at	the	[Chief	Constable]	posts	with	only	one	or	two	applicants.	I’m	
very	concerned	about	the	available	pool’.	
PCC	
‘I	don’t	see	that	as	healthy	at	all.	It	reinforces	what	I	say	about	the	shallow	pool	[of	
Chief	Constable	candidates].	I	don’t	blame	a	PCC	for	appointing	a	Deputy	as	a	Chief	
Constable	as	long	as	there	has	been	a	rigorous	process...	You’ve	got	someone	who	
knows	the	force	inside	out,	but	I	don’t	think	its	a	very	good	thing,	its	usually	expedient’	
Both chief constables and PCCs in these research cohorts saw the interpersonal 
professional relationship between them as crucial in the delivery of effective policing. 
However, there are associated risks when those relationships are not positive or 
breakdown.  In addition both cohorts saw the inherent dangers in the fact that the PCC 
can alone appoint or dismiss the chief constable. This situation was not changed by 
the intervention of the Home Affairs Committee (2014) or of the judgement in R 
(Crompton) v Police and Crime Commissioner for South Yorkshire (2017) that was 
founded upon the requirement of a chief constable to resign by his PCC. Muir (2017) 
in his review of the case found that the tension between operational independence and 
oversight still existed. This appears more significant given the concerns raised by the 
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participants in this research, that was supported recently by Rowe et al. (2018) as part 
of conference panel that included the PCC for Derbyshire and Sir Hugh Orde who 
were in agreement when he commented that Chief Constables now saw themselves 
as ‘subservient’ to the PCC, a situation that did not bode well for an open professional 
relationship.  In summary, the research cohort took the view that a positive 
professional interpersonal relationship between the chief constable and the PCC in a 
force is essential in delivering effective policing to communities. If a positive 
relationship does not exist there are risks to effective policing. 
 
The fact that solely a PCC can appoint or dismiss a chief constable has risks in terms 
of the potential impact upon the professional judgement decision making of chief 
constables. In particular problems were inherent in the selection process that has led 
to a reduced pool of candidates for chief constable posts, the perception that a 
disproportionate number of deputy chief constables are being promoted to chief 
constable in the same force, and that the contractual arrangement for chief constables 
gives rise to the potential for their independence of decision making to be impacted 
upon. 
 
Police Operational Independence 
Chapter two of this thesis dealt with issues of police operational independence, 
identifying the origins of the concept in the work of Marshall (1965) and was committed 
to by Nick Herbert MP the then Policing Minister within the new governance framework 
(Herbert, 2011).  This concept must be considered in the context of the implications of 
the agent/ principal relationship within the governance structure as regards PCCs and 
chief constables (Davies and Johnson, 2016) discussed in Chapter three. 
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This theme was important to chief constables, although some did not identify any 
negative issues. Others saw actual and potential inherent dangers, in particular around 
decisions of PCCs that have the potential to impact upon operational policing delivery. 
This they saw as being exacerbated by the lack of clarity provided in the Policing 
Protocol Order 2011 (Home Office 2011a) as to the definition of ‘operational 
independence’ and the lack of a clear delineation of roles within the governance 
structure; 
CC	
‘Because	of	the	Policing	Protocol,	the	PCC	does	not	know	what	their	role	is	they	think	
they	know	what	the	role	is	the	Chief	Exec	thinks	they	know,	but	that	will	be	completely	
different	to	-	if	you	go	round	the	country	to	what	every	other	PCC	there	is.	To	me	the	
issue	in	***	has	been	does	[the	PCC]	run	the	Police	service	or	do	I	run	the	police	
service.	There	are	two	areas	where	he	has	got	more	control.	One	is	around	
collaboration,	if	[the	PCC]	doesn’t	sign	the	sec	22	framework	agreement	it	doesn’t	
happen.	He	can	therefore	decide	whether	or	not	an	operational	proposal	goes	forward	
or	not.		
CC	
‘I	tried	to	make	sure	there	was	a	distance	between	us	that	our	roles	were	clearly	
understood.	And	that	the	distinction	between	the	strategic	over	view	of	policing	and	
the	operational	That	of	course	is	very	difficult	to	do	when	the	person	that	sets	the	
strategy	also	has	the	money	and	has	control	of	the	money.	That	is	a	difficult	
environment	to	work	in.	I	believe	that	some	CCs	have	taken	the	line	of	least	resistance	
and	allowed	the	border	between	direction	of	operational	policing	and	the	setting	of	
strategy	to	become	very	blurred’.		
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CC	
‘…we	have	never	had	any	tussle	with	PCCs	around	operational	decisions	...	So	the	
worst	fear	that	you’d	have	a	PCC	directing	that	someone	is	arrested	or	directing	the	
use	of	resources,	that’s	never	been,	we’ve	never	been	anywhere	close	to	that’.		
CC	
‘There	are	significant	areas	of	greyness	in	the	way	it	is	set	up	one	test	of	it	is	to	ask	the	
question,	'who	owns	the	IT	strategy?'	...I’m	not	sure	I	can	answer	you,	if	it	was	the	PCC	
on	their	own	then	presumably	they	are	taking	responsibility	for	all	sorts	of	issues,	
around	information	and	if	theoretically	we	had	some	kind	of	breakdown	Soham	style	
[a	murder	investigation	which	identified	information	sharing	failures]	in	terms	of	
information	handling.	Then	its	very	difficult	to	see	how	the	PCC	holds	me	to	account	if	
its	their	thinking	and	systems	-	if	its	my	strategy	then	its	one	that	I	cant	always	
execute	without	contractual	oversight...I	don’t	allow	them	{OPCC}	into	gold	groups	
[strategic	coordination	meetings	regarding	critical	incidents].		If	you	do	you	are	
fudging	the	accountability	you	are	inadvertently	signing	them	up	to	a	collective	
approach	to	something	that	at	some	point	they	may	want	to	hold	you	to	account	for	-	
so	its	quite	dishonest	to	do	that	really’.		
CC	
‘There	is	a	classic	one	at	the	moment	where	a	PCC	...	Who	has	posed	the	question	
about	armed	policing	to	the	electorate	and	whether	his	Chief	Constable	should	allow	
police	officers	to	have	side	arms	or	not.	...to	me	that’s	clearly	an	incredibly	sensitive	
operational	decision	based	upon	intelligence	that	the	PCC	wouldn’t	get	to	see’.		
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PCCs also recognised the importance of this issue and the difficulty of apparent 
ambiguity as to what constituted ‘operational independence’; 
PCC	
‘I	don’t	know	of	any	major	fall	outs,	but	operational	policing	is	the	responsibility	of	the	
Chief	Constable	It	would	have	to	be	a	huge	clash	of	personalities’.		
PCC	
‘There	are	some	PCCs	who	are	getting	involved	in	operational	things	that	are	nothing	
to	do	with	them.	I	don’t	want	anything	to	do	with	it.	The	day	I	go	there	it	all	unravels’.		
PCC	
‘If	we	got	to	the	situation	if	something	was...something	had	happened,	an	event	or	a	
particular	issue,	where	I	felt	the	force	was	wrong,	and	I’d	had	those	conversations	and	
made	those	points	and	we	still	had	a	difference	of	opinion	then	I	would	say	so	because	
I	think	that’s	my	role.	So	I	might	be	critical	publically.	I	don’t	think	I	would	use	my	
authority	as	PCC	to	try	and	instruct	the	Chief	Constable	I	think	that	might	be	–	because	
if	you’re	heading	down	that	road	then	you	are	basically	saying,	my	instruction	is	do	
this,	and	if	they	don’t	then	you	are	on	a	collision	course	that	is	then	ultimately	going	to	
lead	to	a	parting	of	the	ways...because	in	a	dispute	situation	there	is	only	ever	going	
to	be	one	winner	and	that	is	the	PCC,	but	that	not	where	I	would	want	to	be.’	
PCC	
‘Every	decision	that	I	make	has	an	operational	effect’.		
PCC	
‘There	can	be	areas	like	closure	of	Police	Stations	you	might	say	it	is	operational.	I	
think	its	budgetary,	reputational,	efficiency	and	effectiveness,	and	it	affects	public	
confidence	...	So	that	is	when	it	comes	together	if	its	about	directing	operations	and	
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operational	policing,	that’s	an	easy	one,	that’s	the	Chief	Constables	job.	With	some	
PCCs	who	have	little	knowledge	of	policing	they	are	dipping	into	areas	I	wouldn’t	get	
involved	in’.		
PCC	
‘I’m	very	clear	about	what’s	operational	and	what’s	not.	I	am	always	kept	in	the	loop	
about	operational	matters,	there	is	hardly	anything	that	happens	that	I’m	not	briefed	
about.	I	keep	a	finger	in	that	pie.	I’m	kept	updated	...	That	goes	into	my	mental	record.	
Never	commented	on	operations	I	know	other	PCCs	have	expressed	concerns	about	
operations.’	
The participant cohorts therefore shared concerns regarding the lack of definitional 
clarity around ‘operational independence’, but where there was clarity that tended to 
be in the tactical operational sphere where there was and expectation on the chief 
constables that they were to operate as independent professionals. This was 
recognised on the part of the PCCs. In terms of tactical operational policing delivery 
there is recognition of the independence of the police in operational response. 
However, there are a number of areas of concern where decisions of the PCC can 
affect the ability of the Chief Constable to deliver effective policing.  
 
Police & Crime Panels 
In their responses to some of the preceding themes, both chief constables and PCCs 
identified a lack accountability and moderation upon PCCs.  Police and Crime Panels 
(PCPs) were established as something of an after thought (Bailey, 2017) within the 
new policing governance framework, their remit being to ‘scrutinise and support the 
PCC in his/ her work (Home Office, 2011 S28). In Chapter three of this thesis, the 
author discussed PCPs and their perceived effectiveness or otherwise in achieving 
their remit. The issue of the accountability of PCCs appears to have now replaced 
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earlier concerns expressed regarding the accountability of chief constables (Loveday 
2018). The comments of the participants in this study generally supported that view. 
They also supported the wider view that whist some panels try hard, they are on the 
whole relatively ineffective (Committee on Standards in Public Life, 2015, Lister, 2014, 
Bailey, 2017); 
CC	
‘PCC	[local]	is	very	arrogant,	wont	take	any	shit	from	anyone	he	takes	the	view	this	is	
just	something	I	have	to	do	[attend	the	PCP]	and	I	really	don’t	care	what	you	say.	The	
PCC	has	a	political	mandate	they	have	been	elected	on	a	broader	mandate	than	my	
MPs,	...	you’ve	then	got	a	bunch	of	councilors	elected	on	a	far	smaller	level	now	
holding	him	to	account.	Do	they	understand	Policing	-	no	Have	they	been	involved	in	
policing	-	very	few...so	you’ve	got	to	question	what’s	their	knowledge,	what	are	their	
attributes	and	skills	to	really	be	incisive	and	understand	what’s	going	on.	I	don’t	think	
its	there	personally’.	
CC	
‘They	are	rubbish	-the	chair	of	the	PCP	hated	[the	PCC]	he	was	a	mason	and	a	
conservative.	Again,	just	awful…You	have	a	range	of	people	with	a	range	of	
knowledge,	so	I	think	their	ability	to	hold	the	PCC	to	account	is	limited.,	very	limited’.		
CC	
‘What	the	hell	is	the	PCP	?	What’s	it	there	for?	was	it	put	in	there	to	placate	or	for	a	
purpose	and	I	don’t	see	the	latter.	I	think	one	of	the	biggest	issues	is	the	lack	of	any	
true	role	that	the	PCP	has	there	is	no	real	power	that	the	PCP	has	and	as	a	
consequence	its	an	untamed	individual	[the	PCC]	that	can	do	what	they	want.	With	
very	little	recourse	than	to	wait	a	number	of	years	before	the	next	election	when	the	
electorate	will	decide	whether	they	get	through	or	not.	I	think	it	[the	PCP]	is	the	same	
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as	every	other	one	in	the	country	its	benign.	They	will	receive	reports	and	discuss	
issues	but	it	is	fairly	benign.’	
	
PCCs had more mixed views, some seeing the panel as effective, some thought that it 
required improvement, others were quite disparaging; 
PCC	
‘They	do	scrutinise	me	pretty	effectively.	Some	PCPs	think	they	are	there	to	tell	the	PCC	
what	to	do.	They	are	not	there	to	hold	me	to	account	they	are	there	to	scrutinise,	once	
that	was	sorted	here,	that	was	fine’.		
PCC	
‘They	are	not	part	of	my	decision	process,	but	certainly	are	influential.	Support	was	not	
much	in	evidence	in	the	early	months,	but	it	is	now	and	that’s	because	the	PCP,	myself	
and	the	Chief	Constable	with	the	way	that	our	relationship	has	matured,	over	the	last	
couple	of	years	we	are	very	much	on	the	same	side.	I	find	them	now	very	supportive,	
for	example	over	fairer	funding	for	police.’	
PCC	
‘They	are	a	joke,	they	don’t	hold	me	to	account.	The	legislation	is	flawed.	Councilors	
with	no	experience	in	policing	or	budgeting	I	go	in	with	1.99%	[proposed	policing	
precept	increase]	they	say	no,	I	go	back	with	1.98,	thanks	very	much	!	My	biggest	
regret	is	that	I’m	not	held	to	account’.		
The views expressed by both chief constables and PCCs in this research tended to 
support the findings of Lister, (2014), Chambers (2014), Bailey (2017) and of Loveday 
(2017). The reality of the PCP in terms of its ability to scrutinise and mediate PCCs 
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has not realised the intent of the coalition government when Nick Herbert, Policing 
Minister said; 
 ‘These panels are important. They will have teeth…and the weapon of 
 transparency…they will have the power to compel commissioners to release 
 documents and summon them for questioning’. (Herbert 2011a).  
These participants did not see that ambition as having been realised, and the key 
finding that arose was that the effectiveness of Police and Crime Panels in performing 
their role is variable across the country, but is generally seen as ineffective. 
 
Recommendations for Change in Legislation/ Policy 
A number of chief constables and PCCs during their interviews made suggestions as 
to changes in legislation and policy with a view to improving aspects of the policing 
governance structure. The suggestions are recorded here. Chapter seven that follows 
will inter alia discuss recommendations that arise from this research; 
CC	
‘The	inability	to	put	restrictions,	controls	or	dispense	with	a	PCC	needs	looking	at.	If	
you	are	a	PCP	holding	a	PCC	to	account	and	you’ve	got	concerns,	actually	they	are	
pretty	impotent	at	being	able	to	do	anything	about	that	...	I	think	there	needs	to	be	
some	thought	and	the	South	Yorkshire	example	is	a	good	example	of	that	...maybe	
there	needs	to	be	something	that	strengthens	that	[PCP	ability	to	recall	PCC],	but	puts	
the	ability	into	not	just	one	individual	but	a	wider	group.	That	then	and	reduces	the	
risk	of	someone	being	power	crazy	and	doing	things	that	are	not	in	the	best	interests	
of	communities’.	
CC	
‘An	elected	mayor	is	a	better	model	than	PCC’.		
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CC	
‘There	is	a	need	for	marketing	to	explain	the	role	of	PCC’	
CC	
‘A	weakness	of	the	system	is	that	there	is	no	proper	national	oversight	over	Chief	
Constable]	appointments	I	think	that	is	the	area	of	weakness,	things	like	decisions	to	
extend	contracts	appointment	processes	I	think	that	is	the	bit	where	there	is	too	much	
power	in	one	hand.	Where	there	is	potential	for	soft	corruption	on	both	sides	so	I’ve	
been	arguing	that	there	should	be	a	national	system	because	there	are	too	many	
internal	appointments	too	many	DCCs	almost	automatically	getting	the	job.	And	what	
that	is,	is	a	sign	that	govt	in	its	wish	to	push	more	and	more	stuff	down	has	gone	too	
far.		
PCC	
‘There	must	be	some	power	so	that	if	a	PCC	is	barking	mad	we	should	be	able	to	
control	them’.		
PCC	
‘	With	sensible	safeguards	there	should	be	a	power	of	recall	for	PCCs.’	
PCC	
‘‘There	should	be	a	mechanism	so	that	they	[Chief	Constables	whose	contracts	are	not	
renewed]	are	not	unfairly	penalised	if	they	feel	they	have	to	make	a	stand	on	their	
principles.		
PCC	
‘There	may	be	something	that	needs	to	be	done	in	terms	of	early	access	to	a	pension	
[for	Chief	Constables	whose	contracts	are	not	renewed]	to	facilitate	the	underlying	
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intention	of	the	whole	process	which	is	to	enable	the	PCC	to	hold	the	Chief	Constable	
to	account	and	a	Chief	Constable	stand	by	their	operational	independence	with	
integrity	and	if	necessary	walk	away	if	they	feel	its	impossible	without	undue	
penalty...then	that	arrangement	needs	to	exist...the	intention	is	to	allow	that	
accountability	on	the	part	of	the	PCC,	but	also	to	allow	the	CC	,	not	to	unduly	penalise	
them	for	taking	a	principled	stand.	that	needs	to	be	there.	But	that	is	not	a	reason	for	
fettering	further	the	power	of	a	PCC	to	make	decision	about	a	Chief	Constable.	Or	
granting	to	Chief	Constables	that	they	are	more	than	operationally	independent	of	
PCCs.’	
PCC	
‘It	is	an	important	power	(hire	&	fire	Chief	Constables)	there	must	be	the	ability	to	
change	the	top	management	in	practice	its	much	more	difficult.	If	I	were	considering	
that	some	sort	of	double	lock.	Just	having	that	power	in	the	PCC	is	dangerous’.	
PCC	
‘Without	funding	only	political	parties	will	be	successful	and	that	leads	to	political	
influence	in	policing.’	[fund	PCC	candidates].		
The recommendations made by both chief constables and PCCs during the interviews 
focused upon delivering something that in the view of the individual participant would 
significantly improve the current policing governance framework, their 
recommendations were; firstly, PCC candidate issues (e.g. candidate funding/ party 
affiliation). The need for improvements to scrutiny arrangements for PCC along with 
consideration of recall arrangements for PCCs.  There is a need to address chief 
constable terms and conditions with particular reference to selection and contractual 
issues. Finally, there was still felt to be a need to consider an alternative governance 
model. 
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Summary 
This chapter has laid out in detail the findings across all 31 semi structured interviews 
conducted with chief constables and PCCs.  Each of the thirteen themes has been 
examined in terms of the underlying issues that were articulated.  The analysis has 
separated the two interview cohorts, in some themes there were significant differences 
in the issues raised and their weighted importance as between chief constables and 
PCCs. However, it is interesting to see the extent to which both cohorts have agreed in 
terms of the key issues that impact upon the effectiveness of the new policing 
governance arrangements.  
 
This analysis and reporting of the findings brought the author significantly closer to 
answering the research questions that guided this study. 
 
Chapter seven will now move to a discussion of the findings in the context of the 
research questions and the articulation of recommendations that arise. 
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Chapter Seven. 
Conclusions and Implications for the Future 
Discussion 
In Chapter six of this thesis, the author identified the key findings that arose from the 
research that included a wide ranging literature review and the analysis of the semi-
structured interviews of 16 chief constables and 15 PCCs across England and Wales. 
The key findings were recorded in Chapter six within themed categories that were 
identified during the content analysis phase.  Here those findings from the two cohorts 
of participants are represented in terms of their saliency to, and their ability to answer 
the four research questions that have guided this study; 
‘What has been the effect of the new governance paradigm in Policing across 
England and Wales upon the way that Policing is governed and delivered at a 
strategic and operational level?’ 
 
The introduction of PCCs has led to reduction in organisational bureaucracy and to the 
personal bureaucratic demand upon chief constables this has led to improved, quicker 
decision making at the strategic governance level. 
 
There has been, according to these participants, a significant improvement in police 
accountability and enhanced community representation, though in some areas more 
work needs to be done. These improvements have occurred alongside improved 
public engagement in policing, however there remains a lack of understanding across 
communities of the policing governance structure. As regards the interaction of PCCs 
with police officers and staff, whilst there is variability across the country in the manner 
and extent of that interaction, this does not appear to be a significant issue. 
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In terms of the political dimension inherent in this policing governance model, the 
majority of both the chief constables and PCCs who were interviewed saw this as an 
acceptable situation.  Political issues did not, according to these interviewees 
generally lead to problems in terms of policing delivery. However, some participants 
saw the potential for inappropriate party-political influence, particularly in the run up to 
elections. 
 
There has, according to the participants in this study been a significant change in the 
tripartite structure of policing governance, echoing the work of Murphy, Eckersley and 
Ferry (2016) who saw an increased complexity in the governance structure alongside 
a reduction in the influence of chief constables. The development of policing 
governance over time must be seen within the context of wider development within the 
criminal justice and public safety domains. For example, since the 1980’s alone there 
have been the changes in the independence of police conduct accountability, from the 
PCA to IPCC and more recently the IOPC (Home Office 2018). In 1986, charging 
decision making and prosecutions were taken away from the police and vested in the 
Crown Prosecution Service (National Audit Office, 1997). Gilling (1997) draws 
attention to the development at the same time of a multi agency approach to 
community safety sharing some of the responsibility for public safety and crime 
reduction previously the domain of the police with other public bodies within Crime and 
Disorder Partnerships and more recently other fora such as youth justice panels  
(Home Office, 1998a) and hate crime panels  (Winstone and Pakes 2005). The 
development of policing governance that led to the introduction of PCCs was therefore 
part of a wider continuum of development across the domain.  In this research, a 
potential consequence of this change was that chief constables were seen as now 
having less influence within the governance framework. In addition, there was seen to 
be to be a retreat by central government, the latter seen by some as an attempt by 
government to distance itself from responsibility in a time of austerity.  
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The attitude of chief constables as to the demise of ACPO was somewhat sanguine 
and seen as inevitable.  The transition to the NPCC was seen as maintenance of the 
status quo. PCCs, however saw the removal of ACPO as a more significant event in 
terms of reforming the governance structure and in effect reducing the traditional 
power of chief constables. There was a difference in views of HMIC and its role, seen 
by PCCs as a reactionary influence, whilst chief constables merely lamented the loss 
of the HMIC role in the selection of chief officers. 
‘What aspects of the new governance paradigm in policing may be positive in 
terms of improving the effective delivery of policing and community safety?’ 
In addition to a significant reduction in bureaucracy for the police as an organisation, 
and for chief constables personally, the introduction of PCCs was seen by both 
cohorts to have improved partnership working as regards community safety. 
 
In addition, police accountability frameworks were seen as having improved in terms of 
effectiveness and openness along with the representation of communities and police 
engagement with them. 
‘What aspects of the new governance paradigm in policing may inhibit the 
delivery of effective policing and community safety?’ 
There was a perceived lack of accountability of individual PCCs and in particular there 
was an absence of a mechanism to moderate inappropriate behaviour by PCCs. 
Participants also saw the potential for inappropriate political and party-political 
influence upon policing.  These issues were seen in the context of the potential for the 
PCC structure to have to have led to, too much power vested in one individual. This 
coupled with a strong perception of a lack of scrutiny and moderation of PCCs was 
particularly exemplified by the cases of Sean Wright, PCC for South Yorkshire (Evans, 
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2014), Carmel Napier Chief Constable of Gwent (Guardian, 2013), and Neil Rhodes 
Chief Constable of Lincolnshire (Laville, 2013). The view of both chief constables and 
PCCs was that the PCPs put in place to support and scrutinise the PCCs were 
ineffective in doing so. 
 
Both cohorts also saw the lack of personal resilience in PCCs leading to strategic 
vulnerability. This was tragically demonstrated by the death of Bob Jones, PCC for the 
West Midlands (BBC, 2014) and the consequence of the resignation of Sean Wright, 
PCC for South Yorkshire (Evans, 2014) which cases highlighted the fact that only the 
PCC themselves held the electoral mandate to hold the post. There is no statutory 
replacement for a PCC leaving office between elections, and this may be a 
vulnerability in the structure. 
 
A positive professional interpersonal relationship between the chief constable and the 
PCC in a force is essential in delivering effective policing to communities. If a positive 
relationship does not exist there are risks to effective policing.  
 
The concern around the relationship between chief constables and PCCs was seen by 
these participants to link to; Risks inherent in the fact that a PCC alone can appoint or 
dismiss a chief constable.  This presents a potential risk in terms of the potential 
impact upon the professional judgement decision making of chief constables who may 
feel inappropriately obligated to PCCs.  There were also perceived problems inherent 
in the selection process that has led to a reduced pool of candidates for chief 
constable posts, coupled to the perception that a disproportionate number of deputy 
chief constables are being promoted to chief constable in the same force both issues 
which were also highlighted by Roycroft (2016, pp. 97-99). This was seen as leading 
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to a reduction in the potential for the best candidates for chief constable to either apply 
for posts or to have a fair chance of being selected. In respect of the contractual 
arrangement for chief constables, in particular the pension arrangements that require 
the completion of 30 years service in order to receive a full pension it was feared that 
this may lead to younger chief constables being inhibited in their professional 
judgement and decision making if they felt that their professional and fiscal position 
were threatened. This, in particular linked to concerns regarding the operational 
independence of chief constables. These responses supported the early concerns 
regarding the effect of poor relationships between PCCs and chief constables caused 
by the comments made to the author by chief constables who declined to participate in 
this research, in particular the chief constable who called the author to explain that 
they feared the implications of their PCC learning that they had been a participant (see 
Chapter five above). Another example was provided when the author and his first 
supervisor were preparing their submission to the Committee on Standards in Public 
Life. A chief constable approached them asking if issues could be included in the 
evidence anonymously as he was not confident in providing the evidence himself 
because of the implication of his PCC being aware of his comments (Loveday et al, 
2014). This was clearly an issue of great concern to chief constables. 
 
These findings were supported in June 2018 when in his evidence to the Home Affairs 
Committee, Chief HMICFRS Tom Winsor reported his worries that fewer candidates 
were coming forward for chief constable vacancies, and that this may be connected to 
a reduction in the ‘professional freedom’ of chief officers and PCCs putting undue 
pressures upon them. He identified examples such as Greater Manchester Police 
when in the early 2000’s there were eight candidates for the chief constable post, but 
under the PCC regime there were only two applicants and when the role of chief 
constable in West Midlands, the second largest force fell vacant recently, there was 
only one candidate, the incumbent deputy (Winsor 2018). 
  
 
 184 
 
The operational independence chief constable was also discussed by the cohort in 
terms of tactical operational policing delivery. There was a general recognition of the 
independence of the police in operational response. However, there remained a 
number of areas of concern where decisions by the PCC could affect the ability of a 
chief constable to deliver effective policing in decisions that impact upon resourcing 
elements of operational delivery in particular. 
‘What changes or adaptations to the governance paradigm are apparent that 
may have the potential to improve effectiveness in delivering policing and 
community safety?’ 
The democratic legitimacy of PCCs, questioned by commentators (Loveday 2012, 
Berman et al, 2012) was completely accepted by both chief constables and PCCs as a 
fait accompli. However, both cohorts felt that the perception of legitimacy would be 
improved by increased voter involvement in the electoral process for PCCs.  In this 
regard, participants recommended that strategies including a commitment from 
government to raise awareness of the role in addition to improved funding for non 
party-political candidates.  More radically, some participants suggested that 
candidates to be PCCs, in spite of the political nature of the role should not have a 
party affiliation. 
 
Some participants questioned the governance structure more fundamentally, 
suggesting other models such as panels with an elected chair. 
 
There was a significant consensus for improvements to be put in place to improve the 
scrutiny arrangements for PCCs, focusing on the perceived ineffectiveness of PCPs.  
Discussions in this regard included the consideration of recall arrangements for PCCs. 
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In recognition of the ‘grey area’ at the margins of police operational independence, 
there was some support amongst both cohorts for the provision of clarity regarding the 
parameters of  ‘operational independence’. This appears to be more important given 
the judgement on operational independence in the seminal case R (Crompton) v PCC 
South Yorkshire QBD 2017. 
 
An important issue as far as chief constables were concerned with some support from 
PCC participants was the need to address the terms of service, selection and 
contractual issues pertaining to chief constables. This was seen as in order to 
minimise the potential detrimental effect upon the confidence of chief constables to 
make the best professional judgments and decisions even if they do not accord with 
the views of the PCC, without concerns for their personal professional position. Again, 
this position was supported by Chief HMICFRS Tom Winsor who highlighted an 
example of problematic contractual issues affecting chief constables when in 2018, the 
chief constable of Leicestershire was offered five 12 month contracts (Winsor 2018). 
These factors coalesce around the key issue of police operational independence, 
certainly in his service as a chief police officer, the author experienced the attempts by 
central government to direct policing, particularly around major incidents such as the 
widespread riots in 2011 which was highlighted in the public argument in the lead up to 
the implementation of PCCs between Sir Hugh Orde the chair of ACPO and the then 
Home Secretary Theresa May. She asserted that she had instructed police to deliver 
more robust operational tactics (Churcher, 2011).  There was certainly a perception by 
chief officers that the government saw the operational independence of chief 
constables and their lack of ability to control operational responses as at best an 
irritation and more often as obstructive to the will of government.  This debate has 
continued into the era of PCC governance where the police are arguably closer to 
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political control. This was indeed one of the objectives of the policy (Conservative 
Party, 2010) whereby an increased level of political control was seen as necessary to 
provide greater public accountability in policing.  The effect, demonstrated by this 
research is that there has been an increased concern that local politicians are able to 
influence policing to the extent that chief constables are inappropriately influenced in 
their operational decision making by factors such as their potential employment 
vulnerability. Where the PCC is affiliated to national political parties, the proportion of 
which increased in the 2016 PCC elections (Electoral Commission, 2016), there is 
concern that policing priorities and operational delivery may be skewed according to 
party political agendas. These concerns are fuelled by a number of factors including 
the reduction of the pool of chief constable candidates and the concomitant increase in 
single applicants for chief constable vacancies. Often, the only applicant was the 
incumbent deputy chief constable within the force (College of Policing, 2019).  This 
combined with an increase in the number of serving chief constables that would need 
to obtain from the PCC one or more extensions of contract in order to achieve 
pensionable service this research identifies the increased risk that chief constables will 
become less likely to robustly assert their professional judgement in the face of an 
inappropriately assertive PCC to the detriment of communities. 
 
Implications of the Research 
The research conducted during this study therefore, when considered against a critical 
review of the extant literature in the area indicated that the introduction of PCCs as a 
policing governance model across England and Wales was generally positive. 
However, there are significant areas of concern that suggest a need for review and 
change. The implications of the findings for the policing governance structure are 
significant in terms of identifying a need for a fundamental review of key aspects of the 
current policing governance structure. These include the issue of police ‘operational 
independence’, and the way in which the interpersonal relationship between the chief 
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constable and the PCC has the potential to detrimentally affect the strategic and 
operational delivery of policing to communities.  Participants, in particular chief 
constables expressed very forcefully their fears regarding the potential vulnerability of 
chief constables in terms of their ability to make unbiased professional judgements 
dependant upon their contractual position. This issue should therefore be addressed 
as a matter of urgency. Other areas for reform identified by this research include 
scrutiny and monitoring arrangements for PCCs and issues of political legitimacy. 
 
There are a number of issues that arise from this research that merit consideration by 
decision makers and further research.  
 
Firstly, there is a need for a review of the current structure of police governance which 
addresses the concern that the PCC as a single executive has too much responsibility. 
This should examine alternative structures that will provide improved resilience and 
rationality of decision-making. Potential measures may be the PCC operating as the 
chair of a panel, and PCC candidates declaring their deputy during the election so that 
both are elected and therefore both carry a mandate.  
 
Consideration should be given to review of the process for selecting new chief 
constables that addresses the potential that the sole responsibility for this lying with 
the PCC has reduced the number of high quality candidates and has led to a 
disproportionate number of incumbent deputy chief constables being appointed to 
chief constable posts. This may include reinstating the professional role of HMICFRS 
or a requirement for partner agency participation at a senior level. 
 
There is a need for a review of the contractual arrangements and career paths of chief 
police officers in order to minimise the potential detrimental impact upon the 
professional independence chief constables potentially caused the ability of PCCs to 
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dispense with chief constables at the end of a contract period or to require them to 
resign or retire. Potential measures may include the requirement for PCCs who intend 
to dismiss or end the contract of chief constables to have to demonstrate cause to the 
satisfaction of the PCP (or any replacement body) and HMICFRS. Either body should 
have the power to veto the proposal and refer the matter to the Home Secretary.  Any 
dispute of the decision of the Home Secretary advised by HMICFRS should be subject 
to judicial review. In addition, consideration should be given to contractual 
arrangements and career structures that reduce the fiscal vulnerability of chief 
constables in this regard, for example contract period that overlap the electoral tenure 
of PCCs. 
 
Consideration should be given to providing statutory or regulatory clarification of the 
status of the concept of police ‘operational independence’ in order that it is clear where 
and to what extent the concept exists and what responsibility the PCC has to hold the 
police to account for effective and ethical operational delivery. It may be that this 
needs to be set in place by a regulation or amendment to the Policing Protocol 2011 
(Home Office 2011) that includes an indication as to the skills that the PCC will need to 
access in order to discharge those responsibilities.                        
 
There is a need for a review of scrutiny and monitoring arrangements for PCCs which 
addresses the need to ensure that the PCC is effectively held to account and that his/ 
her decision making is subject to rigorous scrutiny that ensures the best interests of 
the community are achieved.  Such a review should address the perception of the 
ineffectiveness of the current PCP arrangements.  
 
A review is required in respect of the arrangements for the election of PCCs in order to 
address the issues of low voter turnout that gives rise to questions of the democratic 
legitimacy of the role. In particular there should be consideration regarding voter 
awareness of the role of the PCC and the timing of elections. 
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It is suggested by the author that if these issues are addressed, then there are likely to 
be improvements to the current policing governance structure, making it more effective 
in delivering policing that balances the needs and expectations of communities with 
independent professional operational policing judgement. 
 
Limitations of this Research. 
This was a relatively extensive research project generating over 31 hours of qualitative 
data from which a rich insight was gained as regards the operation of the current 
policing governance model from the perspective of the key actors. However, as with all 
endeavours limitations of time and physical resources intervened. In Chapter four the 
author discussed his consideration of both quantitative approaches and qualitative 
methodologies such as ethnographic and hermeneutic strategies. He still takes the 
view that the strategy to use semi-structured interviews was appropriate. He 
recognised that whilst interview methodologies can elucidate the perceptions of key 
actors within a paradigm, they cannot not provide empirical evidence of changes in 
operational policing delivery.  Future research in this area may address this dimension, 
however in order to have validity it will need to demonstrate causal links between the 
changed governance structure and operational delivery. This will be challenging, given 
the wide range of variables that bear upon policing outcomes, including resourcing and 
wider societal changes. 
 
Another strategy that could have been deployed that may have generated additional or 
different insights would have been similar semi structured interviews with other players 
within the tripartite structure and beyond. These may have included central 
government, HMICFRS, PCPs, local government and indeed the public who are the 
  
 
 190 
recipients of the policing delivered by this governance construct. Such an approach 
may have provided a greater understanding of the domain from a wider range of 
actors, and may well have strengthened some of the findings and recommendations, 
in particular those that related directly to the delivery of policing services. This may be 
a fertile area for future research, but in the view of the author, this does not detract 
from the significance of this study that accessed the views of the two key players in 
this arena in a way that focuses the learning as a contribution to the body of 
knowledge in this area. 
 
It is unfortunate that the cohort of chief constable participants in this research was self-
selecting in that they were those that agreed to be subject to interview.  Whilst the 
research cohort gave valuable rich data upon which rational findings were based, this 
may have been improved by accessing their more reluctant colleagues. The 
comments of some of those that declined, in particular the chief constable who took 
the time to telephone the author to explain their decision strongly suggested that there 
was a significant group of chief constables who due to concern for the potential 
consequences did not feel confident in participating. This view was supported in the 
reports by some of the chief constables interviewed about the negative experiences of 
many colleagues, some of who had suffered with their health as a consequence.   
 
In any future research in this area, the author takes the view that more work should be 
done to convince reluctant potential participants to become involved, perhaps by one 
to one meetings in which the aims and conduct of the research can be discussed and, 
in particular detailed reassurances can be expressed. In this way, those reluctant 
potential subjects may be given the confidence to participate with fully informed 
consent. 
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An additional factor that may have impacted upon the volume and validity of 
participant responses is the fact of the author’s status as a former chief officer.  All 
participants knew this fact. The author has already discussed the potential for his 
cognitive biases to affect the interviews, and his strategy for reducing the detrimental 
impact upon the data collection, such as unconscious self-censorship in the questions 
asked.  It was also recognised that, in particular the chief constables respondents may 
have been subject to cognitive biases generated by the previous police experience of 
the researcher, or indeed his previous personal interactions and relationships with 
them, which may have led to guardedness in their responses. These risks must 
however be set against the fact that the status of the author undoubtedly facilitated the 
level of participation of respondents. 
 
In terms of the contemporary saliency of the research to the current position, there 
may be an argument to have conducted follow up interviews of a large proportion of 
the participants in this study following the PCC elections in 2016. This was considered 
in the knowledge of the potential size of such a project and the impact upon the 
imperative to deliver the thesis in a timely manner.  In order to test the potential for 
such an exercise to significantly change the findings and recommendations in this 
thesis, the author who is still professionally active within the policing, security and 
counter terrorism domains has spoken to chief constables and PCCs informally, and it 
is clear that the issues uncovered in the findings of this research are still current views 
and concerns. This was further reinforced by the author’s attendance at the Policing 
Governance Summit that took place in June 2018; the currency of the issues was 
evident in the conference debates and in private conversations (CoPaCC, 2018).  
However, the author found it significant that the attendees at the summit were 
predominately PCCs and their chief executives. There were no serving chief 
constables or representatives of the Home Office, raising the question as to how 
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engaged the police and the government are in the development of this still new 
governance structure. 
 
The recent work carried out by Wells (2015) and by Caless and Owens (2016) that 
involved the interviewing of chief constables and PCCs disclosed findings that closely 
resonate with those in this thesis.  The author therefore took the view that the data 
remained robust and salient and that there was no imperative for a further round of 
formal interviews. 
 
Final Reflections. 
The journey undertaken by the author in this research project has been considerable. 
Earlier in this thesis he was open about the fact that as a former chief police officer, 
having worked for 32 years in the governance construct put in place by the Police Act 
1964 (Home Office 1964) he was, like other operational police officers, in the early part 
of his carer completely unaware of the role of the police authority. When he assumed 
more significant positions of leadership he became part of the governance paradigm 
within his police force. By the end of his police career in 2008, there were discussions 
within government and academic circles regarding the need for change in the way that 
policing was governed and held to account. Indeed in 2005, the author had a 
conversation with David Cameron, then leader of the Conservative opposition 
following Cameron’s return from the USA when he began to promote the notion of 
directly elected individuals. It was clear that Mr Cameron was set upon the idea and 
was not prepared to listen to an alternative view. Therefore when in 2010 the concept 
became a key plank of the coalition government’s reform programme, the author was 
volubly sceptical about the whole PCC project, questioning why a structure that, in his 
view had delivered effective policing for the whole of his career should be changed. 
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On reflection, from the distance provided by time and in the light of the critical thinking 
skills acquired during the doctoral programme that has led to this thesis, the author 
can see his experiences of the tripartite policing governance framework of which he 
was a part through a different lens.  He has discussed in this thesis the potential for his 
experiences to cause unintentional bias that may skew the findings and the measures 
that he put in place to avoid this as much as is possible.    
 
In terms of the criticisms of the police authority and of the ACPO, discussed in this 
thesis, the author can now see exactly those issues in his memories of operating 
within that paradigm.  The police authority was a group of often, well meaning, part 
time individuals each with an agenda to do good or to feed personal kudos or other 
ulterior aims.  The part time nature of their role meant that they often did not have the 
capacity to focus on issues at a strategic level. In some cases he questioned their 
intellectual capacity.  The author recalls delivering a briefing to the police authority of 
his force regarding the policing arrangements for a large-scale public event with very 
significant security, public order and terrorist risks, including threats to the royal family 
and visiting international heads of state. He was bemused when one member in all 
earnestness said;  
 ‘Yes that’s very good, but in one of the roads near me there has been a 
 mattress on the pavement for weeks now and the police have done nothing 
 about it.’ (Personal conversation with the author, 2005) 
 
This was an extreme case, but makes a point as regards the often very low level, 
parochial nature of the interests represented on the authority.   
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In terms of engagement with communities, the authority did not see the issue as a 
priority, the councillor members saw their local mandate as demonstrating their 
representativeness and the independent members did not see it as their role to 
represent communities, but to provide skills required by the authority such as financial 
or business experience.  
 
As far being held to account, the author as a chief officer was part of a governance 
culture where the ‘board of directors’, the chief officers of the police force did not see 
the police authority as having any relevance in decision making at either an 
operational or strategic level.  The chief officers set the strategy, wrote the plan and 
delivered the operational response.  Having done so a virtual fait accompli was 
presented to the authority.  The author reflects that he certainly treated individual 
members of the police authority in a patronising manner often providing them 
information tailored their ‘pet’ interests in order to develop a supportive rapport.  
Regularly a tactic employed to obtain police authority buy in was to arrange for a 
member to sit on various project boards, more to make them part of the process and 
therefore an advocate for that particular issue on the authority than to benefit from 
their insights within the project.  Chief officers saw it as a key skill to have the ability to 
articulate in writing or verbally a case in such a way that the authority would accept 
whatever he/ she was reporting or proposing.  There were often conversations with 
colleagues as to how best to present an issue so as to maximise the chance of the 
authority agreeing to it. Nothing in this was inappropriate or corrupt in terms of 
misrepresentation or obfuscation, but there was certainly perceived to be an art in 
‘bringing the authority on board’ in order to maximise the potential for them to agree to 
the proposal in question that were always focussed upon delivering policing benefits to 
communities.  In many ways the authority were seen as an encumbrance, particularly 
as regards the bureaucratic demand rather than a realistic accountability framework. 
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Indeed the author and his chief police officer colleagues saw themselves as more 
accountable to government and HMIC, particularly by way of performance targets. For 
much of his time as a chief officer, the governing party was New Labour and therefore 
the predominant approach from the centre was that of ‘New Managerialism’ (Hood, 
1995). Each year brought a new suite of performance measures requiring increasingly 
bureaucratic resources to deliver what appeared to him and colleagues statistics that 
were largely irrelevant to delivering effective policing to communities.  The HMIC 
provided a regular round of inspections that were focussed as much upon ensuring 
that government requirements were in place as they were upon whether the public 
were receiving effective policing. 
 
As a chief officer, the author was active in leading on several national business areas 
in the investigative and operational policing domains on behalf of ACPO.  In his 
experience, the efforts of ACPO were directed at improving the delivery of policing.  
However, as an organisation and as individuals ACPO saw the government and police 
authorities as hurdles to be scaled, or on occasion adversaries to be overcome.  This, 
on reflection he now sees led a less than effective relationship between the three 
elements key to delivering policing.  The demise of ACPO eventually occurred due to 
the open warfare between the then Home Secretary Theresa May and the Chair of 
ACPO Hugh Orde (Blackburn, 2011). It is interesting that while participants in this 
study recognised this explanation for the demise of ACPO, they did not see its 
replacement body the NPCC as a materially different. 
 
The author therefore, over time saw the need for change in the policing governance 
paradigm if policing was to be more effective and really accountable to communities.  
To the extent that he gave any thought to the issue prior to undertaking academic 
study, he considered that the police authority body should comprise full time members 
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selected for relevant skills with some form of direct election. Once he had embarked 
upon this research journey he was attracted to the recommendations of Loveday & 
Reid (2003) as they are explicitly stated;  
‘Police should be made directly accountable to mayors and council leaders’ 
(ibid p.59) 
 
Rather than the interpretation placed upon that work by David Cameron and the 
Conservative Party that led to the single directly elected individual model, they had in 
the words of Carswell (2010) ‘sent for the Sherriff’. 
 
In terms of self-reflection, in addition to the author’s police service being directly 
relevant to this research, so too is his experience in standing as an independent 
candidate in the PCC elections in 2016.  Having conducted a significant tranche of the 
research, the author formed the view that he would be able to offer himself as a 
credible candidate.  This was in no regard an attempt at an ethnographic study of the 
PCC candidature and election process, indeed the author was aware that he had no 
ethical approval to engage in such research.  His reflection on the process therefore 
will not identify individual rival candidates or their party affiliation, but will be confined 
to more general reflections upon the process. 
The process mitigated against individuals with no support infrastructure such as would 
be provided by a party political structure or available to independent candidates with 
significant funding.  A candidate for election to parliament, requires 10 persons on the 
relevant electoral roll to nominate him or her and to deposit £500.00 returnable if the 
candidate receives 5% of the overall vote, (Electoral Commission 2009).  The 
candidate for PCC, however is required to provide 100 persons on the relevant 
electoral rolls, and deposit £5000.00 (Electoral Commission, 2016 a). For the author 
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this was a very significant logistic and financial consideration when deciding whether 
to stand for PCC.  There was a complete lack of government support, including the 
failure to provide free postage for candidate election material (Electoral Commission 
2016).  However, the author decided to continue and risked his own funds in the 
endeavour. 
 
An early, unexpected issue that arose was that an independent candidate is only 
allowed to describe him/ herself as ‘independent’ on the ballot paper, whereas party 
political candidates may append their party name against their name on the ballot 
paper.  In his electoral area there were three other independent candidates. He took 
the view that many voters would either vote upon party lines or would make a decision 
upon entering the ballot box.  He therefore felt the need to differentiate himself against 
the other independent candidates. This necessitated him either forming a political 
party himself or joining one that aligned with his strategy.  It was too late to do the 
latter, so he technically joined a party that an existing PCC with whom he was 
acquainted had set up with himself as the sole member.  The name of the party had 
been constructed so as to describe in headline terms his policy ‘Zero Tolerance 
Policing, Ex Chief Cop’.  In a very broad way it was felt that this gross statement would 
at least describe to voters the policy and attribute of his candidature. In spite of 
aligning with a political party registered at the Electoral Commission, no additional 
funding accrued. 
 
During the election campaign, it proved impossible for the author to effectively 
communicate across a large geographical area with an enormously diverse 
demographic of over 1.2 million voters.  He worked hard to communicate using print 
and broadcast media, social media and personal interaction, both in groups and 
individuals, however it was clear that he would never be able to match the ability of the 
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large political parties to communicate across the electorate.  Indeed at an early stage, 
the fact that the elections for PCC were being held on the same day as local authority 
elections was a clear advantage to the large political parties who were able to include 
in their election material references to their PCC candidate.   
 
The author was particularly dismayed with the other candidates, both independent and 
party political. None of the candidates, with a single exception (who was the incumbent 
PCC) had any understanding of issues connected with policing, community safety or 
security.  It was apparent that the party political candidates were constrained by their 
party policies; this was particularly visible in their attempts to answer questions from 
members of the public in public fora.  As a candidate who was solely focussed upon 
delivering effective policing, the author was able to provide a response that was not 
contaminated by national party policy, as was the case for the party candidates.  It 
appeared to the author that their candidature was more about imposing their party’s 
control upon local policing than addressing real community concerns and needs. 
 
Over time it became clear to the author that the result of the election was a foregone 
conclusion.  Given that there was a dearth of information provided to the public about 
the role of the PCC, and the fact of the upcoming election, it was likely that voters 
would in the absence of and information on the specific policies of the PCC candidates 
vote in accordance with their customary party preference. This apparently proved to be 
the case. Anecdotal evidence provided to the author by persons known to him acting 
as returning officers at the polling stations indicated that the majority of voters turned 
out to vote for their local councillors. They were surprised to be offered an additional 
ballot paper in respect of the PCC election. A large number of voters indicated that 
they had no idea what a PCC was, they had heard nothing about the candidates and 
therefore would vote for their party’s candidate. It was no surprise, therefore that the 
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candidate for the party that traditionally returns the most MPs across the area provided 
the successful PCC candidate. 
 
The author accepts that this is an extremely subjective view, and this narrative is not 
provided in any way in support of his research, but for him it does underline the 
volatility of the selection process for PCCs which underpins his questioning of the 
suitability of the PCC structure as the right governance structure for an area as 
important as policing and community safety. 
 
This research has demonstrated that there have been benefits as a result of the 
introduction of Police and Crime Commissioners. In terms of a greater speed and 
efficiency in decision-making, reduced bureaucracy, more effective partnership 
working and a more focussed approach that comes with a full time role. There are, 
however significant concerns that need to be addressed if the project driven by the 
Conservative Party of the early 2000’s is to become an effective governance structure 
that both enables the police to serve and protect communities, while also being 
effectively held to account.  
 
   ________________________________ 
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University of Portsmouth ICJS Ethics Self Assessment 
	
 
 
 
	
	
ICJS	Ethics	Self-Assessment	Form	
	
Introduction 
 
All research involving human participants, animals and/or sensitive data undertaken by 
students and staff must receive a favourable ethical opinion before it can be 
undertaken and, if appropriate, subsequently used for publication.   
 
The completion of this ICJS Ethics Self-Assessment Form is the start point for 
applying for favourable ethical opinion and as such it is a record of the ethical 
considerations that have been addressed in planning the research proposal.  
 
The ICJS Ethics Self-Assessment Form has 4 sections, all of which must be 
completed. 
 
Section 1: Student details and proposed research topic 
 
Section 2: Preparation; and details of ethical issues identified in the proposed research 
 
Section 3: Ethical Narrative 
 
Section 4: Ethical Opinion Outcome Record 
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A copy of this completed Self-Assessment Form should be supplied with your research 
proposal. It will then be passed on to your dissertation supervisor.  
 
You may not proceed to data collection until you have received a favourable 
ethical opinion.  
 
Please see the document: ‘How to Apply for Ethical Review’ for the process that 
you will need to follow in order to receive a favourable ethical opinion.  
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Section 1: Student details and proposed research topic 
 
 
Student name: ......Steven A. Watts 
 
Student number:…UP670108 
 
Proposed research topic:  
 
An examination of the impact of the introduction of Police and Crime Commissioners in 
2012 on the governance of Policing across England and Wales. 
 
In November 2012, HM Government policy was enacted in the Police Reform and Social Responsibility 
Act 2011 (http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2011/13/contents/enacted). This established the role of 
democratically elected Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) across 41 Police Forces in England and 
Wales.   At the same time the pre existing Police Authorities were disbanded, effectively introducing a 
completely new paradigm in policing governance across England and Wales.   
 
Secondary legislation in the form of the Policing Protocol Order 2011 
(http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2011/2744/pdfs/uksi_20112744_en.pdf), set out the way that PCCs, 
Chief Officers of Police and Police and Crime Panels should exercise their functions in relation to one 
another, with particular reference to the operational independence of the police.   
 
The Metropolitan Police Service, responsible for the policing of London was not subject to this legislation, 
and in its case governance of policing was vested in the office of the directly elected Mayor of London. 
 
This research is aimed at identifying developing issues in this changed policing governance structure and 
how that affects the delivery of policing to communities.  In this study it is proposed to conduct semi 
structured interviews with Chief Constables, Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) and a 
representative of the Mayor for London’s ‘Mayor’s office for Policing and Crime’ (MoPaC).  Qualitative 
data in the form of audio recorded interviews will be analysed with a view to providing an insight into 
effect of the implementation of the new structure, how since the inauguration of PCCs the relationship has 
developed and how it has affected the way that policing is delivered across their area of responsibility in 
addition to issues and potential challenges for the future. 
 
This research study is advised by an earlier pilot study involving semi-structured interviews of five Chief 
Constables in this regard carried out in April 2013 following a favourable ethical review 
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Section 2: Preparation and details of ethical issues identified in 
the proposed research 
 
 
1. Student has read the British Society of Criminology ethical guidelines.  
 http://britsoccrim.org/docs/CodeofEthics.pdf                               Yes [  X ] No [   ] 
 
 
2. Student has participated in research ethics sessions 
(lecture/seminar/workshop/other on-line or face to face activity) provided by their 
programme of study. 
        Yes [ X  ] No [   
] 
 
 
3. Will the research involve the collection and analysis of primary or secondary data? 
Primary data         Yes [  X ]  No [   
] 
Secondary data         Yes [     ]  
   No[X] 
 
 
Note: Secondary data is data that has already been collected by other researchers 
or an organisation for another purpose. Data may be in the public domain or 
available under the Freedom of Information Act (2000). 
  
 
If ‘No’ to both parts of Q3, go to Q16.  
 
If ‘Yes’ to both or either parts of Q3, go on to answer ALL of the questions on 
the following pages. 
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4. Does proposed research involve face-to-face contact with members of the 
community (including professionals and those held or ‘looked after’)? 
   
         Yes [ x ]  No [  
] 
 
 
5. Is access to personal or confidential data sought?  Yes [ x ] No [   
] 
 
Note 1: This question applies to both primary and secondary data. 
 
Note 2: You should be aware that privileged access to contact details or 
information as a result of a professional role, links to a host organization or 
personal association is considered to be ethically problematic and 
arrangements should be made for third party anonymised access.  
 
 
6. Are you aware of the need to ensure anonymity and confidentiality of research 
participants?        
                 Yes [x ]  No [   
] 
 
 
7. Are there potential risks (to you and/or research subjects) in the research?  
(If ‘Yes’, then specify these risks in the spaces provided.) 
 
 Physical risks – to participants     Yes [   ]  No [x 
]  
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
…… 
Physical risks – to yourself     Yes [   ]  No [x 
]  
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
…… 
Psychological risks – to participants     Yes [x ]  No [   
]  
 
In the case of the Chief Constable participants, there may potentially be some cognitive dissonance 
arising from the subject’s desire to give a factual account against concerns as to the reaction of the 
PCC if those views were known. However, given the senior position of the individuals concerned and 
their generally robust profile, this is unlikely.  In the case of the PCC and MoPaC participants, there is 
no probability of such an effect given their position within the organisational dynamic vis-a-vis the 
organisation and the Chief Constables. 
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Psychological risks – to yourself     Yes [   ]  No 
[x]  
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
…… 
Compromising situations – to participants    Yes [x ]  No [   
]  
 
Views expressed by Chief Constable participants during the interviews may, if the identity of the 
participant is known give rise to disagreement with the PCC consequently a difficult interpersonal 
dynamic may arise, and given the fact that the PCC is responsible for appointing and renewing the 
contract of the Chief Constable, this may give rise to concerns as to their employment security.  
There is no such issue for the PCCs and MoPaC participants, however since the PCCs are subject to 
election to their position, and the MoPaC participant represents the elected Mayor for London, they 
may feel compromised depending upon their responses if they were in the public domain. 
 
Compromising situations – to yourself   Yes [   ]  No 
[x]  
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
……  
8. Do you believe you need to deceive research subjects? (e.g. by not being clear 
about the purpose of your research) 
 Yes [   ] No 
[x ] 
 
 
9. Is there any likely harm to participants involved in the research? 
 Yes [   ]  No [ 
x] 
 
 
10. Is participation in the research entirely voluntary?   Yes [x ] No [   
] 
 
 
11. Have you considered how you are going to obtain informed consent from research 
participants? 
 Yes [ x ] No [   
] 
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12. Is there any potential role conflict for you in the research?  Yes [   ]  No [x 
] 
 
Note: Role conflict is defined as any contact with a participant who knows you (the 
researcher) in another capacity.  Commonly this is a professional capacity.  
 
 
13.  If you are using secondary data, is the data available in the public domain? 
 
                                                    Yes [   ]      No [   ]     Not using secondary data 
[x] 
 
         If “No”, please explain:  
- how you have access to the data .............................................................. 
 
- the arrangements you have made with the host organisation/holder of the 
information to receive the data in an anonymised state which conforms to the 
Data Protection Act (1998)  
……………………………………………………………………………………. 
……………………………………………………………………………………. 
 ……………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
14. If access to data outside of the public domain is proposed, have you consulted 
with your data protection officer?  
          Yes [   ] No 
N/a 
 
 
15.  Are there any other data protection issues?   Yes [   ] No 
[x] 
 
16. Are there any other potential sources of ethical issues or conflict in the proposed 
research (e.g. political considerations, sensitivity of the topic, reputational 
issues for researcher, participants and/or host organisation)? 
          Yes [x ] No 
[  
 
If ‘Yes’, then specify these risks –  
 
This research is focused upon a changed governance paradigm for policing 
across England and Wales that has been put in place by the Coalition government 
as part of the Conservative Party Manifesto.  As such it is a significant national 
issue in terms of government policy and given the debate surrounding its 
appropriateness and effectiveness it is still a live political issue on the national 
stage.  This research and its findings may be picked up and fed into that debate. 
 
Negative risks in this regard will be mitigated by the researcher ensuring that the 
research is conducted professionally and in accordance with the regulations of the 
University and in accordance with best practice.  At all times the research will be 
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subject of close scrutiny by the first supervisor Dr Barry Loveday who is an 
experienced and respected figure in this field. 
        
I confirm that: 
• the information provided is a complete and accurate record of my plans at 
present;  
• I have read and understood the process for obtaining a favourable ethical 
opinion as contained in the document: ‘How to Apply for Ethical Review’; and  
• I shall resubmit an amended version of this form should my research alter 
significantly such that there is any significant variation of ethical risk. 
 
 
Signed:   Steven A Watts..……………………..….. Student  
 
Signed:   Dr Barry Loveday ………………………...Research Supervisor 
              
Date: ……January 2015…………………… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Advice/ decisions/ responsibilities 
 
Answers in bold and underlined require further consideration as they pose potential ethical 
issues.  
 
If any of the questions you have require further consideration, you must: 
 
• attach additional details in an Ethical Narrative (see following page) of how you plan 
to minimize any risks identified; and 
 
• discuss these issues with your dissertation/research supervisor/tutor 
 
Once your dissertation/research supervisor/tutor has agreed that you are ready to apply for 
ethical review, you must follow the process for obtaining a favourable ethical opinion as 
contained in the document: ‘How to Apply for Ethical Review’. You may not proceed to 
data collection until favourable ethical opinion has been given by the ICJS Ethics 
Committee or the Faculty Ethics Committee (FEthC) (as appropriate).  
 
Your dissertation/research supervisor/tutor has the responsibility for ethical oversight of your 
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Section 3: Ethical Narrative 
 
Introduction; 
In its guidelines, the British Sociological Association state clearly that researchers have; 
“...a responsibility both to safeguard the proper interests of those involved in or affected by their work, and 
to report their findings accurately and truthfully. They need to consider the effects of their involvements 
and the consequences of their work or its misuse for those they study and other interested parties...” 
(2002 p.2). 
 
This requirement along with a large body of literature on the subject of ethics in research properly places 
a responsibility upon the researcher to consider at all stages of the research journey issues that may 
affect the subjects of that research, stakeholders and the wider community, as well as ensuring the 
integrity of the methodology and any results reported. 
 
Many professional bodies and authors provide models which are aimed at facilitating ethical practice 
throughout the research project, there is much debate and advice in respect of issues such as informed 
consent of subjects, treating them fairly and with respect, to being clear about the nature of the research 
and how the data will be used.  The literature review carried out by the author in the preparation and 
planning of this research project has significantly raised his awareness of the need to ensure that the 
research is conducted within a strong ethical framework and has enabled him to put in place a 
methodology that will maximise the ethical imperative. The narrative will describe the proposed 
methodology and how this will be conducted within an ethical framework. This application has been 
prepared in close consultation with the first supervisor Dr Barry Loveday of the ICJS. 
 
Research Methodology; 
In order to access qualitative data from Chief Constables, PCCs and a MoPaC representative in respect 
of their experience of the introduction of a new policing governance paradigm, it is proposed that semi 
structured interviews are carried out with individuals on a one to one basis.  The research will be 
conducted in accordance with the protocol contained within the research protocol at Appendix 1.  This 
research project was approved on 11/6/14 assessors of the Institute for Criminal Justice Studies. 
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The interviews will be guided by a template of broad question areas in order to manage the conversation 
and in an attempt to ensure that the maximum areas of relevance are covered within the time constraints 
(see Appx 2). 
 
Selection of the Subjects 
The Chief Constable, PCC and MoPaC participants will be approached directly to seek consent for their 
involvement. The participants are all high status individuals within the Police governance hierarchy. Many 
researchers would therefore expect difficulty in obtaining access to them.  However, this author is a 
retired Chief Officer and is personally acquainted with over 25% of Chief Constables in England and 
Wales and with approximately 20% of PCCs. It is anticipated therefore that access will be forthcoming.  
However, it is important for the author to consider the potential pressure that subjects may feel to comply 
with the request for interview and the impact upon their informed consent of the extant personal 
relationship. It has to be said that the subjects are generally as a group somewhat assertive and resilient, 
particularly the Chief Constables (Reiner 1991). However In order to minimise this potential ethical issue, 
the author will be careful to ensure that the subjects do not include individuals with whom he has a close 
friendship and that within the letter and any supporting briefing it is made absolutely clear that the 
decision to participate must be informed, free and independent. This is addressed in the wording of the 
letter of invitation to potential participants (see Appx 3) and the Participant Information Sheet (see Appx 
4).  
Participant Consent; 
It is absolutely essential that the participants provide informed consent for the interviews to take place 
and for the resultant data to be used in accordance with the research protocol (see Appx. 1). The 
researcher will ensure that the participant fully understands the proposed conduct of the research and 
how the data will be used. 
 
Informed consent by the participant will be recorded at immediately prior to the interview taking place, the 
participant having read the Participant Information Sheet (see Appx 4) and the researcher having 
explained it to the participant and his inviting the participant to raise any issues or concerns.  Once the 
participant is content they will be invited to sign the Participant Consent Form (Appx. 5). 
Sensitivity of the Topic 
The need to consider sensitivity in a topic under research is relative to the potential impact upon the 
participant which will always be subjective; 
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‘...a sensitive topic is one that potentially poses for those involved a substantial threat, the emergence of 
which renders problematic for the researcher and/ or the researched the collection, holding and/ or 
dissemination of research data.’ (Renzetti and Lee, 1993, p.5). 
Considerations regarding the Chief Constables; 
The Policing Protocol Order (Home Office 2011) makes a requirement for a close working relationship 
between the PCC charged with driving a policing strategy that meets the needs of local communities. The 
Chief Constable is charged with delivering an efficient and effective policing response.  In pragmatic 
terms, in order for the Chief Constable to deliver, he/ she needs a positive working relationship with the 
PCC.  In addition at a more individual level, Chief Constables are subject to time limited contracts of 
employment, and the PCC is the appointing authority who has the power to decide whether or not to 
renew that contract, or in cases of discipline whether to dismiss the Chief Constable.  It is reasonable to 
anticipate therefore that the Chief Constables who are subject of this research may be concerned as to 
their position and their relationship with the PCC into the future if their views are put into the public 
domain.  Indeed, this is also a concern as to the validity of the research itself in terms of the potential for 
subjects to be reluctant or inhibited in their responses. This provides an additional imperative to minimise 
the potential for the subject’s participation to impact upon that important professional relationship. 
It is not proposed to approach the PCC to seek permission to interview the Chief Constable participants 
for the reasons explored above. The relationship is such that statutorily although the PCC appoints the 
Chief Constable, he/ she is not in a legal sense the employer of the Chief Constable who is an 
independent officer of the crown.  To inform the PCC would compromise the strategy to ensure the 
anonymity of the Chief Constable participants and this is a significant motivation against doing do.  
The author recognises that in part the decision not to approach the PCC may be driven by a concern that 
he/ she may veto the research by putting pressure upon the Chief Constable not to take part.  However, 
this is a subordinate concern to that of protecting the identity of the Chief Constable participant. 
Maintenance of confidentiality is therefore critical for the Chief Constable participants, and the measures 
to provide this will be discussed below. 
Considerations regarding the Police and Crime Commissioners and MoPaC Representative; 
The PCC and the MoPaC representatives are statutorily separated from the Police hierarchy, and indeed 
they appoint Chief Constables as well as renewing their contracts, it is therefore not the case that they 
would be vulnerable in that regard, however research to date has indicated that the interpersonal 
relationship between the Chief Constable and PCC is critical.  It is therefore important from this 
perspective to maintain the confidentiality of the PCC/ MoPaC participants so as not to compromise that 
working relationship. 
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In addition, as alluded to above, the PCCs and the Mayor of London are subject to election to their 
positions and it is important that their comments are not inappropriately put into the public domain without 
their informed consent.   
Maintenance of confidentiality is also therefore critical for the PCC and MoPaC participants, the measures 
to provide this are discussed below. 
Participant Confidentiality 
In view of the potential serious detrimental impact upon the participants and indeed potentially confidence 
in the policing governance framework, if the participation of individuals and/or their comments were made 
known in the public domain, confidentiality of the data and anonymity of the subjects will be a crucial 
issue in this study.  
The author addresses these issues in some detail in the letter of invitation to potential participants (see 
Appx 3), highlighting them to ensure that they are considered by the participant prior to engaging in the 
research.   The letter and Participant Information Sheet (Appx 4) detail the measures that will be taken to 
ensure anonymity. These measures will need to be relatively sophisticated given the small number of 
potential subjects nationally.  The measures to be adopted will be; 
+ When approaching the potential participant for interview, in order to maintain confidentiality, given the 
sensitivity of the subject matter it will be important to confine any approach to the participant and/ or 
trusted staff members.  Approaches will, therefore be made by the author in a  letter (as at Appendix 3) 
directly to the individual, or via the Personal Assistant (PA) or Staff Officer. Both these members of the 
participant’s staff work closely with him/ her and are very experienced in maintaining confidentiality in 
respect of their principal. They will be clearly advised of the need for confidentiality. 
+ The interviews will be conducted in a manner that does not compromise the participant.  In particular, it 
will not be necessary for the author to identify himself as a researcher to individuals or staff who have 
no legitimate interest in knowing the purpose save the participant and his/ her PA or Staff Officer. 
+  Personal data will be kept in secure IT which is password protected and only accessible to the           
author and his academic supervisors. Personal data will be managed in a manner compliant with the 
Data Protection Act 1998. 
+ Subjects may be concerned about the proposal for the interviews to be audio recorded., or the use of 
an online communication such as ‘Skype’. Measures to secure the digital material produced will be put 
in place to control very tightly access to the recordings. The digital recordings will be secured within 
password protected devices to which the researcher has sole access.  
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+ It must be anticipated that some participants may object to the interview being recorded. In those 
circumstances, the author will be sensitive to those concerns and he will need to be flexible to the 
extent of not insisting on recording the interview, but reverting to note taking. 
+ No reference will be made in any report or document arising from study that identifies or tends to 
identify any individual. This includes no reference to gender, ethnicity, age, policing or other 
professional experience, geographical location any other factor that may allow readers to narrow down 
the identity of the participant in a relatively small pool. 
+ It is recognised that in some cases, a verbatim quote could inadvertently give clues to the participant’s 
identity.  Should it be considered necessary to include in any report verbatim quotes by the participant, 
these will be recorded in such a way that there can be no direct or indirect identification of the 
participant. In addition, the quote will be discussed with the participant and only included with his/ her 
consent. 
+  Should the report be submitted for publication outside of my academic supervisors, then the 
participant will be provided with a copy of the draft publication with a view to identifying and 
removing any text that may tend to identify them as an individual. 
 
+ All documents, records and recordings made will be securely stored within a password 
protected device, or in secure storage to which only the author and his academic supervisors 
have access. 
 
Political Considerations; 
This research is focused upon a changed governance paradigm for policing across England and Wales 
that has been put in place by the Coalition government as part of the Conservative Party Manifesto.  As 
such it is a significant national issue in terms of government policy and given the debate surrounding its 
appropriateness and effectiveness it is still a live political issue on the national stage.  This research and 
its findings may be picked up and fed into that  debate. 
 
Negative risks in this regard will be mitigated by the researcher ensuring that the research is conducted 
professionally and in accordance with the regulations of the University and in accordance with best 
practice.  At all times the research will be subject of close scrutiny by the first supervisor Dr Barry 
Loveday who is an experienced and respected figure in this field. 
        
Inappropriate Disclosures; 
The legal position of the researcher in respect of the disclosure of criminal matters by subjects during 
interviews is very clear. There is no principle of legal confidentiality and any such disclosures will be dealt 
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with by reporting to the appropriate authority. However, given the position and status of the individuals 
concerned, this eventuality is very unlikely. 
 
Ownership of Research Data; 
The issue of the ownership of the data obtained during a research project is crucial.  In accordance with 
the guidance issued by the UK Research Integrity Office at 3.10 of its policy on retention of data; 
 http://www.ukrio.org/publications/code-of-practice-for-research/3-0-standards-for-organisations-and-
researchers/3-12-collection-and-retention-of-data/ 
The issue will be established within the participant consent process. The data will remain the property of 
the University of Portsmouth with the caveat that in that the data will be available for review by the 
participant who may withdraw consent up until the point that the data has been analysed. 
Conclusion; 
This is a research project that is not without potentially significant ethical considerations.  In the 
submission of the author those considerations have been identified and in so far as is possible the risks 
have been effectively mitigated. 
This project has the potential to uncover significant knowledge in respect of the operation of a new 
governance paradigm in policing across England and Wales.  It is asserted therefore that the ethical 
considerations are proportionate to the project that is proposed and are appropriately managed. 
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Ethical Approval Research Protocol 
 
ETHICS COMMITTEE – PROTOCOL 
 
Researcher name:  Steven Alec Watts  (UP670108) 
 
Supervisor name:  Dr Barry Loveday  
 
Project title:  
 
‘Yes Prime Minister’; An Examination of the impact of the introduction of Police and Crime 
Commissioners in 2012 on the governance of Policing across England and Wales’. 
 
Brief summary of the project: 
 
This research will seek to identify what the impact has been on Policing governance at a strategic and 
operational level following the introduction of Police and Crime Commissioners in 2012.  
 
The knowledge obtained will enable an assessment of the level of success of the change in governance 
and it will, potentially identify amendments or changes that have the potential be relevant in the strategic 
framework and/ or day to day functioning of the governance arrangements.  This study has the potential 
to improve the delivery of policing and community safety.  
 
In the 1950s, scandals arose involving English police forces governed then by local ‘Watch Committees’. 
Officials were allegedly exerting an undue and corrupt influence on local policing.  This prompted a Royal 
Commission into Policing with a remit to review the constitutional position of the police (Home Office, 
1962). The findings led to the Police Act 1964 that introduced Police Authorities, governance bodies, 
comprising committees of local councillors, magistrates and independent members responsible for 
scrutinising and holding Police Forces to account (Home Office, 1964). Police Authorities formed part of 
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the ‘tripartite system’ of police governance (Lustgarten, 1986 p.113, Mawby & Wright, 2003, pp.169-195) 
where responsibility was shared between Police Authorities, central government, and chief police officers, 
the latter responsible for operational delivery.  
Prior to the 2010 UK elections, the Conservative Party Manifesto made a commitment to introduce;   
 
‘...a directly elected individual who will set policing priorities for local communities’ (Conservative Party, 
2010 p.57). 
 
In November 2012 Police Authorities were dissolved by the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 
2011 (Home Office 2011), local directly elected Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) were 
established in their place across 41 Police Forces in England and Wales.  
 
In April 2013, a qualitative pilot study in this field was conducted by the author exploring early indications 
of the impact of the change. That research focussed upon five Chief Constables.  The cohort had been 
directly affected by the change, working now with a PCC, who has a de facto democratic mandate to 
deliver policing and crime reduction (Home Office 2011a), in a way that was not the case with Police 
Authorities, whose remit was confined to scrutiny of the Chief Officer in respect of his/ her delivery of 
efficient and effective policing (Home Office, 1994), and under whose scrutiny they had previously worked 
for their entire police service.   
 
The study, an analysis of semi structured interviews, found that the cohort of Chief Constables took the 
view that the change in governance had not been as difficult as they had expected, though there were 
reports of colleague Chief officers having had more negative experiences.  The cohort were, however 
concerned about how the situation may develop into the future.   
 
The research suggested that the interpersonal relationship between the PCC and the Chief Constable is 
crucial in the way that the Police Force is directed particularly in terms of policy and operational 
deployments.  Concerns were evident as to whether the ability for the PCC to recruit their Chief 
Constable, and their remit to continue or end the Chief Constable’s fixed term contract will mean that the 
relationship into the future may become one of Master/ Servant driving a further blurring of the line in the 
sand of operational independence, a distinction seen as critical by the Chief police officer cohort.  
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This research will build upon the pilot study, adopting a similar qualitative approach to data collection and 
analysis, involving semi structured interviews of Chief Police Officers, along with similar interviews of 
serving Police and Crime Commissioners and a representative of the Mayor for London Office of Policing 
and Crime.  
 
The results of the research will enable an enhanced understanding of the changes to the policing 
governance framework and its impact upon the delivery of policing and community safety. It is anticipated 
that issues will be identified that may allow recommendations for change to be made with a view to 
improving service delivery. The potential for useful recommendations to be made in this regard means 
that the research is of importance and has the potential to significantly contribute to the body of 
knowledge.  
 
The audience for this study, in addition to the academic criminology community, will be national and local 
actors in policing and community safety including government, the Association of Police and Crime 
Commissioners, the Association of Chief Police Officers and the College of Policing as well as individual 
Police and Crime Commissioners, Police Officers and staff and local partner agencies with an interest in 
community safety.   
 
It is also likely that the findings may potentially be of interest to the broadcast and print media given the 
criticality of the subject to communities, in this regard consideration will need to be given to the 
management of any communication of the findings, particularly if a publication ensues. 
 
 
Project aims and outcomes: 
 
The overarching objective of this research is to gain an understanding of the way in which the governance 
paradigm in policing across England and Wales has changed, what it now means for the effective delivery 
of policing and community safety, and the key issues from the perspective of significant actors that have 
arisen since the introduction of the role of Police and Crime Commissioner. Having addressed research 
questions around the impact of the new governance paradigm, the study will go on to identify potential 
recommendations for changes or improvements that may improve underlying policing delivery. 
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There is a paucity of literature looking at the way in which the introduction of Police and Crime 
Commissioners has impacted on governance and on the delivery of policing.  Those reviews that have 
been written following the first anniversary of the Police and Crime Commissioners taking up their roles 
have focussed upon public consciousness of the role (Gilmore, 2013) or take the form of governmental 
reviews of effectiveness in setting budgets or holding Chief Officers to account (Home Office, 2014). 
There is some insight into the views of the views of Commissioners in a collection of essays drawn 
together by the Policy Exchange (Chambers, 2013). In addition, the relationship between Police and 
Crime Commissioners and the body set up to support the Commissioners and to scrutinise their activities; 
Police and Crime Panels is examined in a report by the Centre for Public Scrutiny (Centre for Public 
Scrutiny, 2014). However, there is no academic work on the way in which the new governance structure 
is working in practice and how professionals perceive the way in which the new paradigm has affected 
the delivery of policing and community safety in a professional context. This research will address that 
apparent gap.  
The research questions for this study are; 
1. What has been the effect of the new governance paradigm in Policing across England and 
Wales upon the way that Policing is governed and delivered at a strategic and operational level? 
2. What aspects of the new governance paradigm in policing may be positive in terms of improving 
the effective delivery of policing and community safety? 
3. What aspects of the new governance paradigm in policing may inhibit the delivery of effective 
policing and community safety? 
4. What changes or adaptations to the governance paradigm are apparent that may have the 
potential to improve effectiveness in delivering policing and community safety? 
   
Summary of design and methods: 
 
In this study, qualitative techniques, semi structured interviews will be used so as to fully understand the 
issues. 
A semi-structured interview model (Noakes and Wincup, 2004) will be used to obtain data from cohorts of 
Chief Police Officers and Police and Crime Commissioners. There will also be consideration of 
interviewing the head of the London Mayor’s office for Policing & Crime (MOPAC), which in fact 
represents the model of policing governance recommended by Loveday & Reid (2003).  
The semi-structured interview is the most appropriate method, given that the participants are part of a 
small population discussing a subject in respect of which they have a good understanding Bryman & Bell 
(2003). 
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The sampling of participants will ‘purposeful’ in nature, where the participants selected are those likely to 
be most productive in answering the research question (Marshall, 1998, p.523). In terms of the size of the 
cohort, this will be determined in discussion with the first supervisor, balancing the need to obtain a 
sufficient body of data against the pragmatic constraints of the real world.  The entire population of this 
group is, however only 41 Chief Constables and 41 Police and Crime Commissioners and one 
representative of the London Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime. 
In the context of this study in respect of the impact of Police and Crime Commissioners on policing 
governance, the author has constructed a range of question areas that address the research aims, and in 
doing so he will draw upon the themes identified by the pilot study emerging from qualitative interviews. 
This approach has the potential to elicit rich data from interviews that can allow an exploration of the 
perceptions of the key actors in the governance paradigm, and enable comparisons of those themes 
across the governance environment using techniques appropriate to qualitative data sets. 
 
Participants: 
The Chief Constable, PCC and MoPaC participants will be approached directly to seek consent for their 
involvement. The participants are all high status individuals within the Police governance hierarchy. In 
terms of the provision of permission, all individuals have the authority to provide consent to their 
participation in the research without reference to others, there are therefore no ‘gatekeeper’ issues. 
 
Many researchers would expect difficulty in obtaining access to individuals from such a high status 
cohort.  However, the researcher is a retired Chief Officer and is personally acquainted with over 25% of 
Chief Constables in England and Wales and with approximately 20% of PCCs. It is anticipated therefore 
that access will be forthcoming.  Given this fact, it is important for the author to consider the potential 
pressure that subjects may feel to comply with the request for interview and the impact upon their 
informed consent. It has to be said that the subjects are generally as a group somewhat assertive and 
resilient, particularly the Chief Constables (Reiner 1991). However In order to minimise this potential 
ethical issue, the author will be careful to ensure that the subjects do not include individuals with whom he 
has a close friendship and that within the letter and any supporting briefing it is made absolutely clear that 
the decision to participate must be informed, free and independent. This is addressed in the wording of 
the letter of invitation to potential participants (see Appx 3) and the Participant Information Sheet (see 
Appx 4).  
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Participant Consent; 
It is absolutely essential that the participants provide informed consent for the interviews to take place 
and for the resultant data to be used in an ethical context. The researcher will ensure that the participant 
fully understands the proposed conduct of the research and how the data will be used. 
 
Informed consent by the participant will be recorded at immediately prior to the interview taking place, the 
participant having read the Participant Information Sheet (see Appx 4) and the researcher having 
explained it to the participant and his inviting the participant to raise any issues or concerns.  Once the 
participant is content they will be invited to sign the Participant Consent Form (Appx. 5). 
 
Summary of known ethical concerns and strategies to manage these: 
This study will utilise a qualitative approach that requires semi-structured interviews of Chief Police 
Officers and Police and Crime Commissioners. Intuitively a research project looking at issues of policing 
governance may be seen as relatively anodyne and lacking in any sensitivity as far as the subjects are 
concerned.  However, the need to consider sensitivity in a topic under research is relative to the potential 
impact upon the participant which will always be subjective; ‘...a sensitive topic is one that potentially 
poses for those involved a substantial threat, the emergence of which renders problematic for the 
researcher and/ or the researched…’(Renzetti and Lee, 1993, p.5).  
 
The Policing Protocol Order (Home Office 2011) establishes the requirement for a close working 
relationship between the PCC charged with driving a policing strategy that meets the needs of local 
communities and the Chief Constable charged with delivering an efficient and effective policing response.  
In pragmatic terms, in order for the Chief Constable to deliver, he/ she needs a positive working 
relationship with the PCC.  In addition at a more individual level, Chief Constables are subject to time 
limited contracts of employment defined by Regulation 11 of the Police Regulations 2003 (Home Office 
2003) and the PCC is the appointing authority he/ she has the power to decide whether or not to renew 
that contract.  It is, therefore reasonable to anticipate that the Chief Constables, subject of this research 
may be concerned as to their position and their relationship with the PCC into the future if their views are 
put into the public domain. In addition, PCCs are likely to have concerns as to how some of their 
comments if made known will affect their ability to operate effectively. In this regard therefore, 
confidentiality of the data and anonymity of the subjects will be a crucial issue.  
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The author will directly address these issues in the letter to potential subjects, (Appendix 3) highlighting 
the issue to ensure that both the general ethical issues and those specific to the PCC/ Chief Constable 
dynamic are considered by the participant in order to ensure informed consent is provided.   In addition, 
the letter and Participant Information Sheet (Appendix 4) will also detail the measures that will be taken to 
ensure anonymity including the security of physical notes and audio recordings. These measures will be 
relatively sophisticated given the small number of potential subjects nationally, for example reports and 
documents (other than consent forms) will not contain reference to name, gender, ethnicity, length of 
service or geographical location of their area of responsibility.  In recognition of the fact that the cohort of 
participants is so small that small details may by triangulation enable the identification of the participants 
not only will the demographic details of the participants be excluded from reports, so also will direct 
quotations.  In circumstances when it appears to the researcher that it would be helpful to include a direct 
quote from a participant, care will be taken to ensure that it does not contain any information that may 
tend to identify the participant, and the quote (in the context of the surrounding narrative) will, as 
discussed in the ‘Information to Participants’ form, (Appendix 4) be offered for review by the participant to 
ensure that he/ she is content that the material does not identify them to a degree that causes them 
concern.  
 
The PCC and the MoPaC representatives are statutorily separated from the Police hierarchy, and indeed 
they appoint Chief Constables as well as renewing their contracts, it is therefore not the case that they 
would be vulnerable in that regard, however research to date has indicated that the interpersonal 
relationship between the Chief Constable and PCC is critical.  It is therefore important from this 
perspective to maintain the confidentiality of the PCC/ MoPaC participants so as not to compromise that 
working relationship. 
 
In addition, as alluded to above, the PCCs and the Mayor of London are subject to election to their 
positions and it is important that their comments are not inappropriately put into the public domain without 
their informed consent.  Maintenance of confidentiality is also therefore critical for the PCC and MoPaC 
participants, the measures to provide this are the same as those discussed above in respect of Chief 
Constables; reports and documents (other than consent forms) will not contain reference to name, 
gender, ethnicity, length of service or geographical location of their area of responsibility. Not only will the 
demographic details of the participants be excluded from reports, so will direct quotations.  In 
circumstances when it appears to the researcher that it would be helpful to include a direct quote from a 
participant, care will be taken to ensure that it does not contain any information that may tend to identify 
the participant, and the quote (in the context of the surrounding narrative) will, as discussed in the 
‘Information to Participants’ form, (Appendix 4) be offered for review by the participant to ensure that he/ 
she is content that the material does not identify them to a degree that causes them concern.  
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Access to Participants; 
It is not proposed to approach the PCC to seek permission to interview the Chief Constable subject for 
the reasons explored above. The relationship is such that statutorily although the PCC appoints the Chief 
Constable, he/ she is not in a legal sense the employer of the Chief Constable who is an independent 
officer of the crown.  To inform the PCC would compromise the strategy to ensure the anonymity of the 
Chief Constable participants and this is a significant motivation against doing do.  
 
The author recognises that in part the decision not to approach the PCC may be driven by a concern that 
he/ she may veto the research by putting pressure upon the Chief Constable not to take part.  However, 
this is a subordinate concern to that of protecting the identity of the Chief Constable participant. 
 
Maintenance of confidentiality is, as discussed above critical for all potential participants, Approaches will, 
therefore be made by the author in a  letter (as at Appendix 3) directly to the potential participant, or via 
the Personal Assistant (PA) or Staff Officer. Both these members of the participant’s staff work closely 
with him/ her and are very experienced in maintaining confidentiality in respect of their principal. They will 
be clearly advised of the need for confidentiality by a personal briefing by the researcher in this regard 
before the letter is sent to them. 
 
Management & Security of Data; 
The data acquired in this project becomes and remains the property of the University of Portsmouth, and 
this will be made clear to the participant in the ‘Participant Information form’; 
‘Up to and during the interview you may withdraw at any time, this is also the case immediately following 
the interview.  However once the data has been analysed and coded it may not be possible to extract that 
material.  By that time, however the data will be anonymised’ 
The preceding discussion identified the ethical considerations that are particular to this proposed cohort 
of high status and low population of participants and the imperative to ensure that effective measures are 
put in place to ensure anonymity of the participants in the data collection phase. 
It is equally important to put in place a regime that means that once acquired, the data is handled and 
stored in a secure manner that ensures anonymity for the participants and at the same time  is in 
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accordance with best practice of the University of Portsmouth and in respect of material that contains 
personal information, complies with the Data Protection Act 1998. (Home Office,1998).  The Act requires 
that; 
Personal Information must be: 
•  Fairly and lawfully processed 
•  Processed for specified purposes 
•  Adequate, relevant and not excessive 
•  Accurate and up-to-date 
•  Not kept for longer than is necessary 
•  Processed in line with individuals’ rights 
•  Secure 
•  Not transferred outside the European Economic Area without  
 adequate protection. 
 
In order to comply with these ethical and legal requirements to use the personal data acquired during this 
research project, the researcher will ensure that the data is handled in accordance with the requirements 
of the act and in particular ensure its security. 
The digital material, including audio recordings and textual notes or reports will be held in password 
protected devices to which only he and his academic supervisors have access. 
Documentary material including consent forms and copies of letters to participants will be secured in 
locked cabinets to which only he and his academic supervisors have access. 
Material containing personal information will only be accessed by the researcher and academic 
supervisors, who have a need to verify the veracity of the research.   Following the completion of his 
degree, should there be a requirement for the data acquired to be used for further research, the only data 
that will be accessed for that purpose will be that which has been anonymised. 
All material will be retained for at least 7 years after which it will be securely destroyed, in the case of the 
consent forms, they will be securely retained for 30 years.   
Finally, application will be made for the resultant thesis produced in this project will be placed under 
restriction in the University of Portsmouth library. 
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Conclusion; 
The author is confident that by adhering to the principles described in this research protocol, that this 
significant research may be conducted and written up in an ethical manner with proper consideration for 
all participants who will be given full information before being asked to provide informed consent to their 
participation. 
Given the very real issues attached to the confidentiality and anonymity of the participants, effective 
measures are in place to maintain confidentiality as to the identity and comments made by participants.  
In addition, the personal information and data acquired during this research will be handled and stored in 
a secure manner that accords with the requirements of the University and the Data Protection Act 1998. 
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Appendix B 
Letter of Invitation to Chief Constable Participants 
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Steven	A.	Watts	MSc,	D.Crim.	(Cantab)	DPM,	FCMI,	FSyI	 	 	
Institute of Criminal Justice Studies 
Ravelin House 
Museum Road 
Portsmouth 
Hampshire 
PO1 2QQ  
 
Telephone: 
+ 44 (0)23 9284 3933 
Fax: 
+ 44 (0)23 9284 3939 
Email: 
up670108@port.ac.uk 
   
 
	
Study	Title:	The	Impact	of	the	Introduction	of	Police	and	Crime	Commissioners	n	Policing	
Governance	across	England	and	Wales	
								
	
Dear	Chief	Constable,	
	
I	am	Steven	A.	Watts,	a	Professional	Doctorate	student	at	the	University	of	Portsmouth	
Institute	of	Criminal	Justice	Studies.			
	
I	was,	until	September	2008	a	serving	Chief	Police	Officer,	retiring	as	Assistant	Chief	Constable	
‘Specialist	Operations’	of	the	Hampshire	Constabulary	with	31	years	service.	
	
I	would	like	to	invite	you	to	participate	in	a	research	study	which	is	focused	upon	the	changes	
in	policing	governance	following	the	implementation	of	the	Police	Reform	and	Social	
Responsibility	Act	2011,	and	the	Policing	Protocol	Order	2011	which	in	November	2012	
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established	the	role	of	democratically	elected	Police	and	Crime	Commissioners	(PCCs)	across	
41	Police	Forces	in	England	and	Wales.				
	
This	research	is	aimed	at	identifying	developing	issues	in	this	changed	policing	governance	
structure	and	how	that	may	have	affected	the	delivery	of	policing	to	communities.		The	
findings	will	contribute	to	the	production	of	my	thesis	in	partial	fulfilment	of	my	Doctorate.		It	
may	be	that	the	findings	and	any	recommendations	that	arise	will	be	reported	in	an	article	
within	an	academic	journal.		It	is	anticipated	this	research	will	add	to	the	body	of	knowledge	
in	relation	to	policing	governance	models	and	their	effect.	
	
The	study	is	sponsored	by	the	University	of	Portsmouth	Institute	of	Criminal	Justice	Studies,	
and	the	project	has	been	approved	by	the	University	in	terms	of	both	its	academic	and	ethical	
approach.	
	
I	am	supervised	in	this	study	by	Dr	Barry	Loveday,	a	senior	member	of	the	Institute.	
	
	
Chief	Constables,	have	been	significantly	affected	by	this	change	in	governance	and	they	now	
need	to	work	with	the	local	Police	and	Crime	Commissioner	to	deliver	policing	across	their	
communities.		In	this	study	it	is	proposed	to	conduct	semi	structured	interviews	with	Chief	
Constables	and	Police	and	Crime	Commissioners	to	obtain	qualitative	data	that	may	provide	
an	insight	into	perceptions	prior	to	the	implementation	of	the	new	structure,	how	since	the	
inauguration	of	PCCs	the	relationship	has	developed	and	how	it	has	affected,	or	not	the	way	
that	policing	is	delivered	across	communities	as	well	as	the	issues	and	potential	challenges	for	
the	future.	
	
I	recognise	that	some	Chief	Constables	may	be	concerned	about	being	involved	in	such	a	
project,	given	the	importance	of	the	Chief	Constable	maintaining	a	positive	working	
relationship	with	their	PCC.	There	may	be	understandable	concerns	that	comments	made	by	
them	as	part	of	the	research	may	potentially	impact	upon	that	relationship.	I	take	this	issue	
very	seriously,	and	measures	are	in	place	to	ensure	that	absolute	anonymity	of	the	
participants	is	maintained.	Those	measures	are	described	in	detail	in	the	attached	Information	
sheet.	The	information	sheet	also	provides	a	full	resume	of	the	conduct	of	the	research	and	
how	the	data	will	be	used.	
	
Participation	in	this	research	project	is	entirely	voluntary,	and	prior	to	its	commencement	you	
will	be	invited	to	sign	a	consent	form,	a	copy	of	which	is	attached.	Withdrawal	from	the	
project	can	be	facilitated	at	any	time	up	to	the	point	of	data	analysis.	
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I	anticipate	that	the	interview	will	take	no	more	than	one	hour	to	complete.	
Should	you	have	any	queries	at	all,	please	do	not	hesitate	to	contact	me	at	the	above	e	mail	or	
by	telephone	on	the	number	provided.	You	may	also	contact	my	supervisor	Dr	Barry	Loveday,	
if	you	so	wish	his	contact	details	are	on	the	attached	Information	sheet.	
	
If	you	are	content	to	become	a	participant	in	this	project,	I	would	be	grateful	if	your	PA	or	
Staff	Officer	could	contact	me	on	the	above	e	mail	so	that	we	may	arrange	a	convenient	time	
and	place	to	meet	and	conduct	the	interview.	
	
Thank	you	for	taking	the	time	to	read	this	letter	and,	if	you	chose	to	participate	I	look	forward	
to	meeting	you.	
	
Yours	Sincerely	
	
Steven	A.	Watts	MSc,	D.Crim.	(Cantab)	DPM,	FCMI,	FSyI	
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Appendix C 
Letter of Invitation to Police and Crime Commissioner 
Participants 
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Steven	A.	Watts	MSc,	D.Crim.	(Cantab)	DPM,	FCMI,	FSyI	
Institute of Criminal Justice Studies 
Ravelin House 
Museum Road 
Portsmouth 
Hampshire 
PO1 2QQ  
 
Telephone: 
+ 44 (0)23 9284 3933 
Fax: 
+ 44 (0)23 9284 3939 
Email: 
up670108@port.ac.uk 
   
 
	
Study	Title:	The	Impact	of	the	Introduction	of	Police	and	Crime	Commissioners	n	Policing	
Governance	across	England	and	Wales	
							
Dear	Police	and	Crime	Commissioner,	
	
I	am	Steven	A.	Watts,	currently	a	Professional	Doctorate	student	at	the	University	of	
Portsmouth	Institute	of	Criminal	Justice	Studies.			
	
I	was,	until	September	2008	a	serving	Chief	Police	Officer,	retiring	as	Assistant	Chief	Constable	
‘Specialist	Operations’	of	the	Hampshire	Constabulary	with	31	years	service.	
	
I	would	like	to	invite	you	to	participate	in	a	research	study	which	is	focused	upon	the	changes	
in	policing	governance	following	the	implementation	of	the	Police	Reform	and	Social	
   
  
 251 
Responsibility	Act	2011,	and	the	Policing	Protocol	Order	2011	which	in	November	2012	
established	the	role	of	democratically	elected	Police	and	Crime	Commissioners	(PCCs)	across	
41	Police	Forces	in	England	and	Wales.				
	
This	research	is	aimed	at	identifying	developing	issues	in	this	changed	policing	governance	
structure	and	how	that	may	have	affected	the	delivery	of	policing	to	communities.		The	
findings	will	contribute	to	the	production	of	my	thesis	in	partial	fulfilment	of	my	Doctorate.		It	
may	be	that	the	findings	and	any	recommendations	that	arise	will	be	reported	in	an	article	
within	an	academic	journal.		It	is	anticipated	this	research	will	add	to	the	body	of	knowledge	
in	relation	to	policing	governance	models	and	their	effect.	
	
The	study	is	sponsored	by	the	University	of	Portsmouth	Institute	of	Criminal	Justice	Studies,	
and	the	project	has	been	approved	by	the	University	in	terms	of		both	its	academic	and	ethical	
approach.	
	
I	am	supervised	in	this	study	by	Dr	Barry	Loveday,	a	senior	member	of	the	Institute.	
	
The	change	in	governance	means	that	Chief	Constables	and	Police	and	Crime	Commissioner	
need	to	work	together	to	deliver	policing	across	their	communities.		In	this	study	it	is	
proposed	to	conduct	semi	structured	interviews	with	Chief	Constables	and	Police	and	Crime	
Commissioners	to	obtain	qualitative	data	that	may	provide	an	insight	into	perceptions	prior	to	
the	implementation	of	the	new	structure,	how	since	the	inauguration	of	PCCs	the	relationship	
has	developed	and	how	it	has	affected,	or	not	the	way	that	policing	is	delivered	across	their	
communities	as	well	as	the	issues	and	potential	challenges	for	the	future.	
	
I	recognise	that	some	Commissioners	may	be	concerned	about	being	involved	in	such	a	
project,	given	the	importance	of	PCCs	and	Chief	Constables	maintaining	a	positive	working	
relationship.	There	may	be	understandable	concerns	that	comments	made	by	them	as	part	of	
the	research	may	potentially	impact	upon	that	relationship.	I	take	this	issue	very	seriously,	
and	measures	are	in	place	to	ensure	that	absolute	anonymity	of	the	participants	is	
maintained.	Those	measures	are	described	in	detail	in	the	attached	Information	sheet.	The	
information	sheet	also	provides	a	full	resume	of	the	conduct	of	the	research	and	how	the	data	
will	be	managed	and	used.	
	
Participation	in	this	research	project	is	entirely	voluntary,	and	prior	to	its	commencement	you	
will	be	invited	to	sign	a	consent	form,	a	copy	of	which	is	attached.	Withdrawal	from	the	
project	can	be	facilitated	at	any	time	up	to	the	point	of	data	analysis.	
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I	anticipate	that	the	interview	will	take	no	more	than	one	hour	to	complete.	
Should	you	have	any	queries	at	all,	please	do	not	hesitate	to	contact	me	at	the	above	e	mail	or	
by	telephone	on	the	number	provided.		You	may	also	contact	my	supervisor	Dr	Barry	Loveday,	
if	you	so	wish	his	contact	details	are	on	the	attached	Information	sheet.	
	
If	you	are	content	to	become	a	participant	in	this	project,	I	would	be	grateful	if	you	or	your	
representative	could	contact	me	on	the	above	e	mail	so	that	we	may	arrange	a	convenient	
time	and	place	to	conduct	the	interview.	
	
Thank	you	for	taking	the	time	to	read	this	letter	and,	if	you	chose	to	participate	I	look	forward	
to	meeting	you.	
	
Yours	Sincerely	
	
Steven	A.	Watts	MSc,	D.Crim.	(Cantab)	DPM,	FCMI,	FSyI	
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Appendix D 
Participant Information Sheet 
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Participant	Information	Sheet	
Interview	Participants	
	
Study	Title:		
An	Examination	of	the	Impact	of	the	Introduction	of	Police	and	Crime	Commissioners	in	2012	
on	the	Governance	of	Policing	across	England	and	Wales.	
Researcher;		
Steven	A.	Watts	MSC,	D.Crim	(Cantab),	DPM,	FCMI,	FSyI.	
	
	
I	would	like	to	invite	you	to	take	part	in	our	research	study.	Before	you	decide	it	is	important	
that	you	to	understand	why	the	research	is	being	done	and	what	it	would	involve	for	you.	If	
after	reading	this	document	you	have	any	queries	or	require	clarification	please	do	not	
hesitate	ask.		
The	study	is	being	carried	out	under	the	control	and	supervision	of	the	University	of		
Portsmouth	Institute	of	Criminal	Justice	Studies.	I	am	the	researcher	and	my	details	are	above.	
I	am	a	Professional	Doctorate	Student	based	at	the	Institute	of	Criminal	Justice	Studies	of	the	
University	of	Portsmouth.		My	Academic	Supervisor	in	this	project	is	Dr	Barry	Loveday	who	is	
based	at	the	Institute	of	Criminal	Justice	Studies	at	the	University	of	Portsmouth.	We	would	
both	be	happy	to	answer	questions	or	provide	clarification	if	required.	
The purpose of the study 
This	study	forms	a	part	of	my	Doctoral	Thesis	that	will	be	examined	by	the	University	of	
Portsmouth.		
The	research	is	aimed	at	identifying	developing	issues	following	the	changed	policing	
governance	structures	consequent	upon	the	implementation	of	the	legislation	that	
introduced	the	position	of	Police	and	Crime	Commissioners.	In	particular	it	will	examine	the	
professional	relationship	between	Chief	Constables	and	Police	and	Crime	Commissioners	and	
the	extent	to	which	that	has	affected	the	delivery	of	policing	to	communities.		
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The	findings	will	contribute	to	the	production	of	a	Doctoral	Thesis	and,	if	appropriate	the	
publication	of	articles	in	academic	journals	based	upon	those	findings.				
This	research	and	any	recommendations	that	arise	will,	it	is	anticipated	add	to	the	body	of	
knowledge	in	relation	to	policing	governance	models	across	England	and	Wales.	
Why have you been invited?  
Chief	Constables	now	need	to	work	with	the	Police	and	Crime	Commissioner	to	deliver	
policing	across	their	communities.		You	are	therefore	in	a	key	position	to	contribute	to	this	
research.	
It	is	proposed	to	conduct	semi	structured	interviews	with	Chief	Constables	and	Police	and	
Crime	Commissioners	to	obtain	qualitative	data	that	may	provide	an	insight	into	perceptions	
prior	to	the	implementation	of	the	new	structure,	how	the	professional	relationship	between	
Chief	Constables	and	PCCs	has	developed	since	the	inauguration	of	PCCs	and	how	it	has	
affected,	or	not	the	way	that	policing	is	delivered	across	communities,	as	well	as	the	issues	
and	potential	challenges	for	the	future.	
Do you have to take part?  
No.	
Taking	part	in	the	research	is	entirely	voluntary.	It	is	up	to	you	to	decide	whether	to	join	the	
study.		Prior	to	conducting	the	interview,	I	will	describe	the	study	and	go	through	this	
information	sheet.	If	you	agree	to	take	part,	I	will	then	ask	you	to	sign	a	consent	form.	
What will happen to me during the study 
If you agree to take part in the study, I will make arrangements with you or a 
representative that you may nominate for a convenient time and place for an 
interview to take place. The arrangements are entirely at your discretion and 
may be changed at any time.  The interviews would ideally be face to face, but 
may be conducted by telephone, or video conferencing if necessary.  
 
The interview will take no more than one hour, and will involve me asking you 
some open questions and inviting your response to them. 
 
I propose to record the interview and to take trigger notes.  Details as to the 
security of the recording are mentioned below. You may decline to be 
recorded during the interview and this fact will be noted on the consent form. 
In those circumstances I would make written notes. 
 
What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part?  
Participating in the study may cause you inconvenience, I do appreciate your 
taking the time to support this research and I will do all that I can to minimise 
any inconvenience to you. 
 
I also recognise that you may be concerned about being involved in such a 
project, given the importance of the Chief Constables and PCCs maintaining a 
positive working relationship. You may have understandable concerns that 
comments made as part of the interview may potentially impact upon that 
relationship. I take this issue very seriously, and measures are in place to 
ensure that your anonymity is maintained.  
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part ? 
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It would be quite wrong for me to make unrealistic claims for this research, 
but it is of considerable significance given the importance to policing and 
community safety, and it is hoped that the findings will take forward the 
understanding of how the governance framework delivers community safety.   
 
Any insights gained into how this fundamental change in policing governance 
is working will increase our understanding of how that impacts upon the 
delivery of policing to communities and may lead to recommendations for 
improvements.  I hope that you will be keen to contribute to that progress in 
knowledge. 
 
Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential ? 
Yes, confidentiality is of utmost importance in this study, recognising the 
criticality of the Chief Constable, PCC relationship.  I am very aware of the fact 
that you are part of a very small cohort of potential participants, each with a 
local and national profile, and therefore any indication of personal or 
professional details may enable your identity to be deduced.  The following 
measures will, therefore be put in place in order to so far as is possible 
maintain confidentiality of your comments and your anonymity; 
 
1.No reference will be made in any report or document arising from this study 
that identifies or tends to identify any individual. This includes no reference 
to gender, ethnicity, age, policing experience, geographical location any 
other factor that may allow readers to narrow down he identity of the 
respondent in a relatively small pool. 
 
2.Should I consider it important to include in any report verbatim quotes by 
you, these will be discussed with you and only included with your consent. 
It is recognised that in some cases a verbatim quote could inadvertently 
give clues to the participant’s identity. 
 
3.Should the report be submitted for any sort of publication outside of my 
academic supervisors, then you will be provided with a copy of the draft 
publication with a view to you identifying and removing any text that may 
tend to identify you as an individual. 
 
4.Any recordings made will be securely stored within a password protected 
device to which only my academic supervisors and I have access. 
 
5.Documents produced by the research including consent forms will be 
securely retained for 30 years and the data in electronic for 7 years 
 
6.If you join the study, it is possible that some of the data collected will be 
viewed by authorised academic staff working under the authority of the 
University in order to check that the study has been carried out correctly 
and to ensure its validity. All will have a duty of confidentiality to you as a 
research participant. 
 
Confidentiality and anonymity will be maintained during and after the study. 
 
What will happen if I don’t want to carry on with my participation in the 
study?  
Up to and during the interview you may withdraw at any time, this is also the 
case immediately following the interview.  However once the data has been 
analysed and coded it may not be possible to extract that material.  By that 
time, however the data will be anonymised. 
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What if there is a problem? 
If you have a concern about any aspect of this study, you should speak to me, 
or ask to speak to my supervisor, who will do their best to answer your 
questions (contact details below). If you remain unhappy and wish to complain 
formally, you can do this directly to the Institute Manager or the University 
Complaints Officer. 
 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
This study will be analysed and written up before being submitted as part of a 
thesis to academic supervisors for assessment.  It may at a future date be 
refined and submitted for publication. If this happens you will be contacted 
and be given sight of the draft publication so that you can consider whether 
you are content that the text does not identify you as an individual, and if so 
ask for its amendment. 
 
Who is organising and funding the research?  
This study is organised entirely by myself at my own expense, no other 
organisation or individual has any interest in it financial or otherwise. The 
research is sponsored by the University of Portsmouth this means that it will 
be subject to proper supervision and insurance.  The research is for academic 
purposes and no other organisation is involved in any way.  
 
Who has reviewed the study? 
Research in the University of Portsmouth is looked at by independent group of 
people, the Research Ethics Committee, to protect your interests. This study 
has been reviewed and given a favourable opinion by the Institute of Criminal 
Justice Studies Research Ethics Committee. 
 
 
Further information and contact details  
The researcher Steven A Watts can be contacted at; 
 
Institute of Criminal Justice Studies 
Ravelin House 
Museum Road 
Portsmouth 
Hampshire 
PO1 2QQ  
 
Telephone: 
+ 44 (0)23 9284 3933 
 
Fax: 
+ 44 (0)23 9284 3939 
 
Email: up670108@port.ac.uk 
 
Should you wish to contact the supervisor of this research, Dr Barry Loveday or 
the head of department at The University of Portsmouth Institute of Criminal 
Justice Studies, you may do so using the contact below; 
 
The Institute Manager 
Institute of Criminal Justice Studies 
Ravelin House 
Museum Road 
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Portsmouth 
Hampshire 
PO1 2QQ  
United Kingdom 
 
Telephone: 
+ 44 (0)23 9284 3933 
Fax: 
+ 44 (0)23 9284 3939 
 
Email: 
icjsonlinehelp@port.ac.uk 
  
 
Thank you for taking the time to read and consider this proposal, if you 
decide to participate in the study you will be asked to sign a copy of this form, 
and a consent form, copies of which will be provided to you. 
 
 
 
 
Steven A Watts MsC, D.Crim (Cantab), DPM, FCIM, FSyI. 
 
 
 
* I confirm that I have Received a copy of this Participant Information Sheet. 
 
 
Time/ Date ........................... 
 
Name;................................... 
 
 
 
Signed..................................... 
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Appendix E 
University of Portsmouth Favourable Ethical Opinion Letter 
January 2015 
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Mr	Steven	Watts	Professional	Doctorate	Student	Institute	of	Criminal	Justice	Studies	
University	of	Portsmouth	 
REC	reference	number:	14/15:25	Please	quote	this	number	on	all	correspondence.	 
30th	January	2015	Dear	Steven,	 
Full	Title	of	Study:	 
Documents	reviewed:	 
‘Yes	Prime	Minister’;	An	Examination	of	the	impact	of	the	introduction	of	Police	and	Crime	
Commissioners	in	2012	on	the	governance	of	Policing	across	England	and	Wales’.	 
Consent	Form	Ethics	self-assessment	Interview	Schedule	Invitation	Letter	Participant	
Information	Sheet	Protocol	 
Further	to	our	recent	correspondence,	this	proposal	was	reviewed	by	The	Research	Ethics	
Committee	of	The	Faculty	of	Humanities	and	Social	Sciences.	 
I	am	pleased	to	tell	you	that	the	proposal	was	awarded	a	favourable	ethical	opinion	by	the	
committee.	Please	could	we	just	ask	that	you	amend	‘understand’	on	the	consent	form	to	
‘understood’	in	order	for	it	to	read	more	fluently?	 
Kind	regards,	FHSS	FREC	Chair	 
Dr	Jane	Winstone	 
Members	participating	in	the	review:	 
7.   Richard	Hitchcock	   
8.   Geoff	Wade	   
9.   Jane	Winstone	   
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Appendix F 
Participant Consent Form 
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Study	Title:			
An	examination	of	the	Impact	of	the	Introduction	of	Police	and	Crime	Commissioners	in	2012	
on	the	governance	of	Policing	across	England	and	Wales	
Name	of	Researcher:	
Steven	A	Watts	
Name	of	Academic	Supervisor:	
Dr	Barry	Loveday	
Institute of Criminal Justice Studies   
Ravelin House 
Museum Road 
Portsmouth 
Hampshire 
PO1 2QQ  
Telephone: + 44 (0)23 9284 3933 Fax: + 44 (0)23 9284 3939 
   
Please	initial	the	relevant	boxes	below	if	you	are	in	agreement	with	the	statement	given;	
10. I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheet for the above 
study. I have had the opportunity to consider the Participant Information Sheet, and to 
ask questions, where I have done so they have been answered satisfactorily. 
 
          
  
 
 
 
11. I agree that I am able to give my own consent to be interviewed about the impact 
of the introduction of Police and Crime Commissioners on Policing Governance across 
England and Wales without reference to others. 
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12.I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at 
any time prior to, during or immediately following the interview without giving any 
reason. 
 
          
  
 
 
 
13.I agree to my interview being tape recorded Yes/No 
 
          
  
 
 
 
 
 
5. I agree that verbatim quotes from my interview may be used in the report in respect 
of this research subject to my consent to each proposed quote Yes/No 
 
          
  
 
 
 
6. I understand that data collected during the study, may be viewed 
     by individuals from The University of Portsmouth for audit purposes.   
     I give permission for these individuals to have access to my data. 
 
          
          
   
  
 
 
 
7. I understand that the researcher may publish the findings from this 
research. 
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8. I agree that the data that I provide may be used for future ethically 
approved research  
 
          
  
 
 
 
9.  I agree to take part in the above study.  
 
          
  
	
	
	
Name	of	Participant:	 										
	
Date/	Time:	 	 	 		
	
Signature:	
	
	
Name	of	Person	taking	consent	:		
	
Date/	Time:	 	 	 	
	
Signature:	
	
	
	
When	completed:	One	Copy	for	participant;	One	Copy	for	researcher	‘s	file;	 
 
 
 
   
  
 265 
 
Appendix G 
Semi-Structured Interview Schedules 
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Questions to Police and Crime Commissioner Participants 
 
Semi Structured Interviews 
 
I am going to ask you a series of open questions about various aspects of 
the recent changes in policing governance. Please answer them as fully as 
you can.  As explained in the information sheet, your verbatim responses 
will be completely confidential.  If you need any clarification, please ask 
me. 
 
 
1. What are your views about the principle of the introduction of locally 
elected Police and Crime Commissioners ? 
 
 
2. What do you see as your role as PCC ? 
 
 
3. How do you interact with the Chief Constable on a day to day basis: 
• Formally 
• Informally 
• In formal settings 
 
 
4. What do you think has been the impact upon the Chief Constable of 
your arrival in post? 
 
 
5. Since the inauguration of the PCC, how, if at all do you think has the 
delivery of policing been affected? 
 
 
6. As PCC what governance framework have you put in place for policing 
in your area of responsibility? 
 
 
7. What in  your view has been the effect of the introduction of PCCs on 
the governance of policing generally across England and Wales? 
 
 
8. What do you see as the role of the Police and Crime Panel? How 
effective are they ? 
 
 
9. What do you see as your role with partner organisations involved in 
delivering community safety ? 
 
 
10. As PCC what is your relationship with the public? 
 
 
11. As PCC what is your  relationship with the government ? 
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12.How important is your relationship with the Chief Constable in 
delivering policing and crime reduction ? 
 
 
13. Is the fact that you, as PCC has the power of appointment [and in 
some circumstances] and dismissal of  the Chief Constable a significant 
issue in your relationship with the Chief Constable ? 
 - Supplementary – Do you think that this fact affects in any way the 
decision making of the Chief Constable in any way at a Strategic or 
operational level, if so do you have any examples?   
 
 
14. How do you as PCC approach the traditional ‘operational 
independence’ of the Chief Constable? 
 - Supplementary – Have there been any occasions when you have 
given a view or taken any role in operational decision making, or have 
you been tempted to do so? 
 - If so do you have any examples ? 
 
 
15. What positive changes do you think there have been as a result of the 
new governance structure ? 
 
 
16. What negative changes do you think there have been as a result of the 
new governance structure ? 
 
 
17. How do you see the governance structure developing over the short, 
medium and long term ? 
 
18. Do you think that any changes need to be made to the current 
governance framework? If so what do you think should be done to 
improve the effectiveness of police service delivery; 
• In your organisation 
• In policing across England and Wales. 
 
19. Is there anything you would like to add that you think I have not 
asked or has not been covered in your responses? 
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Questions to Chief Constable Participants 
 
Semi Structured Interviews 
 
I am going to ask you a series of open questions about various aspects of 
the recent changes in policing governance. Please answer them as fully as 
you can.  As explained in the information sheet, your verbatim responses 
will be completely confidential.  If you need any clarification, please ask 
me. 
 
 
1. What are your views about the principle of the introduction of locally 
elected Police and Crime Commissioners ? 
 
 
 
2. How have things changed following the inauguration of the PCC ? 
 
 
3. How do you interact with the PCC on a day to day basis; 
• Formally only or 
• Informally 
• In formal settings 
• Mix of these 
 
 
4. Since the inauguration of the PCC, what has been the impact upon you 
the Chief Constable ? 
 
 
5. Since the inauguration of the PCC, how, if at all, has the delivery of 
policing been affected? 
 
 
6. What has been the effect of the inauguration of the PCC on the 
governance of policing in your force. 
 
 
7. What in  your opinion has been the effect of the introduction of PCCs 
on the governance of policing generally across England and Wales. 
 
 
8.How do you see as the role of the Police and Crime Panel. How effective 
are they ? 
 
 
9. Since the inauguration of the PCC has there been any change in your  
relationship with partner organisations ? 
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10. Since the introduction of the PCC has there been any change in your  
relationship with the public ? 
 
 
11. Since the inauguration of the PCC has there been any change in your  
relationship with the government ? 
 
 
12.How important is your relationship with the PCC in delivering policing 
? 
 
 
13. Is the fact that the PCC has direct responsibility for appointing and in 
some circumstances dismissing the Chief Constable a significant issue in 
your relationship with the PCC ? 
 [ Supplementary – Does this fact affect your decision making in any 
way at a Strategic or operational level, if so do you have any examples ?].  
 
 
14. Has the PCC role affected your traditional ‘operational independence’ 
as Chief Constable? 
 - Supplementary – If so – how, and any examples. 
 
 
15. What positive changes, if any have there been as a result of the new 
structure ? 
 
 
16. Have there been any negative consequences arising from the new 
structure ? 
 
 
17. How do you see the governance structure developing over the short, 
medium and long term ? 
 
18. Do you think that any changes need to be made to the current 
governance framework? If so what do you think should be done to 
improve the effectiveness of police service delivery? 
• In your organisation 
• In policing across England and Wales. 
 
	
19. Is there anything you would like to add that you think I have not 
asked or has not been covered in your responses? 
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Appendix H 
Schedule of Comments of Chief Constables 
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	 Common	Interview	Themes		
Comments	of		
Chief	Constables	
	
1.		 Positive	Views	of	Police	&	Crime	Commissioner	Governance	Structure	
	
CC	
	‘Flash	to	bang	time	is	quicker…	There’s	definitely	innovation	around	the	country...	that	probably	wouldn’t	be	set	up	under	a	Police	Authority’.		
		
CC	
‘Governance	and	holding	us	to	account	is	always	going	to	be	tricky.	There	are	strengths	and	weaknesses	with	the	PCC	model	having	one	person	who	is	
here	full	time	makes	things	easier.	However,	there’s	got	to	be	a	significant	question	around	has	the	public	bought	into	PCCs…	I	was	fortunate	to	have	
enjoyed	working	with	a	PA	who	were	incredibly	supportive	of	the	Chief	Officer	team	in	***	and	had	been	for	over	a	decade...they	were	prepared	to	
invest	in	the	organisation	be	supportive	of	the	organisation	critical	when	appropriate...so	the	governance	arrangements	here	I	was	always	very	
comfortable	with	and	I	thought	they	were	effective.	I	had	Always	had	very	good	experience	of	PAs	But	Govt	made	it	very	clear	there	was	going	to	be	a	
change,	it	wasn’t	for	me	to	pass	comment	or	take	a	particular	view,	that’s	not	my	role,	but	I	subsequently	got	on	very	well	with	the	new	governance	
arrangement.’	
	
CC	
‘With	a	Police	Authority	with	17	people	you	were	constantly	being	lobbied,	engaged	in	conversation,	about	local	issues...I	would	go	to	(PA)	meetings	
trying	to	focus	on	the	corporate	...	Inevitably	there	were	conversations	raised	around	local	issues.	The	things	that	local	people	are	speaking	to	the	PCC	
about	are	the	same	that	they	were	at	the	PA.	In	some	ways	that’s	a	good	thing	because	you	only	have	to	have	that	conversation	once.	The	plethora	of	
meetings	and	committees	we	had	under	the	Police	Authority	have	been	swept	away’.		
	
CC	
‘At	the	time	I	could	see	some	advantages	of	having	one	elected	individual	...	which	should	have	ensured	a	more	stream	lined	and	less	bureaucratic	
relationship	with	the	OPCC	and	the	PCC	when	you	compare	it	to	the	Police	Authority.’		
	
CC5.	
‘I	am	completely	supportive,	but	issues	around	the	fact	that	the	PCC	can	only	be	voted	out	once	every	4	years...We	worked	under	one	good	PA	that	
held	policing	to	account	and	one	poor	one	that	did	not	add	anything	to	policing…	This	is	a	better	system	now	but	it	could	be	made	better’.		
	
CC.	
‘I	felt	that	the	link	between	police	and	the	community	is	essential.	Separate	to	the	police	a	route	that	communities	and	partners	can	engage	with	
policing.	I’m	not	sure	there’s	an	ideal	way	of	that	being	delivered.	I	think	the	system	was	appropriate	for	change.	Is	it	right	that	one	individual	
represents	just	shy	of	600,000	people.	Actually	here	having	a	PCC	for	a	small	geographic	area..is	more	likely	to	have	a	broad	understanding	of	the	
whole	community	than	during	my	days	in	**	(Force)	working	with	a	PCC	that’s	got	this	enormous	area.	At	the	time	I	could	see	some	advantages	of	
having	one	elected	individual	...	which	should	have	ensured	a	more	stream	lined	and	less	bureaucratic	relationship	with	the	OPCC	and	the	PCC	when	
you	compare	it	to	the	PA	I	suppose	I	was	in	favor,	because	change	is	important	because	if	we	don’t	we	just	stand	still	and	fester.’	
	
CC.	
‘My	only	difficulty	with	the	arrangement	is	the	fragility	because	it	is	down	to	one	individual	I	have	no	difficulty	in	being	governed	the	police	being	
governed,	I	think	there	should	be	robust	government	We	are	not	a	totalitarian	state	and	we	are	not	puppets	of	the	state	...	so	my	sense	is	that	we	
should	have	strong	democratic	governance.’	
	
CC.	
‘Actually	here	having	a	PCC	for	a	small	geographic	area..is	more	likely	to	have	a	broad	understanding	of	the	whole	community	than	during	my	days	in	
**	(Force)	working	with	a	PCC	that’s	got	this	enormous	area	with	huge	differences	in	demographics..	And	cant	possibly	even	try	to	understand	all	of	the	
demands	and	all	the	different	things	the	communities	are	facing’.		
	
CC.	
‘You	need	to	see	it	[introduction	of	PCCs]	as	part	of	a	general	movement	to	strengthen	accountability	across	public	service	an	era	of	greater	
transparency,	....	Its	being	seen	more	that	the	way	to	strengthen	accountability	is	through	that	direct	political	relationship...	A	form	of	governance	for	
such	a	crucial	public	service	which	is	very	much	about	the	way	that	powers	are	used	against	the	citizen	having	a	committee	to	oversee	that	was	fine	
for	its	time,	but	the	world	has	moved	on	really.	..	I	think	I	probably	would	also	say	because	of	the	degree	of	change	we	have	gone	through	this	
fundamental	shift	in	the	level	of	resourcing	that	having	one	single	person	responsible	for	that	and	accountable	for	that	is	probably	something	that	is	
really	important	for	us	to	get	through	this	you	need	that	sense	of	focus,	that	direct	accountability...	Where	I	am	now	I	would	see	it	as	a	positive	
development…	Police	Authorities	were	great	through	periods	of	growth	when	the	answer	to	anything	could	be	money…	I	would	argue	yes	its	been	
extremely	helpful	with	the	austerity	I	don’t	think	you	can	put	aside	the	austerity,	what	the	Police	is	calling	austerity	I	don’t	think	is	austerity	I	think	it	is	
some	kind	of	fundamental	challenge	to	the	way	that	we’ve	delivered	policing	and	polices	with	the	ability	to	deal	with	some	of	the	really	wicked	
problems	in	society.	We	spend	a	lot	less	time	on	governance,	the	Police	Authority	tended	to	be	more	bureaucratic	accountability	rather	than	political	
accountability’	
	
CC.	
More	effective	than	Police	Authority.	But	not	quite	sure	(PCCs)	understand	the	risk	...	the	risks	we	face	on	a	daily	basis	around	have	we	got	it	right	
where	we	put	our	resources?	The	Police	Authority	was	very	formulaic,	very	committee	focused	...it	was	slow	and	laborious	lots	of	scrutiny	but	it	was	a	
kind	of	chess	match.	This	can	be	far	more	dynamic	because	there	are	two	individuals,	if	those	individuals	agree	it	tends	to	happen.	But	then	there’s	the	
question	who	is	constraining	those	individuals	to	make	sure	they	make	the	right	decision.	There	was	a	desire	or	a	hope	{on	the	part	of	govt.)	that	
somehow	the	election	would	have	resulted	in	a	change	to	the	arrangement	so	there	would	be	more	checks	and	balances.		
	
CC	
‘{the	PCC}	was	former	chair	of	PA	this	made	the	transition	seamless’.	
	
CC	
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‘I’ve	got	one	person	to	deal	with,	I	get	consistency	of	view	from	that	person.’	
	
CC	
	‘There	is	a	challenge	because	with	one	person	you	have	one	view,	but	it	is	better	than	the	Police	Authority’.	
	
CC	
	‘If	you	have	a	relationship	that	works	and	you	understand	who	has	what	and	where	the	lines	are,	in	the	main	because	there	re	always	grey	areas,	then	
that	can	work	quite	effectively.	Its	more	dynamic…	You’ve	got	a	PCC	who’s	in	work	all	the	time	he’s	on	the	end	of	a	phone	so	you	are	making	decisions	
that	are	more	dynamic	than	you	could	have	done	with	your	Police	Authority’.		
	
CC	
‘Decision	making	was	often	slowed	down	thru	Police	Authorities	not	always	a	bad	thing,	it	was	cumbersome	it	was	expensive	in	terms	of	time	but	you	
did	have	a	broader	church	than	you	have	now.	...	Huge	positives	-	decision	making	more	speedy,	and	at	a	time	of	genuinely	unprecedented	change	
that’s	been	very	useful’.	
	
CC	
	’	I	actually	think	its	a	more	professional	relationship	because	we	are	dealing	with	a	professional.	I	can	only	speak	for	my	Force	here,	they	{OPCC}	work	
their	bollocks	off,	they	absolutely	do,	Incredibly	committed’.		
	
CC	
‘At	the	time	I	didn’t	see	the	Police	Authority	structure	was	broken	I	think	that	depended	on	where	you	worked,	I	felt	that	we	were	accountable	to	the	
Police	Authority.	Although	the	PCC	does	highlight	the	things	that	were	deficient	in	the	Police	Authority	structure.	...	{too	many,	no	understanding	of	
policing	part	time}.	
	
CC	
‘The	principle	of	{the	PCCs}	making	policing	more	accountable...	I	think	its	definitely	done	that.	...	A	significant	change	in	policing	on	a	daily	basis.	..	PCC	
is	in	the	next	building,	full	time	staff	who	are	here	permanently	to	support	the	PCC	an	individual	who	is	not	only	passionate	about	**	{Force	area},	but	
is	absolutely	clear	on	benefits	to	communities	that	he	can	bring	without	interfering	with	operational	policing,	and	can	hold	us	to	account	on	behalf	of	
communities,	and	is	absolutely	striving	for	a	more	transparent	service…	One	of	the	biggest	frustrations	with	Police	Authorities	was	-	policing	
effectively	was	justifying	their	existence	{meetings	for	the	sake	of	it}’		
	
CC	
‘You	need	to	see	it	as	part	of	a	general	movement	to	strengthen	accountability	across	public	service	an	era	of	greater	transparency,	....	Its	being	seen	
more	that	the	way	to	strengthen	accountability	is	through	that	direct	political	relationship...	A	form	of	governance	for	such	a	crucial	public	service	
which	is	very	much	about	the	way	that	powers	are	used	against	the	citizen	having	a	committee	to	oversee	that	was	fine	for	its	time,	but	the	world	has	
moved	on	really.	..	I	think	I	probably	would	also	say	because	of	the	degree	of	change	we	have	gone	through	this	fundamental	shift	in	the	level	of	
resourcing	that	having	one	single	person	responsible	for	that	and	accountable	for	that	is	probably	something	that	is	really,	really	important	for	us	to	
get	through	this	you	need	that	sense	of	focus,	that	direct	accountability...	Where	I	am	now	I	would	see	it	as	a	positive	development’.		
	
CC	
‘Police	Authorities	were	great	through	periods	of	growth	when	the	answer	to	anything	could	be	money…	I	would	argue	yes	{it	is}	its	been	extremely	
helpful	with	the	austerity	I	don’t	think	you	can	put	aside	the	austerity,	what	the	Police	is	calling	austerity	I	don’t	think	is	austerity	I	think	it	is	some	kind	
of	fundamental	challenge	to	the	way	that	we’ve	delivered	policing	and	polices	ability	to	deal	with	some	of	the	really	wicked	problems	in	society.	We	
spend	a	lot	less	time	on	governance,	the	Police	Authority	tended	to	be	more	bureaucratic	accountability	rather	than	political	accountability	...	the	PA	
tended	to	be	more	about	a	bureaucratic	accountability	rather	than	a	political	accountability	so	we	spent	a	huge	amount	of	time	on	bureaucracy	on	
meetings	on	action	plans	all	sorts	of	things	like	that	trying	to	keep	19	members	happy.	So	certainly	in	respect	of	me	its	a	lot	more	light	touch	and	there	
are	more	politics	with	a	small	p.’	
	
CC	
‘(Police	Authorities	were)Bureaucratic,	self	serving,	corrupt	and	ineffective.’		
	
CC	
Bureaucracy	has	been	massively	reduced,	typically	with	the	PA	we	would	complete	over	200	reports	a	year	on	anything	they	took	a	fancy	to	or	were	
enquiring	about.	If	we	wanted	to	bring	about	change	in	the	force	particularly	if	it	cost	money,	and	it	was	something	we	felt	needed	Police	Authority	
approval,	then	typically	we	would	submit	a	report,	it	would	get	in	front	of	a	committee	within	3	months	we'd	be	asked	for	another	one	and	another	
one,	and	it	would	go	on	until	eventually	the	answer	would	be	no.	With	the	PCC	all	of	that	bureaucracy	has	been	removed	I	can	either	address	issues	in	
my	one	to	one	with	her,	in	informal	meetings	in	special	meetings	have	a	conversation	and	she	will	make	a	decision	quickly,	its	recorded	in	the	
appropriate	way	its	put	on	her	web	site.’		
	
CC	
‘You	get	business	done	very	quickly...	there’s	less	bureaucracy,	that’s	the	advantage	of	the	system.	But	that’s	only	because	we	have	a	good	
working	relationship’.		
	
CC	
‘The	PA	was	very	formulaic,	very	committee	focused	...it	was	slow	and	laborious	lots	of	scrutiny	but	it	was	a	kind	of	chess	match.	This	can	be	far	more	
dynamic	because	there	are	two	individuals,	if	those	individuals	agree	it	tends	to	happen.	But	then	there’s	the	question	who	is	constraining	those	
individuals	to	make	sure	they	make	the	right	decision’.		
	
2.	 Negative	Views	of	Police	&	Crime	Commissioner	Governance	Structure	
	
CC	
‘The	review	of	PAs	should	have	been	a	much	more	hard	hitting	review	and	they	should	have	reformed	PAs	and	made	them	much	stronger	I	would	have	
gone	for	an	all	elected	PA.	That	would	give	local	accountability	and	the	breath	that	The	problem	was	that	we	didn’t	get	the	right	quality	of	people	on	
the	Police	Authority’.		
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CC.		
‘It	was	a	slightly	alien	concept	no	not	aimed	at	a	particular	set	of	issues.	Was	very	hurriedly	pushed	thru	at	a	time	when	relationships	at	the	top	end	of	
policing	were	quite	adversarial.	Without	having	a	great	deal	of	public	discussion	or	warmth	to	it	and	a	lot	of	loose	ends	in	terms	of	how	it	was	going	to	
work.	It	felt	heavily	doctrinal	and	not	particularly	cleverly	crafted’.		
	
CC	
‘The	line	of	business	that	we	do	is	not	like	other	public	services....	We	often	make	decisions	not	based	on	who	pays	the	most	its	{about}	our	most	
vulnerable	people.	To	introduce	politics	with	a	big	P	into	that	has	got	some	risk.	If	that’s	not	controlled	properly	that	risk	can	be	considerable	So	a	
personal	view	on	the	introduction	of	PCCs	was	a	concern	for	me.	However	in	practice	as	its	worked	out	for	me	its	been	a	pretty	positive	
experience.	...very	high	risk…	..	[the	Police	Authority]	governance	of	17	people	has	got	checks	&	balances	in	it	which	governance	by	one	person	
hasn’t.	.It	was	easier	working	with	a	PA	because	we	decided	we	got	on	with	it,	I	spoke	to	the	chair	of	the	PA	who	said	‘oh	that	sounds	a	good	idea’.	It	
was	much	less	hands	on.	There	were	benefits	to	that	because	you	didn’t	have	someone	you	had	to	constantly	brief	on	everything.	..	You	didn’t	have	
someone	with	a	view	as	to	where	the	organisation	needs	to	go	when	sometimes	they	are	not	that	well	informed.		
	
CC	
‘I	don’t	like	the	principles,	there	was	always	a	clear	distinction	between	the	executive	and	police	one	of	the	principles	I’ve	always	worked	to	is	that	of	
PCCs	has	and	was	bound	to	introduce	politics	with	a	big	P	into	policing.	I	don’t	agree	with	it	I	don’t	like	it.	It	was	a	poor	decision.	I	agree	CCs	needed	
more	accountability...they	had	a	degree	of	autonomy	unlike	other	public	services	I	accept	those	days	are	gone,	but	the	way	in	which	this	operates	its	
too	much	on	the	other	side	of	the	pendulum.	There	is	too	much	political	control...[Police	Authorities]	Did	not	really	work	they	were	variable	in	quality,	
and	I	worked	with	three	or	four	PAs	and	they	allowed	CCs	far	too	much	independence	and	did	not	hold	them	to	account	sufficiently.	They	could	have	
been	made	much	better.	But	I	always	felt	that	having	17	heads	discussing	an	issue	was	better	than	one,	which	is	what	you	have	now.	The	PA	model	had	
its	faults	but	contained	a	variety	of	views	and	perspectives.	Which	was	much	richer	and	broader	than	the	PCC	model	is’.		
	
CC	
‘I	feel	that	the	placing	of	so	much	power	in	the	hands	of	one	person	there’s	a	real	departure	for	governance	in	the	UK.	Particularly	in	such	a	sensitive	
complex,	and	difficult	arena	as	policing…	We	had	a	Police	Authority	of	17	...	We	had	a	couple	of	very	strong	leaders	of	the	PA...	I	didn’t	see	the	
deficiencies	of	the	old	system	in	the	same	way	that	the	Conservatives	in	particular	did.	The	deficiencies	of	the	previous	system	were	overstated	If	you	
wanted	to	make	some	changes	they	could	have	done	something	a	bit	different	such	as	an	elected	chair	of	the	PA’.		
	
CC	
‘Too	much	power	vested	in	one	person	I’ve	seen	the	good	and	bad	of	that	the	trouble	is	you	are	just	too	dependent	upon	the	intellect,	the	politics	the	
personal	characteristics	of	the	individual	that	gets	the	job.’	
	
CC	
‘Fundamentally	I	disagreed	with	it.	On	the	basis	that	it	all	becomes	an	individual	...	It’s	a	big	role	in	the	hands	of	one	person.	The	bits	that	are	positive	
re	it	gives	a	human	face	where	people	know	they	can	contact	somebody	where	PAs	were	anonymous...I	don’t	think	its	right	for	one	to	have	such	an	
influence	over	something	as	important	as	policing.	‘	
	
CC	
‘If	you	look	around	the	country	there’s	a	real	mixture,	some	are	good,	some	not	so	good	and	some	are	quite	extreme.	And	that’s	all	about	individuals	
and	skills	or	experience	they	have...	So	for	an	individual	to	have	that	much	influence	on	policing	is	worrying’.		
	
CC	
‘I	was	quite	troubled	by	it	there	was	a	huge	degree	of	uncertainty	about	how	it	would	work	I	was	worried	about	the	big	P	politicisation	of	policing.	I	
didn’t	agree	with	the	formal	ACPO	position	that	we	should	resist	it	because	as	Chiefs	if	a	democratically	elected	Gov.	says	in	their	manifesto	they	are	
going	to	do	x	and	they	pass	a	bill	they	are	perfectly	within	their	rights.	What	they	should	do	s	that	behind	the	scenes	we	should	do	everything	we	can	
to	shape	that	bill	make	it	work	as	positively	as	possible.	....	My	biggest	worry	was	too	much	power	vested	in	one	person	and	I	think	that	is	definitely	still	
the	case,	insufficient	checks	and	balances	...	I	do	think	the	devil	was	more	in	the	detail	in	many	respects.	Too	much	power	vested	in	one	person	with	
totally	ineffective	PCP	sitting	above	it.’	
	
CC	
‘Before	the	introduction,	I	was	pretty	skeptical	about	how	one	person	could	represent	the	communities	...	And	the	views	of	those	communities	I	was	
pretty	open	minded	about	how	it	could	be	done.	Didn’t	really	understand	how	it	was	going	to	work…	At	the	time	I	didn’t	see	the	Police	Authority	
structure	was	broken	I	think	that	depended	on	where	you	worked,	I	felt	that	we	were	accountable	to	the	PA.	Although	the	PCC	does	highlight	the	
things	that	were	deficient	in	the	PA	structure.	...	{too	many,	with	no	understanding	of	policing	and	a	part	time	commitment}.’	
		
CC	
‘I	don’t	agree	with	it,	its	too	much	power	in	one	person	and	its	too	personality	driven	{however}	My	own	PCC	has	been	breath	of	fresh	air.	...Its	too	
much	power	in	one	pair	of	hands	if	they	choose	not	to	use	it	properly	or	proportionately	or	fairly	or	listen...	The	power	in	the	hands	of	one	person	if	
they	use	it	appropriately	can	be	enormously	helpful,	as	it	is	here	but	it	is	too	dependent	on	one	personality…[The	Police	Authority	was]	Bureaucratic,	
self	serving,	corrupt	and	ineffective’.	
	
CC		
‘...	so	my	sense	is	that	we	should	have	strong	democratic	governance.	albeit,	I	thought	the	Police	Authorities	were	entirely	serviceable	certainly	better	
than	the	watch	committees		which	thru	various	iterations	they	replaced.	When	you	look	back	at	what	was	happening	in	Notts	&	S.	wales	in	the	50's	and	
early	60's	...	I	wouldn’t	want	to	go	back	to	those	bad	old	days.	There	is	a	sense	in	some	of	my	colleagues	that	that	is	what	is	the	case.		
	
CC	
‘I	think	the	model	of	governance	is	fundamentally	flawed	on	a	whole	series	of	levels.	One	thing	that	was	talked	about	was	the	introduction	of	politics	
into	policing	and	I	think	that	has	manifested	itself,	not	so	much	as	party	politics,	but	the	mechanics	and	the	day	to	day	focus	of	somebody	who	is	
elected	and	therefore	is	a	politician,	in	an	organisation	to	influence	views	and	deliverables	which	I	as	a	police	professional	don’t	always	agree	with	
Whilst	there	is	a	Policing	Protocol	that	talks	about	43	CCs	independent	operational	Chief	Constables	and	the	PCC	not	fettering	the	ability	of	the	Chief	
Constable	to	deliver	their	business.	The	reality	is	that	its	not	anything	like	as	black	and	white	as	that	gets	presented.	Because	at	the	end	of	anything	you	
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might	want	to	do	there	is	money	and/	or	reputation.’		
	
	
3.	 Perceived	Dangers	of	Police	&	Crime	Commissioner	Governance	Structure	
	
CC	
{Re	PCC	being	unavailable}	‘It	showed	the	fragility	of	the	system,	the	resilience	was	non	existent	there	is	no	statutory	position	for	the	deputy,	so	that	at	
the	point	{PCC	became	unavailable	}	we	had	no	governance	for	a	period.	The	panel	which	is	one	of	the	elements	in	the	new	governance	arrangements	
that	has	just	not	functioned.	The	panel	had	responsibilities	but	didn’t	appreciate	their	significance,	couldn’t	act	quickly.	We	had	all	sorts	of	fun	and	
games	with	the	HO,	trying	to	work	out	what	the	rules	were.’	
	
	
CC	
[CC	described	the	situation	when	PCC	was	unavailable	long	term].	‘…This	meant	that	policing	would	be	affected	-	the	CFO	was	identified	as	the	person	
who	would	sign	matters	off	in	the	absence	of	any	guidance.		He	avoided	taking	decisions	that	an	elected	PCC	would,	so	was	seen	as	there	to	only	
enable	the	Police	to	conduct	business,	and	not	to	determine	long	term	strategy.’	
	
CC	
‘Too	much	power	vested	in	one	person	I’ve	seen	the	good	and	bad	of	that	the	trouble	is	you	are	just	too	dependent	upon	the	intellect,	the	politics	the	
personal	characteristics	of	the	individual	that	gets	the	job.	...	If	they	don’t	get	checked	by	the	PCP	then	it	can	be	very	different	to	the	old	days	of	the	
Police	Authority.’	
	
CC	
‘Delivering	policing	services	and	delivering	a	business	based	upon	the	relationship	between	two	people	which	is	absolutely	critical	is	flawed.	It	doesn’t	
work	to	the	benefit	of	the	public,	and	as	we	go	into	austerity,	having	to	think	about	what	do	the	public	really	need	from	a	professional	police	service	as	
opposed	to	what	does	the	PCC	want	to	do	because	its	popular	with	the	public	then	we	are	likely	to	get	into	some	difficult	territory.’	
	
CC	
‘The	trouble	with	the	system	is	that	it	is	a	very	personal	system	its	designed	to	be	very	personal...	so	you	make	an	assumption	that	you	set	up	
arrangements	for	how	the	working	relationship	should	work....	there’s	a	great	deal	of	instability	in	it	all...its	possible	you	may	have	to	undo	all	the	
arrangements	{when	a	new	PCC	arrives}.	...the	arrangements	between	the	two	corporations	sole	are	only	as	good	as	the	agreement	of	the	current	
PCC.	...it	seems	to	me	that	because	its	based	upon	the	individual	its	inherently	unstable.’		
	
CC	
‘...what	you’ve	got	with	a	PCC	is	a	personality	who	has	been	put	into	a	role	with	no	prior	qualifications	no	prior	experience...and	then	in	effect	(though	
CHMI)	would	disagree	with	this,	but	has	in	effect	unfettered	power	within	an	organisation.	It	really	is	dependent	upon	the	CC	setting	the	ground	rules,	
developing	the	relationship,	working	out	where	the	line	is.’		
	
CC	
‘There	are	risks	if	it	goes	wrong.	That’s	the	greatest	weakness	{of	the	paradigm}	the	reliance	on	the	relationship	between	two	people	even	more	so	if	
there	isn’t	a	filter.	My	PCC	doesn’t	have	a	Deputy,	you	can	mitigate	some	of	the	tensions	if	you’ve	got	that…	Its	too	much	personality	based.	I	think	
that’s	a	risk	I	think	if	people	aren’t	able	to	maintain	effective	professional	relationships	then	it	is	easy	for	it	to	be	undermined.	We’ve	had	some	
examples,	Lincolnshire	was	the	classic.	There	need	to	be	a	few	more	safety	nets...and	the	PCP,	doesn’t	really	have	much	teeth.’		
	
CC	
‘What	we	have	got	with	the	PCCs	is	a	great	governance	model,	but	it	is	precarious.	Because	they	are	unfettered	the	courts	are	now	fettering	their	
power,	you	only	need	to	look	at	the	Rhodes	case	in	Lincs,	and	I	think	if	the	Gwent	case	had	been	taken	to	Judicial	Review	by	Carmel	Napier	I	think	that	
would	have	led	to	some	fettering	of	the	PCC.	But	when	you	look	at	the	Dyfed	Powys	case	where	there	was	a	very	powerful	and	eminently	
competent	CC,	because	she	was	temp	when	the	PCC	joined	the	force	she	wasn’t	selected.	It	may	be	that	she	wasn’t	the	best	candidate,	but	an	
observer	looking	in	from	outside	would	see	that	as	being	rather	odd’.		
CC	
‘Its	too	much	power	in	one	person	and	its	too	personality	driven	...Its	too	much	power	in	one	pair	of	hands	if	they	choose	not	to	use	it	properly	or	
proportionately	or	fairly	or	listen...	The	power	in	the	hands	of	one	person	if	they	use	it	appropriately	can	be	enormously	helpful,	as	it	is	here	but	it	is	
too	dependent	on	one	personality.’	
	
CC	
‘The	police	service	have	invested	huge	amount	of	time	effort	and	energy	and	money	to	enable	me	to	operate	at	the	executive	level	that’s	not	the	same	
for	{the	PCC}…	There	are	things	that	he	has	got	badly	wrong,	he	has	an	emotional	lens	we	spend	-	less	so	now,	quite	a	lot	of	time	clearing	up	behind	
**	{PCC}.	At	regional	meetings	the	behaviour	of	PCCs	was	just	amazing,	in	the	first	12-18	months.	Its	better	now	their	behaviour	and	the	way	they	
treated	us	professionals,	table	thumping	just	unbelievable	behaviour...	These	are	people	who	have	just	been	transported	into	policing	with	a	greater	or	
lesser	knowledge	of	policing	but	all	had	different	levels	of	humility	about	their	understanding	and	being	able	to	table	thump	with	some	authority.		
	
CC	
‘I	think	the	PCC	finds	policing	quite	complex,	the	reality	is	that	if	you	applied	a	pure	resources	to	risk	basis,	I’d	be	pulling	a	lot	of	resources	out	of	the	
rural	areas	and	putting	them	into	XX	&	XX	(urban	areas)	but	that	is	politically	difficult,	not	only	from	the	PCCs	perspective	but	also	from	the	community	
engagement	aspect	for	me.		
	
CC	
‘He	[PCC]	misses	the	point	its	more	powerful	for	me	to	have	someone	to	say	I’ve	challenged	the	CC	and	I’m	satisfied	rather	than	were	doing	this	and	
that.	The	public	do	not	get	the	scrutiny	they	deserve.’		
	
CC	
‘...	My	only	criticism	would	be	it	can	range	{the	PCC/CC	meeting)	from	the	big	stuff	like	what’s	happening	post	election,	down	to	Mrs	Miggins	cat.	So	
some	times	I	have	to	say,	just	send	that	thru	the	system,	I'll	get	it	looked	at	it	doesn’t	need	to	come	here…[the	PCC]	likes	stories	and	anecdotes.’		
   
  
 275 
		
CC	
‘If	you	are	one	of	those	CCs	with	a	PCC	at	either	end	of	that	curve	of	normality,	particularly	if	you’ve	got	the	more	aggressive	bombastic,	throwing	their	
weight	around	type	of	PCC,	its	incredibly	stressful	because	its	a	one	on	one	relationship...	it	does	make	a	difference	as	to	how	stressful	your	life	is	
massively	....	You’ve	got	***	(CC	who	went	sick)	who’s	gone	off	how	open	people	will	be	I	don’t	know	but	that’s	all	PCC	driven.	I	never	got	there	
because	I	got	my	head	around	it...	But	that’s	ok	for	me	to	say	who's	kids	have	left	school	...	But	if	you’re	(referred	to	another	CC	with	younger	family	
who	had	gone	sick	)	...	In	a	more	vulnerable	position	with	younger	kids	and	you	saw	what	happened	to	**	(referring	to	the	CC	in	question).	Its	all	very	
easy	for	me	to	say	get	your	head	around	it,	perhaps	my	particular	situation	meant	it	was	easier	for	me	to	get	my	head	round	it,	if	Id	been	just	over	
25yrs,	kids	10	&	11	...different	ball	game.’	
	
CC		
If	you	are	one	of	those	CCs	with	a	PCC	at	either	end	of	that	curve	of	normality,	particularly	if	you’ve	got	the	more	aggressive	bombastic,	throwing	their	
weight	around	type	of	PCC,	its	incredibly	stressful	because	its	a	one	on	one	relationship...	it	does	make	a	difference	as	to	how	stressful	your	life	is	
massively....	You’ve	got	***	(CC	who	went	sick)	who’s	gone	off	how	open	people	will	be	I	don’t	know	but	that’s	all	PCC	driven.	I	never	got	there	
because	I	got	my	head	around	it...	But	that’s	ok	for	me	to	say	who's	kids	have	left	school	...	But	if	you’re	(referred	to	another	CC	with	younger	family	
who	had	gone	sick	)	...	In	a	more	vulnerable	position	with	younger	kids	and	you	saw	what	happened	to	**	(referring	to	the	CC	in	qustion).	Its	all	very	
easy	for	me	to	say	get	your	head	around	it,	perhaps	my	particular	situation	meant	it	was	easier	for	me	to	get	my	head	round	it,	if	Id	been	just	over	
25yrs,	kids	10	&	11...different	ball	game.		
	
CC	
‘I	know	it	different	for	others,	**	{adjacent	force}	their	PCC	is	very	difficult’.		
	
CC	
‘Although	our	relationship	is	good	I	didn’t	like	operating	in	it.	I	never	felt	relaxed	I	always	had	to	watch	every	decision	and	every	policy	and	every	thing	
had	to	be	carefully	managed.	It	puts	political	control	into	CCs	too	directly	I	agree	CCs	needed	more	accountability...they	had	a	degree	of	autonomy	
unlike	other	public	services	I	accept	those	days	are	gone,	but	the	way	in	which	this	operates	its	too	much	on	the	other	side	of	the	pendulum.	There	is	
too	much	political	control’.		
	
CC	
‘You	will	not	get	consistency...its	the	same	as	CCs,	we'd	love	to	have	consistency	across	all	CCs	on	a	particular	issue	but	you	don’t	get	it.	with	a	one	
person	PCC,	as	opposed	to	multi	person	commissions,	you	are	going	to	have	mavericks,	I	cant	see	it	changing	at	all.	In	fact	I	think	it	can	only	get	worse	
as	they	embed	different	ways	of	doing	things’.		
	
CC	
Too	much	power	vested	in	one	person	I’ve	seen	the	good	and	bad	of	that	the	trouble	is	you	are	just	too	dependent	upon	the	intellect,	the	politics	the	
personal	characteristics	of	the	individual	that	gets	the	job.	...	If	they	don’t	get	checked	by	the	PCP	then	it	can	be	very	different	to	the	old	days	of	the	
Police	Authority’.	
	
CC	
	‘PCC	must	be	brief	re	things	happening	in	the	area	he	lives’.	
	
CC	
	‘It	becomes	very	localised	around	bad	headlines,	local	issues.	The	PCC	comes	from	???	There	was	the	loss	of	(police	facility),	that	was	a	big	issue	at	the	
same	time	we	were	closing	(another	facility)	-	not	really	interested’.		
CC	
‘All	of	my	problems	with	the	PCC	have	been	because	the	Policing	Protocol	is	wishy-washy	and	doesn’t	tie	people	down.	More	clarity	{is	needed}	around	
operational	independence	does	it	mean	can	you	go	and	arrest	X&Y-no	that’s	not	your	role	commissioner,	that’s	my	{CCs}	role,	is	it	I’ve	looked	at	your	
review	of	policing	{PCC	to	CC}	and	Id	like	you	to	put	55	officers	at	x	and	100	at	Y.	Or	is	it	I	want	you	to	concentrate	on	roads	policing,	I	want	you	to	
concentrate	on	CSE	and	I	don’t	want	you	to	have	any	dog	handlers	or	is	it.	There’s	my	Police	&	Crime	plan	go	and	deliver	it.	..,	apart	from	the	first	every	
single	one	of	those	situations	you	can	read	into	the	Policing	Protocol	if	you	choose	to’.		
	
CC	
.’..governance	of	17	people	has	got	checks	&	balances	in	it	which	governance	by	one	person	hasn’t.	If	somebody	{PCC}	digs	their	heels	in	when	they’ve	
got	something	wrong	you	cant	get	rid	of	them.	I’m	not	sure	there’s	anywhere	else	in	political	service	where	you’d	see	that	happen.	That	has	got	to	be	
high	risk.	
	
CC	
	However	in	practice	as	its	worked	out	for	me	its	been	a	pretty	positive	experience.	But	I	think	that’s	a	bit	of	a	lottery.	I’m	not	sure	there’s	enough	
regulation	around	a	PCC	who	might	want	to	be	making	operational	decisions,	when	they	are	paying	my	salary	and	responsible	for	sacking	me	or	
not.	...I’ve	seen	it	with	neighboring	forces	where	their	relationship	is	just	not	the	same	as	ours.	but	I	really	think	if	you’ve	got	those	three	criteria	right	
(boundaries,	equity	&	trust)	it	works.	...clearly	there	are	some	{PCCs}	that	are	politically	motivated	-	party	political.	...	there	are	CCs	around	the	country	
who	have	no	relationship	with	their	PCCs	...you	have	also	got	some	PCCs	around	the	country	who	have	come	into	office	and	think	they	have	to	have	all	
the	ideas	about	changing	the	service	and	forget	we’ve	done	this	for	150	yrs.,	and	are	not	dull	people.		
	
CC	
‘There	s	very	much	a	mixed	bag	{of	PCCs}	across	the	country.	I	speak	to	colleagues	who	are	having	a	terrible	time,	for	some	its	working	very,	very	well’.	
	
CC	
	‘Significant	differences	in	the	way	that	the	governance	process	works	in	the	adjacent	force.	In	the	other	force,	the	PCC	is	often	absent	and	matters	are	
dealt	with	by	the	deputy,	here	the	PCC	is	daily	involved	and	does	everything	he	can	to	be	visible.	An	example	is	the	different	approach	by	PCCs	to	
operational	force	collaborations.	Some	want	to	deal	with	them	under	Sec	22a,	others	not.	You	will	not	get	consistency...its	the	same	as	CCs,	we'd	love	
to	have	consistency	across	all	CCs	on	a	particular	issue	but	you	don’t	get	it’.		
	
CC	
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‘I	would	say	they	{PA}	would	moderate	each	others	behaviour.	..	You’ve	got	one	individual	that	has	got	so	much	power	its	difficult	sometimes	for	
people	around	them	to	moderate	their	behaviour	at	times	-	and	their	views’.		
	
CC	
‘I	feel	sometimes	they	have	recreated	the	silverbacks	of	policing	but	called	them	something	different.	So	some	of	the	worst	excesses	of	some	of	the	
CCs	who	thought	they	were	running	their	own	fiefdoms	it	does	create	the	environment	for	that	to	happen	because	who’s	going	to	stop	them’.	
CC	
.’..governance	of	17	[PA]	people	has	got	checks	&	balances	in	it	which	governance	by	one	person	hasn’t.	If	somebody	{PCC}	digs	their	heels	in	when	
they’ve	got	something	wrong	you	cant	get	rid	of	them.	I’m	not	sure	there’s	anywhere	else	in	public	service	where	you’d	see	that	happen.	That	has	got	
to	be	high	risk’.		
	
CC	
‘My	biggest	worry	was	too	much	power	vested	in	one	person	and	I	think	that	is	definitely	still	the	case,	insufficient	checks	and	balances	...	I	do	think	the	
devil	was	more	in	the	detail	in	many	respects.	Too	much	power	vested	in	one	person	with	totally	ineffective	PCP	sitting	above	it’.		
	
4.	 Police	&	Crime	Commissioner	Election/	Legitimacy	Issues	
	
CC	
‘You’ve	really	got	to	question	the	democratic	process	where	a	person	has	been	elected	by	14%	of	the	electorate	is	now	responsible	for	such	a	big	
budget	with	big	responsibilities...’		
	
CC	
‘Whatever	the	turn	out	-	that’s	democracy’.		
	
CC	
‘Very	poor	turnout,	that	was	a	national	thing.	A	lot	of	lessons	learned	as	to	how	we	are	going	to	give	more	people	a	voice’.	
	
	
CC	
‘There’s	a	mixed	bag	across	the	country,	I	don’t	think	it	delivered	what	they	(HMG)	thought	it	would	deliver.	Trying	to	bring	in	the	captains	of	industry,	
ex	military	I	think	what	we	got	was	the	usual	kind	of	people	who	get	involved	in	these	kind	of	things’.		
	
CC	
‘I	was	not	the	first	CC	to	work	in	this	force	under	this	PCC,	the	organisation	had	decided	they	were	not	going	to	work	with	it.	The	incumbent	top	team	
behaved	badly	to	the	PCC	i.e.	giving	him	and	his	staff	poor	accommodation.	restricting	access	to	buildings.	Regardless	of	what	you	thought	of	***	as	an	
individual	(ex	Supt	-	not	popular)	he	was	the	elected	PCC	and	I	don’t	believe	that	they	dealt	with	him	properly,	fairly	proportionately,	giving	due	
deference	to	him	now	being	commissioner	of	policing.	There	was	nothing	in	place	here,	so	I	spent	the	first	six	trying	to	build	relationships	with	the	
PCC.’		
	
CC	
‘The	police	service	have	invested	huge	amount	of	time	effort	and	energy	and	money	to	enable	me	to	operate	at	the	executive	level	that’s	not	the	same	
for	{the	PCC}.’		
	
CC	
‘...	There	are	things	that	he	has	got	badly	wrong,	he	has	an	emotional	lens	we	spend	-	less	so	now	quite	a	lot	of	time	clearing	up	behind	**	{PCC}.	At	
regional	meetings	the	behaviour	of	PCCs	was	just	amazing,	in	the	first	12-18	months,	its	better	now	their	behaviour	and	the	way	they	treated	us	
professionals,	table	thumping	just	unbelievable	behaviour.	..	These	are	people	who	have	just	been	transported	into	policing	...	Which	had	greater	or	
less	knowledge	of	policing	but	had	different	levels	of	humility	about	me	understanding	and	being	able	to	table	thump	with	some	authority’.		
	
5.	 Public	Engagement	
	
CC	
‘...the	public	still	recognise	the	head	of	the	police	service	as	being	the	CC	rather	than	the	PCC.	There	are	some	PCCs	who	would	say	they	are	the	boss.	
and	that	has	undoubtedly	caused	some	real	problems’.		
	
CC	
‘I	am	a	fan	of	his	Police	&	Crime	Plan...he	crafted	a	plan	that	was	framed	around	some	priorities	that	would	be	meaningful	to	the	public.	The	public	are	
better	engaged	into	policing	due	to	{the	PCC}.’	
	
CC	
	‘They	{PCCs}	are	more	out	there	in	the	media	and	sometimes	they	can	add	to	the	public	debate	in	a	way	that	i,	it	would	be	inappropriate	for	me	to	
do...He	will	get	engaged	in	political	conversations	and	can	say	what	he	wants’.		
	
CC	
‘The	PCC	will	say	that	the	PA	received	about	60	letters	a	year	and	he	gets	thousands	...the	relationship	with	the	public	from	that	sense	they	do	a	lot	of	
work	to	promote	that	activity.	They	also	are	very	good	at	interacting	with	different	parts	of	the	community.	The	PCCs	role	has	enhanced	the	publics	
access	to	the	governance	of	policing’.		
CC	
‘The	PCC	brought	more	surveys	(e.g.	Road	safety)	the	PCC	is	an	example	of	bringing	a	diversity	into	police	governance’.		
	
CC	
‘The	PCC	is	well	respected	locally	as	someone	who	is	focused	on	the	community.	PCC	has	been	to	over	300	community	groups	{the	PCC}	does	a	huge	
amount	of	engagement	across	the	Force,	with	communities,	business	and	public	sector	organisations	that	helps	him	shape	his	Police	&	crime	plan.’		
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CC	
‘They	are	incredibly	hard	working	they	try	to	meet	as	many	people	as	they	can	my	only	criticism	is	that	sometimes	its	not	coordinated.	...	I	cannot	fault	
their	commitment	and	public	spiritedness.’		
	
CC	
‘Much	better	than	the	Police	Authority.’	
	
CC	
	‘There’s	been	two	or	three	specific	areas	where	if	I’m	honest	we	probably	took	a	paternalistic	view,	about	we	knew	better	than	you	the	public	how	
serious	this	is.	Rural	Crime,	Business	Crime	then	speeding	they	were	high	up	on	our	agendas	of	public	concerns	but	we	tended	to	say	well,	we	think	we	
are	doing	a	quite	decent	job	and	we’ve	got	more	important	things	to	do	bigger	centers	of	population,	and	you	do	live	in	a	low	crime	area,	and	you’ll	be	
fine.	***{the	PCC}	will	say	they	don’t	feel	fine	they	don’t	feel	secure	or	well	looked	after	you	are	not	doing	a	good	enough	job.	I	cannot	hand	on	heart	
say	the	PA	would	not	have	brought	about	that	shift,	and	I	cant	hand	on	heart	say	I	would	have	done	it	without	pushing’.		
	
CC	
‘If	you	ask	the	people	of	***	who	is	in	charge	of	the	police	its	the	CC...	They	see	the	PCC	as	a	politician	and	the	CC	as	head	of	the	police	service’.		
	
CC	
‘The	public	are	confused,	they	don’t	understand	that	the	PCC	is	separate	to	the	police	and	the	PCC	is	there	to	hold	me	to	account	The	public	and	the	
media	sometimes	believe	that	the	PCC	runs	the	operational	side	of	the	organisation.	and	it	is	not	uncommon	to	see	headlines	where	they	talk	
about	the	police	chief	when	they	talk	about	the	PCC.	So	I	do	think	there	is	utter	confusion.	There	is	a	need	for	marketing	to	explain	the	role	of	PCC’.		
	
CC	
‘They	get	confused	over	what’s	the	role	of	the	PCC,	I	think	there’s	still	an	element	of	that.,	they	don’t	quite	get	it’.		
	
CC	
‘The	vast	majority	of	people	in	this	country	arent	really	interested	in	policing	until	they	want	the	service.	If	they	get	the	service	they	are	content	with	t	
they	go	back	to	being	ambivalent,	there	is	a	very	small	group	of	people	that	have	any	genuine	interest.	I	think	the	bigger	question	is	do	the	public	
understand	the	role	of	the	PCC	?	And	I	genuinely	don’t	think	they	do.	I	think	its	all	focused	on	Police	and	not	the	much	wider	role	that	{the	PCC'S}	got	
around	&	crime’.		
CC	
‘The	public,	I	think	they	channel	things	through	to	PCCs	in	a	way	they	never	did	with	the	Police	Authority,	because	they	are	much	more	visible,	I	think	
people	are	getting	answers	I	think	they	are	seen	as	more	responsive	and	more	accountable.’	
	
CC	
	‘The	public	have	more	understanding	of	policing	as	a	result	of	the	introduction	of	PCCs.’	
	
CC	
	‘A	6	week	accountability	meeting	in	public	but	they	are	not	interested,	3	members	of	the	public	turn	up	and	its	the	same	3	each	time.	Its	a	joke,	there’s	
no	public	interest	in	this’.		
	
CC	
‘The	vast	majority	of	people	in	this	country	aren’t	really	interested	in	policing	until	they	want	the	service.	If	they	get	the	service	they	are	content	with	t	
they	go	back	to	being	ambivalent,	there	is	a	very	small	group	of	people	that	have	any	genuine	interest’.		
	
6.	 Partnerships	
	
CC	
‘..has	the	PCC	done	(in	partnerships)	anything	were	not	doing	or	going	to	do.	I	don’t	think	they	have.	...I	don’t	think	the	PCC	has	added	much	there	at	
all.	Because	that’s	what	we	do’.		
	
	
CC	
‘We	are	one	of	the	places	where	it	{partnerships}	has	been	disastrous....the	PCC	is	perceived	in	a	very	hostile	way	by	local	leaders,	seen	as	mayoral	rival	
and	a	point	of	influence	that	they	don’t	control.	Its	made	it	harder	for	us	to	get	engaged	in	partnerships.	..It	shows	how	if	you	drop	a	political	figure	
into	the	pool	of	local	govt	and	local	control	anf	you	cant	judge	where	the	ripples	will	go	to.	In	our	case	its	created	more	tension.	We	,	me	and	the	Chief	
Exec	get	on	well	...but	as	soon	as	the	PCC	is	introduced	into	that	mix	its	difficult	so	we	try	not	to	do	it.	PCC	not	at	the	partnership	meetings.	PCC	has	
high	media	profile	and	often	says	the	wrong	things	because	he	is	not	part	of	the	debate.’	
	
CC	
‘The	PCC	is	very	engaged	in	partnerships	some	times	I	have	to	pick	up	the	pieces.	But	he	can	say	things	I	can’t	that	is	a	really	blunt	instrument.	So	on	
the	one	hand	I	think	oh	goodness	I	have	to	pick	up	the	pieces	but	on	the	other	hand	he	really	does	say	the	things	you	want	to	say	yourself.	CC/	PCC	
sometimes	agree	things	they	think	need	to	be	said.	He	{PCC}	is	good	enough	to	ask	me	before	he	says	it.’		
	
CC	
‘…no	alignment	between	operational	activity	and	funding.	Some	local	commanders	did	not	know	he	was	funding	projects	in	their	areas’.		
	
CC	
‘We	have	brought	the	PCC	into	some	of	the	strategic	management	performance	meetings	so	that	he	can	engage	and	listen,	more	important	I	give	
access	to	senior	leaders	of	the	Force	to	help	{PCC}	understand	some	of	the	challenges	they’ve	got,	perhaps	with	strategic	partners.	Then	in	his	role	as	
PCC,	can	go	out	and	have	additional	conversations	for	us....	There’s	quite	a	few	areas	where	because	of	the	new	arrangements	{the	PCC}	has	helped	us	
move	things	forward.	....	A	good	example	is	recent	work	with	fire,	at	officer	level	they	are	quite	resistant	to	working	together	but	through	{the	PCCs}	
work	through	the	chair	of	the	fire	authority	we’ve	been	able	to	influence	down	to	the	officers.	We	are	now	working	on	a	number	of	collaboration	
fronts’.		
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CC	
‘It	has	changed	because	partners	know	they	can	go	to	the	PCC	and	get	money	and	the	Chief	Constable	can	provide	resources’.		
	
CC	
‘Lack	of	structure	and	planning	means	that	partnerships	have	been	a	bit	of	a	dogs	breakfast.’	
	
CC	
	‘PCC	is	able	to	get	traction	where	we	struggled.’	
	
CC	
‘That’s	more	difficult	{than	public	relationships},	...	Every	partner	wants	us	on	every	forum...	They	are	very	supportive	of	policing,	we	have	a	can	do	
attitude	we		
get	things	done.	We’ve	always	said	yes	and	we	haven’t	criticised	any	other	agency,	The	PCC	where	partners	haven’t	played	their	full	part,	met	their	
responsibilities	or	done	what	he	feels	they	should	do	he’s	pretty	vociferous	about	telling	them.	Its	positive	for	policing,	and	he	knows	this	because	
we’ve	been	able	to	distance	ourselves	from	that’.		
	
CC	
‘Yes	it	has	{changed	CC	relationship	with	partners}	I’m	much	more	of	an	equal	with	the	other	Chief	Execs	because	I’m	no	longer	held	to	account	by	
somebody	who’s	not	in	the	top		
tier	of	governance.	That’s	worked	for	us,	you’ve	got	one	person	who	is	a	much	stronger	public	figure	a	much	stronger	political	figure.’	
	
CC	
	‘In	partnerships,	the	Chief	Constable	does	professional	business,	the	PCC	does	politics.’		
	
CC	
‘Its	a	dogs	breakfast,	[commissioning]	they	cant	work	out	how	to	effectively	fund	and	measure	so	what	happens	is	....	Somebody	will	come	and	see	him	
with	a	project	and	wow	him	then	they'll	fund	him.	..	But	they	never	ask	the	so	what	factor’.		
	
CC	
‘He	{PCC}has	done	a	lot	of	good	in	communities	with	spending	and	commissioning’.		
	
CC	
‘...I	think	the	area	where	{the	PCC}	is	starting	to	develop	more	into	is	...he’s	going	beyond	the	police	...	its	taken	a	long	time	and	a	number	of	PCCs	
colleagues	across	the	country	to	go	-	not	just	the	Force	what	about	the	wider	-	criminal	justice	world	-	health	and	the	roles	he’s	got	in	terms	of	that	and	
he’s	now	doing	that.’		
	
7.		 Politics	(HMG,	HMIC,	ACPO)	
	
CC	
‘Although	our	relationship	is	good	I	didn’t	like	operating	in	it.	I	never	felt	relaxed	I	always	had	to	watch	every	decision	and	every	policy	and	every	thing	
had	to	be	carefully	managed.	It	puts	political	control	into	CCs	too	directly	I	agree	CCs	needed	more	accountability...they	had	a	degree	of	autonomy	
unlike	other	public	services	I	accept	those	days	are	gone,	but	the	way	in	which	this	operates	its	too	much	on	the	other	side	of	the	pendulum.	There	is	
too	much	political	control’.		
	
CC	
‘...central	govt	have	become	less	likely	to	do	anything,	bluntly.	I	don’t	know	if	in	some	respects	they	created	the	PCC	system	because	that’s	what	they	
wanted,	or	whether	the	PCC	system	made	that	happen’.		
	
CC	
‘There	have	been	challenging	times	with	govt	over	the	past	few	years,	I	don’t	think	it	made	any	difference	if	that	was	with	Police	Authorities	or	PCCs..’	
	
CC	
‘The	Home	Office	would	lead	you	to	believe	they	have	stepped	out	of	this	now	I	don’t	think	they	have.	They	have	created	a	bit	more	distance	between	
them	and	the	local	governance	arrangements.	...the	current	govt	wanted	to	step	away	from	running	police	forces	...but	they	have	set	a	very	clear	
position	on	the	strategic	policing	requirement	which	binds	in	the	local	governance.’	
	
	
CC	
	‘The	relationship	with	govt	has	not	been	good	for	a	number	of	reasons	shooting	ourselves	in	the	foot	...	There’s	been	a	perception	around	the	integrity	
of	the	force,	particularly	Chief	Officers.	So	all	of	that	is	swilling	about’.		
	
CC	
‘I’ve	not	seen	it	really	change,	we	have	quite	a	lot	of	engagement	with	the	Home	Office	through	various	groups.	I	think	the	APCC	has	more	of	a	voice	
with	the	Home	Secretary	than	perhaps	the	Association	of	Police	Authorities	had.	But	I	suppose	they	(HO)	were	always	going	to,	it	was	their	baby.	I’ve	
not	seen	it	in	a	detrimental	way	at	all.	In	fact	some	positive	bits	actually’.		
	
CC	
‘If	the	PCC	agrees	with	the	Chief	Constable	re	a	contentious	issue	(Drug	policy)	the	Chief	Constable	is	'protected	from	above	by	my	PCC.	But	if	he	didn’t	
agree	with	me	I	wouldn’t	have	been	able	to	say	it	or	it	would	be	a	different	dynamic.	I	hoped	that	the	PCCs	would	be	more	politically	savvy	in	the	way	
that	they	influence	the	Home	Office	and	Govt.	But	they	haven’t	been	that	at	all.	Some	of	them	being	party	political	hasn’t	helped.	I	think	Lab	PCCs	have	
had	less	influence	than	Tory	PCCs	...	That’s	disappointing	....	There	are	independents	and	good	luck	to	them,	but	that	machinery	of	getting	elected	need	
party	funds.	I	don’t	think	PCC	have	filled	that	hole	as	well	as	they	might.	That	said	Police	Authorities	were	pretty	inert	there	as	well’.		
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CC	
‘I	think	the	relationship	between	CCs	and	Govt	is	dreadful	...	Our	relationship	with	the	Home	Secretary	is	almost	non-existent.	We	go	down	for	
bollockings,	that’s	how	it	feels.	(not	because	of	PCCs)	I	think	PCCs	are	pretty	appalled	by	it	too’.		
	
CC	
‘The	distance	from	the	govt	for	that	direct	accountability	has	been	a	real	positive	step	for	policing...That’s	allowed	us	in	**	to	do	the	right	thing	so	if	we	
want	to	put	the	resource	into,	no	ones	going	to	come	back	and	say	what	about	your	performance	in	theft	from	motor	vehicles	for	example’.		
	
CC	
‘The	relationship	with	government	has	never	been	much	poorer	to	be	honest.	The	whole	movement	to	PCCs	was	to	push	power	down	and	for	the	HO	
not	to	be	responsible	for	the	things	they	were	responsible	for	in	the	past.	Very	little	point	in	talking	to	the	home	office	because	they	don’t	hold	the	
power	anymore,	its	a	waste	of	time	to	be	quite	honest.	I	think	this	govt	went	too	far	in	pushing	power	down	and	not	taking	responsibility	for	anything	
or	providing	any	national	leadership.	...	There’s	a	whole	host	of	reasons	why	with	this	govt	relationship	with	the	HO	has	not	been	good,	but	that’s	not	
to	say	because	we’ve	got	PCCs	its	a	wider	movement’.		
	
CC	
‘Sometimes	it	not	the	[political]	colour	its	the	way	they	operate	he’s	become	the	sort	of	PCC	holding	policing	to	account	that	the	govt	envisaged.’	
	
CC	
‘…because	he’s	a	Tory	has	very	close	relationships	with	ministers	that’s	helpful	or	can	be	helpful	sometimes.’		
	
CC	
‘I	don’t	think	it	[PCC’s	political	affiliation]	does	really	{affect	PCC	behaviour}	It	doesn’t	play	out	at	all’.		
	
CC	
‘Some	Con	PCCs	have	influence	with	govt...there’s	no	great	pattern	to	how	they	are	influential	from	where	I	sit.	The	influence	seems	to	be	a	
combination	of	where	they	are	as	individuals,	things	that	they	are	interested	in	committees	that	they	are	on,	the	other	people	of	power	that	they	know	
and	can	influence.’	
	
CC	
	‘What	I	have	seen	is	**	{PCC}	for	the	majority	of	the	separate	himself	from	his	[party],	political	roots.	acting	in	an	apolitical	way.	I	know	he	has	found	
that	really	difficult	in	the	run	up	to	the	election	{General	Election},	we’ve	had	to	have	some	quite	strong	conversations	with	regard	to	you	are	going	to,	
actually	this	is	electioneering	and	you	need	to	be	really	careful,	don’t	get	yourself	tied	up	in	breach	of	purdah	and	those	sorts	of	things.	He’s	found	that	
difficult	but	I	think	he	manages	it	really	well’.		
	
CC	
‘I	haven’t	experienced	too	much	of	that	I	know	he	has	political	meetings.	I	know	the	Cons	call	them	all	together	for	briefings	which	is	worrying.	local	
Cons	have	considerable	influence.		
	
CC	
‘...we	have	lost	a	lot,	an	awful	lot	with	the	HMI	and	their	role	and	the	fact	that	the	HMI	now	has	zero	impact	on	the	appointment	of	CCs	is	a	huge	loss’.		
	
CC	
‘I’ve	got	a	view	about	this	government	and	the	way	I	think	it	has	emasculated	policing	and	police	leadership	I’ve	been	in	a	position..	When	I’ve	had	
some	difficult	conversations	with	senior	civil	servants	about	what	politicians	think	they	can	&	cant	do	and	direct	as	opposed	to	what	I	as	an	operational	
Chief	Constable	think	they	can	do	and	direct.	To	the	extent	that	...if	David	Cameron	wants	to	walk	into	my	office	and	tell	me	to	do	that	stuff	he	can	do	
that	but	I’m	not	doing	it’.		
	
CC	
‘The	tripartite	arrangement	is	dead	...firstly	{no	part	by	Govt}	in	the	selection	of	Chief	Constables.	Secondly,	the	PCCs	have	not	established	themselves	
as	a	body.	It	{the	tripartite	arrangement}	has	gone,	by	design	I	think	...	To	distance	herself	{H.Sec}	from	decision	making	and	to	make	the	PCCs	a	
disparate	rather	than	a	coherent	group...its	essentially	a	dead	duck’.	
	
CC	
	‘I	don’t	see	the	change.	The	way	that	the	Home	Office	influence	now	is	that	they	centralise	and	top	slice.	No	big	difference	in	the	tripartite’.		
	
CC	
‘Not	now	balanced,	depending	on	what	PCC	you	are	depends	on	what	engagement	you	have	with	the	Home	Office.	The	relationship	completely	
depends	on	which	party	you	are	in	(ie	Cons	are	favored)’.	
	
	
CC	
	‘That’s	completely	unbalanced	now	its	a	linear	polar	model	now	where	it	goes	straight	from	the	politician	to	the	police.	The	govt	don’t	have	anything	
to	do	with	it,	they	can	wash	their	hands	of	what’s	going	on’.		
	
CC	
‘...its	not	the	governance	arrangements	that	potentially	undermine	the	role	of	the	CC	in	operational	independence	its	the	financial	
arrangements.	Chiefs	council	and	ACPO	have	lost	a	lot	of	influence	the	world	has	been	muddied	a	bit	over	where	do	the	PCCs	sit	in	all	of	this?	You	
would	expect	the	PCCs	to	be	influencing	the	local	politicians	and	national	politicians	from	a	purely	political	point	of	view.	And	the	CCs	trying	to	
influence	the	senior	civil	service	and	local	chief	execs.	...	As	a	body	the	APCC	is	relatively	new	Where	are	PCCs	when	policing	is	moving	to	a	more	
functionally	based	model,	tiers	provision	of	national	i.e.	CT	etc.	and	local	funded	by	the	precept	-	how	do	you	provide	governance	in	a	regional	
structure	with	very	local	PCCs.’	
	
CC	
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	‘Of	course	its	changed	(tripartite	structure)	its	changed	in	the	sense	that	one	party	has	the	powers	to	hire	and	fire,	interesting	that	the	govt	talked	
about	firing	CCs	til	someone	pointed	out	they	needed	to	hire	some	first.	So	hiring	and	firing	became	what	they	said	rather	than	firing.	I	think	it	an	
iconoclastic	revolutionary	policy	that	was	forces	thru	because	there	was	a	feeling	that	Chief	Constables	were	overwhelmingly	powerful,	and	weren’t	
listening	probably	caused	a	bit	by	the	previous	administration...	I	think	that	plays	to	a	populist	political	agenda	than	reality,	but	I	do	accept	there	was	
some	evidence	of	that	powerbase	being	used	in	ways	that	politicians	wouldn’t	be	happy	with.’	
	
CC	
‘PCCs	are	far	more	influential	than	Police	Authorities	were	the	Home	office	similar,	Chief	Constables	less.	Its	still	there	[tripartite	structure]	but	the	
relative	weight	afforded	to	the	different	bits	has	changed.		
	
CC		
‘I	do,	[think	that	PCCs	are	about	government	pushing	responsibility	down	to	local	levels	to	avoid	accountability]		you	look	at	CSE	classic	example	of	well	
that’s	a	local	issue.	I	think	we	will	see	that	more	as	the	police	cuts	begin	to	bite.’	
	
CC	
‘Yes,	[think	that	PCCs	are	about	government	pushing	responsibility	down	to	local	levels	to	avoid	accountability	&	risk]		to	give	them	a	bit	of	credit	that	
was	localisms	doctrinal	position.	I	suppose	one	has	to	respect	that	as	a	political	doctrine.	The	effect	is	that	it	does	push	down	risk.’	
	
CC	
	‘I	don’t	see	that	look	at	CSE	that’s	very	much	being	held	by	the	Home	Secretary	in	terms	of	where	we	are	going	so	I	don’t	see	that	at	all.’	
	
CC	
‘If	the	government	don’t	have	anything	to	do	with	it,	they	can	wash	their	hands	of	what’s	going	on.	They	just	say	its	down	to	the	local	PCC.	CCs	are	
pragmatic	they	want	to	deliver	they	delivered	the	cuts	without	moaning	about	it	too	much	between	themselves	and	the	consequences	of	those	cuts’.		
CC	
‘Yes,	I	think	the	whole	devo	max	to	Manchester	that’s	a	good	movement	of	the	NHS	social	care	issues	to	local	government.	There	is	something	around	
national	govt	over	the	past	decade	or	so	putting	a	bit	of	a	gap	between	what’s	happening	on	the	ground	and	themselves.’	
	
CC	
	‘I	would	argue	yes	{it	is}	its	been	extremely	helpful	with	the	austerity	I	don’t	think	you	can	put	aside	the	austerity,	what	the	Police	is	calling	austerity	I	
don’t	think	is	austerity	I	think	it	is	some	kind	of	fundamental	challenge	to	the	way	that	we’ve	delivered	policing	and	polices	ability	to	deal	with	some	of	
the	really	wicked	problems	in	society.	The	relationship	with	government	has	never	been	much	poorer	to	be	honest.	The	whole	movement	to	PCCs	was	
to	push	power	down	and	for	the	Home	Office	not	to	be	responsible	for	the	things	they	were	responsible	for	in	the	past.	Very	little	point	in	talking	to	
the	home	office	because	they	don’t	hold	the	power	anymore,	its	a	waste	of	time	to	be	quite	honest.	I	think	this	govt	went	too	far	in	pushing	power	
down	and	not	taking	responsibility	for	anything	or	providing	any	national	leadership’.		
	
CC	
‘When	you’ve	got	one	local	figure	who’s	been	elected	very	clearly...	They	are	actually	in	a	far	stronger	position	(than	PA),	to	say	no	govt,	I’m	not	going	
to	because	I’ve	got	a	lot	more	political	legitimacy	because	I’m	the	only	person	elected	by	all	the	people	of	**	(force	area)’.	
	
CC	
‘There	is	a	lot	more	about	reputation	because	I	do	think	what’s	this	difference	between	political	accountability	(PCC)	and	bureaucratic	accountability	
(PA)	quite	a	big	bit	of	it	is	the	more	immediate	reputation	really,	its	the	more	reputational	impact	which	is	the	sort	of	thing	on	the	whole	that	the	PCC	is	
more	concerned	about’.		
	
CC	
‘There’s	no	question	that	fewer	CCs	are	speaking	out	and	saying	things	and	I	think	there	are	a	number	of	elements	at	play	there.	One	is	absolutely	they	
are	being	man	to	man	marked	by	their	PCCs.	Some	of	it	is	because	of	that	shift	in	power	its	the	PCC	that	say	things	rather	than	the	CC,	some	of	it	is	the	
weakness	of	the	profession	that	we	have	not	,made	that	distinction	that	is	much	clearer	in	medicine	{professionalism}	And	yes,	its	an	uncertain	world	
where	people	are	on	contracts...	I	think	that	all	affects	it.	Ccs	get	confused	between	thinking	that	I’m	accountable	in	this	way	and	I’ve	got	this	
relationship	withy	the	PCC...	There’s	got	to	be	an	honesty	about	that,	the	world	has	changed	whether	you	like	it	or	not.	Its	changed	across	the	public	
service.	I	think	what	Chief	Constables	find	difficult	is	making	this	distinction	about	saying,	no	its	now	the	college	of	policing	that	should	have	the	voice.’	
	
Re	demise	of	ACPO	
	
CC	
‘...I	didn’t	know	anything	had	happened	[ironically]	...I	don’t	think	its	made	any	difference.’		
	
CC	
‘Has	it	changed?	I’m	still	the	national	lead	for	X	&	Y,	my	meetings	haven’t	changed.	I	think	this	is	Sir	Hugh’s	relationship	with	the	Home	Secretary	etc	
that	caused	a	lot	of	the	issues,	its	between	the	two	and	the	change	in	name,	I	don’t	think	will	alter	one	jot	the	work	that’s	been	undertaken.	Different	
re	the	things	that	should	never	have	been	part	of	ACPO	the	Limited	company	status	that	will	go	but	I	don’t	think	it	will	change’.	
	
CC	
	‘This	administration	wanted	to	remove	the	perceived	power,	some	PCCs	felt	threatened.	The	incentive	for	chief	officers	to	take	national	role	has	
reduced	given	that	PCCs	are	locally	focused	etc.	The	relationship	with	government		was	damaged	during	the	time	with	Hugh	(Orde),	it	is	better	with	
Sara,	she	spends	more	time	in	the	Home	Office.	We	have	to	change,	you	can	no	longer	operate	the	way	some	Chief	Constables	did	(big	Silver	back	
Gorillas)	those	days	are	gone’.	
	
CC	
‘It	has	been	decapitated	by	the	Home	Office	when	you	put	that	all	together,	the	CC	role	has	been	downgraded.	I’m	not	sure	that	the	NPCC	as	a	
coordinating	can	maintain	the	independence	of	policing’.		
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CC	
‘NPCC,	how	different	is	it	to	ACPO	at	the	moment	?	I	think	its	shaping	and	will	change,	but	ACPO	would	change	over	time.	We	had	to	change	the	
title	the	Home	Secretary	was	determined	that	we	would	APCC	wanted	us	to	...	I	think	its	modernising	and	moving	forward	in	a	way	that’s	positive’.	
	
CC	
	‘That’s	an	urban	myth,	ACPO	has	not	gone...	its	just	a	new	name	I	am	still	leading	on	**	bits	of	national	work...I	was	with	ACPO	and	I	am	with	the	
NPCC.	..its	a	great	sound	bite	-	I’ve	destroyed	ACPO,	you	may	not	want	someone	like	Hugh	Orde	being	an	irritant	coming	out	of	COBR	saying	something	
that	is	politically	charged	but	in	terms	of	who	does	the	hard	yards	-	then	discussed	hard	work	of	ACPO	leads.	My	view	is	that	our	voice	is	heard	whether	
we	are	listened	to	is	another	thing	...I	think	we	might	have	been	seen	as	protectionist.’	
	
CC	
	‘Its	just	a	different	name.	It	was	political,	ACPO	had	become	a	toxic	brand’.		
	
CC	
‘They	{PCCs}	believe	its	a	fundamental	change,	it	isnt	its	just	now	hosted	by	the	Met	and	has	different	initials’.		
	
CC	
‘There’s	no	question	about	it,	this	govt	took	a	decision	to	in	effect	weaken	and	challenge	...	Three	of	the	key	police	institutions,	NPIA	ACPO	and	the	
Fedn.	And	all	of	those	have	either	been	pretty	fundamentally	abolished	or	reformed...	That	clearly	has	affected	the	relationship	with	govt’.		
	
CC	
‘Selling	Bramshill	and	deconstructing	ACPO	was	symbolic...	We	didn’t	cover	ourselves	in	glory,	I	didn’t	like	how	ACPO	behaved	at	the	time’.	
	
	
8.	 Police	&	Crime	Commissioner	Scrutiny	&	Accountability	role	in	Policing	
	
CC	
‘I	think	PCCs	do	hold	us	to	account,	it	varies	across	the	country’.		
CC	
‘Relationship	with	PCC	needs	to	be	far	more	iterative	{with	PCC,	than	PA}	because	they’ve	got	the	time,	I’m	not	s	saying	Police	Authority	wasn’t	
interested,	but	they	{PCC}	are	living	&	breathing	this	with	us,	in	a	way	that	PAs	never	used	to	so	its	much	more	of	doing	it	in	bite	sized	chunks	and	they	
develop	it	with	us	rather	than	ta	dah	!	Here’s	a	plan	around	command	&	control.’		
	
CC	
‘He	holds	me	to	account	-	sometimes	he	wants	to	take	joint	decisions,	but	that	is	not	right,	I	am	the	employer	(of	police	officers	&	staff)	it	is	for	me	to	
make	the	decision	and	for	him	to	hold	me	to	account’.		
	
CC	
‘Good	strong	governance	here.’	
CC	
	‘...its	not	the	most	robust	accountability	framework	that	I	have	ever	worked	within	or	had	to	report	to.	Id	say	it	was	the	same	(as	the	PA).	Across	the	
country	you	may	see	PCCs	saying	next	week	I’m	holding	the	CC	to	account	because,	but	that’s	only	showboating.	...there’s	no	huge	interest	in	these	
public	meetings...	They’re	held	in	the	middle	of	the	morning	on	a	working	day	-	who’s	going	to	want	to	come	and	listen	to	that?’	
	
CC	
	‘We	have	a	clear	line	on	governance,	we	talk	to	each	other	every	day	we	meet	every	week	just	me	and	{PCC}	no	one	else	in	the	room,	where	we	will	
have	an	agenda	then	we	have	more	formal	structures	like	our	force	performance	board	in	public’.	
	
CC	
	‘The	PCC	produced	a	Policing	Plan	which	I	was	involved	in	the	creation	of.	I	then	wrote	a	delivery	plan	for	5	years	to	deliver	that	plan.	The	problem	was	
that	some	of	his	objectives	were	very	tactical	in	nature	receive	a	call	from	a	neighbourhood	officer	every	year.	Monitoring	meeting	every	month.	He	
hold	me	to	account	more	effectively	than	the	PA	did.	its	not	a	theatre	where	you	could	walk	into	a	PA	and	perform	in	uniform	and	that	was	the	end	of	
it,	this	is	much	more	intimate,	more	regular	and	it	reacts	more	quickly	to	local	concerns’.		
	
CC	
‘The	PCC	holds	me	to	account	for	the	delivery	of	policing	services,	but	at	the	same	time	I	hold	the	Chief	exec	to	account	for	the	delivery	of	services	to	
enable	me	to	deliver	my	services.	...I	actually	think	its	a	closer	form	of	scrutiny	than	a	very	formalised	meet	once	a	month	here	are	your	papers,	you	
know	have	those	kind	of	conversations.	...It	depends	what	you	mean	by	'hold	to	account',	because	the	strategic	direction	being	taken	forward	is	now	
the	remit	of	the	PCC,	who	sets	the	strategic	direction	through	the	Police	&	Crime	plan	and	then	you	have	this	kind	of	rub	where	the	CC	determines	
where	the	resources	go.	So	if	you	get	a	steer	that	the	priority	is	rural	crime,	but	over	here	I’ve	got	a	cyber	problem	or	a	ct	issue	I	think	that’s	where	the	
rub	comes’.		
	
CC	
‘...	I	don’t	think	there	is	that	much	that	is	different	because	we	have	sat	down	together	and	the	governance	arrangements	are	such	here	that	we	get	
together	fairly	regularly,	he	is	in	a	position	to	hold	me	to	account.	The	plethora	of	meetings	and	committees	we	had	under	the	PA	have	been	swept	
away.	We’ve	got	a	much	tighter	governance	process.	I	invited	the	PCC	and	Chief	Exec	into	the	most	strategic	decision	making	meeting,	because	as	I	said	
everything	is	about	relationships.	I	wanted	to	get	{PCC}	in	close	to	me	and	see	the	issues	I	was	wrestling	with	and	he	can	share	some	of	that	
accountability	with	me.	...	I	just	think	this	organisation	will	be	better	for	me	being	very	clearly	held	to	account	and	so	weve	bent	over	backwards	to	
help	{PCC}	and	the	OPCC	to	be	able	to	focus	on	the	right	areas.	We	made	it	easier	for	the	PCC	to	hold	us	to	account	and	be	more	effective.	If	I	had,	had	
a	more	difficult	intransigent	confrontational	PCC,	then	I	wouldn’t	have	done	it’.	
	
CC	
	‘Its	all	informal,	he	doesn’t	like	formal	governance	which	I	find	at	times	makes	me	feel	a	bit	vulnerable	having	been	brought	up	thru	PAs	where	you	
would	have	a	very	formalised	process	...	PCC	doesn’t	particularly	like	papers	doesn’t	particularly	like	structure.	He	likes	people,	he	likes	stories,	so	you	
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can	find	yourself	him	with	an	anecdote	about	this	or	that	which	tends	to	make	our	interactions	relatively	tactical.	...	He’s	very	supportive,	but	I	do	think	
there	is	a	vulnerability	there’.		
	
CC	
‘The	principle	of	{the	PCCs}	making	policing	more	accountable...	I	think	its	definitely	done	that.	...	A	significant	change	in	policing	on	a	daily	basis.	...	PCC	
is	in	the	next	building,	full	time	staff	who	are	here	permanently	to	support	the	PCC	an	individual	who	is	not	only	passionate	about	**	{Force	area},	but	
is	absolutely	clear	on	benefits	to	communities	that	he	can	bring	without	interfering	with	operational	policing,	and	can	hold	us	to	account	on	behalf	of	
communities,	and	is	absolutely	striving	for	a	more	transparent	service.	There’s	things	hes	challenged	policing	in	**	on	that	we	would	previously	have	
said	either	we	cant	be	open	about	that,	transparent	no	we	wouldn’t	release	that	report	to	the	public,	to	be	honest	wouldn’t	even	have	thought	to	
release	it	to	the	public	{eg	Significant	football	disorder	-	debrief	&	learning	PCC	suggested	publishing	redacted	version	-	CC	thought	this	a	good	idea}.’	
	
CC	
	‘I	think	they	{PCCs}	do	hold	us	to	account...	The	first	couple	of	years	its	very	legitimate	for	them	to	say	that	shouldn’t	be	happening	that	way.	Raise	
your	standards	its	not	good	enough,	once	you	are	on	about	year	3	or	4,	they,	the	PCCs	are	now	part	of	the	problem	and	it	becomes	increasingly	difficult	
for	them	to	flag	up	shortcomings	of	which	they	have	their	fingerprints	all	over	them.	There’s	a	danger	if	they’re	seeking	reelection,	of	somehow	being	
tainted	with	their	own	what	may	be	perceived	as	inability	to	grasp	the	nettle	or	solve	problems.	So	I	think	you	do	reach	a	period	whereby	the	
accountability	gets	less	and	less	transparent	and	probably	less	&	less	searching	and	that’s	not	good.	Whereas	PAs	...I	never	sensed	there	was	a	
loosening	of	that	accountability	framework	because	of	an	electoral	cycle’.		
	
9.	 Police	&	Crime	Commissioner	Relationship	with	Police	Officers	&	Staff	
	
CC	
‘I	spend	a	lot	of	time	with	staff,	I’m	a	very	visible	CC.	Ill	talk	about	our	working	relationship	I’ll	talk	about	his	thinking	and	the	direction	of	travel,	so	they	
understand	that’.		
	
CC	
‘Sometimes	there	are	people	Inside	the	organisation	that	do	not	understand	the	role	of	the	PCC.	They	will	send	him	emails	asking	him	to	permit	certain	
things.	I	think	there	is	a	general	misunderstanding	about	the	role	of	the	PCC’.		
CC	
I’	have	had	to	tell	my	staff	that	sometimes	a	political	decision	may	be	as	legitimate	as	a	decision	on	thinking	through	all	the	objectives	(example	of	
closed	police	stations	being	re	opened	because	of	public	feedback	to	PCC	rather	than	on	demand)	...I	don’t	think	they	really	care’.		
	
CC	
‘They	take	much	more	notice	of	the	CC	than	PCC,	I	try	to	make	sure	that	he	doesn’t	communicate	with	them	directly	(laughs).	He	doesn’t	do	himself	
favours	because	he	doesn’t	think	before	he	speaks’.		
CC	
Particularly	the	cops	just	get	on	with	it.	we	are	looking	at	our	estate	like	everyone	else,	we	may	end	up	reducing	opening	hours	or	the	number	of	
stations.	The	staff	are	saying	this	is	the	PCC	getting	rid	of	staff	they	are	not	saying	its	the	CC,	its	the	PCC.	...the	PCC	said	people	will	always	remain	loyal	
to	the	CC	because	you	are	seen	as	the	institution	of	policing	and	I’m	a	politician.	And	you	cant	get	away	from	the	fact	that	the	public	have	a	particular	
view	of	politics	and	politicians	in	particular	so	they	will	always	query	the	motivations	for	any	particular	decision	and	in	reality	the	review	was	instigated	
through	the	operational	policing	review’.		
	
CC	
‘…some	do	some	don’t	...	Some	have	said	on	retirement	I	hate	the	fact	that	hes	your	boss'	When	I	go	around	the	force	Ill	sometimes	allude	to	the	
relationship	and	try	to	give	them	a	bit	of	information.	I	say	look,	I	could	be	in	a	lot	worse	a	place	than	I	am.	I	think	it	is	to	my	advantage	for	my	staff	to	
understand	the	roles	a	bit	better	and	to	hear	from	me	that	things	are	fine’.	
	
CC	
	‘At	a	senior	level,	less	so	lower	down	i.e.	At	a	strategic	level,	they	are	really	comfortable	around	him.	At	a	lower	level,	Insps,	there	is	a	bit	of	deference,	
they	see	him	as	the	boss,	there	is	a	little	bit	of	that’.		
	
CC	
‘Staff	have	got	more	to	think	about	than	the	PCC’	
	
CC	
	‘…sometimes	people	have	a	confusion	they’re	not	quite	sure	what	the	role	is’.		
	
CC	
‘PCC	is	very	media	savvy,	he	is	a	politician	who	likes	to	get	in	the	press.	The	staff	are	asking	who’s	making	the	decisions.	We	have	had	to	go	on	a	
concerted	effort	to	make	them	understand	that	actually	CC	and	the	executive	team	are	running	Policing,	but	he	{PCC}	is	accountable	to	communities’.		
	
CC	
{PCC}	said	some	things	around	performance	that	suggested	officers	and	staff	were	not	trying	hard	enough.	The	CC	commented	that	this	was	the	closest	
he	had	seen	in	his	staff	to	mutiny,	they	were	asking	if	it	was	possible	for	them	to	take	a	vote	of	no	confidence.	‘There	was	no	way	after	that	that	the	
PCC	could	get	back	his	positive	relationship	with	the	organisation.	The	legislation	is	set	up	on	the	basis	that	the	CC	and	PCC	have	a	relationship	and	can	
get	along,	but	we	had	ended	up	in	a	place	where	the	PCC	had	so	little	credibility	that	I	had	to	constantly	tread	a	line	where	if	I	was	seen	to	be	openly	
supportive	Id	have	had	no	credibility	myself....	So	you	had	to	tread	a	line	where	you	weren’t	openly	criticising	him,	but	you	weren’t	openly	that	
supportive	either.		
	
CC	
‘We	have	an	open	relationship	with	staff	&	PCC	I	know	some	forces	have	a	fire	wall	between	staff	and	the	PCC.	If	{the	PCC}	feels	he	needs	to	know	
something	more	operationally,	Im	really	open	to	the	Supts/	C.CSpts	or	Insps	-	him	asking	questions	and	engaging	with	them.	At	a	strategic	level,	they	
are	really	comfortable	around	him.	At	a	lower	level,	Insps,	there	is	a	bit	of	deference,	they	see	him	as	the	boss,	there	is	a	little	bit	of	that.		
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CC	
‘Often	the	PCC	will	put	things	in	the	media	e.g.	twitter	before	discussing	with	the	force	so	the	staff	get	confused	and	frustrated’.		
10.	 Police	&	Crime	Commissioner/	Chief	Constable	Relationship	
	
CC	
‘If	you	are	one	of	those	CCs	with	a	PCC	at	either	end	of	that	curve	of	normality,	particularly	if	you’ve	got	the	more	aggressive	bombastic,	throwing	their	
weight	around	type	of	PCC,	its	incredibly	stressful	because	its	a	one	on	one	relationship...	it	does	make	a	difference	as	to	how	stressful	your	life	is	
massively	....	You’ve	got	***	(CC	who	went	sick)	who’s	gone	off	how	open	people	will	be	I	don’t	know	but	that’s	all	PCC	driven.	I	never	got	there	
because	I	got	my	head	around	it...	But	that’s	ok	for	me	to	say	who's	kids	have	left	school	...	But	if	you’re	(referred	to	another	CC	with	younger	family	
who	had	gone	sick	)	...	In	a	more	vulnerable	position	with	younger	kids	and	you	saw	what	happened	to	**	(referring	to	the	CC	in	question).	Its	all	very	
easy	for	me	to	say	get	your	head	around	it,	perhaps	my	particular	situation	meant	it	was	easier	for	me	to	get	my	head	round	it,	if	Id	been	just	over	
25yrs,	kids	10	&	11	...different	ball	game.’		
	
CC		
I	know	it	different	for	others,	**	{adjacent	force}	their	PCC	is	very	difficult.		
	
CC	
‘Its	far	too	important,	what	I	mean	by	that	is	that	I’m	incredibly	lucky	here	I	will	finish	my	time	and	feel	-	not	a	friendship	{with	PCC}	we	deliberately	
don’t	even	have	a	drink	together,	we	don’t	have	meals	together.	We’ve	kept	it	very	professional...However,	it	could	be	the	other	way,	and	because	
there’s	no	checks	and	balances...	It	could	be	if	we	didn’t	get	on	there’s	very	little	to	make	it	work,	the	PCP	certainly	couldn’t,	it	doesn’t	have	the	time	
influence,	power	to	bash	heads	together,	and	our	relationship	could	be	very	fractured	and	fraught	and	counter	productive...that	does	worry	me	that	
too	much	is	predicated	on	that	one	to	one	marking...	I	sense	most	CCs	are	saying	its	working	ok	but	its	a	risky	model.	The	one	thing	a	PA	had,	it	did	
have	moderating	impacts...	I	don’t	think	there	are	any	ways	that	it	can	be	mitigated	now	{conflict	between	PCC	&	CC}	I	think	its	a	really	tricky	scenario’.		
	
CC	
‘Whereas	a	lot	of	people	were	worried	very	much	around	what	happens	if	we	are	in	conflict,	my	bigger	fear	is	what	happens	if	we	are	too	close.	If	our	
destinies	seem	intertwined	...May	2016,	elections	will	be	coming	up,	...	In	theory	people	(CCs),	may	be	seeking	contract	extensions	to	what	extent	is	it	
healthy	or	unhealthy	that	you	start	to	see	the	world	thru	the	same	lens.	I’m	not	suggesting	big	C	corruption,	choose	targets	you	both	know	you	can	get	
or	manipulate	figures...	I’m	just	suggesting	that	there	is	a	risk	that	that	degree	of	objectivity	and	separation	of	roles	can	become	blurred’.		
	
CC	
‘Delivering	policing	services	and	delivering	a	business	based	upon	the	relationship	between	two	people	which	is	absolutely	critical	is	flawed.	It	doesn’t	
work	to	the	benefit	of	the	public,	and	as	we	go	into	austerity,	having	to	think	about	what	do	the	public	really	need	from	a	professional	police	service	as	
opposed	to	what	does	the	PCC	want	to	do	because	its	popular	with	the	public	then	we	are	likely	to	get	into	some	difficult	territory’.		
	
CC	
‘I	was	not	the	first	CC	to	work	in	this	force	under	this	PCC,	the	organisation	had	decided	they	were	not	going	to	work	with	it.	The	incumbent	top	team	
behaved	badly	to	the	PCC	i.e.	giving	him	and	his	staff	poor	accommodation.	restricting	access	to	buildings.	Regardless	of	what	you	thought	of	***	as	an	
individual	(ex	Supt	-	not	popular)	he	was	the	elected	PCC	and	I	don’t	believe	that	they	dealt	with	him	properly,	fairly	proportionately,	giving	due	
deference	to	him	now	being	commissioner	of	policing.	There	was	nothing	in	place	here,	so	I	spent	the	first	six	trying	to	build	relationships	with	the	
PCC.’		
	
CC	
‘...what	you’ve	got	with	a	PCC	is	a	personality	who	has	been	put	into	a	role	with	no	prior	qualifications	no	prior	experience...and	then	in	effect	(though	
CHMI)	would	disagree	with	this,	but	has	in	effect	unfettered	power	within	an	organisation.	It	really	is	dependent	upon	the	CC	setting	the	ground	rules,	
developing	the	relationship,	working	out	where	the	line	is.’	
	
CC	
‘I’ve	known	{PCC}	for	many	years,	there	are	three	criteria	that	have	to	exist	or	else	our	relationship	is	built	on	sand.	First	a	shared	vision.	...second,	
there’s	equity	in	the	relationship	...that	equity	works	well	so	we	don’t	fall	out	we	have	difference	of	opinion	but	we	don’t	fall	out	...the	third	one	is	that	
we	trust	each	other’.		
	
CC	
	However	in	practice	as	its	worked	out	for	me	its	been	a	pretty	positive	experience.	But	I	think	that’s	a	bit	of	a	lottery.	I’m	not	sure	there’s	enough	
regulation	around	a	PCC	who	might	want	to	be	making	operational	decisions,	when	they	are	paying	my	salary	and	responsible	for	sacking	me	or	
not.	...I’ve	seen	it	with	neighboring	forces	where	their	relationship	is	just	not	the	same	as	ours.	but	I	really	think	if	you’ve	got	those	three	criteria	right	
(boundaries,	equity	&	trust)	it	works.	...clearly	there	are	some	{PCCs}	that	are	politically	motivated	-	party	political.	...	there	are	CCs	around	the	country	
who	have	no	relationship	with	their	PCCs	...you	have	also	got	some	PCCs	around	the	country	who	have	come	into	office	and	think	they	have	to	have	all	
the	ideas	about	changing	the	service	and	forget	we’ve	done	this	for	150	yrs.,	and	are	not	dull	people.		
	
CC	
	‘If	you	have	a	relationship	that	works	and	you	understand	who	has	what	and	where	the	lines	are,	in	the	main	because	there	re	always	grey	areas,	then	
that	can	work	quite	effectively.	Its	more	dynamic’.		
	
CC	
‘Although	our	relationship	is	good	I	didn’t	like	operating	in	it.	I	never	felt	relaxed	I	always	had	to	watch	every	decision	and	every	policy	and	every	thing	
had	to	be	carefully	managed.	It	puts	political	control	into	Chief	Constables	too	directly	I	agree	Chief	Constables	needed	more	accountability...they	had	
a	degree	of	autonomy	unlike	other	public	services	I	accept	those	days	are	gone,	but	the	way	in	which	this	operates	its	too	much	on	the	other	side	of	
the	pendulum.	There	is	too	much	political	control’.		
	
CC	
‘We	have	had	heated	exchanges.	I	have	to	resist	him	trying	to	be	the	boss.	Although	our	relationship	is	good	I	didn’t	like	operating	in	it.	I	never	felt	
relaxed	I	always	had	to	thing	had	to	be	carefully	managed	and	that’s	extremely	tiring.	It	puts	political	control	into	CCs	too	directly.’		
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CC	
‘…everywhere	we	went	...every	time	he	tried	to	describe	himself	as	my	boss	I	would	stop	him.	It	became	joke	between	us,	but	its	important	...It	is	an	
effective	relationship,	he	has	become	more	relaxed	over	the	3	years....we	treated	each	other	with	kid	gloves	whilst	we	established	the	working	
relationships.	On	a	personal	level	we	like	each	other,	I	respect	him	because	he	is	a	public	servant	...he	has	a	real	social	conscience...’		
	
CC	
‘The	Police	Authority	was	very	formulaic,	very	committee	focused	...it	was	slow	and	laborious	lots	of	scrutiny	but	it	was	a	kind	of	chess	match.	This	can	
be	far	more	dynamic	because	there	are	two	individuals,	if	those	individuals	agree	it	tends	to	happen.	But	then	there’s	the	question	who	is	constraining	
those	individuals	to	make	sure	they	make	the	right	decision’.		
	
CC		
‘There	are	risks	if	it	goes	wrong.	That’s	the	greatest	weakness	{of	the	paradigm}	the	reliance	on	the	relationship	between	two	people	even	more	so	if	
there	isn’t	a	filter.	My	PCC	doesn’t	have	a	Deputy,	you	can	mitigate	some	of	the	tensions	if	you’ve	got	that.’	
	
CC	
‘What	we	have	got	with	the	PCCs	is	a	great	governance	model,	but	it	is	precarious.	Because	they	are	unfettered	the	courts	are	now	fettering	their	
power,	you	only	need	to	look	at	the	Rhodes	case	in	Lincs,	and	I	think	if	the	Gwent	case	had	been	taken	to	JR	by	Carmel	Napier	I	think	that	would	have	
led	to	some	fettering	of	the	PCC.	But	when	you	look	at	the	Dyfed	Powys	case	where	there	was	a	very	powerful	and	eminently	competent	CC,	because	
she	was	temp	when	the	PCC	joined	the	force	she	wasn’t	selected.	It	may	be	that	she	wasn’t	the	best	candidate,	but	an	observer	looking	in	from	outside	
would	see	that	as	being	rather	odd’.	
	
CC	
‘Its	improved	our	lot	significantly	we	no	longer	have	the	bureaucratic	burden	of	interminable	sub	committees...the	one	thing	we	have	lost	are	the	co-
opted	members	who	gave	it	a	healthy	diverse	mix...but	overall	its	been	a	good	thing	because	we	have	a	PCC	who	gets	it	who	doesn’t	want	to	be	
bogged	down	by	bureaucracy.	I’m	lucky,	but	I	know	some	of	my	(CC)	colleagues	aren’t	and	I	think	those	forces	are	suffering	for	it...	Not	all	of	those	are	
with	young	CCs.	I	think	there	is	an	acuteness	to	the	issue	if	they	have	less	than	30	years	in	but	I	don’t	think	there	is	a	straight	cut	off’.		
	
CC	
‘Essential	that	we	both	work	on	making	sure	the	relationship	is	right’.		
	
CC	
	‘The	trouble	with	the	system	is	that	it	is	a	very	personal	system	its	designed	to	be	very	personal...	so	you	make	an	assumption	that	you	set	up	
arrangements	for	how	the	working	relationship	should	work....	there’s	a	great	deal	of	instability	in	it	all...its	possible	you	may	have	to	undo	all	the	
arrangements	{when	a	new	PCC	arrives}.	...the	arrangements	between	the	two	corporations	sole	are	only	as	good	as	the	agreement	of	the	current	
PCC.	...it	seems	to	me	that	because	its	based	upon	the	individual	its	inherently	unstable’.		
	
CC	
‘...its	very	relationship	invested.	The	positive	side	is	that	if	you	have	a	relationship	that	works	and	you	understand	who	has	what	and	where	the	lines	
are,	in	the	main	because	there	re	always	grey	areas,	then	that	can	work	quite	effectively.	Its	more	dynamic’.		
	
CC	
I	know	there	have	been	some	very	difficult	relationships	around	the	country	to	the	extent	that	some	CCs	haven’t	coped	and	have	broken	down.	That’s	
because	of	the	relationship	issue.	I	don’t	think	that	what	the	Cons	wanted	in	high	profile	PCCs	was	what	they	got	The	quality	of	people	was	not	what	
they	wanted,	some	of	the	people	I	wouldn’t	allow	to	run	a	chicken	farm.		
	
CC	
‘I	think	it	only	takes...something	will	test	the	current	system	and	it	will	be	found	wanting	its	not	robust.	Its	too	dependent	on	personalities’.	
	
CC	
	‘Its	too	much	personality	based.	I	think	that’s	a	risk	I	think	if	people	aren’t	able	to	maintain	effective	professional	relationships	then	it	is	easy	for	it	to	
be	undermined.	We’ve	had	some	examples,	Lincolnshire	was	the	classic.	There	need	to	be	a	few	more	safety	nets.	..and	the	PCP,	doesn’t	really	have	
much	teeth’.	
	
CC.	
	‘Too	much	power	vested	in	one	person	I’ve	seen	the	good	and	bad	of	that	the	trouble	is	you	are	just	too	dependent	upon	the	intellect,	the	politics	the	
personal	characteristics	of	the	individual	that	gets	the	job.	...	If	they	don’t	get	checked	by	the	PCP	then	it	can	be	very	different	to	the	old	days	of	the	
Police	Authority’.		
	
CC	
‘Chief	Execs	are	have	come	more	to	the	fore	they	are	not	part	of	the	politics	of	this,	but	part	of	the	dynamic	of	this	that	has	started	to	emerge	gradually	
in	some	places	you	can	have	a	reasonable	PCC	but	a	Chief	Exec	who	is	quite	manipulative,	or	ambitious	and	therefore	exerts	undue	influence	over	the	
PCC	or	you	might	get	a	reasonable	Chief	Exec	and	a	difficult	PCC	which	was	my	situation	{with	previous	PCC}	he	was	difficult	to	deal	with	the	Chief	exec	
was	the	route	into	him	to	try	and	get	some	influence’.		
	
CC	
‘At	first,	the	PCC	would	come	into	meetings	with	a	completely	preconceived	idea	about	what	the	outcomes	would	be	and	would	not	be	persuaded	by	
the	arguments	or	logic.	As	a	Chief	Constable	you	then	had	to	decide	am	I	going	to	die	in	a	ditch	over	this	issue	or	are	we	going	to	try	and	find	a	way	of	
accommodating	it.	We	save	the	proper	rows	for	the	die	in	a	ditch	issues,	which	is	where	you	end	up.	Part	of	that	is	about	managing	the	relationship	
with	the	Force.	The	whole	point	of	the	legislation	is	that	its	founded	on	there	being	a	reasonable	relationship	and	its	difficult	to	do	business	if	its	not.	
Your	personal	resilience	in	being	up	for	a	row	every	time	you	have	a	meeting.		Secondly,	the	PCC	is	a	much	less	politically	ambitious	person,	still	
(political	party)		but	with	a	small	'?',	politician	with	a	small	'P',	intelligent	man,	happy	to	sit	and	debate	the	issues,	happy	to	be	advised,	happy	to	be	
persuaded	by	the	strength	of	the	argument,	but	that’s	not	to	say	that	he	doesn’t	have	a	red	line...Looking	to	be	supportive	and	is	not	looking	for	much	
in	the	way	of	a	public	profile...	He	only	does	media	when	he	feels	he	needs	to,	whereas	his	predecessor	took	every	opportunity	to	try	and	wring	every	
ounce	of	juice	out	of	the	machine	for	his	profile.	You	manage	the	force	in	a	different	way	first	set	of	circumstances	you	are	looking	to	accommodate	
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things	that	you	don’t	agree	with,	they	might	not	impinge	on	your	operational	responsibilities	as	a	CC,	but	there	is	stuff	there	you	don’t	agree	with.	The	
legislation	is	set	up	on	the	basis	that	the	CC	and	PCC	have	a	relationship	and	can	get	along,	but	we	had	ended	up	in	a	place	where	the	PCC	had	so	little	
credibility	that	I	had	to	constantly	tread	a	line	where	if	I	was	seen	to	be	openly	supportive	I’d	have	had	no	credibility	myself....	So	you	had	to	tread	a	
line	where	you	weren’t	openly	criticising	him,	but	you	weren’t	openly	that	supportive	either.		
	
CC	
‘There	are	undoubtedly	some	CCs	who	have	got	a	difficult	relationship	to	manage.	I	thankfully	am	not	one	of	them	and	I’m	very	pleased	with	the	
situation	I	find	myself	in’.		
	
CC	
‘...actually	I	am	in	a	much	better	place.	Than	many	CCs.	Because	this	drops	down	to	personalities	and	relationships	...everything	in	life	is	about	
relationships	as	things	stand	now	here	in	**	(the	PCC)	had	been	on	the	Police	Authority...I	have	known	him	for	a	long	time.	He	is	very	much	a	politician	
through	and	through	...he	is	somebody	that	I	can	speak	to	and	have	conversations	with	and	we	understand	what	it	is	that	we	are	each	trying	to	
achieve.	..essentially	around	our	mission	of	keeping	people	safe	and	especially	the	most	vulnerable.	I	invited	the	PCC	and	Chief	Exec	into	the	most	
strategic	decision	making	meeting,	because	as	I	said	everything	is	about	relationships.	I	wanted	to	get	{PCC}	in	close	to	me	and	see	the	issues	I	was	
wrestling	with	and	he	can	share	some	of	that	accountability	with	me.		
	
CC	
‘{our}	PCC	has	had	a	previous	role	with	the	PA	in	some	ways	that’s	been	really	helpful	because	there’s	somebody	who	more	of	policing	than	someone	
who’s	come	into	it	totally	fresh.	In	**	(previous	Force)	the	PCC	there	had	only	a	knowledge	of	policing	made	by	what	they	had	seen	on	TV	or	read	in	
newspapers	and	it	took	a	long	time	to	get	{the	PCC}	to	understand	lots	of	things	in	terms	of	that’.		
	
CC	
‘Its	been	ok	{for	me}	because	I	have	a	PCC	who	was	on	the	Police	Authority	for	**	yrs	(long	time).	And	was	chair,	so	its	been	a	fairly	smooth	transition.	
The	PCC	has	never	once	sought	to	influence	my	operational	independence	...and	he’s	allowed	me	to	get	on	with	the	job’.		
	
CC	
‘I	can’t	imagine	not	having	a	good	working	relationship	because	if	you	don’t,	whilst	it	may	never	become	public,	it	makes	life	very	difficult.	I’ve	got	too	
much	responsibility,	too	much	going	on	professionally	to	be	concerned	about	is	my	PCC	ok,	is	he	happy	with	what	I’m	doing.	...each	CC	having	the	
ability	to	negotiate	and	influence	and	build	a	working	relationship	but	for	some	its	difficult	and	nigh	on	bloody	impossible’.		
	
CC	
‘Because	I’m	his	pick...	He	is	a	good	man...I	have	described	it	like	working	for	your	Nan,	its	a	positive,	but	its	not	e.g.	if	we	were	talking	about	air	
support	-	he'll	say	I	was	talking	to	some	one	who	fly’s	a	helicopter!’		
	
CC	
Its	importance	is	immeasurable	I	would	say	that	because	of	the	relationship	we’ve	got	but	I	cannot	begin	to	imagine	a	{poor}	relationship	I’ve	heard	of	
colleagues	who,	the	PCC	has	never	been	in	their	office,	if	the	PCC	wants	to	see	the	CC	they	call	them	over	and	keep	them	waiting	until	they	are	ready	to	
see	them...	That’s	unimaginable	to	me	and	non	productive	absolutely	the	wrong	sort	of	relationship...	If	I	had	a	relationship	like	the	one	I	described	or	
like	I’ve	got	to	be	a	yes	person	then	I	wouldn’t	still	be	in	policing	there	wouldn’t	be	any	point.	The	CC	needs	to	feel	without	threat	of	a	job	loss	that	they	
can	do	the	right	thing,	but	that	the	PCCs	views	need	listening	to’.		
	
CC	
The	relationship	is	crucial,	you’ve	even	got	a	tame	PCC,	in	which	case	its	no	different	to	PAs	and	the	CCs	not	accountable	I’ve	heard	CCs	talk	like	that,	
I’ve	heard	one	CC	actually	say	to	me	-	PCCs	lovely,	but	I	have	no	accountability	to	him	and	that	really	uncomfortable	for	the	CC,	the	CC	didn’t	like	it.	...	I	
know	of	one	or	two	{forces}	where	the	CC	does	just	what	they	want	to	do	because	the	PCC	is	totally	tame	and	really	rates	the	CC	and	just	lets	them	
crack	on’.		
	
CC	
‘Its	vitally	important	there’s	got	to	be	a	relationship	of	trust,	there’s	got	to	be	a	relationship	of	quite	a	high	degree	of	a	shared	vision	and	shared	
values.	...	I’ve	not	seen	anything	that’s	been	about	any	compromise	to	operational	independence	or	any	PCC	certainly	here	wanting	to	interfere	in	any	
operational	decision.	But	I	think	it	is	more	about	having	a	clear	joint	strategy	with	national	oversight.		If	you	as	a	Chief	Constable,	as	a	Chief	Exec	cant	
manage	your	form	of	governance	to	gain	their	trust	and	make	sure	they	are	really	well	provided	with	the	information	to	enable	them	to	bat	for	you	in	
line	with	their	own	needs	then	really	you	shouldn’t	be	here	should	you.	I	think	that’s	a	difficult	message	there	as	well’.		
	
CC	
‘Having	seen	what	I	have	in	other	areas,	its	obviously	important	in	that	he	is	supportive	so	I	don’t	have	to	waste	a	load	of	time	and	energy	dealing	with	
that’.		
	
CC	
‘The	police	service	have	invested	huge	amount	of	time	effort	and	energy	and	money	to	enable	me	to	operate	at	the	executive	level	that’s	not	the	same	
for	{the	PCC}.’		
	
CC	
‘I	tried	to	make	sure	there	was	a	distance	between	us	that	our	roles	were	clearly	understood.	And	that	the	distinction	between	the	strategic	over	view	
of	policing	and	the	operational	That	of	course	is	very	difficult	to	do	when	the	person	that	sets	the	strategy	also	has	the	money	and	has	control	of	the	
money.	That	is	a	difficult	environment	to	work	in.	I	believe	that	some	CCs	have	taken	the	line	of	least	resistance	and	allowed	the	border	between	
direction	of	operational	policing	and	the	setting	of	strategy	to	become	very	blurred’.		
	
CC	
‘He	{PCC}	has	courted	controversy	on	occasions	I	have	not	welcomed	that	but	I	recognise	that	he	has	a	public	profile	that	he	works	to	maintain,	and	
candidly	that’s	going	to	get	worse	before	May	next	year	(elections)	because	he	will	want	to	get	re	elected.’	
	
CC	
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PCC	had	a	‘Taliban’	attitude	to	holding	CC	to	account.	If	there	was	a	criticism	he	would	make	critical	comments	in	the	media.	CC	feels	that	for	politically	
ambitious	PCCs	negative	comments	in	the	media	are	more	personally	beneficial	than	supportive	stories.	But	the	PCC	did	it	so	much	that	even	the	public	
worked	out	that	he	only	wanted	to	be	associated	with	good	news.	This	came	back	from	the	media	and	social	media.	
	
	
CC	
‘If	we	get	to	the	stage	when	{the	PCC}	and	I	fundamentally	fall	out	that	means	I	have	to	leave	and	I	don’t	think	that’s	in	the	best	interests	of	the	
organisation	....So	I	work	very	hard,	and	sometimes	I	want	to	smash	my	head	against	a	wall	to	try	to	make	sure	that	regardless	of	what’s	going	on	then	
{the	PCC}	and	I	maintain	a	position	where	we	have	a	strong	working	relationship	that’s	in	the	best	interests	of	delivering	policing	for	the	public’.	
	
CC	
	‘We	argue	but	we	don’t	fall	out...	there’s	the	things	I’m	prepared	to	have	a	fight	on	because	actually	they	mean	too	much	financially	or	they	mean	too	
much	to	our	communities	and	there	are	things	are	on	the	margins	that	are	not	worthy	having	a	fight	about	even	if	I	think	they	are	the	wrong	decision.’	
	
CC	
	‘....there’s	always	going	to	be	tensions,	in	this	arrangement	with	political	PCCs	with	the	financial	situation	and	those	kinds	of	things.	..	You	get	difficult	
and	complex	cases	that	need	to	be	aired	without	it	being	fully	minuted	and	you	need	to	have	that	robust	conversation.	..	Even	if	we	disagreed	it	was	
done	in	a	very	professional	way.	We	have	an	MoU	that	talks	about	how	you	deal	with	disagreement.’	
	
CC	
	‘We	generally	see	things	eye	to	eye,	and	we	haven’t	had	any	major	fallouts	we	have	disagreed	and	sometimes	strongly	over	a	few	things	We	have	both	
compromised.	We	have	probably	stayed	with	a	greater	commitment	to	PCSOs	than	I	would	have	liked.	...	I	don’t	think	there	is	that	much	that	is	
different	because	we	have	sat	down	together	and	the	governance	arrangements	are	such	here	that	we	get	together	fairly	regularly,	he	is	in	a	position	
to	hold	me	to	account	I	will	have	had	those	similar	conversations’(with	the	PA)		
	
CC	
‘We	have	not	come	anywhere	near	that	[CC	resigning]		yes	there	would	have	to	be	things	like	the	number	of	PCSOs	that’s	for	me	to	determine,	he	has	a	
very	strong	view	on	it	but	I	have	to	determine	how	I	put	resources	to	risk	...	We	could	get	edgy	around	that’.		
	
CC	
‘Our	PCC	dos	not	want	a	yes	person,	he	actually	enjoys	a	bit	of	sparing	and	every	thing	that	goes	with	it	-	he	wants	people	to	challenge	him.	...	There	
are	several	times	when	he’s	come	to	me	with	stuff	and	I’ve	said	you	haven’t	thought	this	through,	let	me	put	this,	this	&	this	to	you	and	he’s	said	
you’re	right	I	haven’t	thought	it	through’.		
	
CC	
‘You	have	your	disagreement	in	private,	and	if	that	doesn’t	work	make	the	decision,	right	I’m	going	to	go	because	as	a	Chief	Constable	you’re	never	
going	to	win	against	a	politician,	once	you	take	on	a	PCC,	there’s	only	one	looser.	So	you	then	say	right	I’m	going	to	stand	on	principle,	but	accepting	
the	fact	that’s	going	to	cost	you	your	job’.		
	
CC	
[If	the	PCC	changed	at	the	next	election]	‘I	would	have	to	get	on	with	working	with	a	new	PCC.		Next	election	Cons	&	Lab	will	put	the	weight	of	the	
party	machinery	behind	their	candidates	...they	will	try	and	win	a	lot	of	the	independent	seats.	I	think	we	will	see	a	change	and	all	this	will	be	sucked	up	
into	the	devolution	debate’.		
	
CC	
The	only	potential	negative	for	me	is	when	[PCC]		is	gone	what	the	next	one	[PCC]	looks	like	and	what	they	behave	like	{CC	gave	example	of	extreme	
right	wing	candidate	at	2012	election	who	suggested	police	did	not	investigate	DV	etc.}	...on	very	low	turnouts	strange	things	can	happen	if	that	kind	of	
individual	had	been	the	PCC	there’s	absolutely	no	way	I	would	have	been	as	open	as	I	have	been.	...	I	thought	long	and	hard	if	he	got	elected	whether	I	
would	resign’.		
	
Contractual	Relationship	(as	a	sub	theme).		
	
CC	
‘I	absolutely	believe	that	it	[PCC	ability	to	‘hire	&	fire	Chief	Constables]	affects	the	nature	of	the	relationships	with	CCs	and	PCCs.	Its	got	to	hasn’t	it?	.In	
Chiefs	council,	people	have	said	to	what	sounds	like	a	really	good	professional	idea,	I	wont	be	able	to	do	because	I’ve	got	a	PDR	priority,	I’ve	got	to	
work	very	closely	with	the	PCC.	!!	The	example	is	the	Police	Innovation	fund	we	said,	why	not	pick	three	things	from	policing	that	will	help	advance	
professional	policing.	Rather	than	competing	with	each	other...	I	was	a	big	supporter	of	it,	but	there	were	people	saying	that	'I’ve	got	that	as	a	PDR	
priority,	and	I	wont	be	able	to	go	back	to	the	PCC	other	than,	I	will	be	pursuing	money	on	behalf	of	the	organisation.	People	wont	necessarily	say	I’m	
concerned	about	my	position	but	we’ve	got	people	(CCs)	in	the	country	that	are	in	quite	a	difficult	position	because	of	their	relationship	with	the	PCC’.		
	
CC	
‘I’m	fairly	confident	that	the	whole	ethos	was	very	much	based	upon	...we	don’t	like	the	power	that	Chief	Constables	have	and	we	are	going	to	put	in	
place	this	system	whereby	the	power	and	independence	of	the	Chief	Constables	will	be	curbed.	And	in	some	cases	it	undoubtedly	has’.		
	
CC	
‘Its	always	fragile,	if	you	gat	somebody	new	{PCC}	and	you’ve	worked	very	well	with	the	previous	PCC,	they	are	going	to	be	suspicious	of	you’.		
	
CC	
‘The	pension	is	one	thing	that	locks	you	into	a	particular	career	if	you	had	a	flexible	pension	that	you	are	able	to	tap	into	...you	could	see	people	taking	
much	more	of	a	risk...	Where	you	have	the	potential	that	you	may	not	be	able	to	take	it	until	you	are	60	(due	to	pension	changes)	it	stuffs	you’.		
	
CC	
‘A	lot	of	CCs	depend	on	their	contracts	with	PCCs	and	that	means	that	they	don’t	have	the	strength	to	stand	their	ground.	To	stand	up	and	resist	it	
as	they	did	before.	PCC	I’m	not	worried	about	my	pension.	Or	getting	my	contract	extended,	a	lot	of	people	are	not	in	that	position.	The	CCs	wanted	to	
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write	a	collective	letter,	to	the	H	Sec	from	all	43	CCs	saying	that	we	believed	that	the	cuts	could	no	longer	be	maintained	without	a	serious	impact	on	
public	safety.	..at	the	last	minute	in	Chiefs	council,	7	or	8	CCs	said	our	PCCs	have	told	us	that	if	we	sign	that	letter	it	will	have	consequences	for	us.	(all	
CCs	with	less	than	30	yrs	service)	That	demonstrated	to	me	...	...they	are	beholden	to	PCCs.	
	
CC	
‘Its	there	in	the	back	of	your	mind,	but	it	would	have	to	be	something	relatively	seismic	for	me	to	think,	I’m	not	going	to	challenge	on	this	because	they	
might	not	extend	my	contract.	I	think	the	concern	for	the	CCs	is	that	they	don’t	really	need	a	rationale	to	do	it.	Say	crime	figures	start	going	south,	what	
a	great	thing	to	do	{for	PCC}	I’ve	decided	this	is	not	acceptable	I’ve	asked	the	Chief	Constable	to	resign...	Your	ability	{as	CC}	to	influence	crime	figures	
in	any	given	year	is	subject	to	so	many	vagaries’	...	...its	a	degree	of	insecurity	one	of	the	things	that	we’ve	negotiated	for	Chief	Constable	pay	to	go	to	
the	senior	salaries	review	board,	because	we	wanted	to	take	the	PCCs	out	of	it.	One	of	the	arguments	we	put	forward	is	that	Job	security	has	really	
changed	for	Chief	Constables	...	Its	now	more	open	than	its	ever	been	I’m	sure	in	the	next	five	years	there	will	be	some	American	CC	posted	in.	..the	
safety	net	is	not	there	any	more.	If	you’ve	got	22	yrs	service	you	are	going	to	view	the	world	in	a	different	way’.		
	
CC	
‘If	you’ve	got	a	PCC	who	is	extremely	negative,	who	doesn’t	get	on	-	I’ve	worked	with	{a	senior	officer}	and	we	were	never	going	to	get	on...if	that	had	
been	a	PCC	to	CC	relationship,	I	think	my	days	would	have	been	numbered’.		
	
CC	
‘It	helps	that	I’ve	got	over	30	years	in	-	that	was	a	very	liberating	milestone.	Because	I’ve	got	that	in	my	back	pocket	he	can	make	me	a	retired	person	
I’d	be	disappointed	because	I’ve	still	a	lot	to	do.	...	I’m	not	going	to	deny	my	selflessness	is	influenced	by	that	30	years’.		
	
CC	
‘If	I	desperately	wanted	the	job	and	I	only	had	25	years	service,	wanted	the	CC	Job	-	could	I	potentially	be	...	More	agreeing	with	him	etc.	Yeah	
absolutely.	Would	it	make	a	difference	you’ve	got	to	be	honest,	if	you’ve	got	25	years	service	in	and	you	desperately	wanted	the	job,	but	with	him	
{PCC}	as	an	individual,	I’m	not	sure	that	it	would...if	Id	got	25	yrs	service	and	Id	taken	it	to	the	wire	and	I	wanted	the	job	and	I	thought	that	could	affect	
whether	I	got	the	job	or	not,	there’s	a	real	chance	I	wouldn’t	{push	the	matter}	but	its	easy	for	me	to	say	this	because	I	haven’t	got	25	yrs	service	in.	On	
a	matter	of	principle,	I	would	really	struggle	not	to	do	what	I	thought	was	the	right	thing,	just	because	that	might	upset	a	PCC.	But	it	is	hypothetical,	I	
haven’t	been	in	that	position	and	he	doesn’t	operate	like	that.	But	I	know	some	colleagues,	I’ve	sat	in	at	CC	council	where	a	colleague	has	old	us	that	
he’s	been	told	by	his	PCC	not	to	do	something	,	something	national	if	he	does,	his	jobs	on	the	line’.	{letter	to	Home	Sec}		
	
	
CC	
‘It	doesn’t	really	{affect	me}	because	he	is	so	supportive.	He	appointed	me	and	we	have	been	working	towards	the	restructure...’	
	
CC	
‘There	are	risks	in	the	system	around	that	{contracts	for	CC}	...	You’ve	got	to	build	up	the	profession	through	the	college	of	policing,	that	to	be	the	
voice,	Ccs	get	confused	between	thinking	that	I’m	accountable	in	this	way	and	I’ve	got	this	relationship	withy	the	PCC...	There’s	got	to	be	an	honesty	
about	that,	the	world	has	changed	whether	you	like	it	or	not.	Its	changed	across	the	public	service.	I	think	what	CCs	find	difficult	is	making	this	
distinction	about	saying,	no	its	now	the	college	of	policing	that	should	have	the	voice’.		
	
CC	
	‘...	the	fact	that	the	HMI	now	has	zero	impact	on	the	appointment	of	Chief	Constables	is	a	huge	loss.	There’s	now	no	movement	around	the	
country...there	are	very	few	appointments	being	made	outside	what	the	PCC	already	sees	(incumbent	DCC)	I’m	not	sure	that’s	good	for	policing	...the	
HMI	brought	a	degree	of	independence	and	transparency,	that’s	not	there	now.	The	HMI	knew	the	cohort	of	people	coming	through	and	could	look	at	
the	fit	and	that	doesn’t	take	place	any	more’.		
	
CC	
‘I	had	a	good	panel	but	you	hear	tittle	tattle,	but	there	is	a	vacancy	at	the	moment	and	there	is	somebody	who	has	only	just	got	there	as	an	ACC.	The	
PCC	likes	them,	and	is	saying	do	you	not	want	to	be	Chief	Constable	?	You	shouldn’t	be	selecting	people	on	whether	you	like	them	or	not.	The	issue	
around	the	selection	of	people	{CCs}	and	hiring	and	firing	needs	greater	checks	and	balances	and	that	may	be	a	greater	involvement	of	the	HMIC,	or	
the	PCP.		
	
CC	
I	had	a	positive	experience	thru	SAP,	but	I	dunno,	I’ve	got	a	view	that	I’m	less	worried	about	external	people	applying	to	become	CCs.	Lots	of	the	things	
we	hold	up	like	the	firearms	one,	most	gold	commander	firearms	are	at	Supt/	C.Supt	level	now.	I	think	we	kid	ourselves	that	no	body	else	can	do	our	
jobs.	But	having	had	experience	working	with	a	big	strategic	partner	(Steria),	that	pool	aint	as	rich	as	some	people	think	it	is.	The	dynamic	decision	
making	That	I	think	we	don’t	have	in	terms	of	business,	I’ve	not	been	impressed	with	what	I’ve	seen	here.	Whatever	process	you	have	for	selection	
some	people	are	happy	with	it,	usually	those	who	were	successful	and	some	unhappy	with	it	often	those	who	aren’t	successful’.	
	
CC	
‘But	when	you	look	at	the	Dyfed	Powys	case	where	there	was	a	very	powerful	and	eminently	competent	CC,	because	she	was	temp	when	the	PCC	
joined	the	force	she	wasn’t	selected.	It	may	be	that	she	wasn’t	the	best	candidate,	but	an	observer	looking	in	from	outside	would	see	that	as	being	
rather	odd.	That	selection	process	just	seems	whimsical	you’ve	got	someone	as	important	as	the	Chief	Constable	in	the	constitution	of	the	fabric	of	
society,	I	don’t	think	you	should	l	be	whimsical.	Its	not	really	a	PCC	issue,	its	because	they	got	rid	of	SAP	so	all	those	checks	and	balances	that	would	
have	supported	the	PCC	e.g.	HMIC	are	no	longer	allowed	to	be	part	of	the	selection	process.	I	rang	the	HMIC	when	I	was	looking	to	appoint	a	Deputy	
and	he	said	I	can’t	get	involved,	I	would	have	loved	him	to	get	involved’.		
	
	
CC	
‘Another	effect	was	the	loss	of	something	like	SAP	there	is	nothing	there	the	college	has	done	some	good	work	to	put	some	best	practice,	some	
guidelines	around	it	(selection	of	CCs),	but	not	to	put	too	finer	point	on	it,	it	really	is	down	to	PCCs	to	pick	their	person.	There	is	no	coordination	of	
Chief	Officer	careers	the	quantitative	stats	would	suggest	they	are	safer	than	ever,	there’s	less	movement	of	Chief	officers,	more	Deps	get	put	in	Chief	
Constable	slots	than	ever	before....	So	any	sense	that	bringing	PCCs	in	would	create	a	healthier	refreshing,	that’s	not	happening’.		
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CC	
‘I	have	a	colleague	who	was	unexpectedly	and	surprisingly	appointed	{	as	CC}	by	his	PCC.	Who	now	feels	obligated	to	the	PCC	and	its	a	particular	PCC	
who’s	outspoken	and	dictatorial	that	cant	be	good	for	policing…The	removal	of	SAP,	HMI	involvement	and	introduction	of	local	appointments	by	the	
CC	and	the	PCC,	because	I	appoint	the	rest	of	the	team,	means	that	the	pool	is	massively	reduced.		There	some	chief	officers	whose	ego	is	so	big	they	
wouldn’t	want	work	with	a	PCC	who	was	heavily	involved	and	held	them	to	account	and	there’s	some	PCCs	who	want	a	tame	CC,	that	cant	be	good’.		
	
CC	
A	weakness	of	the	system	is	that	there	is	no	proper	national	oversight	over	{CC}	appointments	I	think	that	is	the	area	of	weakness,	things	like	decisions	
to	extend	contracts	appointment	processes	I	think	that	is	the	bit	where	there	is	too	much	power	in	one	hand.	Where	there	is	potential	for	soft	
corruption	on	both	sides	so	I’ve	been	arguing	that	there	should	be	a	national	system	because	there	are	too	many	internal	appointments	too	many	
DCCs	almost	automatically	getting	the	job.	And	what	that	is,	is	a	sign	that	govt	in	its	wish	to	push	more	and	more	stuff	down	has	gone	too	far.	And	
there	needs	to	be	a	bit	of	adjustment	back	up	to	say	that	within	this		
process	there	are	some	really	crucial	decisions	like	the	appointment	of	the	CC.	..	Going	to	some	form	of	SAP	process	some	form	of	external	
accreditation,	some	form	of	national	talent	mgt.		
	
CC	
‘That	was	part	of	the	reform	that	swept	under	the	wire	[CC	appointing	his/	her	Chief	Officer	team]	its	actually	given	CCs	more	power	than	they’ve	ever	
had	before.	...	it	also	threatens	CCs	because	it	starts	throwing	open	the	allegation	that	he	may	not	be	diversity	friendly’.		
	
CC	
‘The	removal	of	SAP,	HMI	involvement	and	introduction	of	local	appointments	by	the	Chief	Constable	and	the	PCC,	because	I	appoint	the	rest	of	the	
team,	means	that	the	pool	is	massively	reduced’.		
	
CC	
‘There’s	now	no	movement	around	the	country...there	are	very	few	appointments	being	made	outside	what	the	PCC	already	sees	(incumbent	DCC)	I’m	
not	sure	that’s	good	for	policing.	
	
CC	
	‘That	was	always	going	to	be	the	case,	I	still	think	that	(the	regulation)	that	said	you	could	not	be	an	ACC,	a	DCC	and	CC	in	the	same	force	I	still	think	it	
was	wrong	to	get	rid	of	that.	I	can	understand	why	PCCs	would	choose	the	DCC.	The	likelihood	of	them	picking	somebody	else	is	just	think	unlikely’.		
	
CC	
‘I	think	that	one	of	the	truly	constitutionally	worrying	issues	is	the	number	of	CCs	now	being	appointed	from	deputies	in	their	existing	force	...there’s	a	
number	who	have	never	served	in	forces	other	than	the	one	they	are	about	to	be	CC	of,	I	don’t	think	its	good.	Also	I	think	it	creates	a	sort	of	mutual	
dependence	that’s	not	great.	Almost	it	could	take	us	back	into	the	Cleveland	scenario	of	mutual	support.	....	there	is	something	not	very	healthy	where	
two	people	work	together	and	one	gets	picked	as	the	next	CC.	It’s	very	hard	then	to	get	clarity,	separation	and	to	dig	in	on	the	points	that	perhaps	you	
would	want	to	dig	in	professionally	around’.		
	
CC	
‘I	don’t	think	its	any	different	than	before.	The	thing	that	worries	me	most	is	the	change	in	legislation	around	Chief	Officers	-	{in	some	forces}	their	
entire	Chief	Officer	team	has	never	left	the	force	they	are	in.	That	to	me	is	utterly	wrong’.	
	
CC	
	‘Figures	have	been	passed	on	to	the	Senior	salaries	board	around	the	number	of	people	applying	for	jobs	{as	CCs}	and	a	relatively	significant	
proportion	has	just	been	one	candidate.	It	tends	to	be	the	deputy	From	my	own	experience	looking	to	see	what	jobs	were	coming	up,	and	you	could	
see,	there’s	no	point	applying	there	with	the	incumbent	Dep.	This	is	another	issue	around	the	PCCs	-	why	would	you	throw	yourself	into	a	competition	
with	somebody	who	has	had	a	2	or	3	year	relationship	with	a	PCC,	and	who	do	you	ask	is	it	going	to	be	a	fair	competition.	I	came	here	because	it	was	
the	second	interview	nobody	got	it	including	the	incumbent	deputy,	so	I	thought	ok	an	open	competition.	I’m	not	sure	how	many	of	them	there	have	
actually	been’.		
CC	
‘Going	from	PC	to	Chief	Constable	in	the	same	force,	there’s	something	nice	about	that,	but	I	don’t	think	its	healthy	for	the	Force	...there	is	a	lack	of	
Chief	Officer	circulation	at	the	moment	its	not	a	fear	of	nepotism	but	it’s	a	fear	of	sharing	experience	and	moving	experience	round,	because	before	
you	know	it	...	that	cant	be	healthy	in	terms	of	continuing	the	development.	of	an	organisation.	I	can	understand	why	it	would	happen,	and	I	suppose	it	
depends	where	the	Dep	has	come	from,	if	you’ve	got	a	Dep	that’s	come	from	another	Force	and	has	got	that	experience	then	that’s	maybe	less	of	an	
issue	than	someone	who’s	come	all	the	way	through...but	there’s	a	number	of	Forces	now	that	have	got	Chief	Constables	that	have	come	through,	I	
think	history	will	tell	us	(if	it	was	a	good	thing)	or	not’.		
	
CC	
‘The	rewards	of	doing	the	job	staked	against	the	risk	associated	with	doing	the	job	are	nothing	like	they	once	were	the	rewards	are	certainly	less	the	
risks	are	certainly	more.	The	lack	of	mobility	around	the	country,	and	applicants	for	jobs	its	another	part	of	the	conversation	we	were	having	a	moment	
ago	{re	dangers	of	CCs	being	influenced	by	having	less	than	30	yrs	service’.		
CC	
‘I	don’t	know	any	of	the	detail,	but	I	think	**	(Force	where	a	CC	resigned	shortly	after	arrival	of	PCC}	is	one	of	the	occasions	where	people	might	have	
looked	and	wondered	about	that’.		
	
CC	
‘The	DCC	deals	with	OPCC	and	often	delivers	bad	news,	It	surprises	me	that	more	DCC	s	are	getting	thru	I	would	have	thought	more	DCCs	would	have	
been	tarnished	by	their	role	than	not.	Of	course	there	is	always	the	risk	as	there	was	with	Police	Authorities	that	if	the	Police	Authority	didn’t	like	the	
Chief	Constable	or	the	PCC	didn’t	like	the	Chief	Constable,	then	they	could	play	one	off	against	the	other	that	just	comes	down	to	individual	integrity...’		
	
CC	
‘The	role	of	HMIC	in	{CC}	appointments	was	critical	because	if	you’ve	got	a	dysfunctional	chief	officer	team	who	are	going	to	select	the	next	
person	who	comes	in	and	joins	them	sometimes	its	really	wise	that	the	HMI	that	sits	outside	of	it	and	has	that	view	that	'bloody	hell,	this	force	is	going	
down	the	pan'	...that	to	me	was	absolutely	essential	as	part	of	the	process	with	SAP	I	can	understand	that.	But	the	trouble	was	it	was	inconsistent,	
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wasn’t	listened	to	at	least	people	can	get	thru	to	the	next	stage	of	the	interview,	but	it	does	have	its	dangers.’	
	
CC	
	‘I	saw	that	in	**	force	and	the	Chief	Constable	told	me	I’ve	been	undermined	here	because	the	deputy	has	formed	a	very	good	relationship	with	the	
PCC.’	
	
CC	
	‘I	look	round	the	room	at	Chief	Constables	council	and	there	are	too	many	people	in	that	room	who	are	not	capable	I	don’t	believe	of	standing	up	to	
their	PCCs	and	saying	this	is	operational	policing	this	is	none	of	your	business	and	being	prepared	to	fight	their	corner.	Easy	for	me	to	say	that	from	my	
position	of	strength,	they	are	vulnerable	nothing	to	loose	I	just	want	to	come	into	work	and	do	a	good	job	in	an	in	terms	of	their	appointment	and	their	
longevity	as	CCs	It	doesn’t	seem	to	me	terribly	healthy	that	you’ve	got	that	situation	and	something	needs	to	be	done	about	it.	One	thing	you	could	do	
is	change	the	selection	process	for	CCs	take	it	out	of	the	hands	of	the	PCC	and	say	that’s	a	decision	for	the	panel	or	for	whoever	takes	the	place	of	the	
panel’.		
	
CC	
‘I	was	appointed	by	the	PCC,	it	makes	it	easier	for	me	he’s	very	positive	about	me	because	I’m	his	pick	so	on	a	personal	level	we	would	all	see	the	
benefits	of	that	but	for	me	it	doesn’t	particularly	change	it	because	I	try	and	keep	it	to	what	I	believe	to	be	right.	It	is	not	difficult	to	agree	with	his	
policing	plan,	its	like	world	peace,	wed	all	agree	with	that’.	
	
CC	
	‘If	we	carry	on	with	PCCs	this	problem	will	become	more	acute.	The	age	&	service	profile	in	comparison	with	pensionable	age	will	become	more	
difficult	to	achieve	...	That	level	of	influence,	that	leverage	potentially	will	be	there	to	a	greater	extent	in	the	future	than	it	is	now.	I	wasn’t	the	PCCs	
choice	(appointed	by	PA),	so	that	also	played	into	this	as	well	(difficulties	with	PCC).	Had	I	been	the	PCCs	choice,	then	it	might	not	have	been	the	same,	
but	we'll	never	know’.		
	
CC	
‘A	lot	of	CCs	depend	on	their	contracts	with	PCCs	and	that	means	that	they	don’t	have	the	strength	to	stand	their	ground.	To	stand	up	and	resist	it	
as	they	did	before.	I’m	not	worried	about	my	pension.	Or	getting	my	contract	extended,	a	lot	of	people	are	not	in	that	position.	The	CCs	wanted	to	
write	a	collective	letter,	to	the	H	Sec	from	all	43	CCs	saying	that	we	believed	that	the	cuts	could	no	longer	be	maintained	without	a	serious	impact	on	
public	safety.	..at	the	last	minute	in	Chiefs	council,	7	or	8	CCs	said	our	PCCs	have	told	us	that	if	we	sign	that	letter	it	will	have	consequences	for	us.	(all	
CCs	with	less	than	30	yrs	service)	That	demonstrated	to	me	...	...they	are	beholden	to	PCCs	Policing	is	different	we	are	not	a	commercial	company.’		
	
CC	
‘You	can	see	with	some	that	the	fact	they’ve	got	a	contract	that	takes	them	through	to	27	years,	they	need	an	extension,	the	whole	contractual	
arrangements	the	pension	arrangements	-	that	cant	be	good	for	policing.	that	a	CC	has	got	in	the	back	of	their	mind	I’ve	got	a	contract	coming	up	for	
review’.		
	
CC	
‘I	see	it	as	a	huge	issue	...	I	wonder	how	many	people	will	want	to	be	Chief	Constables	in	the	future	with	the	politics,	the	risk	that	comes	with	it,	the	
personal	risk	...	We	are	now	in	a	world	whereby	...	The	extreme	of	that	is	if	proven	is	gross	misconduct	which	means	now	you	cant	leave	the	service’.		
	
CC	
‘Its	no	different	than	under	the	PA,	but	In	the	right	circumstance	that	could	make	it	more	difficult.	But	the	bigger	hurdle	for	me	is	the	appointment	
process.’	
	
CC	
‘Absolutely,	there	are	two	risks	for	me	one	those	that	can	finish	with	one	contract	those	{CCs}	with	less	that	5	years	service	to	do	can	be	influenced	
if	they	believe	their	job	will	be	in	jeopardy	if	they	didn’t	go	down	a	particular	route.,	That	said	I	think	the	'fire'	bit	of	'hire	&	fire'	has	had	absolute	clarity	
given	to	it.	and	I	think	there	is	a	recognition	that	you	cant	just	get	rid	of	somebody	just	because	they	don’t	agree	with	you.	Whereas	at	the	beginning	I	
think	they	thought	if	they	{PCCs}	didn’t	like	you,	they	didn’t	get	on	with	you	tough	luck.	...	My	dilemma	was	can	you	take	the	Chief	Constables	job	
before	30	years	service	and	be	true	to	yourself.	That	is	a	real	dilemma	you	have	to	work	thru	and	you	can	because	of	the	clarity	we’ve	been	given	
...	I’ve	got	a	friend	with	21yrs	service	and	is	applying	for	Chief	Constable	jobs.	...because	there’s	no	flexibility	in	the	pension,	you	have	to	make	sure	you	
do	keep	your	job	and	of	course	people	will	sit	there	and	bend	towards	it.’	{will	of	the	PCC}		
	
CC	
‘I	suppose	you	can	only	answer	that	from	your	own	circumstances	...I’ve	got	over	30	yrs	service	so	if	I	was	asked	to	leave	the	job	tomorrow	there’s	no	
detriment	to	me	financially.	Its	given	me	a	greater	degree	of	confidence	in	the	way	that	I	can	say	who	I	am	and	what	I	do.	...If	I	had	ten	yrs	left	to	do	its	
really	high	risk	if	my	relationship	with	the	PCC	breaks	down	regardless	of	my	competency,	if	I	haven’t	got	a	relationship	that	works	then	...what	do	you	
do	in	those	circumstances.	Do	you	compromise	your	values	?	Compromise	your	ethics?’	
	
CC	
‘We	joke	about	this	at	Chiefs	[CC	Council]	which	is	you	have	a	different	conversation	if	you’ve	already	got	your	30	years	in	I	don’t	know	how	much	
that’s	just	cops	doing	their	usual	joking.	I	think	it	is	a	factor	I	suppose	it	depends	on	your	individual	circumstances	and	your	view	of	the	world,	because	I	
certainly	know	that	people	(CCs)	have	bitten	their	lip	around	things.	Prior	to	Xmas,	when	we	found	out	the	top	slicing	(by	govt)	was	a	lot	more	than	we	
thought	...a	letter	to	the	H	sec...	The	letter	was	devised	by	Peter	Fahy	and	he	was	going	to	do	it	on	behalf	of	the	Chief	Constables	and	was	getting	all	
the	Chief	Constables	to	sign	up	to	it...	Tony	Lloyd,	his	PCC	sent	a	circular	around	to	all	the	other	PCCs.	It	was	then	interpreted	as	a	Labour	led	letter.	
And	you	ended	up	with	6	or	7	of	the	CCs	who	have	Conservative	PCCs	being	contacted	in	various	ways	one	of	whom	was	literally	told	not	to	...	I	actually	
didn’t	support	the	content	of	the	letter	....	Some	of	that	was	around,	people	need	to	keep	that	relationship	which	means	I	need	to	do	X	in	order	to	get	
beyond	my	30	years.	So	I	do	think	it	has	an	influence.	..when	people	get	to	30	there’s	a	sigh	of	relief	because	ultimately	you	can	say	-	Oh	sod	you.	Its	
there	in	the	back	of	your	mind,	but	it	would	have	to	be	something	relatively	seismic	for	me	to	think,	I’m	not	going	to	challenge	on	this	because	they	
might	not	extend	my	contract.	I	think	the	concern	for	the	Chief	Constables	is	that	they	don’t	really	need	a	rationale	to	do	it’.	
	
CC	
	‘...other	Chief	Constables	are	in	a	very	different	position,	either	because	they	fall	short	of	their	30	and	they	want	to	stay	so	they	need	to	get	that	
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support	from	the	PCC	....or	they	have	been	appointed	by	that	PCC	and	I	don’t	know	what	conversations	go	on	around	the	recruitment	process	and	the	
priorities	for	that	force.	I’ve	seen	some	of	it	play	out	including	at	CC	council,	in	the	last	6	months	or	so	where	CCs	as	a	group	were	talking	about	a	
particular	course	of	action	which	involved	writing	a	letter	to	the	H	Sec,	and	one	(CC)	spoke	very	powerfully	about	if	I	were	to	put	my	signature	to	that	
letter,	Id	be	committing	professional	suicide.	(that	was	someone	needing	additional	contracts)	That	to	me	is	unacceptable,	but	I’m	not	so	naive	as	to	
think	that	those	dynamics	don’t	play	out.	I	bet	it	does	go	the	other	way,	more	CCs	have	persuaded	their	PCCs	to	be	supporters	of	them	and	their	force.	
Than	have	found	themselves	in	regular	battle	with	their	PCCs.	We	are	pretty	good	in	policing	in	getting	people	close	to	us,	looking	in	their	eyes	
persuading	them	that	we	know	what	were	doing	we	are	pretty	professional’.		
	
CC	
‘If	you	look	at	what’s	happened	nationally,	there’s	been	some	quite	high	profile	ones	look	at	Carmel	Napier's	experience	with	her	PCC.	And	there	are	
other	ones	where	if	you	weren’t	at	your	30yrs	service,	lets	say	you	had	4	or	5yrs	to	do	because	there’s	a	lot	of	young	Chief	Constables	that	have	got	a	
long	time	to	serve.	How	strong	would	they	be	if	they	thought	that’s	going	to	cause	real	difficulties	with	their	employer	...	now	I	don’t	think	we	should	
shy	away	from	those	(challenges)	regardless,	but	it	is	probably	easier	to	say	when	you’ve	got	29,	30	years	service	in	than	if	you	had	24,	25	years	service	
in.	That’s	where	were	heading	to,	a	fixed	term	contract	that	takes	you	to	still	2yrs	away	from	your	pensionable	service,	and	you	need	an	extension.	I	
think	there	is	potentially,	although	regulations	still	give	quite	a	lot	of	protection	to	Chief	Constables	but	its	not	about	the	regulations	sometimes,	its	
about	whether	you	get	to	a	position	where	you	just	cannot	do	your	job	because	the	relationship	breaks	down	to	such	an	extent.	I	think	its	always	there	
as	a	danger,	its	got	to	be	recognised	as	a	danger	lots	of	CCs	work	really	hard	to	prevent	relationships	breaking	down	to	that	level	-	but	you	could	always	
end	up	with	{S.Yorks	PCC}...	I	would	guess	the	Chief	Constable	there	had	some	very	difficult	times	with	him’.		
	
CC	
[CC	needed	a	contract	extension	to	get	to	pensionable	service]’…	which	didn’t	help'...	It	did	influence	the	Chief	Constable	..	It	did	in	the	sense	of	where	
do	you	draw	the	line	...	I	got	to	a	position	in	my	own	mind	where	I’d	accepted	the	fact	that	there	might	come	a	day	where	we	would	fall	out	so	
spectacularly	that	it	wasn’t	going	to	be	possible	to	get	to	30	yrs	and	I	was	accepting	of	that	fact...	The	only	way	to	look	at	yourself	in	the	mirror	in	the	
morning	having	got	involved	in	some	of	the	discussions	I	was	involved	in	was	to	be	prepared	to	say	no	and	take	what	came	with	it...	You	could	see	that	
the	day	would	dawn	where	you	absolutely	would	have	to	say	I	am	not	doing	that...	He	was	a	difficult	guy	to	work	with	probably	the	most	stubborn	
person	I’ve	ever	met...	You	just	have	to	get	your	head	around,	I	may	not	get	to	30	here,	but	I’ve	got	to	run	the	force	and	I’ve	got	to	have	a	means	of	
doing	it,	that	is	to	accept	you’re	not	going	to	get	to	30	years	but	the	trade	off	for	that	is	that	it	becomes	easier	to	make	some	of	the	decisions	about	
fronting	him	up	then	so	be	it	(This	CC	would	have	fallen	9	months	short	but	still	would	have	lost	several	thousand	pounds	on	commutation).	[CC	
indicated	that	things	had	come	close	when	the	PCC	demanded	that	the	command	team	change].	’Its	ok	quoting	stuff	out	of	the	book,	but	you’ve	still	
got	to	do	business	the	day	after…You’ve	got	***	(CC	who	went	sick)	who’s	gone	off	how	open	people	will	be	I	don’t	know	but	that’s	all	PCC	driven.	I	
never	got	there	because	I	got	my	head	around	it...	But	that’s	ok	for	me	to	say	who's	kids	have	left	school	...	But	if	you’re	(referred	to	another	CC	with	
younger	family	who	had	gone	sick	)	...	In	a	more	vulnerable	position	with	younger	kids	and	you	saw	what	happened	to	**	(referring	to	the	CC	in	
question).	Its	all	very	easy	for	me	to	say	get	your	head	around	it,	perhaps	my	particular	situation	meant	it	was	easier	for	me	to	get	my	head	round	it,	if	
Id	been	just	over	25yrs,	kids	10	&	11	...different	ball	game.	You	can	genuinely	take	it	out	of	the	equation	if	you	are	one	of	those	people	who’s	got	a	
reasonable	relationship	and	a	reasonable	PCC	the	likelihood	is	your	PCC	is	going	to	give	you	some	security’.		
	
CC	
‘You	have	to	be	able	to	say	I’m	not	doing	that	and	not	say	how	can	I	live	because	there	is	no	CC	who	gets	sacked	by	a	PCC	is	going	to	get	another	job	its	
never	going	to	happen...	A	CC	may	need	to	be	chosen	3	times	by	3	PCCs	and	that’s	genuinely	scary.	That’s	one	of	the	reasons	my	job	is	not	easier	but	its	
more	comfortable	because	I	know	I	could	say	**	{PCC}	I’m	not	doing	that	and	now	do	your	worst	sort	of	thing.	But	I	do	think	its	worse	for,	I	cant	name	
them	but	there	are	Chief	Constables	who,	with	mid	20s	(yrs	service)	who	have	been	in	very	scary	positions.	So	you	have	touched	on	a	very	important	
point	there.	I’m	not	saying	they	would	do	anything	corrupt	or	unethical,	but	can	you	hand	on	heart	say	it	couldn’t	potentially	influence	you	or	be	seen	
to	influence	you	your	integrity	is	then	up	for	grabs	and	I	think	you	are	weakened	by	that	internally	and	externally	You	are	then	into,	its	that	old	thing	of	
the	extent	to	which	your	destinies	are	intertwined	.	Its	not	good	for	the	public	and	its	not	good	for	policing’.	
	
CC	
	‘There	are	{risks}	and	I	think	its	exactly	that	point	where	the	potential	for	corruption...	I	think	before	PCCs	came	in	there	was	this	fear	that	there	were	
going	to	be	big	fights	and	big	hostility,	and	initially	there	was	but	I	think	if	anything	the	problem	is	the	other	way,	is	over	cosiness.	And	that	potentially	
corrupting	decisions	like	appointments,	extensions..	I	think	there	are	two	aspects	to	that	some	form	of	independent	oversight	which	is	certainly	not	
being	provided	at	the	moment	by	PCPs	...	And	recognise	this	is	a	really	difficult	emotive	issue	...	I	do	see	generally	in	policing	that	the	idea	of	o	job	for	
life	has	gone	and	its	just	as	much	a	challenge	for	some	of	those	CCs	about	are	they	going	to	get	a	contract	extension	as	it	is	with	some	of	the	PCs	that	I	
talk	to	who	have	got	no	hope	of	promotion’.		
	
CC	
Had	I	gone	{if	a	racist	candidate	had	become	PCC},	somebody	would	have	taken	over	with	probably	23	or	24	yrs	service	with	far	less	ability	to	stand	up	
to	the	PCC	and	possibly	not	enough	contract	to	get	them	to	a	pension.	I	have	spoken	on	why	it	works	so	well	here,	and	the	PCC	and	I	have	identified	
why	{Because	of	the	long	service	of	the	CC}	I’ve	got	nothing	to	prove,	and	I’ve	got	an	organisation	I	care	passionately	about.	...	What	I’m	doing	here	is	
not	being	done	with	a	view	to	me	going	onto	another	role	the	PCC	is	the	same	[the	PCC	is]	an	experienced	politician	has	not	got	ambition	or	ego	
stamped	across	their	head	[the	PCC]	comes	to	work	because	they	care	about	public	service.	..	So	that	makes	for	a	very	easy	relationship.	What	we	are	
seeing	in	other	parts	of	the	country	are	people	with	very	big	egos	and	certainly	some	who	see	the	role	of	PCC	as	a	stepping	stone	to	either	higher	
political	office	or	building	the	cv	for	some	other	purpose.	Then	you	add	to	that	the	dynamic	of	my	boy	or	my	girl,	because	I’ve	appointed	this	person	
and	they	are	going	to	do	exactly	as	I	say	and	do	you	know	what	they’ve	got	22	yrs	service	I’ll	give	them	a	5	yr	contract	that	still	leaves	them	3/4yrs	short	
-	they	cant	really	stand	up	to	me.	There’s	one	Chief	Constable	off	sick	at	the	moment	because	of	the	relationship	with	the	PCC	and	I’m	told	that	person	
is	going	to	go	on	a	medical	pension.		
	
CC	
‘Absolutely,	you	can	see	it,	[a	new	PCC	not	renewing	contract	of	the	incumbent	CC]	I	do	think	there	are	people	{PCCs}	who	will	come	in	there	and	try	to	
make	their	mark	on	it	saying	I’m	a	different	politician	I’m	a	different	colour	...there’s	a	real	risk	that	somebody	saying	I	need	someone	{CC}	associated	
with	me	as	an	individual	its	a	huge	risk’.	
	
CC	
	‘This	is	one	of	the	concerns	that	we	raised	at	CPOSA	when	all	this	was	being	proposed	under	the	PSRA,	which	is	the	is	the	American	system	literally	you	
come	in	as	a	new	administration	and	all	those	people	go.	There’s	a	prospect	here	if	my	PCC	decides	not	to	stand	at	the	next	election,	there	will	be	a	
perception	that	I	was	their	choice	and	whoever	comes	in	may	decide	they	want	somebody	else.	And	this	is	the	issue	around	checks	and	balances,	in	
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effect	they	could	ask	me	to	retire	or	resign	and	I’ve	got	very	little	in	the	way	of	...	Hang	on	I’m	doing	a	good	job.	I’m	as	qualified	better	than	the	next	
man...this	isn’t	right,	but	there	isn’t	anything	there	to...	Its	there	in	the	back	of	your	mind,	but	it	would	have	to	be	something	relatively	seismic	for	me	
to	think,	I’m	not	going	to	challenge	on	this	because	they	might	not	extend	my	contract.	I	think	the	concern	for	the	Chief	Constables	is	that	they	don’t	
really	need	a	rationale	to	do	it’.	
	
CC	
This	[a	new	PCC	not	renewing	contract	of	the	incumbent	CC]	concerned	the	CC	more	than	being	sacked	by	the	current	PCC	’That	worries	me	more	than	
{PCC}	sacking	me	because	you	do	feel	vulnerable	if	some	body	comes	in	and	thinks	mm...	It	goes	back	to	my	point	about	individuals	a	lot	of	it	is	at	a	
whim’.		
	
CC	
‘People	putting	themselves	forward	[for	CC	roles]are	now	looking	at	their	length	of	service,	at	the	time	the	contract	will	last.	And	making	a	decision	to	
wait	until	they	are	in	that	safe	zone	where	a	4	year	contract	takes	them	to	30	yrs	It	is	happening,	people	are	making	that	decision.	You	are	not	getting	
the	movement	around	the	country	that	you	used	to	get’.		
	
CC	
‘Without	a	doubt,	no	doubt	at	all	I’m	convinced	that’s	the	case	[CC	Candidates	are	choosing	forces	to	apply	to	based	upon	the	reputation	of	the	PCC].	I	
cant	prove	it,	but	I	think	absolutely.	Would	I	apply	for	a	post	knowing	that	I	was	going	to	come	into	work	every	day	hating	the	fact,	knowing	I	was	going	
to	have	another	battle...your	policing	career	is	too	short.	I	cant	imagine	coming	into	work	where	you	know	that	you	are	going	to	be	at	loggerheads	with	
your	PCC.’		
	
CC	
‘I	think	it	will	(affect	candidates	applying	for	CC	jobs)	absolutely	if	you’ve	got	a	PCC	who	has	a	legend	of	being	difficult	and	extreme	behaviors,	I	think	
that	would	limit	who’s	prepared	to	go	work	for	them.	Northumbria	Chief	Constable	is	advertised	at	the	moment,	I	don’t	know	how	many	applicants	
they’ve	had	but	its	not	many’.		
	
CC	
‘I’ve	had	it	said	to	me	by	a	number	of	DCCs	said	if	your	job	came	up	tomorrow	there’s	no	way	I'd	apply	for	it’.		
	
CC	
...	If	you	are	a	Chief	Constable	candidate	you’d	be	bonkers	not	to	look	at	that	person	{future	PCC}	if	they	have	a	reputation	for	being	really	good	to	
work	with	for	being	personable	they	get	policing	they	get	the	division	of	responsibilities	they’re	doing	great	stuff	together,	are	you	going	to	look	at	that	
exactly	the	same	way	if	somebody	is	perceived	{PCC}	as	take	S.	Yorkshire	as	an	extreme	(Sean	Wright}	would	you	want	to	work	for	that	guy?	...	Are	you	
really	going	to	say	that	has	no	bearing	-	course	it	does.	There’s	an	argument	for	saying	that’s	just	like	Police	Authorities,	some	Police	Authorities	were	
known	to	be	really	good	to	work	with	and	others	were	known	to	be	really	difficult.’	
	
CC	
	‘Out	of	the	43	Chief	Constables,	currently	23	are	under	investigation,	I	don’t	think	we	are	an	inherently	corrupt	generation	of	police	officers,	I	think	its	
because	previously	that	complaints	against	Chief	Constables	were	dealt	with	more	effectively	more	fairly	and	more	proportionately.	than	they	are	by	
current	PCCs.	Because	they	cover	their	backs	by	referring	straight	to	the	IPCC	any	complaint	against	a	Chief	Constable.	The	Police	Authority	had	a	sub	
committee	to	consider	complaints	against	Chief	Officers	that	would	consider	the	complaint,	the	seriousness,	corroboration...and	come	to	a	balanced	
view	about	how	to	deal	with	that	complaint.	Chief	Constables	get	complained	about	a	lot	so	we	become	so	risk	averse	that	we	refer	everything	to	the	
IPCC’.		
	
CC	
Chief	Constable		needed	a	contract	extension	to	get	to	pensionable	service.	’…which	didn’t	help'...	[It	did	influence	the	CC]	..	It	did	in	the	sense	of	
where	do	you	draw	the	line	...	I	got	to	a	position	in	my	own	mind	where	I’d	accepted	the	fact	that	there	might	come	a	day	where	we	would	fall	out	so	
spectacularly	that	it	wasn’t	going	to	be	possible	to	get	to	30	yrs	and	I	was	accepting	of	that	fact...	The	only	way	to	look	at	yourself	in	the	mirror	in	the	
morning	having	got	involved	in	some	of	the	discussions	I	was	involved	in	was	to	be	prepared	to	say	no	and	take	what	came	with	it...	You	could	see	that	
the	day	would	dawn	where	you	absolutely	would	have	to	say	I	am	not	doing	that...	He	was	a	difficult	guy	to	work	with	probably	the	most	stubborn	
person	I’ve	ever	met...	You	just	have	to	get	your	head	around,	I	may	not	get	to	30	here,	but	I’ve	got	to	run	the	force	and	I’ve	got	to	have	a	means	of	
doing	it,	that	is	to	accept	you’re	not	going	to	get	to	30	years	but	the	trade	off	for	that	is	that	it	becomes	easier	to	make	some	of	the	decisions	about	
fronting	him	up	then	so	be	it	(This	CC	would	have	fallen	9	months	short	but	still	would	have	lost	several	thousand	pounds	on	commutation).	[the	CC	
indicated	that	things	had	come	close	when	the	PCC	demanded	that	the	command	team	change].	’Its	ok	quoting	stuff	out	of	the	book,	but	you’ve	still	
got	to	do	business	the	day	after.	'		
	
CC	
‘...a	lot	of	it	is	at	the	whim	of	an	individual	the	whole	barking	misconduct	stuff,	some	PCCs	suspend	some	don’t	...	We	shouldn’t	be	surprised	because	
you’ve	got	amateurs	in	those	roles	a	lot	of	them’.		
	
CC	
‘If	you	are	in	the	strategic	leadership,	its	more	and	more	about	strategic	leadership	in	the	public	sector	to	some	degree	then	whether	you	get	that	
contract	or	not	you’re	not	worried	about	-I’ve	only	got	42	police	forces,	to	get	a	job	no	actually	there’s	all	over	the	health	service,	etc’.		
11.	 Police	Operational	Independence	
	
CC	
‘Because	of	the	Policing	Protocol,	the	PCC	does	not	know	what	their	role	is	they	think	they	know	what	the	role	is	the	Chief	Exec	thinks	they	know,	but	
that	will	be	completely	different	to	-	if	you	go	round	the	country	to	what	every	other	PCC	there	is.	To	me	the	issue	in	***	has	been	does	{PCC}	run	the	
Police	service	or	do	I	{CC}	run	the	police	service.	There	are	two	areas	where	he	has	got	more	control.	one	is	around	collaboration,	if	{the	PCC}	doesn’t	
sign	the	sec	22	framework	agreement	it	doesn’t	happen.	He	can	therefore	decide	whether	or	not	an	operational	proposal	goes	forward	or	not.		
	
CC	
‘It’s	been	ok	{for	me}	because	I	have	a	PCC	who	was	on	the	Police	Authority	for	**	yrs	(long	time).	And	was	chair,	so	its	been	a	fairly	smooth	transition.	
The	PCC	has	never	once	sought	to	influence	my	operational	independence	...and	he’s	allowed	me	to	get	on	with	the	job’.		
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CC	
‘In	terms	of	one	individual,	not	in	my	force	but	across	the	country,	at	national	meetings	thinking	what	planet	is	that	person	{PCC}	on’.		
	
CC	
‘I	tried	to	make	sure	there	was	a	distance	between	us	that	our	roles	were	clearly	understood.	And	that	the	distinction	between	the	strategic	over	view	
of	policing	and	the	operational	That	of	course	is	very	difficult	to	do	when	the	person	that	sets	the	strategy	also	has	the	money	and	has	control	of	the	
money.	That	is	a	difficult	environment	to	work	in.	I	believe	that	some	CCs	have	taken	the	line	of	least	resistance	and	allowed	the	border	between	
direction	of	operational	policing	and	the	setting	of	strategy	to	become	very	blurred’.		
CC	
‘…around	collaboration,	if	{the	PCC}	doesn’t	sign	the	sec	22	framework	agreement	it	doesn’t	happen.	He	can	therefore	decide	whether	or	not	an	
operational	proposal	goes	forward	or	not.	Eg	CC	can	put	together	with	adjoining	CC	a	joint	team	if	PCC	doesn’t	sign	it	I	cant	do	an	operational	team.’	
	
CC	
	‘…we	have	never	had	any	tussle	with	PCCs	around	operational	decisions	...	So	the	worst	fear	that	you’d	have	a	PCC	directing	that	someone	is	arrested	
or	directing	the	use	of	resources,	that’s	never	been,	we’ve	never	been	anywhere	close	to	that’.		
	
CC	
‘So	if	you	get	a	steer	that	the	priority	is	rural	crime,	but	over	here	ive	got	a	cyber	problem	or	a	CT	issue	I	think	that’s	where	the	rub	comes.	It	becomes	
very	localised	around	bad	headlines,	local	issues.	Where	the	PCC	comes	from	there	was	the	loss	of	(police	facility),	that	was	a	big	issue	at	the	same	
time	we	were	closing	(another	facility)	-	not	really	interested.’.	
	
CC	
‘I	think	this	is	widely	misunderstood...people	say	you	cant	talk	about	that,	its	operational	what	they	mean	is	you	cant	get	involved	in	the	day	to	day	
command	of	the	organisation.	But	I	think	its	perfectly	legitimate	for	a	PCC	to	speak	about	what	we	should	focus	on...the	PCC	represents	the	public	...	
{re	Critical	Incident	Gold	Groups}	..PCC	does	not	attend	Gold	groups,	if	he	did	then	he	may	become	enjoined	with	the	decisions,	but	it	is	legitimate	for	
his	Chief	of	Staff	to	attend	and	observe’.		
	
CC	
‘PCC	does	not	tend	to	stray,	he’s	more	interested	in	local	and	community	policing,	we	tend	to	have	conflict	round	the	estate	and	PCSOs’	(CC	sees	this	
as	affecting	the	operational	as	keeping	stations	open	impacts	upon	resources.	).	
	
CC	
	‘They	{OPCC}	have	effectively	an	open	invitation	to	every	critical	incident	Mgt	meeting	but	they	will	very	often	listen	to	my	advice	**	{PCC}	this	is	one	
where	its	absolutely	critical	you’re	here,	and	this	is	one	where	(example	given	}	you	are	welcome	as	always	but	I	don’t	think	you	can	add	much.	What	
{PCC}	tends	to	do	is	send	one	of	the	Officers	that	works	well,	they’re	not	actually	in	there	they	can	genuinely	say	I	was	not	part	of	the	decision	making.	
They	{OPCC	Officers}	will	give	an	input	if	they	feel	they	can	help,	I’ve	never	once	felt	it	was	inappropriate	never	even	bordering	on	it...its	a	useful	
addition	to	our	thinking’.		
	
CC	
‘...	I’ve	not	seen	anything	that’s	been	about	any	compromise	to	operational	independence	or	any	PCC	certainly	here	wanting	to	interfere	in	any	
operational	decision.	But	I	think	it	is	more	about	having	a	clear	joint	strategy	with	national	oversight.’	
	
CC	
‘…with	a	PA	the	lines	{of	Operational	independence}	were	less	likely	to	become	blurred	because	you	had	a	group	of	people	some	of	whom	were	
independent	holding	each	other	to	account,	so	you	didn’t	get	close	to	that	operational	line	whereas	now	there	is	one	person,	far	more	immersed	in	it,	
feel	they	are	the	public	face	of	policing	...I	am	concerned	around	what	I	perceive	to	be	the	increasing	position	that	PCCs	are	taking	in	terms	of	starting	
to	affect	some	CCs	operational	independence.	In	some	cases	they	are	dictating	what	is	happening	operationally’.		
	
CC	
‘Whilst	there	is	a	Policing	Protocol	that	talks	about	43	CCs	independent	operational	CCs	and	the	PCC	not	fettering	the	ability	of	the	CC	to	deliver	
their	business.	The	reality	is	that	its	not	anything	like	as	black	and	white	as	that	gets	presented.	Because	at	the	end	of	anything	you	might	want	to	do	
there	is	money	and/	or	reputation	The	delivery	model	is	my	business,	is	it	costing	more,	are	we	using	our	buildings	effectively	is	territory	for	the	PCC.	...	
**	{the	PCC}	will	say	I’ve	been	to	wherever	and	they	haven’t	seen	the	PCSO	recently.	We	have	reviewed	what	we	have	got	and	where	we	are	putting	
them	on	the	threat	risk	and	harm	and	demand.	{he	says}	well	I	think	we	should	have	Fred	Bloggs	back	at	wherever,	so	you	know,	at	a	very	tactical	level	
he	tries	to	do	that	at	a	strategic	level	we	still	work	through	him	understanding	what	does	governance	mean	and	what’s	governance	of	the	delivery	of	
policing’.		
	
CC	
‘There	are	significant	areas	of	greyness	in	the	way	it	is	set	up	one	test	of	it	is	to	ask	the	question,	'who	owns	the	IT	strategy	?'	...I’m	not	sure	I	can	
answer	you,	if	it	was	the	PCC	on	their	own	then	presumably	they	are	taking	responsibility	for	all	sorts	of	issues,	around	information	and	if	theoretically	
we	had	some	kind	of	breakdown	Soham	style	in	terms	of	information	handling	then	its	very	difficult	to	see	how	the	PCC	holds	me	to	account	if	its	their	
thinking	and	systems	-	if	its	my	strategy	then	its	one	that	I	cant	always	execute	without	contractual	oversight...	I	don’t	allow	them	{OPCC}	into	gold	
groups,	you	are	{if	you	do}	fudging	the	accountability	you	are	inadvertently	signing	them	up	to	a	collective	approach	to	something	that	at	some	point	
they	may	want	to	hold	you	to	account	for	-	so	its	quite	dishonest	to	do	that	really’.		
	
CC	
‘There	is	a	classic	one	at	the	moment	where	a	PCC	...	Who	has	posed	the	question	about	armed	policing	to	the	electorate	and	whether	his	CC	should	
allow	police	officers	to	have	side	arms	or	not.	...to	me	that’s	clearly	an	incredibly	sensitive	operational	decision	based	upon	intelligence	that	the	PCC	
wouldn’t	get	to	see’.		
	
CC	
‘I	always	brief	him	I	always	make	sure	he	knows.	..straight	on	the	phone	to	{PCC}	as	much	detail	as	I	can	give,	because	he	is	going	to	get	asked	
questions	by	people	in	the	locality.	My	brief	to	the	Chief	Officer	team	is	that	you	need	to	keep	the	PCC	informed	does	he	have	any	direction	or	control	
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around	that	-	no.		I	always	invite	{PCC}	onto	gold	groups	as	observer.’	
	
CC	
‘I	believe	that	some	CCs	have	taken	the	line	of	least	resistance	and	allowed	the	border	between	direction	of	operational	policing	and	the	setting	of	
strategy	to	become	very	blurred.	And	almost	let	the	PCCs	role’.		
	
CC	
‘Its	grey,	people	talk	about	operational	independence	of	the	CC	and	political	interference	in	policing.	I	think	this	is	the	latest	iteration	of	that	kind	of	
arrangement.	...its	not	the	governance	arrangements	that	potentially	undermine	the	role	of	the	CC	in	operational	independence	its	the	financial	
arrangements’.		
	
CC	
‘I	invited	the	PCC	and	Chief	Exec	into	the	most	strategic	decision	making	meeting,	because	as	I	said	everything	is	about	relationships.	I	wanted	to	get	
{PCC}	in	close	to	me	and	see	the	issues	I	was	wrestling	with	and	he	can	share	some	of	that	accountability	with	me.	He	did	that	for	a	couple	of	years	
then	a	new	C	Exec	arrived	and	he	reflected	that	{the	PCC}	was	probably	getting	a	little	too	close	to	the	operational	decisions	and	I	could	see	that,	so	he	
has	stepped	out	of	that	meeting.	But	I	think	it	worked	for	us	because	of	a	trust	issue,	me	bringing	him	in	there	him	seeing	me	with	commanders	trying	
to	wrestle	with	some	difficult	stuff.	We’ve	tried	to	be	clear	where’s	the	line	and	he	has	not	been	predatory	at	all.	...	If	there	is	anything	{operational	
incidents}	that	has	either	a	reputational	issue	attached	to	it...or	whether	its	something	that’s	got	something	political	attached	to	it	or	is	so	unusual	or	
of	a	particular	nature	that	he	should	know	about	it,	then	he	will	get	a	call.	(re	Gold	groups)	...	For	some	things	(PCC/	OPCC	would	be	invited	onto	gold	
groups)..	But	its	not	something	they’ve	pushed	for’.		
	
CC	
‘There’s	nothing	that	I	haven’t	been	able	to	resolve	and	work	through	with	him,	and	it	is	about	characters	and	personal	style.	I’ve	had	to	tell	him	some	
times	you	are	overstepping	the	mark	now	putting	that	foot	over	into	direction	and	control	...	we’ve	had	to	have	those	conversations.	E.g.	there	are	
some	groups	that	he	engages	with	that	feed	him	information	about	potential	rt	wing	protest	where	he	was	almost	on	the	cusp	of	being	an	informant.	
Certain	areas	around	work	we	ate	doing	re	hate	crime	where	he’s	almost	directing	us	to	do	things	rather	than	helping	us	to	understand	the	challenges.	
He	gets	that.	If	you’ve	got	a	PCC	who	is	extremely	negative,	who	doesn’t	get	on	-	I’ve	worked	with	{a	senior	officer}	and	we	were	never	going	to	get	
on...if	that	had	been	a	PCC	to	CC	relationship,	I	think	my	days	would	have	been	numbered.	Re	Critical	incidents,	we	engage	with	him	and	keep	him	
briefed	(during	a	protest	policing	event)	the	PCC	wanted	to	come	out	and	walk	around	engaging	with	staff...we	chaperoned	him	as	much	as	anything	to	
make	sure	he	didn’t	appear	to	be	aligning	himself	with	any	of	the	groups	down	there	for	a	politician	he’s	a	bit	naive	in	terms	of	how	things	like	that	can	
be	used.	PCC	does	sometimes	attend	Gold	groups	as	a	participant,	he	is	helpful’.		
	
CC	
‘I	have	never	once	felt	‘you	should	investigate	this	or	you	shouldn’t	investigate	that	or	why	are	we	investigating	that’,	never	felt	the	hairs	on	the	back	of	
my	neck	go	up	thinking	**	{PCC}	this	is	dodgy.	However,	I’ve	already	said	they	said	{OPCC}	we	need	you	to	put	more	into	rural	business	so	they	are	
affecting	it....It	is	a	completely	redundant	argument	about	interfering	in	operational	policing,	because	if	they	want	to	they	just	say	you	wont	have	the	
cheque	you	wont	have	the	money	to	do	that.	(eg	MPS	Water	cannon,	other	PCCs	said	they	would	not	have	them	whatever	the	CC	said	because	they	
would	not	provide	the	money	&	eg	locally	two	CCs	and	one	PCC	wanted	a	joint	control	room	other	PCC	said	no	and	would	not	fund	it).	I	get	highly	
amused	by	the	huge	amount	of	time	and	effort	spent	on	drafting	up	that	Protocol	that	seemed	to	defy	the	relationship,	that	to	me	never	bore	any	
resemblance	to	realities.	All	it	needed	to	do	was	to	have	concentrated	on	the	separation	of	powers	over	operational	decision	making	in	the	are	we	
going	to	deploy	Taser	if	I	think	its	the	right	thing	to	do	we	are	going	to	we	are	then	going	to	have	to	argue	the	toss	about	the	money	are	we	going	to	
investigate	that	bent	politician	?	Yes	I	am	no	matter	what	you	tell	me	and	there	had	to	be	a	way	in	which	that	could	have	been	codified	but	no	we	tried	
to	sort	of	somehow	describe	a	world	where	they	would	never	ever	somehow	step	into	the	operational	arena’.		
	
CC	
	‘A	lot	of	us	in	policing	thought	that	it	would	be	really	clear	{Op	independence}	actually	its	a	really	blurred	line,	because	there	are	very	few	instances	
where	its	an	operational	policing	issue	whether	something	planned	or	spontaneous	that	doesn’t	have	some	sort	of	community	impact,	media	
involvement.	I	think	its	really	blurred	line.	Someone	would	have	to	convince	me	not	to	brief	them,	not	to	have	them	involved	in	almost	every	instance	I	
can	think	of...	I	don’t	think	you	can	write	it	down	because	there’s	too	many	different	permutations	of	what	could	happen.	{example	of	reducing	
numbers	of	neighbour	hood	officers	to	supplement	response.	CC	recognised	that	this	would	be	a	concern	for	PCC	so	discussed	with	PCC,	arrived	at	a	
compromise	recognising	community	concerns	-	CC	sees	this	as	positive.}’.		
	
CC	
‘I	can	give	numerous	examples	here	where	I’ve	wanted	to	do	something	for	the	public	and	the	politicians	looking	at	the	protocol	say	that’s	absolutely	a	
matter	for	the	CC	but	I’ve	had	to	work	really	hard	with	my	PCC	to	get	to	a	position	where	taking	decisions	that	are	in	my	domain	did	not	impact	
negatively	on	the	relationship	between	me	and	the	PCC.’		
	
CC	
‘Who	is	responsible	for	shaping	the	future	of	the	force.	And	the	idea	that	you	jointly	own	future	strategy	is	fine	as	long	as	you	both	agree	on	direction	
of	travel.	I	suspect	that	across	forces,	thus	far	on	the	whole	people	{PCCs}	have	generally	listened	to	professional	advice	and	reached	agreement.{CC}.’	
	
CC	
‘No	problems	in	this	area	PCC	understands	the	line.	sometimes	PCC	will	ask	for	a	briefing	so	that	he	is	not	wrong	footed	and	that	is	appropriate...he	
never	has	said	you	should	be	doing	this	or	that.	PCC	does	not	attend	Gold	groups,	but	CC	would	welcome	him	doing	so	as	a	voice	not	a	decision	maker’.		
	
CC	
He	{PCC}	has	never,	he	has	come	close,	but	he	has	never	overstepped	the	mark	on	a	policing	issue.	He	would	rather	put	one	of	his	officers	on	a	gold	
group,	rather	than	him	sitting	himself....	Full	understanding	from	them	because	we	don’t	have	to	involve	them	in	a	gold	meeting	but	much	better	for	
them	to	be	able	to	say	we	sat	thru	the	police	planning	of	this	and	they	did	consider	community	impact	etc.	They	are	absolutely	clear	it’s	as	an	observer.		
	
CC	
(CC	indicated	that	things	had	come	close	when	the	PCC	demanded	that	the	command	team	change).	’Its	ok	quoting	stuff	out	of	the	book,	but	you’ve	
still	got	to	do	business	the	day	after.'		
CC	
  
 
 294 
‘We	made	it	easier	for	the	PCC	to	hold	us	to	account	and	be	more	effective.	If	I	had,	had	a	more	difficult	intransigent	confrontational	PCC,	then	I	
wouldn’t	have	done	it.	I’d	have	been	just	trying	to	fight	my	corner	and	make	sure	that	operational	independence	and	direction	&	control	was	
absolutely	clear.	...but	he	does	not	try	to	step	over	the	line’.		
	
CC	
‘We	have	a	clear	understanding	that	the	CC	runs	the	police	force	and	my	accountability	is	for	operational	delivery.	The	setting	of	the	strategy	based	on	
his	manifesto	is	something	we	agree	on.	In	the	early	days	he	tried	to	control	me	by	setting	the	budget	and	allocating	sums	of	money	for	policing	
functions.	Ie	£3M	for	local	policing.	I	refused	to	play	that	game	because	what	that	would	lead	to	would	be	a	way	of	him	having	long	term	control	over	
what	I	did.	It	could	force	me	into	making	cuts	in	specific	areas	of	policing.	I	don’t	think	he	intended	that	I	think	he	thought	that	was	holding	me	to	
account	by	controlling	the	budget	tightly.	What	we	agreed	was	for	him	to	fund	my	delivery	plan.	A	lot	of	smoke	and	mirrors	and	the	money	passed	to	
me	the	same	as	every	other	year.’	
	
12.	 Police	&	Crime	Panels	
	
CC	
.’..governance	of	17	people	has	got	checks	&	balances	in	it	which	governance	by	one	person	hasn’t.	If	somebody	{PCC}	digs	their	heels	in	when	they’ve	
got	something	wrong	you	cant	get	rid	of	them.	I’m	not	sure	there’s	anywhere	else	in	political	service	where	you’d	see	that	happen.	That	has	got	to	be	
high	risk.’	
	
CC	
‘Who	is	holding	to	account	the	PCC	its	a	bit	glib	to	say	the	electorate.	South	Yorkshire	showed	that	is	not	a	very	effective	...it	became	a	source	of	
embarrassment	for	other	PCCs	that	there	is	no	recall	mechanism	that	would	be	completely	unacceptable	if	that	was	a	PCC.	There	are	42	PCCs	each	
with	their	own	personalities;	strengths	and	weaknesses	odds	are	there	are	one	or	two	who	may	stray	to	some	degree.	Some	of	the	excesses	of	
previous	Chief	Constables	you	see	in	PCCs	who	seem	to	be	operating	their	own	fiefdoms,	as	opposed	to	more	checks	and	balances	through	a	more	
robust	PCP.	I	think	there	is	a	relatively	naive	view	that	you	are	held	to	account	by	the	electorate.	..I	think	that’s	spin	to	some	degree.	The	ability	to	
recall	{the	PCC}	needs	to	be	in	place...’		
	
CC	
‘PCC	{local}	is	very	arrogant,	wont	take	any	shit	from	anyone	he	takes	the	view	this	is	just	something	I	have	to	do	and	I	really	don’t	care	what	you	
say.	The	PCC	has	a	political	mandate	they	have	been	elected	on	a	broader	mandate	than	my	MPs,	...	you’ve	then	got	a	bunch	of	councilors	elected	on	a	
far	smaller	level	now	holding	him	to	account.	Do	they	understand	Policing	-	no	Have	they	been	involved	in	policing	-	very	few...	so	you’ve	got	to	
question	what’s	their	knowledge,	what	are	their	attributes	and	skills	to	really	be	incisive	and	understand	what’s	going	on.	I	don’t	think	its	
there	personally’.	
	
CC	
‘They	are	rubbish	-	the	chair	of	the	PCP	hated	**	{the	PCC}	he	was	a	mason	and	a	conservative.	Again,	just	awful.	We	spent	3	and	a	half	hours	at	my	
confirmation	hearing	where	their	behaviour	was	discourteous	and	disrespectful	to	both	to	me	and	to	**	{PCC}	You	have	a	range	of	people	with	a	range	
of	knowledge,	so	I	think	their	ability	to	hold	the	PCC	to	account	is	limited.,	very	limited’.		
	
CC	
‘What	the	hell	is	the	PCP	?	What’s	it	there	for	?	was	it	put	in	there	to	placate	or	for	a	purpose	and	I	don’t	see	the	latter.	I	think	one	of	the	biggest	issues	
is	the	lack	of	any	true	role	that	the	PCP	has	there	is	no	real	power	that	the	PCP	has	and	as	a	consequence	its	an	untamed	individual	{the	PCC}	that	can	
do	what	they	want.	With	very	little	recourse	than	to	wait	a	number	of	years	before	the	next	election	when	the	electorate	will	decide	whether	they	get	
through	or	not.	I	think	its	{the	PCP}	is	the	same	as	every	other	one	in	the	country	its	benign.	They	will	receive	reports	and	discuss	issues	but	it	is	fairly	
benign.’	
	
CC	
	‘They	are	non	existent	they	can	veto	certain	things	but	he	can	say	no	-	the	chair	of	the	Police	Authority	could	not	say	no	to	the	Police	Authority,	there	
would	be	a	vote’.		
	
CC	
‘The	PCP	consists	of	people	the	Local	Authority	don’t	want	they	are	not	strong	their	remit	is	very	limited	and	if	a	PCC	doesn’t	want	anything	to	do	with	
them	then	they	don’t	have	to	and	quite	a	few	of	them	don’t’.		
	
CC	
‘Lincolnshire	was	the	classic.	There	need	to	be	a	few	more	safety	nets.	..and	the	PCP,	doesn’t	really	have	much	teeth	Who	is	holding	to	account	the	PCC	
its	a	bit	glib	to	say	the	electorate.	There	are	42	PCCs	each	with	their	own	personalities,	strengths	and	weaknesses	odds	are	there	are	one	or	two	who	
may	stray	to	some	degree.	Some	of	the	excesses	of	previous	Chief	Constables	you	see	in	PCCs	who	seem	to	be	operating	their	own	fiefdoms,	as	
opposed	to	more	checks	and	balances	through	a	more	robust	PCP’.		
	
CC	
‘Its	ok…leaders	of	the	Local	Authorities	form	the	PCP.	I	think	the	{PCC}	would	say	he	generally	gets	a	good	hearing,	they	are	Local	Authority	leaders	so	
they	know	their	way	round’.		
	
CC	
‘The	challenge	that	wee	still	got	to	crack	locally	is	how	the	PCP	operate	although	we	are	starting	to	see	some	changes	in	that	their	role	is	to	hold	the	
PCC	to	account,	I	think	they	hold	him	more	to	account	than	they	did	2	years	ago,	,	eg	still	as	the	Police	Authority	did,	being	concerned	re	TOIL	levels	in	
Force’.		
	
CC	
‘They	are	finding	their	feet	the	PCC	has	allowed	them	a	lot	of	freedom	than	the	act	of	parliament	gives	them.	..	There	are	some	very	astute	people	on	
the	PCP	-	they	hold	bthe	PCC	to	account	the	best	they	can	with	their	limited	powers.’	
	
CC	
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‘In	quite	a	few	areas,	the	PCPs	don’t	exercise	that	much	in	the	way	of	proper	challenge	to	the	PCCs	..	That’s	totally	true	here.	Going	back	you	has	**	
(PCC)	died	in	the	wool	Lab,	virtually	every	other	person	on	the	PCP	died	in	the	wool	Lab.	The	PCC	would	have	a	pre	PCP	meeting	where	they	would	all	
agree	what	was	going	to	be	discussed	what	was	going	to	be	asked,	then	they'd	go	in	and	put	on	a	show	so	a	lack	of	challenge	because	everyone	is	
coming	from	the	same	background,	and	as	unhelpfully,	another	PCP	not	a	million	miles	away	from	here	where	they	take	on	the	PCC	for	fun	to	
score	political	points,	neither	of	those	two	ends	of	the	spectrum	is	helpful	to	anybody.	Its	not	the	way	the	system	was	meant	to	work.	The	system	
works	well	where	you’ve	got	reasonable	people	as	in	the	CC	and	the	PCC	are	both	reasonable...	Making	reasonable	decisions	in	a	reasonable	
environment.	Now	it	works	better	(with	new	PCC)	Its	now	appropriately	challenging’.		
	
CC	
‘PCP	here	has	not	been	very	effective	at	all.	Its	because	its	not	a	cohesive	area	and	its	not	very	high	status	(so	people	don’t	want	to	do	it)	They	do	not	
have	a	huge	amount	of	interaction	with	the	PCC	at	all	you	had	people	on	it	who	were	on	the	PA	but	left	because	it	was	so	dysfunctional.	They	don’t	
make	much	impact	on	us	as	a	force	or	on	{the	PCC}	to	be	honest.	He’s	not	dismissive	but	he	doesn’t	worry	about	what	they	think.’	
	
CC	
	‘My	biggest	worry	was	too	much	power	vested	in	one	person	and	I	think	that	is	definitely	still	the	case,	insufficient	checks	and	balances	...	I	do	think	
the	devil	was	more	in	the	detail	in	many	respects.	Too	much	power	vested	in	one	person	with	totally	ineffective	PCP	sitting	above	it’.	
	
CC	
‘Their	role	is	to	scrutinise	the	PCC,	not	the	police,	they	started	off	wanting	the	police	to	go	to	every	session...we’ve	come	away	from	that	now	to	
them	scrutinising	the	PCC,	but	not	in	any	real	meaningful	accountable	way	because	they	don’t	understand	it’.	
	
CC	
	‘...	On	the	whole	its	a	weakness	in	the	model’.		
	
CC	
‘But	you’ve	got	to	look	at	the	politics	of	the	PCP,	because	the	chair	of	our	panel	…stood	against	the	PCC.	So	he	has	an	axe	to	grind.	The	members	of	the	
panel	were	the	same	members	of	the	Police	Authority	so	the	people	who	were	disempowered	were	given	the	role	of	holding	the	PCC	to	account,	and	it	
was	quite	lumpy	for	a	while...	There	are	issues	about	how	under	the	legislation	how	effectively	the	PCP	are	able	to	hold	the	PCC	to	account	and	what	
levers	they	have	to	do	it,	and	on	the	face	of	they	don’t	appear	to	be	very	strong.’	
	
CC	
[CC	attends	PCP]		‘To	be	honest	most	questions	are	operational	so	without	me	there	would	not	be	much	said.’	
	
CC	
	‘We	provide	joint	leadership,	I	sit	beside	the	PCC	[at	PCP]	and	I	will	help	where	I	can’.	
	
CC	
	‘I	have	been	to	the	odd	one	[PCP],	but	if	I	go	it	becomes	about	me.	By	not	going	it	means	they	talk	to	him	{PCC}’.		
	
CC		
[[[PCC]	will	not	take	me,	if	the	Chief	Constable	goes	they	love	it,	it	makes	them	feel	good’	
	
CC	
‘[CC	attends]	As	a	guest,	I	know	there’s	some	debate	as	to	whether	I	should.	A	lot	of	the	PCP	are	ex	Police	Authority,	and	having	the	Chief	Constable	
there	then	people	start	getting	into	very	localised	issues,	rather	than	strategic	oversight’.		
	
CC	
‘I	go	to	all	PCP	meetings	with	the	PCC	it	is	helpful	because	it	helps	us	to	manage	the	demand	from	him,	because	if	there’s	things	that	I	can	answer	there	
and	then,	and	help	him	to	answer	its	better	than	him	coming	back	and	saying	can	I	have	a	report.	More	importantly	to	help	move	the	PCP	on	they	are	
made	up	of	predominantly	ex	PA	people	at	those	meetings	if	they	steer	a	question	straight	at	me	I	I	say	-	what	I	think	you	are	asking	{the	PCC}	is	how	
does	he	hold	the	CC	to	account	for.	..Over	time	gradually	we	have	moved	them	to	a	position	of	being	more	appropriate	in	the	questioning.’		
	
CC	
‘Most	of	the	questions	[from	PCP]	...	If	I	remove	the	signing	of	the	policing	plan	and	the	budget,	most	of	the	questions	come	to	the	Chief	Constable	..	If	
we	[Police]	didn’t	feed	the	agenda	it	would	be	Mrs	Miggins	cat.	That	sounds	dreadfully	patronising	but	it	doesn’t	work’.		
	
CC	
The	inability	to	put	restrictions,	controls	or	dispense	with	a	PCC	needs	looking	at.	If	you	are	a	PCP	holding	a	PCC	to	account	and	you’ve	got	concerns,	
actually	they	are	pretty	impotent	at	being	able	to	do	anything	about	that	...	I	think	there	needs	to	be	some	thought	and	the	S	Yorks	example	is	a	good	
example	of	that	...maybe	there	needs	to	be	something	that	strengthens	that	{PCP	ability	to	recall	PCC},	but	puts	the	ability	into	not	just	one	individual	
but	a	wider	group.	That	then	and	reduces	the	risk	of	someone	being	power	crazy	and	doing	things	that	are	not	in	the	best	interests	of	communities’.		
	
CC	
‘..the	middle	ground	between	some	of	the	advantages	of	PCCs	and	the	advantages	of	PAs	with	a	number	of	people	who	could	bring	different	views	to	
the	table...	PCPs	were	an	after	thought	politically	they	were	never	given	the	clout,	they’ve	not	been	given	the	budget	so	nobody	who’s	got	any	sense	
wants	to	be	on	a	PCP...	they	meet	on	a	minimal	number	of	occasions	because	they	don’t	have	the	money	to	support	otherwise.	They	are	not	doing	
what	Police	Authorities’	used	to	do’.	
	
13.	 Recommendations	for	Change	in	Legislation/	Policy	
	
CC	
‘...	so	my	sense	is	that	we	should	have	strong	democratic	governance.	albeit,	I	thought	the	Police	Authorities	were	entirely	serviceable	certainly	better	
than	the	watch	committees	which	thru	various	iterations	they	replaced.	When	you	look	back	at	what	was	happening	in	Notts	&	S.	wales	in	the	50's	and	
early	60's	...	I	wouldn’t	want	to	go	back	to	those	bad	old	days.	There	is	a	sense	in	some	of	my	colleagues	that	that	is	what	is	the	case.	Because	they	feel	
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a	precariousness	around	their	decision	making	should	it	impinge	on	the	personal	views	or	priorities	of	the	PCC.	So	the	checks	&	balances	that	one	had	
with	the	Home	Secretary,	Police	Authority	&	Chief	Constable	and	the	CC	having	his	team	chosen	by	the	PA	...	In	Britain	we	have	all	sorts	of	triangulation	
the	Judiciary,	the	legislature,	and	the	executive.	So	we	have	all	sorts	of	balancing	constitutional	-	and	the	triangle	is	a	very	useful	balance’.		
	
CC	
‘All	of	my	problems	with	the	PCC	have	been	because	the	Policing	Protocol	is	wishy-washy	and	doesn’t	tie	people	down.	More	clarity	{is	needed}	around	
operational	independence	does	it	mean	can	you	go	and	arrest	X&Y-no	that’s	not	your	role	commissioner,	that’s	my	{CCs}	role,	is	it	I’ve	looked	at	your	
review	of	policing	{PCC	to	CC}	and	Id	like	you	to	put	55	officers	at	x	and	100	at	Y.	Or	is	it	I	want	you	to	concentrate	on	roads	policing,	I	want	you	to	
concentrate	on	CSE	and	I	don’t	want	you	to	have	any	dog	handlers	or	is	it.	There’s	my	Police	&	Crime	plan	go	and	deliver	it.	..,	apart	from	the	first	every	
single	one	of	those	situations	you	can	read	into	the	Policing	Protocol	if	you	choose	to’.		
	
CC	
‘Because	of	the	Policing	Protocol,	the	PCC	does	not	know	what	their	role	is	they	think	they	know	what	the	role	is	the	Chief	Exec	thinks	they	know,	but	
that	will	be	completely	different	to	-	if	you	go	round	the	country	to	what	every	other	PCC	there	is.	To	me	the	issue	in	***	has	been	does	{PCC}	run	the	
Police	service	or	do	I	{CC}	run	the	police	service.	There	are	two	areas	where	he	has	got	more	control.	one	is	around	collaboration,	if	{the	PCC}	doesn’t	
sign	the	sec	22	framework	agreement	it	doesn’t	happen.	He	can	therefore	decide	whether	or	not	an	operational	proposal	goes	forward	or	not.		
	
	
CC	
‘Who	is	holding	to	account	the	PCC	its	a	bit	glib	to	say	the	electorate.	South	Yorkshire	showed	that	is	not	a	very	effective	...it	became	a	source	of	
embarrassment	for	other	PCCs	that	there	is	no	recall	mechanism	that	would	be	completely	unacceptable	if	that	was	a	PCC.	There	are	42	PCCs	each	
with	their	own	personalities;	strengths	and	weaknesses	odds	are	there	are	one	or	two	who	may	stray	to	some	degree.	Some	of	the	excesses	of	
previous	Chief	Constables	you	see	in	PCCs	who	seem	to	be	operating	their	own	fiefdoms,	as	opposed	to	more	checks	and	balances	through	a	more	
robust	PCP.	I	think	there	is	a	relatively	naive	view	that	you	are	held	to	account	by	the	electorate.	..I	think	that’s	spin	to	some	degree.	The	ability	to	
recall	{the	PCC}	needs	to	be	in	place...’		
	
CC	
‘The	American	model	which	is	having	three.	A	commission	of	3	people	it	adds	moderation,	its	not	as	cumbersome	as	a	authorities,	but	moderation	of	
thought,	discussion,	debate	and	democracy,	but	how	you	get	to	having	3	would	be	really	tricky...its	the	least	number	that	you	can	have	and	still	have	
an	odd	number	to	allow	some	form	of	voting	to	deal	with	the	issue.’		
	
CC	
‘Elected	mayor	is	a	better	model	than	PCC’.		
	
CC	
‘There	is	a	need	for	marketing	to	explain	the	role	of	PCC’	
	
CC	
A	weakness	of	the	system	is	that	there	is	no	proper	national	oversight	over	{CC}	appointments	I	think	that	is	the	area	of	weakness,	things	like	decisions	
to	extend	contracts	appointment	processes	I	think	that	is	the	bit	where	there	is	too	much	power	in	one	hand.	Where	there	is	potential	for	soft	
corruption	on	both	sides	so	I’ve	been	arguing	that	there	should	be	a	national	system	because	there	are	too	many	internal	appointments	too	many	
DCCs	almost	automatically	getting	the	job.	And	what	that	is,	is	a	sign	that	govt	in	its	wish	to	push	more	and	more	stuff	down	has	gone	too	far.	And	
there	needs	to	be	a	bit	of	adjustment	back	up	to	say	that	within	this		
process	there	are	some	really	crucial	decisions	like	the	appointment	of	the	CC.	..	Going	to	some	form	of	SAP	process	some	form	of	external	
accreditation,	some	form	of	national	talent	mgt.		
	
CC	
	‘I	look	round	the	room	at	Chief	Constables	council	and	there	are	too	many	people	in	that	room	who	are	not	capable	I	don’t	believe	of	standing	up	to	
their	PCCs	and	saying	this	is	operational	policing	this	is	none	of	your	business	and	being	prepared	to	fight	their	corner.	Easy	for	me	to	say	that	from	my	
position	of	strength,	they	are	vulnerable	nothing	to	loose	I	just	want	to	come	into	work	and	do	a	good	job	in	an	in	terms	of	their	appointment	and	their	
longevity	as	CCs	It	doesn’t	seem	to	me	terribly	healthy	that	you’ve	got	that	situation	and	something	needs	to	be	done	about	it.	One	thing	you	could	do	
is	change	the	selection	process	for	CCs	take	it	out	of	the	hands	of	the	PCC	and	say	that’s	a	decision	for	the	panel	or	for	whoever	takes	the	place	of	the	
panel’.		
	
CC	
The	inability	to	put	restrictions,	controls	or	dispense	with	a	PCC	needs	looking	at.	If	you	are	a	PCP	holding	a	PCC	to	account	and	you’ve	got	concerns,	
actually	they	are	pretty	impotent	at	being	able	to	do	anything	about	that	...	I	think	there	needs	to	be	some	thought	and	the	S	Yorks	example	is	a	good	
example	of	that	...maybe	there	needs	to	be	something	that	strengthens	that	{PCP	ability	to	recall	PCC},	but	puts	the	ability	into	not	just	one	individual	
but	a	wider	group.	That	then	and	reduces	the	risk	of	someone	being	power	crazy	and	doing	things	that	are	not	in	the	best	interests	of	communities’.	
	
CC	
‘Needs	to	be	a	body	that	scrutinises	PCCs	along	with	other	parts	of	local	govt.	Similar	to	the	Audit	Commission.	
	
	CC	
‘PCP	should	be	the	policing	board	and	the	PCC	the	elected	chair	of	the	board.	That’s	a	stronger	check	and	balance’.		
	
CC	
‘They	{PCCs}	would	be	accountable	to	a	board	probably	appointees	with	a	mixture,	some	from	Local	Authorities	.	It	would	be	part	of	the	selection	of	
Chief	Constables.	You	write	in	there	{law}	that	firstly	they	hold	the	PCC	to	account	...	They	are	a	board	that	makes	sure	the	PCC	is	doing	what	they	are	
expected	to	do	they	have	teeth	over	appointments,	they	have	teeth	over	the	way	the	PCC	runs	his	office.	Proper	confirmatory	hearings	(for	CC	
selection)	.	They	have	some	financial	clout	and	the	audit	function’.		
	
CC	
‘The	American	type	of	system	of	a	public	safety	board	a	group	of	individuals...a	very	strong	mayor	that	board	reports	to’.	
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?	A	central	service	role	for	CCs	who	do	not	get	contract	renewals	would	be	positive?		
	
CC	
‘I	think	the	world	has	moved	on,	look	at	the	public	who	are	loosing	jobs...	Who	are	used	to	insecurity,	to	zero	hours	contracts.	The	idea	that	somehow	
CCs	are	going	to	be	protected	in	that	way	no	I	just	don’t	think	you	can	do	it’.		
CC	
‘It	would	certainly	enable	more	security	...it	would	allow	you	to	realise	that	you	didn’t	have	to	comply	to	keep	your	job’.		
	
CC	
‘College	of	Policing	where	you	could	spend	a	few	months,	but	there’s	just	no	mechanism	to	do	it’.		
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Schedule of Comments of Police and Crime Commissioners 
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	 Common	Interview	Themes		
Comments	of		
Police	and	Crime	Commissioners	
	
1.		 Positive	Views	of	Police	&	Crime	Commissioner	Governance	Structure	
	
PCC	
‘One	person	for	4	years	representing	the	community	is	quite	difficult	I	was	anxious	about	it	now	It	think	its	an	important	role’.		
	
PCC	
‘Police	Authorities	did	not	do	the	job	they	were	paid	to	do.	The	relationship	between	Police	Authority	and	Chief	Constables	was	one	with	too	
much	familiarity.	Police	forces	had	more	money	than	they	needed	and	were	not	used	to	being	held	to	account’.		
	
PCC	
I	did	not	think	there	was	a	need	for	change.	As	a	PCC	one	person	far	more	identifiable	to	communities.	There	is	a	benefit	in	having	a	full	time	person	
we	can	influence	business	cases	much	earlier	Louder	voice	for	victims,	louder	voice	for	the	public.	Internally	much	more	attention	to	detail.	Far	more	
transparency	and	accountability’.		
	
PCC	
‘The	core	principle	of	democratically	accountable	policing	I	supported.	Having	taken	it	on	I	really	think	it’s	a	good	idea.	The	public	identify	Chief	
Constables	who	have	failed	but	for	each	of	those	there	was	a	Police	Authority	that	allowed	them	to	fail.	There	has	been	inadequate	policing	
governance	in	the	past	and	the	principle	of	making	that	governance	sharper,	open,	transparent,	locally	democratically	accountable	is	a	really	good	
principle’.		
	
PCC	
‘I	did	not	see	the	Police	Authority	system	needed	fixing	saw	it	as	a	move	by	government	to	blame	PCCs	for	the	failures	that	were	inevitably	going	to	
result	from	cutbacks.	Although	I	was	an	opponent,	it	is	a	better	system’.		
	
PCC	
‘The	role	is	meaningful	and	implemented	with	the	best	intentions.	From	the	public’s	point	of	view	there	are	real	benefits...I’m	talking	about	the	role	
rather	than	the	individuals	in	the	role	because	that’s	where	some	of	the	issues	have	been.’	
	
PCC	
‘On	the	whole	its	fairly	satisfactory,	a	huge	improvement	on	Police	Authorities,	for	example	in	speed	of	decision	making.	We	get	things	done	its	a	
proactive	system	rather	than	a	reactive	system	as	Police	Authorities	were.	for	example	five	PCCs	and	5	Chief	Constables	could	sit	down	and	agree	a	
regional	crime	arrangement’.		
	
PCC	
‘Important	that	Police	forces	are	democratically	accountable	to	the	people	rather	than	as	they	have	for	the	past	100	odd	years	being	accountable	only	
to	themselves.	And	jumping	only	when	the	Govt	issued	dictats	-	I	think	it	is	a	very	good	thing’.		
	
PCC	
‘I	thought	...	After	Cameron	had	come	back	from	what	you	might	call	the	Policing	family	were	at	that	time.	All	Police	Authorities	and	Police	Forces	were	
skeptical,	...I	was	encouraged	to	stand	as	PCC...The	transition	for	me	has	been	relatively	easy’.		
	
PCC	
‘Policing	in	a	difficult	period	has	moved	forward	pretty	well	under	PCCs’.	
	
PCC	
‘I	cant	think	that	any	aspect	of	policing	is	the	worse	for	PCCs’.	
	
PCC	
‘They	[Pas]	did	a	competent	job	but	I	saw	nothing	at	all	that	convinced	me	that	they	were	properly	holding	the	CCs	to	account	on	behalf	of	the	public.	
PAs	were	cowed	by	the	sight	od	someone	in	braid.	However	on	the	technical	side	they	were	quite	effective	I	don’t	think	they	were	a	waste	of	time	but	
they	were	invisible.’		
	
PCC	
‘I	think	the	PCC	model	works,	or	:...	The	PCC	model	can	be	made	to	work	some	people	work	it	more	successfully	than	others.,	some	people	have	been	
quite	unsuccessful,	some	have	learned	along	the	way’.	
	
PCC	
[PAs]	‘…Did	not	represent	the	public.’	
	
PCC	
[Pas	were]	‘Next	to	useless.’	
	
PCC	
‘...they	[the	public]	get	a	direct	line	of	accountability	that	they’ve	never	had	before.	With	PAs	they	were	never	elected	to	represent	the	authority’.		
	
PCC	
‘People	seem	to	forget	that	decisions	can	be	made	very	quickly,	not	hastily,	but	the	decision	making	process	which	helps	the	force,	helps	the	CC	they	
  
 
 300 
need	to	know	where	they	stand	on	funding	and	a	million	and	one	other	things.	I	can	say	to	the	CC,	and	nobody	can	gain	say	me,	I	can	say	you	will	have	
this,	this	is	the	amount	of	money	you	will	have...its	not	just	a	steer,	making	a	decision	is	another,	I	can	give	the	CC	certainty	I	don’t	have	to	ask	anybody	
else,	I	do,	obviously	have	my	own	team	of	advisors	every	PCC	does...but	that	decision	can	be	made	within	a	day,	within	an	hour	so	we	can	react	very	
quickly,	that	is	a	really	good...thing	for	a	CC	to	know.	We	can	rule	out	any	uncertainty’.	
	
PCC		
‘If	we	decide	to	move	in	a	certain	direction	we	can	do	it	much	quicker	than	the	old	system’.		
	
PCC	
‘It	would	be	very	hard	for	me	in	this	role	to	operate	in	a	secret	perverted	way	or	be	corrupt,	I	think	there’s	more	likelihood	of	that	in	a	Police	Authority	
type	setting	where	you’ve	got	part	time	members	who	are	occasional	visitors	...I	think	when	you’ve	got	a	full	time	person	in	that	role	they	{others}	are	
far	better	informed	far	more	aware	of	what’s	going	on’.	
	
2.	 Negative	Views	of	Police	&	Crime	Commissioner	Governance	Structure	
	
PCC	
‘Not	strong	enough	checks	and	balances	on	the	PCC	to	do	things	that	are	disruptive.’	
	
3.	 Perceived	Dangers	of	Police	&	Crime	Commissioner	Governance	Structure	
	
PCC	
‘Must	be	a	system	that	prevents	mad	people	being	PCCs.’	
	
PCC	
‘If	there	was	a	PCC	where	it	had	gone	to	their	head	and	there	was	no	check	on	them,	it	invites	that	kind	of	egotism	and	flamboyance'		
	
PCC	
‘Third	of	PCCs	are	really	good	a	third	need	improvement	a	third	are	crap	and	we	don’t	have	a	mechanism	for	sorting	the	wheat	from	the	chaff.’	
	
PCC	
‘Its	unproven	whether	the	model	is	sustainable	by	investing	it	in	one	person	particularly	when	we	are	doing	it	with	meager	resources	Its	about	
resourcing	and	personal	resilience.’		
		
PCC	
‘Are	we	going	to	find	those	people	who	will	carry	the	responsibility	and	the	media	and	have	the	skills	and	attract	the	staff	and	manage	the	office	and	
maintain	the	relationships	...on	balance	probably	yes	but	there	are	some	risks’.		
	
PCC	
‘[personal	resilience	is	an	issue]	The	age	profile	of	PCCs	is	quite	high.	The	statistical	chance	of	someone	dropping	dead	in	the	next	4	years	is	very	high.	
At	the	moment	two	are	seriously	ill	and	one	has	died.’	
	
PCC	
‘There	is	also	a	succession	planning	issue,	if	the	deputy	was	elected	with	the	PCC	they	may	be	able	to	take	over	after	2	years	for	example.’	
	
PCC	
[re	potential	dangers]	‘Not	if	there	is	effective	scrutiny.’		
	
PCC	
‘If	you	have	a	maverick	what	do	you	do.	PCCs	should	have	same	power	of	recall	as	MPs.’		
	
PCC	
‘I	often	feel	I	don’t	have	much	power.	Unless	you	are	doing	something	very	stupid	your	power	is	pretty	limited	You	have	the	PCP	and	you	are	
constrained	by	the	law.	I	do	appoint	the	CC	but	I	don’t	do	it	by	myself,	I	have	a	committee	and	an	independent	person	appointed	by	the	Police	
College.	I’m	told	by	some	that	I	have	unfettered	power.	But	I	seem	to	be	fettered	by	law	at	every	step.	A	lot	of	responsibility	but	fettered	power’.		
	
PCC	
‘The	PCC	has	a	lot	of	responsibility	but	not	much	exercisable	power	There	is	a	risk	from	maverick	PCCs,	but	they	would	be	recognised	and	weeded	out	
the	big	risk	is	from	mediocre	PCCs	who	might	coast	along	not	take	decisions	etc’.	
	
PCC	
‘Its	a	hugely	powerful	role	(PCC)	...I	don’t	think	it	places	too	much	power	in	the	hands	of	one	person	I’m	an	Individual,	I’m	a	PCC,	I’m	a	Corporation	
Sole,	and	I’m	a	Local	Authority	all	rolled	into	one	nobody	has	ever	had	that	before	-	never.	I	don’t	think	its	too	much	power	and	the	govt	are	going	to	
give	us	even	more	power.	It	would	be	nice	if	I	could	employ	more	staff,	or	a	deputy	I	don’t	have	one’.		
	
4.	 Police	&	Crime	Commissioner	Election/	Legitimacy	Issues	
	
PCC	
‘There	is	a	single	elected	person	and	it	doesn’t	matter	if	it	was	16.38%	or	60%.’	
	
PCC	
‘Having	the	election	in	November	was	crazy	and	it	affected	the	whole	process’.		
	
PCC	
‘...they	[the	public]	get	a	direct	line	of	accountability	that	they’ve	never	had	before.	With	PAs	they	were	never	elected	to	represent	the	authority’.		
   
  
 301 
	
PCC	
‘I	represent	the	county,	every	person	in	the	county	is	my	boss...I	am	accessible,	accountable,	open	and	transparent.	I	am	there	to	make	sure	that	the	
people	of	this	county	get	the	best	possible	deal	from	the	police	force’.		
	
PCC	
‘Previously	the	Police	Authority	set	the	[policing]	plan	without	accountability	[to	the	public]’.	
	
5.	 Public	Engagement	
	
PCC	
‘94%	didn’t	know	a	PA	existed...	at	least	70-%	of	people	know	they	have	a	PCC.’	
	
PCC	
‘...the	frustration	from	the	public	early	on	was	a)	there	was	no	point	complaining	because	nobody	listened	and	b)	if	you	did	complain	it	put	you	at	a	
disadvantage	...	A	sense	of	there’s	no	way	into	this	organisation,	no	way	to	challenge	it.	The	very	fact	of	there	being	someone	who	is	not	the	police	but	
has	some	authority	over	them,	that	in	itself	is	a	reassurance’.		
	
PCC	
‘It	is	difficult	to	engage	with	the	public	across	a	large	force.	The	size	of	my	area	is	such	that	I	needed	a	part	time	one	driver/	staff	officer.	I	was	accused	
of	having	a	chauffer,	I	was	hammered	by	the	BBC	and	the	papers	MPs	and	Local	Councilors	can	claim	expenses	to	go	to	their	place	of	work	PCCs	cant.	It	
could	put	people	off	doing	the	job,	particularly	rural	ones’.		
	
PCC	
‘…,	the	PCC	job	is	to	be	the	bridge	with	the	public.’		
	
PCC	
‘Some	PCCs	don’t,	but		Public	meetings	and	surgeries	are	essential’.	
	
PCC	
‘PCC	job	is	to	open	up	not	only	police	but	other	authorities	to	the	public.’	
	
PCC	
[PCC	attends	public	meetings	accompanied	by	senior	police	officer]	‘So	that	the	Chief	Constable	or	the	senior	Officer	can	cover	operational	things.’	
	
PCC	
[PCC	must]	‘…focus	upon	the	priorities	that	are	based	on	public	expectations	sourced	thru	surveys.	The	PCC	must	identify	all	groups	and	engage	with	
each.’	
	
PCC	
‘I	have	public	meetings	but	unless	there	is	a	local	issue	nobody	turns	up.	I	go	to	council	meetings...	They	are	the	democratic	representatives	of	the	
public	that	is	probably	the	best	way…’	[to	engage	with	the	public].	
	
PCC	
‘Most	of	the	public	know	they	have	a	PCC	something	like	78%.’	
	
PCC	
‘In	the	first	year	I	got	a	lot	of	anger,	asking	me	what	the	PCC	was,	they	are	now	much	more	aware’.		
	
PCC	
‘The	PCC	receives	more	mail	in	a	month	than	the	Police	Authority	received	in	year’.		
	
PCC	
‘Most	people	don’t	spend	their	life	thinking	about	[police]	governance,	as	a	result	there	is	a	bit	of	vague	confusion.	But	they	have	got	somewhere	to	
go.’	
	
PCC	
‘Various	editorials	were	very	aggressive,	for	example	the	Times	reported	that	24	PCCs	were	under	investigation,	when	many	of	those	matters	related	
to	things	years	before	PCCs	were	created.	I	think	the	press	have	now	woken	up	to	PCCs	being	quite	a	good	thing’.		
	
PCC	
‘The	PCC	becoming	thru	the	media	exposure	is	the	most	visible	politician	in	every	county.	PCCs	have	become	influential	in	forming	public	opinion.’	
	
PCC	
‘Much	more	to	the	fore	than	with	the	Police	Authority,	part	of	the	PCC’s	role	is	answering	to	the	public.’	
	
PCC	
‘A	good	example	is	that	the	public	were	very	concerned	about	policing	of	a	demonstration.	In	one	of	my	web	cast	monthly	reviews	I	asked	the	Chief	
Constable	the	questions	that	the	public	needed	answers	to’.		
	
6.	 Partnerships	
	
PCC	
‘I	think	the	'and	Crime'	bit	of	the	role	is	important.’	
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PCC	
‘PCCs	have	significant	soft	power.	to	influence	and	drive	activity’.		
	
PCC	
‘A	big	part	of	my	job	is	to	bring	organisations	together...to	have	sensible	conversations	often	quite	difficult	ones.	E.g.	Community	safety	partnerships	I	
aligned	all	their	priorities	to	the	police	&	crime	plan	priorities’.		
	
PCC	
‘We	hear	this	cry	of	partnerships	if	we	are	not	careful	partnerships	get	into	some	very	blurred	areas.	Who	is	responsible...in	a	time	of	budgets	dropping	
there	is	a	tremendous	sloping	of	shoulders	by	people	trying	to	avoid	responsibility.’	
	
PCC	
	‘All	on	a	case	by	case	basis.	As	far	as	possible	PCC	deals	with	leaders	of	councils	to	determine	where	we	are	going,	CC	with	officials	deliver.	Concerns	
regarding	governance	of	the	police	can	be	multiplied	by	10	and	applied	to	local	authorities’.	
	
PCC	
	‘...we	face	the	same	challenges...based	on	what	I	learn	I	can	make	better	informed	decisions.	Its	important	to	get	out	and	speak	to	as	many	partners	as	
possible	-	public	too’.		
	
PCC	
‘You	have	to	get	commissioning	right	to	lower	the	load	(on	Policing).’	
	
PCC	
‘Funding	is	important	to	pull	levers	with	partners’.		
	
PCC	
‘But,	they	[partners]	need	to	be	motivated	by	someone	asking	the	difficult	questions	that	others	cant’.	
	
PCC	
‘Co-	Commissioning	with	partners	can	bring	better	value.’	
	
PCC	
‘You	must	gain	peoples	trust	...once	they	work	with	you	on	one	thing	and	you	deliver	that	successfully	they	will	work	with	you	on	other	things.’	
	
PCC	
‘I	have	supported	about	150	projects	we	have	also	taken	on	victims	services’.		
	
PCC	
‘CPS	fear	being	held	to	account.	Courts	too	traditional.’	
	
PCC	
‘Collegiate	approach	important.’	
	
PCC	
‘…often	its	politician	to	politician.’	
	
PCC	
‘Joint	commissioning	is	effective.’	
	
PCC	
‘The	Chief	Constable	and	staff	are	good	at	building	partnerships.’	
	
PCC	
‘The	Chief	Constable	has	very	good	relations	with	partners’.		
	
PCC	
‘Its	about	parking	your	ego	and	saying	what	can	we	do.’	
	
PCC	
‘I’ve	been	able	to	make	alliances	that	perhaps	the	authority	because	of	the	way	they	work	and	they	were	very	geographically	confined.	I	can	move	out	
nationally	as	well	for	example	a	CSE	project	with	the	Children’s	Commissioner.’		
	
PCC	
‘Partners	saw	police	as	difficult	to	work	with	and	unresponsive.	PCC	tried	to	force	more	openness’.	
	
	PCC	
‘I’ve	got	good	relationships	with	the	local	authorities’.	
	
PCC	
	‘The	PCC	can	think	outside	traditional	policing	solutions’.		
	
PCC	
‘They	[PCCs]	just	haven’t	had	the	time	to	fully	engage	with	partners’.		
   
  
 303 
	
7.		 Politics	(HMG,	HMIC,	ACPO)	
	
PCC	
‘The	government	did	not	do	enough	to	create	the	legitimacy	of	the	new	post.’	
	
	PCC	
‘I	don’t	think	I	would	instruct	them	(police	re	policing	of	demonstrations)	...	but	I	can	see	conflicts	with	police	if	I	went	to	a	demonstration	and	they	
weren’t	happy	I	was	there.		
No,	The	role	of	the	PCC	from	my	point	of	view,	I	would	say	there	are	several	aspects	to	that,	there	is	the	traditional	role	of	holding	the	Force	to	account	
holding	the	CC	to	account	and	introduce	an	accountability	structure	that	works	...’(	this	PCC	did	not	add	anything	else	to	performance	monitoring).	
PCC	
‘Good	policing	underpins	society	by	underpinning	the	tax	base.	You	can	only	have	a	healthy	and	fair	society	by	paying	for	it	from	taxes.	The	Guardians	
of	order,	police,	courts	prisons	etc	protect	the	tax	base	by	controlling	crime’.		
	
PCC	
‘Its	the	opposite	of	being	politicised...most	of	the	PCCs	don’t	have	political	differences	about	policing	in	the	APCC	unless	you	looked	them	up	you’d	be	
hard	pressed	to	tell	if	they	were	representing	Conservatives	Independents	or	Labour	Its	a	red	herring	The	government	has	less	direction	[of	policing]	at	
a	local	level	it	has	been	devolved.’	
	
PCC	
‘For	cities,	I	can	see	the	benefits	[of	elected	mayors	being	in	charge	of	policing],	but	I	don’t	think	the	issues	for	large	county	forces	has	been	thought	
through’.		
	
PCC	
‘Not	a	danger	[politicisation	of	policing],	policing	should	be	subject	to	democratic	scrutiny	this	makes	it	political,	but	not	party	political.’	
	
PCC	
‘The	relationship	has	become	more	political	since	Police	Authorities	.	As	an	example,	last	year	when	the	announcement	was	made	about	further	cuts,	
the	APCC	said	this	cannot	continue.	...we	decided	to	write	to	the	Home	Secretary	saying	we	are	happy	to	take	our	share,	but	this	is	now	getting	
dangerous...	the	conservative	PCCs	to	a	man	and	woman	refused	to	sign	it.	On	a	more	local	level,	an	MP	summoned	me	to	a	meeting,	I	declined	the	
PCC	from	**	went	they	are	from	the	same	political	party.	You	get	it	from	both	Tory	and	Labour	saying	they	cant	go	or	express	a	view	because	their	
party	allegiance	is	stronger.’	
	
PCC	
‘The	PCC	can	contribute	by	supporting	the	police	to	legitimately.	Funding	is	difficult	for	Police	leaders	to	speak	on	this	without	straying	into	party	
politics	whilst	the	PCC	can.		
	
PCC	
‘A	PCC	does	not	agree	with	a	local	Chief	Constable	what	might	be	said	but	at	a	National	level	the	APCC	will	work	with	the	NPCC	for	example	particularly	
around	austerity	issues.’	
	
PCC	
‘PCCs	have	significant	soft	power.	to	influence	and	drive	activity’.		
	
PCC	
‘The	difference	is	that	I	can	say	what	I	want,	the	CC	is	not	a	politician.’	
	
PCC	
‘Policing	damn	well	ought	to	be	under	political	control	!	In	any	democracy	the	police	answer	to	the	civilian	authority	that	is	a	fairly	fundamental	
principle.	All	civilian	authorities	in	a	democracy	are	political	because	they	are	elected	The	police	answer	to	someone	not	run	around	doing	what	the	
hell	they	think	they	should	be	doing.’	
	
PCC	
[The	PCC]	‘…good	relationship	with	the	Home	Secretary	&	Police	Minister.	I	deal	with	MPs	behind	the	scenes,	don’t	embarrass	them	publically.	
	
PCC	
‘Government	ministers	have	said	we	have	devolved	policing	to	local	areas,	now	get	on	with	it.	I	don’t	think	that’s	acceptable	or	helpful’.		
	
PCC	
‘Very	supportive	good	relationship’	[with	government].	
PCC	
‘	It’s	a	very	hands	off	localist	agenda.	The	government	need	to	show	leadership.	It’s	the	terms	of	the	deal’.	
	
PCC	
‘You	[the	PCC]	becomes	the	wicked	stepmother...reduction	of	the	number	of	officers	will	be	seen	as	my	fault’.	
	
PCC	
‘The	Home	Office	in	some	ways	wish	they	had	not	let	the	Genie	out	of	the	bottle,	I	think	they	would	like	to	have	a	bit	more	control	than	they	do.	Look	
at	the	Rotherham	case	where	they	realised	they	couldn’t	sack	a	PCC	that	was	a	wake	up	call	to	them’.		
	
PCC	
‘I	Feel	abandoned	by	central	government.’	
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PCC	
‘A	cynical	view	-	this	Home	Secretary	has	a	really	strong	agenda	to	transform	the	police’.		
	
PCC	
‘Government	relationship	is	thru	APCC	so	not	particularly	good.	The	current	Home	Secretary	will	not	listen	to	anybody.’	
	
PCC	
‘Politics	does	not	get	in	the	way	of	being	PCC’.		
	
PCC	
‘The	Police	have	not	been	very	politically	astute,	they	have	had	things	done	to	them	in	the	past...PCCs	use	their	political	leverage	to	get	a	better	deal	
...that	is	healthy	for	the	Chiefs	because	it	keeps	them	out	of	the	political	side’.		
	
PCC	
‘Direction	[in	policing]	has	been	devolved	to	a	local	level’.	
PCC	
‘Funding	formula	is	gobbledygook	cuts	are	undermining	law	and	order	which	underpins	society	you	are	undermining	the	foundations	of	democracy.’	
	
PCC	
‘We’ve	got	access	to	them	[government]	in	meetings	The	Home	Office	doesn’t	trust	us,	so	there’s	always	going	to	be	that	central/	local	tension’.		
	
PCC	
‘I	think	it	[relations	with	HMG]	depends	on	the	Government	of	the	day.	The	APCC	relationship	is	ok	with	government’.		
	
PCC	
‘I	think	there’s	a	tactic	there	but	that	central/	local	buck	passing	doesn’t	worry	me.	I	can	look	after	myself.	We	can	fight	our	corner	and	the	public	
aren’t	stupid’.		
PCC	
‘Tom	Windsor	[Chief	HMI]	is	a	bully	and	a	bigot’.		
	
PCC	
‘The	PCC	[policing]	plan	skewed	when	HMIC	tell	the	Chief	Constable	to	do	x	&	y	They	have	no	regard	to	the	PCCs	plan.’	
	
PCC	
‘	Its	to	be	expected	that	Conservative	PCCs	will	have	more	influence	but	the	political	differences	have	not	been	as	stark	as	I	thought	they	would	be’.	
	
PCC	
[Referring	to	party	political	PCCs]	‘Mainly	those	with	an	eye	to	their	next	political	job’	[are	affected].	
	
PCC	
‘I	don’t	see	it	[government	favouring	Conservative	PCCs].	We	meet	together	as	a	group	but	the	other	groups	do	too.	The	Home	Secretary	will	always	
praise	the	work	of	PCCs	irrespective	of	political	party.’	
	
PCC	
‘The	majority	of	PCCs	have	no	further	political	ambition	and	do	a	good	job	irrespective	of	political	views,	there	may	be	one	or	two	who	are	still	
ambitious	and	might	be	constrained	from	going	against	their	parties	views’.	
	
PCC	
‘Probably	a	greater	difference	between	types	of	forces	than	political	lines.	Governance	is	politics,	you	cant	escape	that	...governance	at	any	level	is	
about	choices...the	PCC	brings	a	particular	view	and	is	elected	on	that	mandate,	that’s	not	to	say	if	the	Home	Secretary	tells	the	PCC	they	jump,	its	not	
party	political.	The	introduction	of	PCCs	has	now	made	explicit	politics,	that	which	was	implicit	politics.	I	refuse	to	believe	there	was	no	politics	in	the	
Police	Authority.		
	
PCC	
‘The	Police	have	been	thoroughly	reformed,	HMIC	still	reflects	policing	of	yester	year’.	
PCC	
‘The	Tory	PCCs	and	the	Home	Office	are	getting	on	really	well.	Too	well	at	times.	The	Independents	and	Labour	feel..	somewhat	excluded’.		
	
PCC	
‘With	reductions	in	the	number	of	police	officers	its	going	to	be	very	difficult	to	meet	our	Strategic	Policing	Requirement	if	we	have	a	problem	back	
home	I’m	not	going	to	send	half	our	police	force	off	to’	[big	city].		
	
PCC	
‘People	seem	to	forget	that	decisions	can	be	made	very	quickly,	not	hastily,	but	the	decision	making	process	which	helps	the	force,	helps	the	CC	they	
need	to	know	where	they	stand	on	funding	and	a	million	and	one	other	things.	I	can	say	to	the	CC,	and	nobody	can	gain	say	me,	I	can	say	you	will	have	
this,	this	is	the	amount	of	money	you	will	have...its	not	just	a	steer,	making	a	decision	is	another,	I	can	give	the	CC	certainty	I	don’t	have	to	ask	anybody	
else,	I	do,	obviously	have	my	own	team	of	advisors	every	PCC	does...but	that	decision	can	be	made	within	a	day,	within	an	hour	so	we	can	react	very	
quickly,	that	is	a	really	good...thing	for	a	CC	to	know.	We	can	rule	out	any	uncertainty’.		
	
PCC	
‘In	the	late	1990s	when	he	[Cameron]	was	talking	about	PCCs,	he	said	under	no	circumstances	can	we	have	anyone	with	a	political	label	standing	for	
these	jobs.	If	we	could	go	back	to	PCCs	not	being	political	representatives	that	would	be	good’.		
	
PCC	
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‘I	saw	the	silver	backs	in	action,	they	had	to	go	[ACPO].'		
	
PCC	
‘It	was	an	anti	democratic	organisation	[ACPO]	They	had	to	change’.	
	
PCC	
‘The	NPCC	is	developing	well.’	
	
PCC	
‘Some	[in	ACPO]	thought	they	were	bigger	than	the	Government.	The	NPCC	a	better	model’.	
	
PCC	
‘ACPO	did	not	have	the	wisdom	to	see	where	they	fitted	in	the	governance	arrangement’.	
	
PCC	
‘ACPO	is	significantly	responsible	for	the	reduction	of	influence	of	the	police	in	policing.’	
	
PCC	
‘There	is	no	difference	[since	demise	of	ACPO]	the	NPCC	and	College	[of	Policing]	take	the	roles.’		
	
PCC	
‘There	were	significant	problems	with	ACPO	making	up	the	rules	as	they	went	along.	A	lot	of	their	guidelines	became	almost	law	without	outside	
scrutiny	or	thought.	The	companies	they	set	up	were	wrong’.		
PCC	
‘The	establishment	of	NPCC	and	College	of	Policing	is	a	good	thing’.	
	
PCC	
‘[ACPO	was]	Not	a	model	that	allowed	democratic	accountability’.	
	
PCC	
‘ACPO	had	forgotten	who	it	worked	for,	the	public	or	the	police.’	
	
PCC	
‘It	[ACPO]	was	not	too	strong,	it	was	a	way	of	organising	themselves	Some	of	the	political	PCCs	see	it	as	as	a	challenge,	the	Chief	Constables	conspiring.	
I	see	it	as	them	talking	about	the	challenges	and	what	they	can	do	together	to	address	them’.		
	
PCC	
‘The	way	the	Home	Secretary	dealt	with	ACPO	was	quite	damaging.	It	didn’t	do	the	PCC/	Chief	Constable	relationship	much	good.	Some	PCCs	who	like	
to	flex	their	muscles	used	that	time	to	reinforce	the	fact	that	they	are	in	charge.	The	loss	of	ACPO	itself	is	not	that	important	NPCC	will	take	it	forward’.		
	
PCC	
‘We’ve	got	rid	of	most	of	the	ACPO	bunch	...who	wanted	to	strangle	PCCs	before	they	were	born	-	That	ludicrous	Stevens	report	which	was	just	
pathetic	in	the	extreme	(Stevens	report	was	sponsored	by	New	Labour!)	we’ve	got	rid	of	all	that.	ACPO	have	changed	the	name,	because	we	PCCs	
made	them	change	the	name.	But	I	think	that	change	of	name	is	a	recognition	of	the	changing	and	changed	aspects	of	policing	in	this	country.	You’ve	
got	the	College	of	policing	which	is	a	force	for	good.’	
	
PCC	
[Does	PCC	behaviour	change	in	the	lead	up	to	elections]	‘It	must	do,	this	is	a	particular	problem	for	those	with	political	colours.’	
	
PCC	
‘Candidates	and	parties	begin	to	attack	the	police	[in	the	lead	up	to	elections]	as	a	way	of	getting	at	the	PCC,	that	impacts	on	public	confidence.’	
	
PCC	
‘For	career	politicians	this	[the	election]	will	loom	large	the	need	for	votes	will	drive	lots	of	things’.		
	
PCC	
‘Always	aware	there	is	an	election,	there	are	going	to	be	big	budget	cuts	and	I’ve	got	to	get	out	and	explain	that’.		
	
PCC	
‘I’m	already	seeing	evidence	of	PCC	colleagues	acting	in	a	way	that	they	have	one	eye	on	May	2016.	Its	already	started.	That	is	counter	productive.	Its	a	
demanding	job,	they	should	be	concentrating	on	the	job	and	delivering	for	the	public.	There	is	one	PCC	who	has	said	to	me	that	they	are	taking	3	
months	off	from	February	to	May	to	prepare.’		
PCC	
‘Who	can	blame	them	[PCCs	who	see	the	role	as	a	career	step]	I’ve	got	no	problem	with	that’.		
	
PCC	
‘Without	funding	[of	PCC	candidates]	only	political	parties	will	be	successful	and	that	leads	to	political	influence	in	policing’.		
	
PCC	
‘There	are	young	Tory	Turks	who	do	not	listen.’	
	
PCC	
‘Even	with	the	ones	who	belong	to	political	parties	-	...I	have	never	ever	seen	or	heard	of	a	decision	that	is	politically	motivated	...	‘	
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PCC	
‘	With	sensible	safeguards	there	should	be	a	power	of	recall	for	PCCs.’	
	
8.	 Police	&	Crime	Commissioner	Scrutiny	&	Accountability	role	in	Policing	
	
PCC	
‘I	see	the	role	as	making	sure	that	the	public	know	what	the	Police	are	doing.	Police	had	lost	sight	of	the	fact	that	they	were	to	serve	the	public,	the	
fixation	was	on	recoded	crime’.		
	
PCC	
‘...I	had	a	very	low	opinion	of	the	police...in	2	1/2	years	[as	a	PCC]I	have	a	much	greater	respect	for	the	police	that	I’m	able	to	portray	to	the	public.’		
	
PCC	
‘Things	were	being	done	with	taxpayers	money	that	the	police	were	not	being	held	to	account	on’.		
	
PCC	
‘The	role	of	the	PCC	from	my	point	of	view,	I	would	say	there	are	several	aspects	to	that,	there	is	the	traditional	role	of	holding	the	Force	to	account	
holding	the	CC	to	account	and	introduce	an	accountability	structure	that	works	...	‘(did	not	add	anything	else	to	performance	monitoring).	
	
PCC	
	‘Media	exposure	demonstrates	[the	PCC]	holding	Police	to	account.’	
	
PCC	
‘PCC	needs	to	send	that	message	that	the	force	is	being	held	to	account’.		
	
PCC	
‘Policing	damn	well	ought	to	be	under	political	control	!	In	any	democracy	the	police	answer	to	the	civilian	authority	that	is	a	fairly	fundamental	
principle.	All	civilian	authorities	in	a	democracy	are	political	because	they	are	elected	The	police	answer	to	someone	not	run	around	doing	what	the	
hell	they	think	they	should	be	doing.’		
	
	
PCC	
‘I	sense	with	the	departure	of	the	dinosaurs	in	policing....	there	is	a	genuine	desire	to	reinvigorate	policing....in	the	past	if	the	boys	club	has	decided	
something	will	happen	its	damn	well	happened	PAs	Govt	or	not.	But	now	I	think	there	is	a	wind	of	change...but	not	unfortunately	enough	yet	to	re	
shape	and	re	model	policing	at	the	top...I	sense	there	is	the	appetite	for	change	and	if	the	government	would	give	policing	the	respect	it	deserves,	the	
govt	would	be	repaid...	the	police	need	to	be	shown	that	the	govt	are	confident	in	them	not	being	bashed	right	left	&	centre...I	think	this	would	be	a	
better	policed	country’.		
	
PCC	
‘{my	CC}	is	of	the	current	age	of	Chief	Constables,	...going	back	you	got	some	Chief	Constables	who	probably	fed	the	government’s	desire	for	reform	by	
their	demeanor,	behaviour	which	has	probably	got	peoples	backs	up....I	think	the	former	generation	of	CCs	have	contributed	to	part	of	this	reform	
agenda’.		
	
9.	 Police	&	Crime	Commissioner	Relationship	with	Police	Officers	&	Staff	
	
PCC	
‘No	I	don’t	do	that	[meet	with	police	officers	&	staff]...	I	meet	at	a	regular	forum	with	the	Federation	and	Unison’.			
	
PCC	
‘...don’t	think	they	[police	officers	and	staff]	really	think	about	it,	they	get	on	with	the	job,	the	PCC	pops	up	occasionally	Police	Officers	are	concerned	
more	about	what’s	in	front	of	them	on	that	day’.		
	
PCC	
‘There	was	a	lot	of	anxiety	when	PCCs	first	came	in.	I	have	spent	a	lot	of	time	building	that	relationship	with	the	police	by	being	professional,	breaking	
down	worries	and	concerns.’		
	
PCC	
‘At	commander	level,	they	[the	police]definitely	understand,		below	that	I	think	no’.	
	
PCC	
‘There	is	no	misunderstanding	in	force	as	to	what	PCC	can	&	cannot	do	PCC	must	stand	up	and	say	I	am	not	the	Chief	Constable,	the	PCC	job	is	to	be	
the	bridge	with	the	public.’		
	
PCC	
‘I	go	on	patrol	with	teams	but	very	clear	the	Chief	Constable	is	my	route	into	the	force.	I	get	email	from	staff,	the	Chief	Constable	is	ok	with	that’.	
	
PCC	
‘Some	aggression	from	junior	cops	until	they	meet	PCCs	and	understand	the	role’.		
	
PCC	
‘If	you	get	the	relationship	wrong,	it	will	damage	most	of	the	PCC/Chief	Constable	problems	around	country	due	to	clashes	of	egos.’		
	
	
PCC	
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‘It	matters	that	there	is	interpersonal	trust	and	that	his	vision	of	where	policing	lies	in	the	21st	century	is	not	identical	but	similar	to	mine’.	
	
PCC	
‘He	[CC]	is	my	key	partner.’	
	
PCC	
‘PCC	&	Chief	Constable	understand	each	others	roles.’	
	
PCC	
‘That	cooperation	is	key.	There	has	to	be	trust,	a	lot	of	integrity	openness	and	transparency.	In	Police	Authority	times	that	was	not	present.’	
	
PCC	
‘There	are	some	cases	and	When	I	see	some	of	the	PCCs	I	couldn’t	get	on	with	them.’	
	
PCC	
‘There	must	be	clear	blue	water	between	the	governance	and	the	PDR	side’.		
	
PCC	
‘Vital,	really	important	that	you’ve	got	a	good	working	relationship.	It	would	be	very	difficult	to	do	your	role	effectively	if	you	haven’t	got	that.	I’ve	seen	
it	in	some	areas	where	its	not.	I	like	to	think	we’ve	got	a	good	balance...	He	(CC)	has	a	wealth	of	experience.’	
	
PCC	
‘It	would	be	very	awkward	if	you	didn’t	get	on’.	
	
PCC	
‘The	most	important	relationship	that	I	have.	We	must	get	on	but	that	doesn’t	mean	we	have	to	agree	on	everything.	In	some	senses	its	quite	healthy	
that	we	don’t	agree	on	some	things.	It	is	important	that	we	share	an	understanding	and	an	ability	to	understand	each	other	and	what	it	is	we	are	trying	
to	get	to.	There	is	no	structure	anywhere	in	the	world	that	will	work	regardless	of	who	you	put	in	it’.		
	
PCC	
‘Absolutely	vital,	weekly	we	have	robust	discussions,	but	when	I	leave	the	room	we	still	have	a	good	working	relationship....	We	get	on	we	don’t	agree	
on	anything,	we	talk,	we	never	disagree	in	public,	only	in	his	or	my	office.’	
	
PCC	
‘Its	vital,	that	we	should	have	a	good	working	professional	relationship	and	mutual	respect.	without	that	policing	isn’t	going	to	reach	the	high	standards	
that	the	people	of	this	county	deserve.’	
	
PCC	
‘Its	evolved	to	a	degree	but	common	sense	plays	a	part	in	this,	{CC}	understands	the	engagement	with	the	public	is	now	largely	down	to	me.	I	
understand	that	the	delivery	of	operational	policing	is	down	to	**{CC}.	Its	{the	relationship}	critical,	...I	would	have	thought	if	you	don’t	have	a	
constructive	relationship	between	the	PCC	&	CC,	then	I	think	you’ve	really	got	a	problem...if	the	two	people	at	the	top	of	the	organisation,	the	
professional	and	the	policy	maker,	don’t	get	on	there’s	a	problem	there	and	that’s	down	to	both	to	be	mature,	to	be	realistic	and	to	be	constructive.	
On	occasions	to	be	critical,	on	occasions	to	be	supportive...’	
		
10.	 Police	&	Crime	Commissioner/	Chief	Constable	Relationship	
	
PCC	
‘The	PCC	drives	the	strategy.’	
	
PCC	
‘PCC	is	the	chairman	Chief	Constable	is	CEO	The	sole	shareholder	is	the	PCC	but	the	management	comes	from	the	Chief	Constable.	Neither	role	with	
work	if	the	other	doesn’t	and	you	don’t	communicate’.	
	
PCC	
‘You	can	make	any	governance	system	work	provided	you’ve	got	the	right	individuals	involved.	If	You	have	got	people	who	are	reasonably	mature,	
proportionate	balanced	then	you	would	have	a	reasonably	constructive	working	relationship.	If	you’ve	got	individuals	who	are	flawed	in	whatever	been	
one	or	two	examples...	I	think	there	should	probably	be	some	reforms	to	the	role’.		
	
PCC	
‘Chief	and	I	work	very	much	as	a	team	I	go	out	of	my	way	to	make	sure	we	are	saying	the	same	thing’.		
	
PCC	
‘But	the	PCC	is	in	charge.’	
	
PCC	
‘The	PCC	deals	with	the	Chief	Constable,	he	goes	to	others	within	the	force	by	invitation’.		
	
PCC	
‘PCC	job	is	to	enable	the	force	to	deliver	for	the	public.’	
	
PCC	
‘PCC	gives	Chief	Constable	the	priorities	from	the	public	to	deliver	PCC	then	deals	with	the	politics	and	the	funding.’	
	
PCC	
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‘I	want	him	to	be	the	best	Chief	Constable	in	the	country	because	that	delivers	better	policing.	...its	not	about	publically	humiliating	him	because	the	
only	person	that	shows	up	is	you.	I	have	seen	that	done	unfortunately	and	its	been	quite	unedifying’.		
	
PCC	
‘The	CC	doesn’t	contribute	to	formulating	the	policing	plan.’	
	
PCC	
‘We	are	not	best	mates,	that’s	not	how	it	works,	we	have	a	mutual	respect...he’s	got	a	job	I’ve	got	a	mandate.	In	the	balance	a	mandate	is	far	more	
powerful	than	a	job...we	get	on	very	well’.		
	
PCC	
‘We	don’t	live	a	life	of	compromise	I	produce	a	police	and	crime	plan	that	plan	is	followed	by	the	Chief	Constable...	on	behalf	of	the	people	of***	
whose	views	I	have	sought	before	drawing	up	the	plan,	I	make	sure	they	get	the	sort	of	policing	they	tell	me	they	want’.		
	
PCC	
‘I	try	to	work	constructively	with	the	force,	and	we’ve	got	a	good	relationship	for	several	reasons.	firstly	we	are	co	located	in	the	same	
building...secondly,	I	have	a	track	record	locally	so	I’m	reasonably	respected	by	people	in	the	Force	I’ve	got	reasonably	good	interpersonal	skills	so	I	get	
on	well	with	the	Chief	Officer	team.	They	understand	where	I	am	and	what	I	have	to	do	and	I	understand	where	they	are	and	what	they	have	to	do.	I	
think	it	works	reasonably	well.	We	will	be	mutually	supportive	{CC/	PCC}	The	Chief	Constable	will	make	the	decisions	about	operational	policing,	
decisions	about	wider	strategic	issues	that	are	relevant	to	community	safety	are	for	me’.		
	
PCC	
‘A	partnership,	but	the	PCC	leads.’	
	
PCC	
‘If	the	PCC	and	Chief	Constable	don’t	get	on	one	of	them	has	to	go,	and	its	probably	the	Chief	Constable’.	
	
PCC	
‘Problems	occur	when	PCC	sees	themselves	as	superior	or	Chief	Constables	often	resent	the	PCC	role.	Its	all	about	relationships'		
	
PCC	
‘We	spent	6	months	exploring	the	relationship.’	
	
PCC	
‘The	Chief	Constable	understands	PCC	has	a	role	vis	a	vis	the	public	and	may	have	to	say	things	the	Chief	Constable	does	not	like.’	
	
PCC	
‘I	need	him	and	he	needs	me’.	
	
PCC	
‘The	Chief	Constable	and	the	PCC	have	different	roles	but	it	is	clear	that	the	Chief	Constable	is	accountable	to	the	PCC’.		
	
PCC	
‘PCC	supports	the	CC,	but	is	clear	that	he	is	the	vox	populis	of	the	public	and	will	hold	the	CC	to	account’.	
	
PCC	
‘However,	in	meetings	with	only	PCCs	and	CCs	it	is	clear	that	all	the	relationships	are	different..	there	is	no	model.	More	and	more	are	getting	on.	But	
still	some	exhibit	behaviour	as	if	they	constantly	want	to	remind	the	chief	who	is	in	charge.	..they	tend	to	be	more	on	the	Tory	side.’	
	
PCC	
‘It	is	important	to	work	out	how	we	work	together’.	
	
PCC	
‘I	think	the	Chief	Constable	would	find	it	better	than	the	PA,	the	advantages	are,	decision	making	is	swift,	we	can	turn	decisions	around	in	a	couple	of	
hours	if	we	need	to.	..	(the	CC)	has	the	advantage	of	working	with	someone	who	is	full	time,	as	opposed	to	part	time	Police	Authorities	and	someone	
who	knows	their	way	around	the	***	area	I	can	keep	{CC}	reasonably	well	informed	about	what	is	going	on	in	the	****area’.		
	
PCC	
‘I	have	a	good	relationship	with	the	Chief	Constable	because	personalities	match	with	the	DCC,	our	two	emotional	personalities	clash.’		
	
PCC	
‘In	some	forces	the	relationship	is	poisonous	its	no	way	to	work’.		
	
PCC	
‘Is	the	regime	as	strict	as	it	might	be,	no	because	I	trust	him	and	it	works	both	ways’.		
	
PCC	
‘We	disagree	on	things	and	discuss	them’.		
	
PCC	
‘I	meet	with	the	Chief	Constable	3-5	times	a	day.’	
	
PCC	
‘	[I	meet	with	the	Chief	Constable]at	least	2	times	a	week.’	
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PCC	
‘[I	meet	with	the	Chief	Constable]	a	couple	of	times	a	week	informally’.		
	
PCC	
‘[I	meet	with	the	Chief	Constable]		‘every	week.’	
	
PCC	
‘Not	a	daily	basis	but	regular	minuted	and	public’.		
	
PCC	
‘I	interact	with	the	Chief	Constable	once	a	week	in	a	formal	meeting.’	
	
PCC	
‘I	give	the	CC	the	resources	to	achieve	the	plan	and	he	gets	on	with	it.	There	are	no	disagreements.’	
	
	
	
11.	 Police	Operational	Independence	
	
PCC	
‘I	don’t	know	of	any	major	fall	outs,	but	operational	policing	is	the	responsibility	of	the	CC	It	would	have	to	be	a	huge	clash	of	personalities’.		
	
PCC	
‘There	are	some	PCCs	who	are	getting	involved	in	operational	things	that	are	nothing	to	do	with	them	I	don’t	want	anything	to	do	with	it.	The	day	I	go	
there	it	all	unravels’.		
	
PCC	
‘If	we	got	to	the	situation	if	something	was...	something	had	happened,	an	event	or	a	particular	issue,	where	I	felt	the	force	was	wrong,	and	Id	
had	those	conversations	and	made	those	points	and	we	still	had	a	difference	of	opinion	then	I	would	say	so	because	I	think	that’s	my	role.	So	I	might	be	
critical	publically.	I	don’t	think	I	would	use	my	authority	as	PCC	to	try	and	instruct	the	Chief	Constable	I	think	that	might	be	-	because	if	you’re	heading	
down	that	road	then	you	are	basically	saying,	my	instruction	is	do	this,	and	if	they	don’t	then	you	are	on	a	collision	course	that	is	then	ultimately	going	
to	lead	to	a	parting	of	the	ways...because	in	a	dispute	situation	there	is	only	ever	going	to	be	one	winner	and	that	is	the	PCC,	but	that	not	where	I	
would	want	to	be...	...I'll	tell	you	when	it	will	happen,	if	this	government	is	re	elected,	and	there	is	a	further	round	of	public	sector	cuts	I	can	foresee	a	
winter	of	discontent	emerging,	and	I	think	that	will	be	an	extremely	testing	time	for	the	police	service.	and	for	PCCs	because	I	suspect	that	what	will	
happen	is	that	...I	can	see	a	real	dilemma	for	Chief	Constables	in	having	to	maintain	the	peace...I	can	see	a	situation	where,	and	this	has	happened	we	
have	days	of	action	where	the	***	went	on	strike	and	I	went	down	to	(the	picket	line)	the	police	got	very	nervous	about	that.	Its	not	a	major	problem	
as	far	as	I’m	concerned	its	a	peaceful	protest...	I	don’t	think	I	would	instruct	them	(police	re	policing	of	strikes)	...	but	I	can	see	conflicts	with	police	if	I	
went	to	a	demonstration	and	they	weren’t	happy	I	was	there’.		
	
PCC	
‘Difficult	[operational	independence]	but	not	for	me	as	an	ex	cop.’	
	
PCC	
‘I	will	ask	for	a	report	if	constituent	complains.’	
	
PCC	
‘Every	decision	that	I	make	has	an	operational	effect’.		
	
PCC	
‘PCC	might	look	at	operational	things	if	there	are	concerns	that	is	part	of	holding	the	Chief	Constable	to	account’.		
	
PCC	
‘The	division	is	clear	PCC	does	not	get	involved	in	tactics	but	holds	the	Chief	Constable	to	account.’	
	
PCC	
‘It’s	the	PCC’s	job	to	support	the	Chief	Constable	during	a	critical	incident’.		
	
PCC	
‘We	know	intuitively	where	those	lines	[operational]	are	and	there	has	never	been	a	problem,	we	have	a	scheme	of	delegation	to	guide	us’.		
	
PCC	
‘How	they	achieve	the	aim	is	up	to	them,	they	are	the	experts.	Where	you	put	operations	is	to	do	with	the	police	plan..’	
	
PCC	
‘I	will	engage	in	all	critical	incidents.’	
	
PCC	
‘There	can	be	areas	like	closure	of	Police	Stations	you	might	say	it	is	operational	I	think	its	budgetary,	reputational,	efficiency	and	effectiveness,	and	it	
affects	public	confidence	...	So	that	is	when	it	comes	together	if	its	about	directing	operations	and	operational	policing,	that’s	an	easy	one,	that’s	the	
Chief	Constables	job.	With	some	PCCs	who	have	little	knowledge	of	policing	they	are	dipping	into	areas	I	wouldn’t	get	involved	in’.		
	
PCC	
‘I	just	get	a	few	details	from	the	on	duty	ACPO,	that’s	all	I	need.’	
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PCC	
‘No	I’ve	not	found	that,	I’m	very	clear	about	what’s	operational	and	what’s	not.	I	am	always	kept	in	the	loop	about	operational	matters,	there	is	hardly	
anything	that	happens	that	I’m	not	briefed	about.	I	keep	a	finger	in	that	pie.	I’m	kept	updated	...	That	goes	into	my	mental	record.	Never	commented	
on	operations	I	know	other	PCCs	have	expressed	concerns	about	operations.’	
	
PCC	
‘The	PCC	needs	to	be	informed	[of	critical	incidents]	so	that	PCC	can	understand	any	community	issues.’	
	
PCC	
‘PCC	staff	attend	‘Gold	Groups’		to	understand	reputational	issues.	The	PCC	would	not	attend.’	
	
PCC	
‘Only	[attend	Gold	Groups]	in	thematic	organisational	matters	or	very	significant	operations	i.e.	CSA	then	as	observer.’	
	
PCC	
	The	PCC	has	observed	a	Gold	group,	but	does	not	see	it	as	his	role.	PCC	will	have	staff	attendance	on	Gold	groups	re	organisational	failing	as		
participant	to	the	extent	of	commenting,	but	not	designing	the	response.	Will	not	sign	up	to	the	decisions.	
	
PCC	
‘The	PCC	needs	to	know	[about	critical	incidents]	because	of	force	reputational	issues	and	impacts	on	public	confidence.’	
	
PCC	
‘Where	the	public	are	concerned	about	an	extraordinary	police	operation	I	think	it	is	the	PCC	role	to	ask	those	questions.’	
	
PCC	
‘The	PCC	has	a	part	to	play	in	those	meetings	[Gold	groups]	along	with	the	other	agencies,	but	actually	directing	the	police	how	they	deal	with	the	
(incident),	its	up	to	them.	But	later	in	private,	I	think	its	fair	enough	for	me	to	say,	I	don’t	think	we	handled	that	very	well	or	why	didn’t	we	do	
something.	If	I	don’t	think	something	is	handled	particularly	well	operationally,	then	I	would	probably	say	that,	but	the	decision	is	the	Chief	
Constable’s’.		
	
Sub	Theme	re	Contracts			
	
PCC	
‘I	can	see	that	the	fear	that	PCCs	may	use	the	power	[to	decline	to	renew	a	CC	contract]	arbitrarily	is	true’.		
	
PCC	
‘I	come	across	Chiefs	who	appear	to	be	a	bit	frightened	of	the	PCC.	There	was	an	occasion	when	a	group	of	Chiefs	wanted	to	write	a	letter	to	the	Home	
Secretary…’[repeated	story	of	some	CCs	declining	to	sign	fearing	repercussions	from	their	PCC].	
	
PCC	
‘I	understand	their	concerns	[re	PCC	declining	to	renew	a	CC	contract]	and	it	depends	on	the	PCC	but	I	don’t	know’.	
	
PCC	
‘I	can	see	it	would	be	a	concern	for	some	Chief	Constables.	But	a	5	year	contract	not	a	bad	thing,	because	Chief	Constables	can	go	on	for	years.	I	
suppose	Chief	Constable	could	act	in	this	way,	but	they	should	not	be	Chief	Constables’.	
	
PCC	
‘	It	is	a	concern	[re	PCC	declining	to	renew	a	CC	contract]	because	I	have	discussed	it	with	the	Chief	Constable	What	we	want	in	our	Chief	Constables	
is	Honesty,	integrity	and	truth	and	operational	independence	...	one	would	hope	that	there	is	a	healthy	relationship	between	PCC	&	CC...	This	creates	a	
politically	controlled	because	younger	CCs	will	bend	to	the	wishes	of	whoever	the	politician	is	[because	of	the	pension	situation]	They	will	jump	to	the	
tune	of	a	Tory	Turk	because	they	are	a	£150,000	package	that	can	be	terminated	in	2	years	time	if	they	don’t	do	what	they	are	told...	you	cannot	
expect	a	40yr	old	Chief	Constable	with	a	young	family	to	challenge	a	a	headstrong	PCC	who	wants	to	interfere	operationally’.		
	
PCC	
‘It	would	depend	on	the	Chief	Constable	[re	PCC	declining	to	renew	a	CC	contract]	and	how	confident	they	are	in	themselves.	Suppose	there	is	always	a	
potential	for	a	PCC	who	thinks	that	way,	I	hope	that	colleagues	would	rein	them	in,	but	some	PCCs	are	independent	minded,	its	not	the	way	I	do	
business’.		
	
PCC	
‘As	to	whether	a	Chief	Constable	requiring	a	further	contract	would	tell	the	PCC	what	they	think	they	want	to	hear.	I	would	really	earnestly	hope	
that	doesn’t	happen,	but	I	suspect	that	it	probably	does.	I	can	only	speak	from	my	own	experience	and	it	doesn’t	happen	here.	But	we	are	dealing	with	
human	nature,	and	I	can	quite	see	that	might	be	the	case...I	have	no	evidence	at	all	that	it	is	elsewhere,	but	it	would	not	surprise	me.		But	if	you	looked	
into	it	and	it	was	the	Chief	Constable	fulfilling	the	police	&	crime	plan,	I	don’t	regard	that	as	brown	nosing,	that’s	doing	your	job.	As	I	said	
Commissioners	have	a	mandate,	everyone	else	has	a	job.	Chief	Constables	should	be	well	remunerated,	which	they	are,	but	they	shouldn’t	expect	a	job	
for	life.	They	shouldn’t	expect	to	complete	their	30	years	and	then	kick	up	a	fuss	I	don’t	think	members	of	the	public	appreciate	it.’	
	
PCC	
‘Similar	to	military	a	tenured	appointment	when	pensionable	at	a	certain	rank.	You	leave	with	a	pension.	If	CCs	were	appointed	on	the	understanding	
that	at	the	end	of	a	contract	they	would	be	pensionable	this	would	prevent	political	control’.		
	
PCC	
‘We	need	to	appoint	people	who	have	a	business	brain.	I’m	not	saying	they	need	to	be	Chief	Constable	but	they	need	to	be	right	up	there	in	the	top	
team...it	doesn’t	matter	if	they	know	how	to	catch	crooks	as	long	as	they	know	how	to	run	a	business.’		
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PCC	
‘[DCCs	being	appointed	to	CC	posts	in	the	same	force]	Huge	danger,	just	not	healthy.	One	PCC	got	on	with	his	DCC	and	could	not	be	bothered	with	a	
wider	process.	This	happened	with	Police	Authorities,		DCCs	groomed	Police	Authority	reps.’	
	
PCC	
‘Big	danger	[single	CC	candidates	for	vacancies].	I	increased	the	pay	rate	for	my	Chief	Constable	to	get	more	applicants.	I’m	considering	international	
applicants’.		
	
PCC	
‘I	don’t	like	it	[DCC	getting	CC	posts	in	the	same	force].	People	from	outside	is	challenging	brings	new	ideas.	Its	bad	practice,	sign	of	a	cosy	relationship’.		
	
PCC	
‘I’ve	been	surprised	at	the	[CC]	posts	with	only	one	or	two	applicants.	I’m	very	concerned	about	the	available	pool’.		
	
PCC	
‘I’m	not	sure	more	DCCs	are	getting	Chief	Constable	jobs	in	the	same	force.’	
	
PCC	
‘Its	not	good	enough	[single	CC	candidates]	there’s	a	real	issue	about	quality’.		
	
PCC	
‘Not	healthy	[single	CC	candidates]	but	its	real	politic.’	
	
PCC	
‘…but	that	was	always	the	way	with	Police	Authorities’[DCC	getting	CC	posts	in	the	same	force].		
	
PCC	
‘	We	are	tending	to	see	more	promotions	in	force	due	to	the	lack	of	mobility	of	senior	police	officers	for	smaller	forces	its	more	of	a	problem.	..	If	a	
person	is	chosen	from	inside	he	knows	where	the	worms	are.’	[re	corruption]	
	
PCC	
‘I	appointed	the	current	Chief	Constable	he	was	the	only	person	who	applied.	a	wider	field	may	have	given	people	a	warmer	feeling	but	I	don’t	think	it	
would	have	benefitted	because	I	think	we	would	have	come	to	the	same	conclusion.	People	need	to	have	a	reasonable	thought	that	they	are	that	they	
are	going	win...it	was	fairly	obvious	that	XX	would	stand	(the	incumbent	DCC)	for	the	job	and	people	were	not	prepared	to	stand	against	him	and	I	
understand	that’.		
	
PCC	
‘This	happened	because	with	the	new	governance,	some	Chief	Constables	decided	to	go	because	they	had	done	their	time,	a	cohort	who	said	I	will	
see	how	it	is,	give	it	6	months	then	see	if	I	want	to	go	or	not.	There	was	a	few,	very	few	(of	CCs)	who	could	not	make	the	adjustment	at	all	to	the	new	
governance	model.	So	we	(PCCs)	appointed	so	many	Chief	Constables	in	an	18	month	period	that	political	opponents	were	saying,	you	are	only	getting	
one	applicant	and	it’s	a	done	deal.	It	wasn’t	that	we	didn’t	enough	candidates’.		
	
PCC	
‘I	don’t	see	that	as	healthy	at	all.	It	reinforces	what	I	say	about	the	shallow	pool	(of	CC	candidates}	I	don’t	blame	a	PCC	for	appointing	a	Deputy	as	a	
Chief	Constable	as	long	as	there	has	been	a	rigorous	process...	You’ve	got	someone	who	knows	the	force	inside	out,	but	I	don’t	think	its	a	very	good	
thing,	its	usually	expedient’.		
	
PCC	
[re	CCs	not	applying	for	posts	in	forces	with	perceived	difficult	PCCs]	‘This	may	alter	the	culture	of	police	leadership	which	will	be	regrettable.’	
	
PCC	
‘I	understands	the	issue,	[re	PCC	declining	to	renew	a	CC	contract]	but	PCC	must	have	the	power	to	ensure	delivery’.		
	
PCC	
‘The	only	reason	you	could	do	[decline	to	renew	a	CC	contract]	it	is	if	a	force	wasn’t	performing	and	the	responsibility	lay	with	the	CC.	In	those	
circumstances	bad	luck	I’m	afraid	!	But	I	don’t	think	that	situation	has	arisen	except	on	one	occasion	early	on’	[Gwent].		
	
PCC	
‘There	should	be	a	mechanism	so	that	they	[CCs	whose	contracts	are	not	renewed]	are	not	unfairly	penalised	if	they	feel	they	have	to	make	a	stand	on	
their	principles’.		
	
PCC	
‘There	may	be	something	that	needs	to	be	done	in	terms	of	early	access	to	a	pension..	to	facilitate	the	underlying	intention	of	the	whole	process	which	
is	to	enable	the	PCC	to	hold	the	Chief	Constable		to	account	and	a	Chief	Constable	stand	by	their	operational	independence	with	integrity	and	if	
necessary	walk	away	if	they	feel	its	impossible	without	undue	penalty...then	that	arrangement	needs	to	exist...the	intention	is	to	allow	that	
accountability	on	the	part	of	the	PCC,	but	also	to	allow	the	CC	,	not	to	unduly	penalise	them	for	taking	a	principled	stand.	that	needs	to	be	there.	But	
that	is	not	a	reason	for	fettering	further	the	power	of	a	PCC	to	make	decision	about	a	Chief	Constable.	Or	granting	to	Chief	Constables	that	they	are	
more	than	operationally	independent	of	PCCs.’	
	
PCC	
‘[The	situation	for	CCs	in	the	position	of	not	having	contract	renewed]	...is	no	more	that	anyone	else	who's	got	a	job	would	be	my	answer	to	that.	The	
realities	of	the	world	have	always	been	if	you	have	a	job	and	you	cock	up,	then	you’re	out	on	your	ear,	or	if	you’ve	got	a	fixed	term	contract	and	it	
expires	then	off	you	go.	I	don’t	want	to	appear	to	be	hard	hearted,	but	I	don’t	think	because	a	Chief	Constable	has	a	particular	job	he	or	she	should	
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regard	it	as	a	job	for	life...I	think	that	members	of	the	public	would	be	not	very	pleased	with	the	PCC	who	simply	went	ok	mate,	I’ll		give	you	18	months	
or	however	long	it	is...members	of	the	public	are	already	browned	off	with	officers	who	have	resigned	on	full	pension	when	they	have	been	caught	
doing	whatever’.		
	
PCC	
‘I	suppose	that’s	always	a	possibility	[CC	more	likely	to	do	all	that	the	PCC	asks	due	to	contract	issue]	I	wouldn’t	ask	anyone	to	deliver	beyond	what	I	
thought	was	appropriate	in	terms	of	the	police	and	crime	plan	or	whatever.	I’m	acutely	aware	that	this	is	a	powerful	role,	no	doubt	about	that,	the	
individual	{PCC}	could	overstep	the	mark	and	move	into	operational	policing.	I	think	here	the	relationship	is	pretty	good,	they	{Police}	would	say	you	
are	getting	into	operational	policing	matters	here	**	{First	name	of	PCC}	and	I	would	probably	say	I’m	giving	you	the	views	of	the	community	and	now	
its	down	to	you...If	the	Chief	Constable	was	moving	in	a	direction	that	I	thought	was	dangerous	for	them	and	for	me	ultimately	then	I	would	say	so	but	I	
don’t	think	I	would	say	police	this	ward	more	than	that	ward	because	you	know	my	family	lives	here...	When	I	recruit	a	new	Chief	Constable	I	wont	be	
thinking	of	that	{contract	issue},	I’ll	be	thinking	of	appointing	somebody	to	do	a	job	and	letting	them	get	on	with	it	and	where	appropriate	encouraging	
and	supporting.	The	age	and	length	of	service	of	the	individual	will	be	irrelevant	to	me	all	I	will	want	is	the	best	one	for	the	job...’	
	
PCC	
‘If	I	have	to	fire	the	Chief	Constable	I’ve	failed...I	think	its	dismissal	an	act	of	failure.	Unless	there’s	been	some	gross	misconduct...but	on	a	day	to	day	
basis	there’s	an	onus	on	individuals	to	work	professionally	and	constructively...the	instances	Ive	seen	or	read	about	where	there’s	been	breakdown	in	
that	relationship,	I	think	the	individuals	involved	need	to	take	a	look	at	themselves...If	as	a	Chief	Constable	you’ve	got	responsibility	for	a	force	area	
and	the	welfare	of	several	thousand	people,	and	you’re	a	PCC	responsible	for	several	hundred	million	pounds	worth.	of	service,	and	the	interests	of	
hundreds	of	thousands	of	people,	you’ve	got	to	...I	think	the	police	have	been	going	thru	some	cultural	changes	of	their	own	and	that’s	been	overdue’.		
	
PCC	
‘When	I	appointed	**	{current	CC},	I	set	my	own	process	up,	we	had	a	series	of	stakeholder	meetings,	I	had	the	various	partners	involved...	I	had	an	
interview	panel’	[partner	involvement	not	community].		
	
PCC	
‘In	that	respect	PCCs	have	less	power	than	the	old	Police	Authorities	...now	the	Chief	Constable	appoints	his	own	chief	officer	team,	and	that’s	a	good	
thing.	A	lots	been	made	of	it	(power	to	hire	&	fire)	but	its	always	been	that	way	...in	the	past	the	HMI	had	the	list	of	suitable	people,	which	was	a	bad	
thing.’	(SAP)	
PCC	
‘I	think	its	a	very	healthy	system	now’.		
	
PCC	
‘It	is	natural	that	a	Chief	Constable	appointed	by	a	PCC	is	more	likely	to	acquiesce	to	the	requests	of	the	PCC.	If	as	PCC	you	don’t	like	the	look	of	who	is	
applying,	you	are	not	going	to	appoint	them.	If	you	are	not	getting	on	then	there	has	been	a	mistake	in	the	selection	process’.		
	
PCC	
‘The	importance	(of	the	PCC)	being	able	to	appoint	the	Chief	Constable	is	crucial.	If	you	‘carry	the	can’	you	must	have	the	power	to	make	changes	(to	
the	CC)	I	appointed	(the	CC)and	I	did	so	because	he	met	what	I	was	looking	for.	He	understood	what	an	area	like	this	needed.	I	wanted	someone	
focused	on	fighting	crime	not	chasing	figures.	(the	power	to	sack	the	CC)	...is	vital	in	fact	it	would	be	impossible	to	do	this	job	without	that	ability.	But	
the	fact	of	having	that	ability	makes	it	less	likely	that	you	will	need	it.	All	that	ability	is	a	reflection	of	the	accountability	one	to	the	other.	Its	not	
unfettered...	if	you	were	to	say,	you	are	PCC,	but	we	will	give	you	a	Chief	Constable,	how	on	earth	do	you	account	for	what	is	done	in	your	name	if	you	
do	not	have	the	power	to	influence	what	is	done	in	your	name..	‘	
	
PCC	
‘The	whole	thing	[hire	&	fire	issue]	has	been	overstated	by	the	press’.		
	
PCC	
‘If	you	have	to	fire	someone	you	have	failed	that’s	a	real	indictment	on	you	as	a	person	that	you	have	got	to	that	position.’	
	
PCC	
‘If	the	relationship	with	the	CC	has	broken	down	to	the	extent	you	are	looking	to	fire	there	are	issues	with	ACPO	and	HMI,	mediation	etc.	But	if	it	has	
got	to	the	stage	where	you	think	it	has	got	to	end	then	probably	its	got	to	end	the	relationship	is	so	important.	I	don’t	think	you	can	be	effective	if	you	
are	at	constant	loggerheads	with	the	Chief’.		
	
PCC	
‘It	is	critical	(the	power	to	hire	&	fire)	If	you	can’t	find	a	Chief	to	do	that	eventually	you	will’.	(deliver	the	plan)		
	
PCC	
‘It	is	an	important	power	(hire	&	fire)	there	must	be	the	ability	to	change	the	top	management	in	practice	its	much	more	difficult.	If	I	were	considering	
that	some	sort	of	double	lock.	Just	having	that	power	in	the	PCC	is	dangerous’.		
	
PCC	
‘I	suppose	it	is	a	thing	that	could	weigh	on	the	mind	of	the	Chief	Constable.’	[power	of	PCC	to	dismiss]		
	
PCC	
‘No	one	should	do	ten	years	as	a	Chef,	look	at	all	the	silver	backs,	all	Chiefs	for	more	than	10	years,	the	aggressive	culture	of	aggressive	Chiefs’.		
	
PCC	
‘Never	even	discussed	it	[contract	renewal].	That’s	not	nuclear,	its	Armageddon.'		
	
PCC	
‘You	wouldn’t	start	off	with	the	view	that	you	would	sack	the	Chief.	I	think	it	would	be	a	slow	dawning	realisation’.		
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PCC	
‘In	my	view,	CC	contracts	are	now	open	ended	unless	the	CC	insists	on	it	(not	mentioned	by	any	others)	In	the	APCC	we	tried	to	put	in	place	a	new	
model	but	we	couldn’t	agree	so	each	PCC	can	do	their	own	thing	now’.		
	
PCC	
‘That	may	well	happen	[issues	re	contract	renewal]	**	{the	CC}	is	due	to	retire	****	and	they	are	over	the	30	years	so	its	not	a	problem	for	me	at	this	
point	in	time.	But	if	I	get	someone	earlier	in	their	career	that’s	an	interesting	question.	I’m	not	sure	of	the	answer.’		
	
12.	 Police	&	Crime	Panels	
	
PCC	
‘They	are	a	joke,	they	don’t	hold	me	to	account.	The	legislation	is	flawed.	Councilors	with	no	experience	in	policing	or	budgeting	I	go	in	with	1.99%	they	
say	no,	I	go	back	with	1.98,	thanks	very	much	!	My	biggest	regret	is	that	I’m	not	held	to	account’.		
	
PCC	
‘PCP	Councilors	need	to	be	better	trained	and	more	committed.’	
	
PCC	
‘…one	of	the	problems	is	that	I	interact	closely	with	the	members	in	other	areas.’	
	
PCC	
‘It’s	the	only	body	I’ve	got	I	go	out	of	my	way	to	work	with	the	PCP,	but	do	I	think	its	satisfactory	-	no.	They	don’t	ask	hard	questions.’	
	
PCC	
‘They	make	me	think,	they	ask	good	questions.’	
	
PCC	
‘They	do	scrutinise	me	and	challenge.’	
	
PCC	
‘Their	role	is	to	scrutinise	my	decisions,	but	they	talk	about	expense	claims	and	utter	trivia’.	
	
PCC	
‘...they	are	quite	effective	but	it	has	been	a	journey.	We	educated	the	panel	setting	up	working	groups	around	key	issues,	e.g.	Policing	plan	and	the	
budget.	...we	were	careful	not	to	get	them	involved	in	the	decision	making’.	
	
	
PCC	
‘They	support	me	very	well	for	example	regarding	the	police	cuts	they	provide	support	and	understanding.’	
	
PCC	
‘They	struggled	and	still	are	struggling	to	find	their	role.	They	are	a	channel	for	the	public	to	if	a	PCC	were	resisting	giving	information	the	public	can	
force	it	through	the	PCP.’		
	
PCC	
‘They	struggle	they	are	coming	to	terms	with	scrutinising	the	PCC	not	dealing	with	local	issues	as	PAs	tended	to	do’.		
	
PCC	
‘It	was	difficult	to	start	with	many	of	them	were	ex	Police	Authority.’		
	
PCC	
‘Sometimes	they	[PCP]	are	operational,	but	not	a	problem’.		
	
PCC	
[PCP]	‘Not	too	many	the	CC	answers	operational	questions.’	
	
PCC	
‘The	PCP	do	give	me	a	hard	time,	particularly	around	finance’.	
	
PCC	
‘They	do	scrutinise	me	pretty	effectively/	some	PCPs	think	they	are	there	to	tell	the	PCC	what	to	do.	They	are	not	there	to	hold	me	to	account	they	are	
there	to	scrutinise,	once	that	was	sorted	here,	that	was	fine’.		
PCC	
‘They	are	not	part	of	my	decision	process,	but	certainly	are	influential.	Support	was	not	much	in	evidence	in	the	early	months,	but	it	is	now	and	that’s	
because	the	PCP,	myself	and	the	Chief	Constable	with	the	way	that	our	relationship	has	matured,	over	the	last	couple	of	years	we	are	very	much	on	the	
same	side.	I	find	them	now	very	supportive,	for	example	over	fairer	funding	for	police.’	
	
PCC	
‘	[The	CC]	Does	not	have	to	[attend	the	PCP],	but	the	Chief	Constable	or	DCC	does	often	the	PCP	ask	questions	re	operational	issues,	I	can	only	give	
headlines’.		
	
PCC	
‘The	DCC	attends	PCP	with	me	when	they	stray	into	areas	of	operational	policing	which		
they	inevitably	will	do,	he	is	there	to	be	able	to	answer	questions	around	that	or	I	would	have	to	say	I	will	come	back	to	you	on	that.’		
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PCC	
‘	The	DCC	attends	PCP	with	me	when	they	stray	into	areas	of	operational	policing	which		
they	inevitably	will	do,	he	is	there	to	be	able	to	answer	questions	around	that	or	I	would	have	to	say	I	will	come	back	to	you	on	that.’	
	
PCC	
‘Sometimes	the	Chief	Constable	attends	to	discuss	operational	issues’.		
	
PCC	
‘Not	his	place	[CC	in	the	PCP]	the	PCP	is	there	to	scrutinise	the	PCC	if	there	are	operational	questions	I	get	Chief	Constable	to	give	me	an	answer’.		
	
PCC	
‘They	are	challenging	in	a	constructive	way.	I	have	to	feed	them	things	from	time	to	time	-	suggest	you	know	this	might	be	worth	looking	at...otherwise	
they	would	tend	to	stick	to	the	traditional	Police	Authority	role	crime	performance	and	it	isn’t	about	crime	performance,	its	just	a	part	of	it.	It	works	
reasonably	well,	they	ask	me	questions	about	decisions	I’ve	made,	about	community	engagement,	about	policies	that	I	might	be	seeking	to	advance’.		
	
PCC	
‘They	will	occasionally	revert	to	being	a	PA,	which	is	understandable.	they	can	ask	questions	and	I	will	try	to	answer	them,	but	they	tend	to	revert	to	
questions	about	operational	policing.	I’m	not	saying	they	are	an	unreformed	PA,	but	that	does	happen’.		
	
PCC	
‘Aspects	of	the	PCP	legislative	scenario	are	quite	restrictive	...should	have	far	more	far	broader	far	more	leeway	to	look	at	all	aspects	of	policing	and	
crime.	As	a	scrutiny	panel	they	should	have	to	power	to	scrutinise	other	people	too,	partners	and	agencies’.		
	
PCC	
‘The	powers	at	the	moment	don’t	work.	For	example	if	they	don’t	agree	with	my	precept		
figure,	I	just	have	to	change	it	and	take	it	back,	it	might	be	0.001%	different	but	they	have	to	accept	it.	There	must	be	a	greater	level	of	scrutiny	of	the	
PCC’.		
	
PCC	
‘They	[the	PCP]	have	got	the	powers	its	about	knowing	how	to	use	them’.		
	
PCC	
‘They	[PCPs]	are	not	properly	funded	to	be	very	effective	They	need	a	professional	secretariat.	To	support	regional	PCPs.’		
	
PCC	
‘The	PCP	are	not	elected,	the	public	should	decide	by	the	ballot	box.	Members	of	the	PCP		
were	not	elected	to	scrutinise	the	police’.		
	
PCC	
‘The	PCP	was	a	half	baked	idea	no	different	to	the	Police	Authority’.	
	
PCC	
[The	PCP]	‘Should	be	a	strategic	panel	holding	the	PCC	to	account’.		
	
PCC	
‘The	membership	of	the	PCP	are	vested	interests	and	their	powers	are	poor	and	illogical	They	are	unable	to	rise	above	petty	politics	They	should	be	
disbanded.’		
PCC	
‘They	[the	PCP]	need	to	understand	what	they	are	expected	to	do’.	
	
13.	 Recommendations	for	Change	in	Legislation/	Policy	
	
PCC	
‘Must	be	a	system	that	prevents	mad	people	being	PCCs.’	
PCC	
‘There	must	be	some	power	so	that	if	a	PCC	is	barking	mad	we	should	be	able	to	control	them’.		
	
PCC	
‘	With	sensible	safeguards	there	should	be	a	power	of	recall	for	PCCs.’	
	
PCC	
	‘Similar	to	military	a	tenured	appointment	when	pensionable	at	a	certain	rank.	You	leave	with	a	pension.	If	CCs	were	appointed	on	the	understanding	
that	at	the	end	of	a	contract	they	would	be	pensionable	this	would	prevent	political	control’.		
	
PCC	
‘‘There	should	be	a	mechanism	so	that	they	[CCs	whose	contracts	are	not	renewed]	are	not	unfairly	penalised	if	they	feel	they	have	to	make	a	stand	on	
their	principles.		
	
PCC	
‘There	may	be	something	that	needs	to	be	done	in	terms	of	early	access	to	a	pension..	to	facilitate	the	underlying	intention	of	the	whole	process	which	
is	to	enable	the	PCC	to	hold	the	Chief	Constable		to	account	and	a	Chief	Constable	stand	by	their	operational	independence	with	integrity	and	if	
necessary	walk	away	if	they	feel	its	impossible	without	undue	penalty...then	that	arrangement	needs	to	exist...the	intention	is	to	allow	that	
accountability	on	the	part	of	the	PCC,	but	also	to	allow	the	CC	,	not	to	unduly	penalise	them	for	taking	a	principled	stand.	that	needs	to	be	there.	But	
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that	is	not	a	reason	for	fettering	further	the	power	of	a	PCC	to	make	decision	about	a	Chief	Constable.	Or	granting	to	Chief	Constables	that	they	are	
more	than	operationally	independent	of	PCCs.’	
	
PCC	
‘It	is	an	important	power	(hire	&	fire)	there	must	be	the	ability	to	change	the	top	management	in	practice	its	much	more	difficult.	If	I	were	considering	
that	some	sort	of	double	lock.	Just	having	that	power	in	the	PCC	is	dangerous’.		
	
PCC	
‘If	you	have	a	maverick	what	do	you	do.	PCCs	should	have	same	power	of	recall	as	MPs.’		
	
PCC	
‘PCP	Councilors	need	to	be	better	trained	and	more	committed.’		
	
PCC	
‘Aspects	of	the	PCP	legislative	scenario	are	quite	restrictive	...should	have	far	more	far	broader	far	more	leeway	to	look	at	all	aspects	of	policing	and	
crime.	As	a	scrutiny	panel	they	should	have	to	power	to	scrutinise	other	people	too,	partners	and	agencies’.		
	
PCC	
‘They	[PCPs]	are	not	properly	funded	to	be	very	effective	They	need	a	professional	secretariat.	To	support	regional	PCPs.’		
	
PCC	
‘The	PCP	are	not	elected,	the	public	should	decide	by	the	ballot	box.	Members	of	the	PCP		
were	not	elected	to	scrutinise	the	police’	
	
PCC	
‘Without	funding	only	political	parties	will	be	successful	and	that	leads	to	political	influence	in	policing.’	[fund	candidates].		
	
PCC	
‘In	the	late	1990s	when	he	[Cameron]	was	talking	about	PCCs,	he	said	under	no	circumstances	can	we	have	anyone	with	a	political	label	standing	for	
these	jobs.	If	we	could	go	back	to	PCCs	not	being	political	representatives	that	would	be	good’.	
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Appendix J 
Form UPR 16 – Confirmation of the Ethical Conduct of the 
Research 
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